

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 19) was agreed to.

TARGET PRACTICE AND MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING SUPPORT ACT

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 18, S. 94.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 94) to amend the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act to facilitate the establishment of additional or expanded public target ranges in certain States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to proceeding to the measure?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read a third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass?

The bill (S. 94) was passed, as follows:

S. 94

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Target Practice and Marksmanship Training Support Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) the use of firearms and archery equipment for target practice and marksmanship training activities on Federal land is allowed, except to the extent specific portions of that land have been closed to those activities;

(2) in recent years preceding the date of enactment of this Act, portions of Federal land have been closed to target practice and marksmanship training for many reasons;

(3) the availability of public target ranges on non-Federal land has been declining for a variety of reasons, including continued population growth and development near former ranges;

(4) providing opportunities for target practice and marksmanship training at public target ranges on Federal and non-Federal land can help—

(A) to promote enjoyment of shooting, recreational, and hunting activities; and

(B) to ensure safe and convenient locations for those activities;

(5) Federal law in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, including the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. 669 et seq.), provides Federal support for construction and expansion of public target ranges by making available to States amounts that may be used for construction, operation, and maintenance of public target ranges; and

(6) it is in the public interest to provide increased Federal support to facilitate the construction or expansion of public target ranges.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to facilitate the construction and expansion of public target ranges, including ranges on Federal land managed by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC TARGET RANGE.

In this Act, the term “public target range” means a specific location that—

- (1) is identified by a governmental agency for recreational shooting;
- (2) is open to the public;
- (3) may be supervised; and
- (4) may accommodate archery or rifle, pistol, or shotgun shooting.

SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO PITTMAN-ROBERTSON WILDLIFE RESTORATION ACT.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 2 of the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. 669a) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (8) as paragraphs (3) through (9), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:

“(2) the term ‘public target range’ means a specific location that—

“(A) is identified by a governmental agency for recreational shooting;

“(B) is open to the public;

“(C) may be supervised; and

“(D) may accommodate archery or rifle, pistol, or shotgun shooting.”;

(b) EXPENDITURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE AREAS AND RESOURCES.—Section 8(b) of the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. 669g(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking “(b) Each State” and inserting the following:

“(b) EXPENDITURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE AREAS AND RESOURCES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), each State”;

(2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking “construction, operation,” and inserting “operation”;

(3) in the second sentence, by striking “The non-Federal share” and inserting the following:

“(3) NON-FEDERAL SHARE.—The non-Federal share”;

(4) in the third sentence, by striking “The Secretary” and inserting the following:

“(4) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary”; and

(5) by inserting after paragraph (1) (as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection) the following:

“(2) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding the limitation described in paragraph (1), a State may pay up to 90 percent of the cost of acquiring land for, expanding, or constructing a public target range.”.

(c) FIREARM AND BOW HUNTER EDUCATION AND SAFETY PROGRAM GRANTS.—Section 10 of the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. 669h-1) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

“(3) ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS.—Of the amount apportioned to a State for any fiscal year under section 4(b), the State may elect to allocate not more than 10 percent, to be combined with the amount apportioned to the State under paragraph (1) for that fiscal year, for acquiring land for, expanding, or constructing a public target range.”;

(2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:

“(b) COST SHARING.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Federal share of the cost of any activity carried out using a grant under this section shall not exceed 75 percent of the total cost of the activity.

“(2) PUBLIC TARGET RANGE CONSTRUCTION OR EXPANSION.—The Federal share of the cost of acquiring land for, expanding, or constructing a public target range in a State on Federal or non-Federal land pursuant to this section or section 8(b) shall not exceed 90 percent of the cost of the activity.”; and

(3) in subsection (c)(1)—

(A) by striking “Amounts made” and inserting the following:

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), amounts made”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) EXCEPTION.—Amounts provided for acquiring land for, constructing, or expanding a public target range shall remain available for expenditure and obligation during the 5-fiscal-year period beginning on October 1 of the first fiscal year for which the amounts are made available.”.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CO-OPERATION.

It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with applicable laws and regulations, the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management should cooperate with State and local authorities and other entities to carry out waste removal and other activities on any Federal land used as a public target range to encourage continued use of that land for target practice or marksmanship training.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS IN BOLIVIA AND THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 58, S. Res. 35.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 35) supporting democratic principles and standards in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment, and with an amendment to the preamble, as follows:

Whereas the nation of Bolivia proclaimed independence from Spain on August 6, 1825, with Simón Bolívar as its president;

Whereas Bolivia endured more than a century of fragile governance and instability, with more than 150 changes of leadership since it gained independence;

Whereas Bolivia experienced a succession of military coups that resulted in the irregular transfer of power between presidents and military juntas during the period of 1964 to 1982;

