

importance of trade, what it means to our markets, what it means to exports, and what it means to States like mine, that being Colorado. The USMCA is incredibly important as we turn to that debate this week.

NAFTA and what it meant to Colorado was incredibly significant and the number of jobs that it created as was the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the number of jobs that its agreement created. We have seen the benefits of trade in a State like Colorado for a number of years, and we see the opportunity for additional trade agreements in the future. This past year and this past Congress, we adopted the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which created U.S.-Asia trade partnership opportunities in energy—renewable energy and traditional energy.

This week, Congress turns its entire focus to the USMCA and its modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement. We have to continue looking for new trade opportunities—ways to open up trade around the globe. It is vitally important to agriculture, to our electronic sector, and to our service sector. People of all walks of life and business in Colorado understand the importance of trade and what it means to our industry. If we don't seek out new trade opportunities—it is not like we operate just by ourselves—we know what will happen. We will see China, India, and other countries displace us. We will see them build new supply chains and go around the United States, and we will end up losing those market opportunities, those investment opportunities, and the jobs that go along with them.

If we don't open up new trade opportunities, farmers and ranchers in my home State will suffer. We have already seen incredibly low commodity prices hurt our agricultural communities. One way to overcome that is to open up new markets and create value-added opportunities in those new markets. That is how we can add one more potential tool to our ag economy to help make it survive and thrive. We have new product flows all the time out of our State, and this USMCA agreement is one more way we can create that new flow of opportunity. The North American Free Trade Agreement supports, really, 14 million jobs around the United States. Those are thousands of jobs in all 50 States.

Despite its benefits, however, we can always do a better job of making sure it meets the needs of our modern-day economy by modernizing NAFTA. Modernizing NAFTA to increase market access, to expand energy exports, to maximize domestic energy production, including having provisions on intellectual property and e-commerce, will make this agreement even more beneficial to the United States. If you think back to 1994 and the timeframe of pre-iPhones and pre-iPads and of so much of the technology that we have today, this agreement was in place before

that. That is why modernizing this agreement makes sense.

As I mentioned, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement is incredibly important to the State of Colorado. Out of 750,000 trade-related jobs, there are nearly 220,000 jobs in Colorado—a great pro-trade State—that are directly related to the USMCA. Canada and Mexico are our State's largest trading partners. Obviously, that makes sense, for right in the middle is our State. Amongst Colorado, Canada, and Mexico, we trade more than \$2.7 billion worth of goods and support the 220,000 jobs that I just talked about.

Colorado's farmers produce nearly half of all of the potatoes that Mexico imports from the United States. We also supply about 97 percent of all U.S. beverages to Mexico. Mexico has certainly been able to tap the Rockies when it comes to our beverage production in Colorado. Our biggest export—beef—accounts for more than \$880 million worth of goods that are shipped to Mexico and Canada.

In 2018, Colorado exported to Mexico more than \$45 million worth of milk, cream, cheese, and related dairy products. Meanwhile, we have exported about \$2.2 million worth of those products to Canada. The USMCA will reform Canada's protectionist dairy policies and help American dairy farmers access the dairy markets in Canada so that we can increase our exports to Canada in cream, milk, cheese, and other dairy areas. We sent more than \$31 million worth of cereals, like wheat, to Mexico in 2018 and more than \$2 million worth to Canada.

Even our sugar and candy manufacturers benefit from trade with Mexico and Canada. I just had a meeting with the Western Sugar Cooperative of Colorado. We talked about the importance of trade and about getting this trade agreement right. Both countries have received more than \$14 million a piece worth of Colorado's sugar and confectionery exports.

Increased trade with these countries will also benefit the beverage industry in Colorado. As I mentioned, 97 percent of the beverages that Mexico imports are from Colorado, and we shipped more than \$63 million worth of beverages to Canada in 2018. Beyond commodities like wheat, dairy, and sugar, Colorado's electronic manufacturers shipped to Canada more than \$105 million worth of its goods in 2018, and Mexico received about \$60 million worth of our electronic goods.

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement includes new digital provisions to account for our changing landscape of new technologies, advanced manufacturing products, and it tackles the issue of cross-border dataflow, which is something that was just, basically, in its very infancy when NAFTA was enacted.

We know that the USMCA is a better opportunity for us to gain even more jobs, more income, and more opportunity for the State of Colorado. We

know that these trade agreements add to the household incomes across our State and that it benefits our economy. This agreement brings opportunity to all four corners of our State.

