

War II. God bless our servicemembers, veterans, and their families, and God bless, yes, the United States of America.

Thank you.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

#### ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BARRASSO. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII, if cloture is invoked on the Combs nomination, the Senate vote on confirmation of the Combs nomination at 1:45 p.m., Wednesday, June 5. I further ask that following disposition of the Combs nomination, the Senate vote on the motions to invoke cloture on the Holte, Alston Jr., and Hertling nominations in the order listed; finally, that if cloture is invoked on those nominations, the confirmation votes on the nominations occur at a time to be determined by the majority leader in consultation with the Democratic leader and that if confirmed, the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid on the table and the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### LEGISLATIVE SESSION

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to legislative session for a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Madam President, on May 24, 2019, pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State determined "that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the following military sales" to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Arms Export Control Act indicates that, in the Senate, the notification of such a determination shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Secretary's determination and transmittals submitted to the committee by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency regarding sales under section 36(b). The Secretary's emergency determination and transmittals for sales conducted pursuant

to other sections of the Arms Export Control Act were included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD via separate executive communications on June 3, 2019.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY  
COOPERATION AGENCY,  
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On May 23, 2019, the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, determined that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the defense articles and defense services identified in the attached transmittals to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the Foreign Military Sales process, including any further amendments specific to costs, quantity, or requirements, occurring within the duration of circumstances giving rise to these emergency sales, in order to deter further the malign influence of the Government of Iran throughout the Middle East region.

Please find attached (Tab 1) the Secretary of State Determination and Justification waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b)(1) and 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, for the attached list of Transmittals of proposed Letters of Offer and Acceptance to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services pursuant to the notification requirements of Section 36(b)(1) and Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. The determination and detailed justification are a part of each Transmittal. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of the proposed sales.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Enclosures.

#### DETERMINATION UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Subject: Emergency Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan

Pursuant to sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby state that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the following foreign military sales and direct commercial sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the national security interest of the United States:

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

F-15 Support  
Paveway Precision Guided Munitions (sale and co-production)

Aircraft Maintenance Support

Aurora Bomb Fuzing System

120mm M933A1 Mortar Bombs

Fl10 Engines for F-15s

F/A-18 Panel Manufacture in Saudi Arabia for other end-users

Advising and support of Ministry of Defense reform

Continuation of follow-on logistics support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force, including Tactical Air Surveillance System support

For the United Arab Emirates:

AH-64 Equipment

APK WS Laser-guided Rockets

Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles

Paveway Precision Guided Munitions and Maverick missile support

RQ-21 Blackjack UAS

M107A1 .50 caliber Rifles

FMU-152A/B Programmable Bomb Fuse

Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile—Tactical Ballistic Missile

U.S. Marine Corps training of UAE Presidential Guard

F-16 engine parts

Amendment to previously Congressionally notified case for ScanEagle and Integrator Unmanned Aerial Systems

For Jordan:

Transfer of Paveway II Precision Guided Munitions from the United Arab Emirates.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress.

(U) MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS AND AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN TO DETER IRANIAN MALIGN INFLUENCE

(U) Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to the stability of the Middle East and to American security at home and abroad. Iran's actions have led directly to the deaths of over six hundred U.S. military personnel in Iraq, untold suffering in Syria, and significant threats to Israeli security. In Yemen, Iran helps fuel a conflict creating the world's greatest humanitarian crisis. Iran directed repeated attacks on civilian and military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by Iranian-designed explosives-laden drones and ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who receive financial, technical, and materiel support from Iran.

(U) Current threat reporting indicates Iran engages in preparations for further malign activities throughout the Middle East region, including potential targeting of U.S. and allied military forces in the region. As the Administration publicly noted and briefed to Congress in greater detail in the appropriate setting, a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings from the Iranian regime have prompted an increased U.S. force posture in the region. The Iran-backed Houthis publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in Yemen. The rapidly-evolving security situation in the region requires an accelerated delivery of certain capabilities to U.S. partners in the region.