Whereas a transition to civilian democracy occurred in 1982, after the ruling military junta handed over power to a civilian government, which managed to maintain control despite major economic upheavals and painful market reforms;

Whereas elected President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his successor Carlos Mesa both resigned in the face of destabilizing protests in 2003 and 2005, respectively;

Whereas, in 2005, Evo Morales won his first term as president, becoming Bolivia’s first indigenous citizen elected to the office;

Whereas Bolivia's historically marginalized indigenous peoples represent approximately 41 percent of the country's population, according to the 2012 Bolivian census;

Whereas, in 2006, the people of Bolivia elected a constituent assembly to write a new constitution recognizing greater political and economic rights for the country's indigenous population, while key opposition parties boycotted the constituent assembly election;

Whereas, in 2008, a recall referendum on President Morales was rejected by 67 percent of voters in Bolivia;

Whereas, in 2008, amidst growing protests in the country and rising tensions between Bolivia and the United States, President Morales expelled the United States ambassador to Bolivia;

Whereas, in 2009, Bolivians approved, by a vote of more than 60 percent in a nationwide referendum, a new constitution that included a limit of two five-year presidential terms;

Whereas, in 2009, President Morales won re-election to a second term with more than 60 percent of the vote;

Whereas, in 2013, President Morales' loyalists in Bolivia's Legislative Assembly approved legislation allowing him to run for a third term—a law that President Morales' political allies in the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal affirmed, ruling that the two-term limit in the country's new constitution did not apply because President Morales' first term was under the old constitution;

Whereas, in 2013, President Morales expelled the United States Agency for International Development for trying to "conspire against Bolivia";

Whereas, in 2014, President Morales won his third term as president, with 60 percent of the vote;

Whereas, in 2016, the Government of Bolivia called a national referendum to modify the constitution in order to allow for an additional term for Morales;

Whereas, that same year, more than half of voters in Bolivia rejected the proposed lifting of presidential term limits that would have allowed President Morales to run for a fourth term and serve at least 19 years in office;

Whereas, after the referendum, the Morales Administration increased its troubling rhetoric against opposition media and advanced a narrative suggesting a plot to prevent President Morales from staying in power;

Whereas, in 2017, President Morales' loyalists on the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal lifted constitutional term limits arguing that they violated the candidates' human rights, citing the American Convention of Human Rights, adopted at San Jose November 22, 1969, the main human rights treaty in the Americas, as the legal foundation for its decision;

Whereas the Convention states that political rights can only be limited under very specific circumstances, a provision which, when drafted in 1969, was intended to prevent abusive governments from arbitrarily barring opposition candidates and not to impede constitutional reelection limits designed to reduce corruption and abuse of power given Latin America's long history of violent and prolonged dictatorship;

Whereas the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal's ruling rendered Bolivia one of a very small number of countries in the Western Hemisphere that does not place limits on presidential reelection;

Whereas the Secretary General of the Organization of American States said the cited clause "does not mean the right to perpetual power . . . Besides, presidential re-election was rejected by popular will in a referendum in 2016.";

Whereas, in March 2018, a report commissioned by the Organization of American States specifically related to this issue stated that—

(1) "There is no specific and distinct human right to re-election.";

(2) "Term limits. . . are a reasonable limit to the right to be elected because they prevent an

unlimited exercise of power in the hands of the President.";

(3) "The limits on a president's re-election do not therefore unduly restrict his/her human and political rights.";

Whereas the Morales era has seen many social and economic gains, but also a weakening and undermining of key democratic institutions in order to favor the ruling party: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) supports the important transitions to democracy and the regular peaceful transfers of power through elections that have taken place in the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries in recent decades;

(2) recognizes the historic significance of Bolivia's 2005 election;

(3) expresses concern for efforts to circumvent presidential term limits in the Bolivian constitution;

(4) supports presidential term limits prevalent in Latin America as reasonable checks against a history of coups, corruption, and abuses of power;

(5) expresses the belief that the 2016 referendum vote to maintain presidential term limits reflected the legitimate will of the majority of voters in Bolivia;

(6) agrees with the Organization of American States Secretary General's interpretation of the American Convention of Human Rights as not applicable to presidential term limits;

(7) calls on the Government of Bolivia to respect, and where necessary restore, the independence of key electoral and governing bodies and administer the October 2019 election in adherence with international democratic norms and its own constitutional limits on presidential terms; and

(8) calls on Latin American democracies to continue to uphold democratic norms and standards among member states.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I know of no further debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 35) was agreed to.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported amendment to the preamble be agreed to, the preamble, as amended, be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee-reported amendment to the preamble was agreed to.

The preamble, as amended, was agreed to.

