

who have dared to protest against corruption, infrastructure development that threatens their land, water, farms and communities, excessive force by the military and police, and the lack of access to justice.

These types of crimes are nothing new in Honduras; in fact, they are shockingly common. But they have noticeably increased in frequency since the conviction in a New York Federal court on October 18 of Tony Hernandez, a notorious drug kingpin and the brother of President Juan Orlando Hernandez who was named as an unindicted coconspirator. It begs credulity that President Hernandez was completely unaware of the actions of his brother or of the reported use of profits from drug trafficking to finance his political campaign. Honduras, which was already among the most corrupt and dangerous countries in the world for those who have dared to challenge the dominance of a tiny elite who continue to wield unbridled control over the political and economic levers of the country, has become even more corrupt and dangerous.

Ever since President Hernandez successfully orchestrated his reelection to an unprecedented second term, the country has become increasingly polarized. Social and political dissent, when the government's consistent response is to use force—including lethal force—and to misuse the judicial process to silence its critics, fuels instability and violence which are among the key drivers of migration. This is what we are seeing in Honduras, and the United States shares some of the blame as our Embassy and the Department of Defense continue to publicly portray their engagement with the Hernandez Government as business as usual.

There is only one person who has the authority and responsibility to lead Honduras down a better path, a path toward real stability and a culture of lawfulness, and that is President Hernandez. The election of his successor is only 2 years away. In the time remaining, President Hernandez could use what credibility he has left and take decisive action to begin a process of reconciliation aimed at uniting the Honduran people in pursuit of the common goals of economic opportunity, personal security, and justice. Doing so would require a fundamental change of attitude and approach, including installing people in key positions of government who have unimpeachable integrity and who represent a wide spectrum of Honduran society.

Absent such enlightened leadership, Honduras will likely remain a fractured society, plagued by instability, rampant poverty, violence, and impunity. Honduras's democratic institutions will continue to be corrupted and eroded, and Hondurans will continue to seek a better, safer life outside their country.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I vividly recall the feeling of optimism that people in this country and around the world felt on that day in Washington in 1993 when Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat signed the Oslo Accords. For those too young to remember, the Oslo process began as secret negotiations in Oslo, resulting in the recognition by the PLO of the State of Israel and the recognition by Israel of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people for the purpose of direct negotiations between the two parties. The Oslo Accords marked the formal start of that process, which aimed at achieving a peace treaty based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and at fulfilling the "right of the Palestinian people to self-determination."

The negotiations were to focus on resolving the key issues in dispute: Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, Israel's military presence in and control over remaining territories after Israel's recognition of Palestinian autonomy, and the return of Palestinian refugees. It was hoped and believed that the signing of the Oslo Accords was the beginning of the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of a process that would culminate in a two-state solution with secure borders for both Israel and a new Palestinian state.

Since then, virtually nothing has occurred as envisioned. Prime Minister Rabin, a visionary leader whom I knew and greatly respected, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist. Over the years, time after time, the hopes and aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians have been dashed. Israelis have suffered countless deadly attacks by Hamas and by other Palestinian extremists. The Palestinians have suffered countless humiliations and assassinations. But despite the many setbacks, missed opportunities, and failures of leadership on both sides, I have never felt that the Oslo process was a lost cause—until today. Today, I feel a greater sense of sorrow and discouragement about that once hopeful vision than I ever have before.

On Monday, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the administration no longer considers Israeli settlements to be contrary to international law, thereby reversing a long-standing U.S. position that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal. That position was based on adherence to international law and UN Security Council resolutions and was embraced by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Upon learning of this change of position, I could not help but feel that it signified the demise of the Oslo Accords. After so many similar reversals of U.S. positions by this White House on key issues that both sides had pledged would be resolved only through negotiations, it seems beyond dispute that President Trump never believed in a two-state solution.

In fact, this White House has been consistently disingenuous about its intentions in the Middle East, all the time talking about wanting a political settlement but acting in ways that put it increasingly out of reach. It was just a matter of time before they abandoned any pretext of supporting the principle that territorial disputes should be resolved through dialogue. Every step of the way, administration officials have insisted on the myth that they are improving the prospects for peace, but 3 years later, Israelis and Palestinians are farther from that goal than at any time since 1993. The White House, with the support and encouragement of the U.S. Ambassador and the Secretary of State, has done whatever it could to ensure that the West Bank, home to nearly 3 million Palestinians, is occupied permanently or annexed by Israel.