(U) As President Trump noted in National Security Memorandum 11 of May 8, 2018, "the actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its proliferation and development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, its network and campaign of regional aggression, its support for terrorist groups, and the malign activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its surrogates continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."

(U) Iran's actions pose a critical threat to regional stability and the national security of the United States, which has been long acknowledged. Since 1984, Iran remains designated by the United States as a State Sponsor of Terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. In addition, the recent designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act notes the Government of Iran, through the IRGC-Quds Force, provides material support

to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran is also identified as constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States under Executive Orders dating back to the Carter and Clinton Administrations.

(U) In 2014, the Houthis, an Iran-supported force increasingly contributing to the Iranian regime's efforts to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to overthrow the internationally recognized government of Yemen. The Houthis have greatly increased regional instability, threatened the global economy, destroyed infrastructure, and terrorized the Yemeni people.

(U) The Houthis have attacked civilian areas within Saudi Arabia and the UAE with ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks in addition to cross-border raids; these have resulted in the deaths of over five hundred Saudi civilians, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was fortunate in 2017 to have intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Mecca which could have led to a regional conflagration.

(U) The Houthi threat to stability extends beyond the security of their immediate neighbors. Over 10% of global shipping passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb straits separating Yemen from Africa, including an estimated 4.8 million barrels of oil per day, or about 5% of the global oil trade. Since 2016, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted international shipping transiting these straits to or from the Suez Canal. Houthi-controlled media recently announced the Houthis' intent to target Saudi ARAMCO infrastructure. Utilizing anti-ship cruise missiles, small boat attacks, and remote-controlled explosive vessels, the Houthis continue to strike not only commercial oil tankers, but also struck a cargo ship carrying grain to a Yemeni port. The Houthis conducted maritime attacks on the USS *Mason* and the USS *Ponce*, demonstrating the direct nature of the Houthi threat to U.S. personnel, assets, and our national security.

(U) Within Yemen, the Houthis severely limited the ability of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to the population under their control. International humanitarian organizations report the "Houthi forces' widespread use of landmines along Yemen's western coast since mid-2017 has killed and injured hundreds of civilians and prevented aid groups from reaching vulnerable communities." Despite the humanitarian catastrophe, the Houthis continue to escalate the conflict in Yemen, most recently disregarding their own commitments under the UN-sponsored ceasefire deal regarding the port city of Hudaydah.

(U) The United States strongly backs peace efforts brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Griffiths' painstaking endeavor to have parties reach agreements in peace talks in Sweden in 2018 would lay a solid track for a political process to end the conflict.

(U) For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision of certain defense systems to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in the national security interest of the United States. Such transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales system, or through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales, must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the congressional review requirements of those provisions.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-0B

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(8)(C), AECA)

(i) Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 16-15.

Date: 8 December 2016.

Military Department: Army.

(iii) Description: On December 8, 2016, Congress was notified by Congressional certification transmittal number 16-15 of the possible sale under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act of twenty-eight (28) AH-64E Remanufactured Apache Attack Helicopters; nine (9) new AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters; seventy-six (76) T700-GE-701D Engines (56 remanufactured, 18 new, 2 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (28 remanufactured, 9 new, 2 spares); thirty-two (32) remanufactured AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometers; forty-six (46) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (31 remanufactured, 9 new, 6 spares); eighty-eight (88) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (72 new, 16 spares); forty-four (44) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMTi) systems (28 remanufactured, 9 new, 7 spares); and fifteen (15) new MUMTi System Upper Receivers, training devices, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles and organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost was \$3.5 billion. Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted \$1.68 billion of this total.

This transmittal reports:

1. the addition of thirty (30) Radar Electronic Units (REU) as MDE, which were included in the total value of the original transmittal, but were not properly identified as MDE; and

2. the inclusion of additional quantities of the following items: one (1) new AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter, six (6) T700-GE-701D engines (2 installed, 4 spares), one (1) new AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor, one (1) new AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System, sixty-two (62) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGIs) (60 remanufactured, 2 new), and one (1) new Manned-Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMTi) system. The total MDE value of these items is \$101,518,591. The addition will not add to the total notified value of MDE, which will remain \$1.68 billion. The total notified case value will remain \$3.5 billion.