New customs and trade rules will cut redtape and make it easier for Colorado's startups and entrepreneurs to sell their products into Canada and Mexico. U.S. agricultural and food exports are expected to rise more than \$2 billion every year if the USMCA is adopted. So many goods in Colorado that are in our top 10 exported items are ag related. This \$2 billion-a-year increase will mean there will be significant opportunities for Colorado's agriculture.

Obviously, I am very encouraged by the Senate Committee on Finance in its reporting the agreement out favorably last week. I was honored to support the USMCA this morning by voting for the agreement—voting it out of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and out of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which are two of the committees on which I serve. I look forward to its expeditious passage here in the U.S. Senate.

I live in rural Colorado. I am surrounded by wheat farms, corn farms, hog producers, feed lots, and I know how important trade is to our State. This agreement to modernize and continue our agreement with Canada and Mexico is critical to the survival of agriculture in Colorado and this country. I know, with new markets opening around the world, this agreement will continue to be the keystone of Colorado's trade. We stand to benefit tremendously, enormously from this update. Our farmers and ranchers are counting on us to get this done, and our manufacturers are counting on us to get this done. Our economy depends on our getting this done.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

IMPEACHMENT

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. President, at this particular moment in our history, we are witnessing the convergence of three events.

The Senate will likely be sworn in tomorrow for the impeachment trial of President Trump. One of the Articles of Impeachment that will be coming over from the House relates to the President's abuse of power—the charge that he has used the power and prestige of the Office of the Presidency to, among other things, withhold vital U.S. security assistance to Ukraine in order to pressure it to announce an investigation into Burisma, Hunter Biden, and, possibly, Joe Biden in an attempt to get Ukraine to interfere in the upcoming 2020 election on behalf of President Trump.

Now, I am not here today to go into issues directly related to that trial. It is vitally important that we get relevant witnesses, that we get relevant

documents, and that we have a fair trial and get to the truth.

The second event that we learned about just this week that relates to the impeachment trial was that Russian military hackers broke into the Burisma computers in Ukraine and that they used the same phishing techniques that the GRU used—the Russian military intelligence—to break into the Democratic National Committee headquarters' servers during the 2016 Presidential elections. All of the evidence points to another attempt by Vladimir Putin to use his military GRU hackers to interfere in an American election—this time in the 2020 election.

I don't know what is going to happen during the election on November 3 of this year. Obviously, each of us has his hopes as to what the result will be, but that is not the purpose of my being here on the floor today. My focus is on what should unite all of us in this body—that should unite all 100 U.S. Senators—and that is that we should all agree that it is outrageous for any foreign power to interfere in an American election the way Russia interfered in our election in 2016 and that it would be equally outrageous for us, in our knowing that this is Russia's intent in 2020, to sit here and not do anything to protect the integrity of our democracy.

Look, we all know what happened in 2016. Just to refresh our memories, it was the unanimous conclusion of all U.S. intelligence agencies that Russia interfered in the 2016 Presidential election. That was the unanimous conclusion of the leaders of intelligence agencies appointed by President Trump. It was also the bipartisan verdict of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which painstakingly documented the fact that elections systems in all 50 of our States were targeted to one degree or another by Russian hackers in the 2016 elections. In fact, we know this from the outcome of the Mueller investigation that led to the indictment of 12 Russian military intelligence individuals, members of the GRU. They were indicted because of their interference in the 2016 elections.

We also know that Vladimir Putin and the Russians intend to interfere in our elections again in 2020. We know that because of the revelations this week about the actions the GRU is taking with respect to Burisma—same fingerprint, same techniques—but we also know that from our own U.S. intelligence agencies, which, in November of last year, all got together to issue a warning that Russia was going to interfere again in 2020.

I am holding in my hand a joint statement from the leaders of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and what they say is that our adversaries—and they point to Russia—will seek to interfere in the voting process or influence voter perceptions. This document is not about the past. This document is not about 2016. This document is about the here and now

and the November 2020 elections. And this is, again, from the heads of our intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies who have been appointed by President Trump.

Now we have overwhelming evidence that Russia interfered in 2016, we have overwhelming evidence and predictions that Russia will interfere again in our elections in 2020, and so we clearly are facing an immediate danger to the integrity of our elections and our democracy. It is like we have a Russian missile in the air right now headed toward our election integrity systems and our electoral process. That is what the intelligence agencies are telling us right now.

We learned the hard way in 2016, and now it is happening all over again. So the question for this body is, When you know something is happening, what are you going to do about it? There are two things we should be doing about it. We should be working to strengthen our elections systems here at home, to harden them, to make it more difficult for Russian military intelligence to hack into them. We should be working with social media companies to prevent the Russian Government and their agents from spending money on advertising on social media or using other techniques on social media to influence American voters. We need to be doing all that. We have appropriated some funds to do that.

