

into long-term facilities so we can actually get them in better housing situations, but when we debated our way through this, our Democratic colleagues held firm and said: No funding for ICE detention. That perpetuates this problem on the border.

We have to solve this. They should be able to have the additional funding that they need so that we can get these kids and families into better locations for their housing and not temporary, stopgap locations.

The next issue we need to address is, we should move asylum officers to the border. This is one of the prime things that Border Patrol wanted. Many of these individuals come and say: I want asylum. Let's walk them through the process. Let's get there. The problem is that the vast majority of individuals who request asylum do not qualify for asylum. They come into the United States because they want to connect with family members who are here or for economic or other opportunities. I completely understand that. We have a legal process to do that. But someone can't just come across the border and say: I have a cousin who lives here and I want to come, and that qualifies as asylum. That is not asylum. Only 15 percent of the people crossing the border who are asking for asylum actually qualify, but individuals wait up to 2 years for a hearing to find out if they qualify. So the legitimate individuals who desperately need asylum, who have to get through that process as rapidly as they can, cannot do so because 85 percent of the people are clogging up the system, asking for things that are not asylum.

We should move asylum officers closer to the border to do faster processing so we can help individuals who are seeking asylum to get it and also identify people who are gaming the system and say: You cannot just game the system. You have to go through the process legally.

Additionally, we have to deal with this 20-day release issue. Right now, the rule is that a family with a child or a child can only be held for 20 days total. They can be held for only 20 days, and after that, they have to be released into the country. The cartels and human smugglers know that rule, and that is why we have seen an increase from 2014 from only 1 percent of the men bringing a child to now 50 percent of the men bringing a child, because they know that if they bring a child, they will be released within 20 days.

Here is what is different, though. In 20 days, we can do our record checks in the United States to see whether this person has a criminal record, but when we contact any of the 63 other countries that these individuals are coming from, just in that sector, most of those countries can't respond to us with their country's criminal record within 20 days.

What is really happening on the border is individuals are coming across

with a child. They are being detained for 20 days while we request criminal records from their home country. They are still there when on the 21st day we have to release them, and 10 to 15 days later, we get word that the individual actually had a murder warrant in their home country. That really happened just a few days ago.

Also, a few days ago, we released an adult with a child and then found out a few days later that their home country was seeking them because they were a pedophile in their country. But we had just released that adult with a child into our country because we have a 20-day restriction and we can't wait until we get criminal records from another country. That is absurd.

We are encouraging the trafficking of children by saying that you can get into our country no matter what if you just bring a child, and we are encouraging people with a criminal record to come in and bring a child because they know that is their fast track to be able to get in, because their home country can't fulfill our request fast enough. Why would we do that as a country? Why would we knowingly, willingly do that?

We can solve this problem. It is a horrible humanitarian crisis. We need to pay attention to it and be logical about this. Stop saying "abolish ICE" when what we really need is the ICE facilities to help us to detain people in the best possible of environments while we find out who they are, what their records are, who is related to whom, and what their background is.

Stop ignoring the obvious things. We have some people coming due to poverty. We have some people coming to smuggle drugs. Until we can sort that out, we should figure out who is who. That doesn't seem irrational to me.

We should also find a way to process asylum requests faster than we are so that individuals pursuing asylum can go through the system and get processed and individuals who are gaming the system do not get to game the system.

We can do better, and we have to do better. I would encourage us to be serious about immigration in the days ahead. This Congress can solve this issue, but it won't because it is just a political game. When it is about scoring political points rather than solving a humanitarian crisis, people in this body have to decide which one they want to do more.

I will never forget last year, sitting with a bipartisan group of my colleagues, and as we discussed solutions to immigration, one of my Democratic colleagues said out loud: I haven't decided what I want to do on this yet. There is an angel on one shoulder saying this problem needs to be solved, and there is a devil on my other shoulder saying this is the greatest political weapon I have against the President. Why would I give that up? And I haven't decided which way I am going to go yet.