(iv) Significance: This notification is being provided to report the inclusion of MDE and non-MDE items that were not included in the original notification. The UAE lost a helicopter during recent operations and has requested to replace this loss.

(v) Justification: The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. This equipment will support the capabilities of UAE's Apache fleet

and enhance interoperability with the United States.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology: The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system contains communications and target identification equipment, navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the pertinent equipment listed below will be either installed on the aircraft or included in the sale:

a. The Radar Electronic Unit (REU) is a component upgrade to the AN/APO-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR). The REU replaces two legacy Line Replaceable Units (Programmable Signal Processor and Low Power Radio Frequency), achieving a weight reduction of approximately 85 pounds, with improved reliability, increased processing power, growth for new modes/capabilities and replacement of obsolete components. Critical system information is stored in the FCR/REU in the form of mission executable code, target detection, classification algorithms and coded threat parametric. This information is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by the foreign user via anti-tamper provisions built into the system.

b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering helicopters, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. If desired, the radar data can be used to refer targets to the regular electro-optical Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS). This information is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by the foreign user. The content of these items is classified SECRET. User Data Module (UDM) on the RFI processor, contains the Radio Frequency threat library. The UDM, which is a hardware assemblage, is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with threat parameters, threat priorities and/or techniques derived from U.S. intelligence information.

c. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather target information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection, recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics (DVO), EII television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems that may be used singularly or in combinations. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Technical manuals for authorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED. Reverse engineering is not a major concern.

d. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures. The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.

e. The Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System plus Multi-Mode Receiver (EGI+MMR) The aircraft has

two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate gyro measurements, and external sensor measurements to estimate the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and position data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-aided, strap down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The EGI unit houses a GPS receiver. The receiver is capable of operating in either non-encrypted or encrypted. When keyed, the GPS receiver will automatically use anti-spoof/jam capabilities when they are in use. The EGI will retain the key through power on/off/on cycles. Because of safeguards built into the EGI, it is not considered classified when keyed. Integrated within the EGI is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) for processing functions. Each EGI also houses a Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR). The MMR is incorporated to provide for reception of ground based NAVAID signals for instrument aided flight. Provides IMC I IFR integration and certification of improved Embedded Global Positioning System and Inertial (EGI) unit, with attached MMR, with specific cockpit instrumentation allows Apaches to operate within the worldwide IFR route structure. Also includes integration of the Common Army Aviation Map (CAAM), Area Navigation (RNAV), Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) and Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) compliance.

f. Manned-Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMT-I) provides Manned-Unmanned Teaming with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), other Apaches and other interoperable aircraft and land platforms. Provides ability to display real-time UAS sensor information to aircraft and transmit MTADS video. Capability to receive video and metadata from Interoperability Profile compliant (IOP) as well as legacy systems. It is a data link for the AH-64E that provides a fully integrated multiband, interoperable capability that allows pilots to receive off-board sensor video streaming from different platforms in non-Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) bands. The MUMT-I data link can retransmit UAS or Apache Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight full-motion sensor video and metadata to another MUMT-I-equipped Apache. It can also transmit to ground forces equipped with the One Station Remote Video Terminal. It provides Apache aircrews with increased situational awareness and net-centric interoperability while significantly reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines. This combination results in increased survivability of Apache aircrews and ground forces by decreasing their exposure to hostile fire.

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

#### TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-39

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment\* \$35 million.

Other \$45 million.

Total \$80 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty (20) RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).