We should be doing more than we have, but the best defense is a good offense. We can and should spend money to strengthen and protect our elections systems, but that is not enough because it is kind of like the arms race. We will work to try to better strengthen and protect those systems, and the hackers who are trying to get in will develop new techniques to try to get around them. It is an endless cycle. That doesn't mean we shouldn't harden them—we should—but that is not enough to protect the integrity of our elections.

We have to apply the principle that the best defense is a good offense and make it clear up front to Vladimir Putin and Russia that the costs of interfering in another American election far outweigh the benefits. That is what we need to do because right now it is absolutely cost-free to Vladimir Putin to mess around in our elections. In fact, it is a big benefit to Vladimir Putin and the Russians. That is why they do it.

What do they accomplish? Well, first of all, they succeed in dividing Americans against one another. They succeed in undermining public confidence in the outcome of our elections, and that is part of their overall strategy—to try to undermine democracies, whether here in the United States or in Europe or other places around the world. Maybe they also succeed, ultimately, in weighing in and helping their preferred candidate in an election.

But the point is, right now, if you are Putin, there is zero cost to getting

caught interfering in our elections and lots of perceived benefits by Vladimir Putin. So that is why, more than 2 years ago, Senator MARCO RUBIO and I introduced the bipartisan DETER Act, and there are many other Senators, both Democrats and Republicans, who were on that bill. The DETER Act is very straightforward. It would enact into law a very straightforward proposition. It says to Russia—and also to other countries, but the main attack seems to be coming from Russia—it says to Putin and Russia: If we catch you again interfering in our elections, there will be immediate and very harsh penalties for you to pay.

This will happen virtually automatically. So Vladimir Putin will know up front that if our intelligence agencies catch them again, which they are likely to do, then he will finally pay a price for interfering in our elections and trying to undermine our democratic processes. These are not sanctions against a couple of Putin's pals. These are not sanctions against a couple of oligarchs. These would be sanctions against major sectors of the Russian economy—state-owned banks, state-owned parts of their energy industry—so their economy will take a big hit if we catch them attacking our democracy once again.

That is absolutely appropriate because what Putin is doing is undermining faith and confidence in our democratic process, and we need to make it clear up front that there is a big price to pay—not because we want those sanctions to go into effect but because we don't. That, of course, is the entire idea behind deterrence. You raise the cost, you raise the price on Putin and Russia to the point it is no longer worth it to interfere in our elections.

That is why Senator RUBIO and I introduced this legislation 2 years ago. We hoped it would be in place before the 2018 midterm elections, but that date has passed, and still here we are in the U.S. Senate having failed to adopt this bipartisan legislation.

I was right here on the floor of the Senate just a few months ago when we were debating the NDAA, the National Defense Authorization Act. I asked for a vote to include the essential provision of the DETER Act in the Defense authorization bill because it makes a lot of sense that in a bill that is supposed to defend the United States, we include a provision to defend the integrity of our democracy and electoral system against Russian attack or any other attack. Apparently every single Senator in this body agreed because it passed unanimously.

The Senate went on record unanimously saying we should include provisions like the DETER Act in the NDAA to deter Russian interference in our elections. Then we were in negotiations on the NDAA, and it turned out that in the back rooms, behind closed doors, the Trump administration got Republican Senators to insist on throwing that provision out of the NDAA bill.

This was one of the matters that was discussed until the final stages of negotiations on the NDAA, and apparently the majority leader and other Republican Senators, at the behest of the Trump administration, said no—said no to a provision that had been agreed to unanimously by this body to help protect our elections by deterring Russian interference. The question is, Why? Why, when our own intelligence agencies are telling us that Russia is planning to do in 2020 what they did in 2016, would Republican Senate leaders block a provision that lets Putin know “You will be punished if you do that again. You will be punished if you attack our democracy”? And I haven’t gotten a straight answer to that question. Why not? Why not include that provision? Clearly, there are Senators who don’t want to build up our defenses and deterrence against Russian interference in our elections.

When we failed to get that into the NDAA, I came to the Senate floor, and I asked for unanimous consent to bring up the bipartisan DETER Act. Because every one of the Senators in this body had voted or said through lack of objection that they wanted the DETER Act in the NDAA, I brought up the bill for unanimous consent passing here. Well, the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee came to the floor and objected, and we had a back-and-forth conversation about the DETER Act.