Without a change of leadership with the necessary vision and political courage in the United States and in Israel, the Palestinians will remain as second-class citizens, subjected to a lifetime of indignities and entitled to only limited rights. I cannot help but wonder what my friend Prime Minister Rabin would be thinking today and how he would react to this announcement. I suspect he would be as disappointed as I am that his courageous act more than a quarter century ago, and the opportunity that act offered for lasting peace for both Israelis and Palestinians, has been so selfishly and recklessly squandered.

(At the request of Mr. SCHUMER, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.)

VOTE EXPLANATION

• Ms. HARRIS. Mr. President, I was absent but had I been present, I would have voted no on rollcall vote No. 360, the confirmation of Executive Calendar No. 488, Barbara Lagoa, of Florida, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit. •

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-67 concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Australia for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$245 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREGORY M. KAUSNER,
(for Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-67

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Australia.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$ 0 million.

Other \$245 million.

Total \$245 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

None.

Non-MDE: Up to eight hundred fifty (850) Joint Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Increment 1 Block 1 (JCREW 11B1) Systems (533 vehicle mounted and 317 dismounted); spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; technical exchanges, publications and technical documentation; support equipment; engineering change proposals; classified software/loadsets; training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (AT-P-LGA).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AT-P-LFX.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 20, 2019.

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Australia—JCREW Systems and Support

The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to eight hundred fifty (850) Joint Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Increment 1 Block 1 (JCREW 11B1) Systems (533 vehicle mounted and 317 dismounted); spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; technical exchanges, publications and technical documentation; support equipment; engineering change proposals; classified software/loadsets; training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics support. The total estimated cost is \$245 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States. Australia is one of our most important allies in the Western Pacific. The strategic location of this political

and economic power contributes significantly to ensuring peace and economic stability in the region.

The proposed sale will provide Australia increased force protection from Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device threats for its defense forces and vehicles. Australia is interested in procuring the dismounted and mounted variants that have a modular, open architecture and are upgradeable in order to maintain capability against evolving global threats. Australia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Corporation, San Diego, California. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Australia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-67

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. Australia's requirement for 850 JCREW 11B1 systems could potentially include:

(1) Expeditionary Warfare, Force Protection, (2) Techniques for the Defeat of Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices, (3) Force Protection, Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems, (4) Capabilities and Limitations of Electronic Warfare Systems, and, (5) Threat Assessment from Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices.

2. The Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare technical insertion development may contain sensitive technology; however, defined requirements are not known at this time and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

3. A determination has been made that Australia can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary to further the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

4. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Australia.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter

references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-69 concerning the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of New Zealand for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$1.4 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREGORY M. KAUSNER
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-69

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of New Zealand.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment \$6 billion.

Other \$8 billion.

Total \$1.4 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Five (5) C-130J Aircraft.

Twenty-four (24) Rolls Royce AE-2100D3 Turboprop Engines (20 installed, 4 spares).

Fifteen (15) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) (EGIs) with GPS Security Devices, Airborne (10 installed, 5 spares).

Eight (8) Multi-Information Distribution System (MIDS)/Link-16 Low Video Terminal (LVT)-BU2 (5 installed, 3 spares).

Thirteen (13) AN/AAQ-24(V)N LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures) System Processor Replacement (LSPR) (10 installed, 3 spares).

Nineteen (19) Guardian Laser Transmitter Assembly for LAIRCM (15 installed, 4 spares).

Non-MDE: Also includes eight (8) AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning System (MWS); eight (8) AN/APN-241 Low Power Color Radar; eight (8) AN/ALR-56M Missile Warning System Receiver; fifteen (15) AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing System; six (6) MX-20HD Electro-Optical/Infrared Imaging System; forty-four (44) Missile Warning Sensor, LAIRCM; Control Interface Unit Replacement, LAIRCM; classified memory cards, LAIRCM; Low Volume Terminal Cryptographic Modules KIV-55; AN/ARC-210 RT-1990A(C) Radio; AN/ARC-164(V) RT-1518 Radio; AN/ARC-153 Tactical Air Navigation; AN/ARN-147 VHF Receiver; AN/ARC-190 HF Radio; AN/ARC-222 VHF Radio w/SINCGARS; Classified Tactical Manuals; Cartridge Activated Devices/Propellant Activated Devices; M206 Flares; MJU-64B Decoy; BBU-35A/B Impulse Carts; Joint Mission Planning System; Classified Computer Identification Numbers; Electronic Combat International Security Assistance Program (ECISAP) support, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S.