Non-MDE: This request also includes the following Non-MDE: Forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II (MPE-S), air vehicle support equipment to include eight (8) Ground Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four (4) retrievers, spare and repair parts, publications, training and technical support services.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-SAW).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

#### POLICY JUSTIFICATION

##### United Arab Emirates (UAE)—RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles

The Government of the UAE has requested to buy twenty (20) RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). Also included are forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II (MPE-S); air vehicle support equipment including eight (8) Ground Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four (4) retrievers; spare and repair parts; publications; training; and technical support services. The estimated total case value is \$80 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign and national security of the United States by improving the security of an important ally in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. national security objectives of assisting the UAE in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability and enhancing interoperability with U.S. forces. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing these UAVs into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Insitu, Bingen, WA, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to participate in program and technical reviews plus training and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for a period of twenty-four (24) months. It will also require one (1) contractor representative to reside in country for a period of two (2) years to support this program.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

#### TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-39

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

#### Annex Item No. vii

##### (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The following components and technical documentation for the program are classified as listed below:

a. The RQ-21 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a runway-independent, modular unmanned aircraft system that is designed for a variety of missions. The RQ-21 UAS has four subsystems: RQ-21A air vehicle (AV), launcher, retriever, and ground control stations (GCS).

1) The RQ-21A AV is a fixed-wing, single engine AV remotely controlled by an operator via the GCS.

2) The launcher is a pneumatically-controlled launch device that accelerates the RQ-21A AV to flying speed.

3) The retriever is a hydraulically-controlled telescoping crane that captures the RQ-21A AV at the end of the flight.

4) The GCS is a workstation that is used to plan missions, control and monitor the RQ-21A AV, and manage the data received from the air vehicle.

b. The RQ-21 UAS is capable of transport via ground, air, or ship. The RQ-21 UAS performs a wide variety of reconnaissance, intelligence, and special missions. Operationally or tactically vital data may be obtained cost-effectively by exploiting the UAS mission systems and payload options. The RQ-21A AV is designed to perform air reconnaissance (AR) based missions. It is equipped to carry a forward turret to support the primary mission of reconnaissance and an assortment of specialized, mission specific, payloads within the center payload bay. The Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter Countermeasures sensor ball is the Alticam 11 EOIR4, which provides exceptional day/night capability in a small, lightweight, low power solution, or the EOIR5 which adds a laser designator capability. It uses mid-wave infrared (MWIR) electro-optical image, a gyrostabilized gimbal system, has multiple operating modes, is compatible with the Alticam video processing board (AVS), and has a laser pointer and rangefinder. It is designed for small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and is also used on piloted airplanes, blimps, ground vehicles, and unmanned surface vehicles.

c. The imagery and electronic reconnaissance functions of the RQ-21A AV support intelligence functions and operational warfighting missions. Intelligence-based support functions range from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) including imagery associated sub-tasks. Operational functions are enhanced by a laser rangefinder and infrared marking system. The turret, with laser system, facilitates target acquisition and terminal guidance operations in support of a wide breadth of aviation support to MAGTF operations mission. These include but are not limited to point, area, and route reconnaissance; convoy escort; call for indirect fires; battle damage assessment; and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel. The aircraft also passively supports radio communications relay and the vessel traffic function of automatic identification.

d. The GCS includes an operator work station (OWS), a ground data terminal for C2 communication and video downlink, and a GPS electronics module (GEM) integration kit for navigation. The GCS is composed of a standard component package. If installed on a ship, the GCS will be composed of the same components as the land based system, but the number and arrangement of each of the components will vary depending on the specific class of ship on which the GCS is installed. The RQ-21 GCS is comprised of the following components:

1) Two operator work stations. The OWS consist of four modules: electronics power module (EPM), network computer module (NCM), user interface module (UIM), and the data storage module (DSM). The EPM provides the power source for the GCS. The EPM is the bottom module in the OWS. The UIM is not installed in the GCS for ship-based operations.

2) Ground data terminal. The GDT includes the antenna interface module (AIM), directional antenna, and omni antennas (for shipboard operations only). The AIM models are different between land and ship-based configurations.

3) GEM integration kit. The GEM integration kit includes the GEM itself and the ground GPS antenna.

4) Moving platform module (MPM) integration kit (ship-based only).

5) Selective availability and anti-spoofing module (SAASM) GPS antenna.

6) Systems check laptop.