I looked at them and said: Here is a basic rule of thumb I live by. When there are an angel and a devil talking to you, go with the angel every time.

This is something we should do, and we should stop playing political games and trying to hurt the President and ignoring the obvious solution we all should see. This is not a partisan issue; this is a humanity issue. Let's solve it together.

With that, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED TRANSFER TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES—S. J. RES. 36—VETO

PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES—S. J. RES. 37—VETO

PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES—S. J. RES. 38—VETO

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate having received the veto messages on S.J. Res. 36, S.J. Res. 37, and S.J. Res. 38, the messages are considered read and spread upon the Journal in full, en bloc.

The veto messages are ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 36, a joint resolution that would prohibit the issuance of certain licenses with respect to several proposed agreements or transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of

Spain, and the Italian Republic. This resolution would weaken America's global competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share with our allies and partners.

In particular, S.J. Res. 36 would prohibit licensing for manufacturing in Saudi Arabia of Guidance Electronics Detector Assemblies, Computer Control Groups, Airfoil Groups, Aircraft Umbilical Interconnect Systems, Fuses, and other components to support the production of Paveway II, Enhanced Paveway II, and Paveway IV munitions. The misguided licensing prohibitions in the joint resolution directly conflict with the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively affecting our bilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, the joint resolution would hamper the ability of the United States to sustain and shape critical security cooperation activities. S.J. Res. 36 would also damage the credibility of the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when threats to them are increasing.

The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and who are imperiled by Houthi attacks from Yemen. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have attacked civilian and military facilities using missiles, armed drones, and explosive boats, including in areas frequented by United States citizens, such as the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Second, the joint resolution would degrade Saudi Arabia's military preparedness and ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting its ability to defend United States military personnel hosted there. Third, Saudi Arabia is a bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its proxies in the region, and the licenses the joint resolution would prohibit enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against these threats.

In addition, S.J. Res. 36 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.

Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 36 would likely prolong the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By undermining bilateral rela-

tionships of the United States and impeding our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint resolution would harm—not help—efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. And without precision-guided munitions, more—not fewer—civilians are likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training and advising Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting processes.

The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.

For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 36 to the Senate without my approval.

DONALD J. TRUMP.
THE WHITE HOUSE, July 24, 2019.

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 37, a joint resolution that would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for certain defense articles, defense services, and technical data to support the transfer of Paveway II kits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of France. This resolution would weaken America's global competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share with our allies and partners.

In particular, S.J. Res. 37 would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for Paveway II kits to the UAE, the United Kingdom, and France. The misguided licensing prohibitions in the joint resolution directly conflict with the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively affecting our bilateral relationships with the UAE, the United Kingdom, and France, the joint resolution would hamper the ability of the United States to sustain and shape critical security cooperation activities with those partners. S.J. Res. 37 would also damage the credibility of the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when threats to them are increasing.

The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution seeks

to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and are imperiled by Houthis attacking from Yemen using missiles, armed drones, and explosive boats. The UAE is an important part of the Saudi-led Coalition that helps protect Americans from these Iranian-supported Houthi attacks on civilian and military facilities, including those located in areas frequented by United States citizens like the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Second, the joint resolution would degrade the UAE's military preparedness and ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting its ability to defend the thousands of United States military personnel hosted there. Third, the UAE is a bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its proxies in the region. It is also an active partner with the United States in combatting terrorism in Yemen and elsewhere. The licenses the joint resolution would prohibit enhance our partner's ability to deter and defend against these threats.

In addition, S.J. Res. 37 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.

Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 37 would likely prolong the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint resolution would harm—not help—efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. And without precision-guided munitions, more—not fewer—civilians are likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training and advising the Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting processes.

The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.

For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 37 to the Senate without my approval.

DONALD J. TRUMP.
THE WHITE HOUSE, July 24, 2019.

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 38, a joint resolution that would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services, and technical data to support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program in regard to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This resolution would weaken America's global competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share with our allies and partners.