Yesterday, I was planning to come to this floor and again ask for unanimous consent to take up the DETER Act, but we heard from the chairman of the Banking Committee that he wanted to find a way to get this done. So I am going to take the chairman of the Banking Committee up on that offer, and I hope we can get it done. But I want to be really clear. If we are not able to work this out in a smart, straightforward way, which is what the bill does right now—as I said, it has strong bipartisan support right now—then I will be back on the Senate floor regularly to ask for unanimous consent, and any other Senator who wants to come down here and object can do that. That is their right. But I am going to keep pushing this issue because the clock is ticking. Every day that passes while we know from our own intelligence agencies that Russia plans to interfere in the 2020 election and we don’t do anything about it—we are grossly negligent.

I want Senators who are not going to support that to come here in the light of day and let the American public know they are blocking that effort. I hope we don’t have to do that. I hope we can work this out. I hope we can pass the bipartisan legislation that has been sitting in the Senate for over 2 years now as we get warning after warning after warning that Vladimir Putin, the GRU, and the Russians intend to interfere in our democratic process again and attack the integrity of our electoral system.

Let’s get this done. Let’s protect our democracy. Let’s make it clear in advance to Putin that the price he will pay for trying to interfere in our democracy will be much higher than any benefit he expects to gain.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAN

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss U.S. policy regarding Iran. We know that in 2009 the new Obama administration came into office at a time when the Iranian regime was racing to develop a nuclear weapon. The prospect of the Iranian regime with a nuclear weapon would present a substantial threat to America and to our allies. At the same time, Iran was engaged in a host of other malign activities, but the most urgent and significant threat was nuclear.

In 2013, Iran was 2 to 3 months from being able to build a nuclear weapon. The Obama administration decided to use hard-nosed diplomacy resulting in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known by the acronym JCPOA. This agreement was entered into with a number of countries, three of them our allies—the United Kingdom, France and Germany. We also had two partner countries—countries with which we have a lot of tensions and conflict. We were partners with China and Russia. So this agreement stretched from one end of the world to the other.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action prevented Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by, among other steps, authorizing some of the most intrusive inspections that have ever been put into place. This agreement, the JCPOA, did not cover several other nonnuclear malign activities that the Iranian regime was and is engaged in. The JCPOA isolated and largely solved the most dire threat, that of a nuclear-armed Iran in the near future.

This agreement, from its signing in 2015 through 2018, worked. Until recently, Iran was complying with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That is the considered judgment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, known as IAEA. The considered judgment of the U.S. intelligence community was that Iran was complying with the agreement. It was also the judgment made by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense in both the Obama administration and the Trump administration.

The determination that Iran was complying with the agreement is also the assessment of our allies and partners with whom the Obama administration worked to bring into a coalition.

Here is a sampling of assessments prior to recent events. In September

2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that Iran is in “technical compliance” with the JCPOA.

Second, in October 2017, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis stated that Iran was “fundamentally” in compliance with the JCPOA. “Overall our intelligence community believes that they have been compliant and the IAEA also says so,” said General Mattis, then Secretary of Defense.

In March 2018, IAEA Director Amano stated: “Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments. . . . If the JCPOA were to fail, it would be a great loss for nuclear verification and for multilateralism.”

Finally, No. 4, in January 2019, former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, a former Republican Senator from the State of Indiana, said: “We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device.”

Three of the four officials—Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Mattis, and Director of National Intelligence Coats—all three were appointed by President Trump.

President Trump came into office determined to pull out of this agreement, despite the fact that it was working. He surrounded himself with advisers who supported a policy of regime change. Of course, the words “regime change” are words that they will not say out loud—the President or his administration—but that is the policy. The American people, after nearly two decades of conflict, know that regime-change policy is a march to war.

This administration calls their regime change policy a “maximum pressure campaign.” Its stated goal was to force Iran to negotiate a new agreement that would include a host of other nonnuclear issues. Despite the stated goal, an examination of the methods used to achieve it make it obvious that the administration was engaged in a policy that would most likely lead to war instead of a new agreement. The administration pulled out of the nuclear agreement, which was working, and while it was in effect, it took the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran off the table.

The administration reimposed sanctions which were lifted as part of the nuclear agreement. They engaged in a host of other activities that resulted in increased risks and moved us further away from a diplomatic resolution.

The administration’s regime change policy was supposed to deter the Iranian regime from threatening our Nation and its allies. This policy has not done that. This policy was supposed to bring Iran to the bargaining table. It has not. It was supposed to cajole Iran to behave like a “normal nation.” Once again, it has not.

Tensions have increased. Threats to our servicemembers, our citizens, and allies have increased, not decreased. The region—the Middle East—is less