7) GCS cables.

e. The launcher provides the initial RQ-21A AV speed required for air vehicle flight over a wide range of wind and density altitude conditions, and enables expeditionary employment of the UAS in locations without suitable runways. The launcher is designed for transport by air, ship, or towed by light vehicles into rugged terrain. The launcher is made up of the launcher core and systems and the accessory components. The launcher core is attached lengthwise on the launcher trailer deck at two interface towers. The trailer is used to transport the launcher components and serves as a platform for the launcher core and systems.

f. The retriever system is comprised of the recovery system and trailer. The recovery system is a hydraulically-controlled telescoping crane mast that uses a vertical capture rope to catch the RQ-21A AV. The vertical capture rope features a bungee and rope energy dissipation system. The retriever is mounted to a modified MIL-STD trailer chassis. The trailer frame and hitch assembly connects the retriever to a towing vehicle. The trailer has one axle and four outriggers that are installed for use.

g. While no part of the RQ-21A UAS is itself classified, the following performance data and technical characteristics are classified as annotated:

RQ-21 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)

GPS P/Y Code navigation equipment: SECRET when keyed.

UAS Susceptibility to Jamming: SECRET.

UAS TEMPEST Characteristics: SECRET.

UAS Vulnerabilities: SECRET.

UAS Survivability: SECRET.

UAS Radar Cross Section: Up to SECRET.

UAS Infrared Signature: SECRET.

UAS Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Vulnerability: SECRET.

UAS Threat Data: SECRET.

Communications Relay Tactical Employment: CONFIDENTIAL.

Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter Countermeasures: SECRET.

EO/IR Imager Operational Characteristics: Up to SECRET.

Automatic Information System Vulnerabilities: SECRET.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary obtains knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

3. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale of the RQ-21 UAS and associated equipment is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.

4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:  
Major Defense Equipment\* \$92 million.  
Other \$10 million.  
Total \$102 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:  
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin Guided Missiles with Containers.

Non-MDE: Also included are System Integration & Checkout (SICO) service; Field Service Representative; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support services' tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; spare and repair parts; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (AE-B-ZAO, Amendment 3).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-B-ZUB.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

#### POLICY JUSTIFICATION

##### UAE—JaVELIN Guided Missiles and Associated Materiel and Services

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin Guided Missiles with container. Also included are System Integration & Checkout (SICO) service; Field Service Representative; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support services' tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; spare and repair parts; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total case value is \$102 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of an important partner that has been, and continues to be, a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The proposed program will enhance the UAE's capability to meet current and future enemy threats. The UAE will use the capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense. The UAE previously procured Javelin missiles and will have no difficulty absorbing these additional missiles into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be is Raytheon, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed program will not require additional Contractor or U.S. Government personnel in country for an extended period of time.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Javelin Weapon System is a medium-range, man portable, shoulder-launched, fire and forget, anti-tank system for infantry, scouts, and combat engineers. It may also be mounted on a variety of platforms including vehicles, aircraft and watercraft. The system weighs 49.5 pounds and has a maximum range in excess of 2,500 meters. The system is highly lethal against tanks and other systems with conventional and reactive armors. The system possesses a secondary capability against bunkers.

2. Javelin's key technical feature is the use of fire-and-forget technology which allows the gunner to fire and immediately relocate or take cover. Additional special features are the top attack and/or direct fire modes, an advanced tandem warhead and imaging infrared seeker, target lock-on before launch, and soft launch from enclosures or covered fighting positions. The Javelin missile also has a minimum smoke motor thus decreasing its detection on the battlefield.

3. The Javelin Weapon System is comprised of two major tactical components, which are a reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU) and a round contained in a disposable launch tube assembly. The CLU incorporates an integrated day-night sight that provides a target engagement capability in adverse weather and countermeasure environments. The CLU may also be used in a stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and target detection. The CLU's thermal sight is a second generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor. To facilitate initial loading and subsequent updating of software, all on-board missile software is uploaded via the CLU after mating and prior to launch.

4. The missile is autonomously guided to the target using an imaging infrared seeker and adaptive correlation tracking algorithms. This allows the gunner to take cover or reload and engage another target after firing a missile. The missile has an advanced tandem warhead and can be used in either the top attack or direct fire modes (for target undercover). An onboard flight computer guides the missile to the selected target.