In particular, S.J. Res. 38 would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services, and technical data for the manufacturing of the Aurora Fuzing System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program. The misguided licensing prohibition in the joint resolution directly conflicts with the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively affecting our bilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, the joint resolution would hamper the ability of the United States to sustain and shape critical security cooperation activities. S.J. Res. 38 would also damage the credibility of the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when threats to them are increasing.

The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and who are imperiled by Houthi attacks from Yemen. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have attacked civilian and military facilities using missiles, armed drones, and explosive boats, including in areas frequented by United States citizens, such as the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Second, the joint resolution would degrade Saudi Arabia's military preparedness and ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting its ability to defend United States military personnel hosted there. Third, Saudi Arabia is a bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its proxies in the region, and the licenses the joint resolution would prohibit enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against these threats.

In addition, S.J. Res. 38 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability with and between

our partners. It could also create diplomatic and security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.

Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 38 would likely prolong the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint resolution would harm—not help—efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. And without precision-guided munitions, more—not fewer—civilians are likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training and advising the Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting processes.

The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.

For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 38 to the Senate without my approval.

DONALD J. TRUMP.
THE WHITE HOUSE, July 24, 2019.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST—
S. 2242

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in a moment, I will ask unanimous consent for the Senate to take up and pass legislation I have introduced to help protect our democracy from foreign interference.

Earlier today, Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified that the Russian Government's efforts to undermine our elections are "among the most serious challenges to our democracy"—a challenge he says that "deserves the attention of every American."

Mr. Mueller's testimony should serve as a warning to every Member of this body about what could happen in 2020—literally, in our next election—if we fail to act. When asked if he thought that Russia would attack our democracy again in 2020, Mr. Mueller said: "They're doing it as we sit here."

Think about that for a moment. The special prosecutor spent 2½ years looking into Russian intervention in our elections in 2016 and says not only are they going to do it, but they are doing it as we sit here.

If this were just coming from the special prosecutor, some folks might be

willing to dismiss it, but this is exactly the same message we heard earlier this week from FBI Director Wray. It is a message that all of us have heard, and being on the Intelligence Committee, I have heard repeatedly from Director of National Intelligence Coats, and we have heard this, as well, from other leaders of law enforcement and our intelligence community. Again, I point out that the leaders who have sounded the alarm about the ongoing Russian threat to our elections were all appointed by this President.

Unfortunately, in the nearly 3 years since we uncovered Russia's attack on our democracy, this body has not held a single vote on stand-alone legislation to protect our elections.

I am not here to relitigate the 2016 election or, for that matter, to second-guess the special counsel's findings. This is more a question of how we defend our democracy on a going-forward basis.

The reason we need to do this—amongst a host of reasons—is that just a month ago, the President of the United States sat in the Oval Office, and by dismissing this threat, effectively gave Russia the green light to interfere in future elections. Since then, unfortunately, my Republican colleagues have done nothing to prevent further future attempts at undermining our democracy.

Let me be clear. If a foreign adversary tries to offer assistance to your campaign, your response should not be thank you; your response should be a moral obligation to tell the FBI. Mr. Mueller, the former FBI Director and inarguably the straightest arrow in public service, said as much this afternoon.

So if the President or other members of his family or his campaign can't be trusted to do the right thing and report their foreign contacts and foreign offers of assistance to their political activities, then we need to make it a legal requirement.

That is what my legislation, the FIRE Act, is all about. The FIRE Act is a simple, narrowly targeted bill. All it does is make sure that attempts to interfere in future Presidential elections are promptly reported to the FBI and the FEC.

Let me be clear. The FIRE Act is not about prohibiting innocent contacts or the exercise of First Amendment rights. Contrary to some of the mistaken rhetoric we have heard, it does not require the reporting of contacts with foreign journalists or with Dreamers or of official meetings with foreign governments. It is simply about preserving Americans' trust in our democratic process. If a candidate is receiving or welcoming help from the Kremlin or its spy services, I think the American people should have a right to know before they head to the polls.

Consequently, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules and Administration be discharged from further consideration of S. 2242, the FIRE