5. The Javelin Missile System hardware and the documentation are UNCLASSIFIED. The missile software which resides in the CLU is considered SENSITIVE. The sensitivity is primarily in the software programs which instruct the system how to operate in the presence of countermeasures. The overall hardware is also considered sensitive in that the infrared wavelengths could be useful in attempted countermeasure development.

6. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

7. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.

8. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of United Arab Emirates.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment\* \$850 million.

Other \$50 million.

Total \$900 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds.

Non-MDE: Also included is weapon support and test equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-ABL).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-ABH (P&A) and AE-P-ABI (P&A).

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds. Also included is weapon support and test equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total case value is \$900 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of an important partner in the region. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The APKWS will provide the UAE with flexibility in the use of proportional, precision fires when operating in remote and mountainous regions as well as populated areas. The APKWS will complement the Hellfire II missile as a secondary precision munition with lower collateral damage potential. These aspects make the APKWS, employed in conjunction with UAE's multiple types of helicopters and Hellfire II missiles, an appropriate munition for the UAE's counterterrorism operations. UAE will have no difficulty absorbing the APKWS into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be BAE Systems, Nashua, NH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require up to 20 U.S. Government and up to 30 contractor representatives to travel to UAE.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

## (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The APKWS II All-Up-Round (AUR) is an air-to-ground weapon that consists of an APKWS II Guidance Section (GS), legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor and legacy MK152, MK282 and MK435/436 warhead/fuze. The APKWS II GS is installed between the rocket motor and warhead and provides a Semi-Active Laser (SAL) precision capability to legacy unguided 2.75-inch rockets. The APKWS II is procured as an independent component to be mated to the appropriate 2.75-inch warhead/fuze. The GS is manually set with the appropriate laser code during loading and is launched from any platform configured with a LAU-68F/A, or similar launcher(s). After launch, the GS activates and the seeker detects laser energy reflected from a target designated with a remote or autonomous laser. The control system then guides the rocket to the target. The only interface required with the host platform is a 28V direct current (DC) firing pulse.

2. APKWS II increases stowed kills by providing precise engagements at standoff ranges with sufficient accuracy for a high single-shot probability of hit against soft and lightly armored targets, thereby minimizing collateral damage. The APKWS II is capable of day and night operation and performance in many adverse environments.

3. The APKWS II requires no depot maintenance. Activities to prepare the APKWS II for use include setting the laser code switches, turning on the Electronic Thermal Battery Initiator, and loading the AUR into the launcher. Wing Slot Seals (WSS) may be replaced, if necessary, at an I-level maintenance facility.

4. All training for APKWS II is unclassified. The training required is:

a. Pilot training to effectively employ the APKWS II.

b. Ordnance Handler training for safe handling and preparation of the APKWS II and AUR, and

c. Maintenance training for replacement of WSS.

5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

6. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.

7. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 18-21

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.

(ii) Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment\* \$0 million.

Other \$800 million.

Total \$800 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None

Non-MDE: Follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (QAH).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: FMS Case QAY-\$100,000,000-05 June 2010 and QAY Amendment 7-\$739,508,525-30 October 2016.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia—Follow-on Support and Services for the Royal Saudi Air Force Aircraft

Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost will be \$800 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to improve the security of a friendly country, which has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic growth in the Middle East. This potential sale is a continuation of current support. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this support and services into its armed forces.

Implementation of this sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's flight and maintenance activity. It will improve sustainability and continue support for the fleet.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

There will be various contractors associated with the equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance, training, and sustainment.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 18-31

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment\* \$0 million.

Other \$136 million.

Total \$136 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.

Non-MOE: Continued spare and repair parts, U.S. Government and Contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support for the TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance System) aircraft program. Additionally, the sale will support the rehabilitation of the integrated lab located in the United States used for testing and troubleshooting.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (SR-D-QDJ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAS, SR-D-QCH.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia—Sustainment Support for Tactical Air Surveillance System (TASS)

Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase spare and repair parts, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support for their TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance System) aircraft program. Additionally, the sale will support rehabilitation of the integrated lab located in the United States used for testing and troubleshooting. The total estimated program cost will be \$136 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a key regional ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia's surveillance capability to counter current and future regional threats and strengthen its homeland defense. This is a continuation of a previous sustainment case and Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing addition support in country.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be L3 Technologies, Greenville, Texas. There are no known offsets proposed with this sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of up to 25 additional L3 contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-18

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment\* \$0 million.

Other \$100 million.

Total \$100 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.

Non-MOE: Follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps training, training support, and other training related services in support of the United Arab Emirates Presidential Guard Command.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-TAM).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-TAM.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Follow-On Blanket Order Training

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps training, training support, and other training related services in support of the UAE Presidential Guard Command. The total value for this sale is \$100 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important partner in the region.

The proposed sale will provide the continuation of U.S. Marine Corps training of the UAE's Presidential Guard for counterterrorism, counter-piracy, critical infrastructure protection, and national defense. This training also provides engagement opportunities through military exercises, training, and common equipment. UAE will have no difficulty absorbing this training.

The proposed sale of training will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

There will be no principal contractor associated with this proposed sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed amendment to a current sale will allow for the continued permanent assignment of thirty-four (34) U.S. Marine Corps active duty personnel to the UAE.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

## TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-01

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment\* \$0 billion.

Other \$1.8 billion.

Total \$1.8 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None.

Non-MDE: Follow-on logistics support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost is \$1.8 billion.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAY, SR-D-QDE, SR-D-QBO, SR-D-QBD, SR-D-QBI, SR-D-QDF, SR-D-QAH.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

\* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia—Follow-on Logistics Support and Services

Saudi Arabia has requested to buy follow-on logistics support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost will be \$1.8 billion.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic growth in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this support and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's operations and maintenance activity, improve sustainability and ensure capability for near and long term air operations across the fleet.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

There will be various contractors associated with the equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance, training, and sustainment.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

#### REMEMBERING THAD COCHRAN

Mr. ENZI. Madam President, today I wish to honor the life and legacy of the late Senator Thad Cochran.

I appreciate having this opportunity to celebrate the life and accomplishments of Senator Cochran. His loss will be deeply felt by all of us here in the Senate, not only by those of us who served with him, but also by the many staff and individuals he has worked with over time. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1972, Senator Cochran touched many lives in his 46 years faithfully serving his State of Mississippi in Congress.

As the son of a school principal and a math teacher, Senator Cochran understood the value of hard work and dedication. He emerged as a leader among his peers from a young age. He was an Eagle Scout who helped establish a new troop and valedictorian of his class in high school where he earned varsity letters in football, basketball, baseball, and tennis. At the University of Mississippi, Senator Cochran was a fraternity president, student body vice president, and a member of Omicron Delta Kappa, a national honorary leadership fraternity. Senator Cochran began his service to our country while at the University of Mississippi as a company commander in the Navy ROTC and, once graduated, was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Naval Reserve and assigned to duty aboard the USS *Macon*.

As a fellow Eagle Scout, Senator Cochran demonstrated core scouting values like trust, loyalty, courtesy, and reverence. He displayed these values not only in his nearly five-decade-long career in Congress, but also as a father to his two children, Kate and Clayton.

Described as gentle and soft-spoken, Senator Cochran was a defender of Senate procedure and often worked across the aisle. Senator Cochran was known to hold strong opinions; yet he developed close working relationships with members of both parties. Senator Cochran was determined that, if you look hard enough, there is common ground to be found with everyone. He earned his nickname of the Quiet Persuader through a determined yet respectful approach to negotiations.

I had the honor of working with Senator Cochran in his role as chairman of the Appropriations Committee while I was chairmen of the Budget Committee. He was a hard worker and always guided by his core values. As a good statesman, he didn't let party politics get in the way and always did what he thought was right.

In a nearly five-decade-long career in Congress, it is difficult to pinpoint Senator Cochran's single greatest achievement. Following Hurricane Katrina's devastation, Senator Coch-

ran played a central role in security relief funds for Gulf States, especially for his home State of Mississippi. During his tenure as chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Senator Cochran was a champion of the farm bill's nutrition programs. Senator Cochran served as a tireless advocate for farm families and America's agricultural industry.

Senator Cochran authored the Mississippi Wilderness Act, which was the first Federal legislation ever passed for the perpetual protection of lands in the State of Mississippi. He was greatly involved in land and wildlife conservation in Mississippi, a legacy of his that will endure for future generations to enjoy.

Senator Cochran was an effective lawmaker who was a tireless advocate for his constituents. His model of public service was that the constituents are always right. He said we are in Congress to serve, not to be served. Senator Cochran's model of public service is one to look up to and his style of leadership will serve as an inspiration for future generations to come.

Senator Cochran was a committed man of faith. A member of the Southern Baptist Church, he was always one to do what he thought was right rather than what was easiest.

My wife Diana joins me in sending our deepest condolences to his loved ones and know he will find eternal peace and happiness knowing he had a profound effect on all that knew him a colleague, as a father, and as a friend.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

#### TRIBUTE TO BRIGADIER GENERAL ERIK H. TORRING

• Mr. CRUZ. Madam President, I am proud to recognize BG Erik H. Torring III, who is retiring after 30 years in the U.S. Army. General Torring has been a leader in not only our soldiers' health, but the health of all the service animals that support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the battlefield.

General Torring's career culminated in his current post as both Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Army's Office of the Surgeon General and Chief of the U.S. Army Veterinary Corps, where he oversees the recruitment, training, and equipment of almost 3,000 veterinary personnel in the U.S. Army. He spearheaded the development of the Army's electronic veterinary records program and maintained standards for food safety across the Armed Forces.

For his service to the United States of America, I am proud to recognize Brigadier General Torring and welcome him home to Texas.●

#### REMEMBERING STAFF SERGEANT JORDY SOESBE

• Mr. ROUNDS. Madam President, today I would like to remember the life

of retired U.S. Army National Guard SSG Jordy James Soesbe. Staff Sergeant Soesbe passed away on May 20, 2019, at the age of 44.

Jordy Soesbe was born in Burke, SD, and raised on his family's farm and ranch in Gregory, SD.

Soesbe spent more than 20 years in the U.S. Army and Army National Guard, retiring in 2017 at the rank of staff sergeant in the National Guard. He completed two tours of duty in Afghanistan, serving as a gunner on a Humvee, sniper, and prison guard. He served with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and 25th Infantry Division and the South Dakota National Guard's 235th Military Police Company.

During his time in the military, he earned numerous commendations and medals, including the Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Armed Forces Reserve Medal with "M" Device and 10-year Hourglass Device, Army Commendation Medal, and four Army Achievement Medals.

Aside from his career in the military, he also served as a reserve sheriff's deputy with the Meade County Sheriff's Office.

In his spare time, he was an avid pheasant and deer hunter. He also enjoyed spending time at his local shooting range.

Staff Sergeant Soesbe was not only a hero in life, but also a hero in death. As an organ donor, he saved at least three lives. I commend this hero for his service, both in life and death, and offer my sincerest condolences to his family and friends. He is survived by his mother Virginia; brother Brett; daughters Alexandra, McKenna, and Alyssa; and numerous nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles, cousins, and in-laws.●

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

At 10:03 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Novotny, one of its reading clerks announced that the House has passed the following bills, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 559. An act to amend section 6 of the Joint Resolution entitled "A Joint Resolution to approve the Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, and for other purposes".

H.R. 1261. An act to establish a national program to identify and reduce losses from landslide hazards, to establish a national 30 Elevation Program, and for other purposes.

H.R. 2940. An act to extend the program of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families and related programs through September 30, 2019.

The message also announced that the House has agreed to the following concurrent resolution, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 45. Concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of the House to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R. 2157.

The message further announced that the House has agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2157) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2019, and for other purposes.