The resolution with its preamble, as amended, reads as follows:

S. RES. 35

Whereas the nation of Bolivia proclaimed independence from Spain on August 6, 1825, with Simón Bolívar as its president;

Whereas Bolivia endured more than a century of fragile governance and instability, with more than 150 changes of leadership since it gained independence;

Whereas Bolivia experienced a succession of military coups that resulted in the irregular transfer of power between presidents and military juntas during the period of 1964 to 1982;

Whereas a transition to civilian democracy occurred in 1982, after the ruling military junta handed over power to a civilian government, which managed to maintain con-

trol despite major economic upheavals and painful market reforms;

Whereas elected President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his successor Carlos Mesa both resigned in the face of destabilizing protests in 2003 and 2005, respectively;

Whereas, in 2005, Evo Morales won his first term as president, becoming Bolivia's first indigenous citizen elected to the office;

Whereas Bolivia's historically marginalized indigenous peoples represent approximately 41 percent of the country's population, according to the 2012 Bolivian census;

Whereas, in 2006, the people of Bolivia elected a constituent assembly to write a new constitution recognizing greater political and economic rights for the country's indigenous population, while key opposition parties boycotted the constituent assembly election;

Whereas, in 2008, a recall referendum on President Morales was rejected by 67 percent of voters in Bolivia;

Whereas, in 2008, amidst growing protests in the country and rising tensions between Bolivia and the United States, President Morales expelled the United States ambassador to Bolivia;

Whereas, in 2009, Bolivians approved, by a vote of more than 60 percent in a nationwide referendum, a new constitution that included a limit of two five-year presidential terms;

Whereas, in 2009, President Morales won re-election to a second term with more than 60 percent of the vote;

Whereas, in 2013, President Morales' loyalists in Bolivia's Legislative Assembly approved legislation allowing him to run for a third term—a law that President Morales' political allies in the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal affirmed, ruling that the two-term limit in the country's new constitution did not apply because President Morales' first term was under the old constitution;

Whereas, in 2013, President Morales expelled the United States Agency for International Development for trying to "conspire against Bolivia";

Whereas, in 2014, President Morales won his third term as president, with 60 percent of the vote;

Whereas, in 2016, the Government of Bolivia called a national referendum to modify the constitution in order to allow for an additional term for Morales;

Whereas, that same year, more than half of voters in Bolivia rejected the proposed lifting of presidential term limits that would have allowed President Morales to run for a fourth term and serve at least 19 years in office;

Whereas, after the referendum, the Morales Administration increased its troubling rhetoric against opposition media and advanced a narrative suggesting a plot to prevent President Morales from staying in power;

Whereas, in 2017, President Morales' loyalists on the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal lifted constitutional term limits arguing that they violated the candidates' human rights, citing the American Convention of Human Rights, adopted at San Jose November 22, 1969, the main human rights treaty in the Americas, as the legal foundation for its decision;

Whereas the Convention states that political rights can only be limited under very specific circumstances, a provision which, when drafted in 1969, was intended to prevent abusive governments from arbitrarily barring opposition candidates and not to impede constitutional reelection limits designed to reduce corruption and abuse of power given Latin America's long history of violent and prolonged dictatorship;

Whereas the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal's ruling rendered Bolivia one of a very small number of countries in the Western Hemisphere that does not place limits on presidential reelection;

Whereas the Secretary General of the Organization of American States said the cited clause "does not mean the right to perpetual power . . . Besides, presidential re-election was rejected by popular will in a referendum in 2016.;"

Whereas, in March 2018, a report commissioned by the Organization of American States specifically related to this issue stated that—

(1) "There is no specific and distinct human right to re-election.;"

(2) "Term limits . . . are a reasonable limit to the right to be elected because they prevent an unlimited exercise of power in the hands of the President.;" and

(3) "The limits on a president's re-election do not therefore unduly restrict his/her human and political rights.;" and

Whereas the Morales era has seen many social and economic gains, but also a weakening and undermining of key democratic institutions in order to favor the ruling party: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) supports the important transitions to democracy and the regular peaceful transfers of power through elections that have taken place in the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries in recent decades;

(2) recognizes the historic significance of Bolivia's 2005 election;

(3) expresses concern for efforts to circumvent presidential term limits in the Bolivian constitution;

(4) supports presidential term limits prevalent in Latin America as reasonable checks against a history of coups, corruption, and abuses of power;

(5) expresses the belief that the 2016 referendum vote to maintain presidential term limits reflected the legitimate will of the majority of voters in Bolivia;

(6) agrees with the Organization of American States Secretary General's interpretation of the American Convention of Human Rights as not applicable to presidential term limits;

(7) calls on the Government of Bolivia to respect, and where necessary restore, the independence of key electoral and governing bodies and administer the October 2019 election in adherence with international democratic norms and its own constitutional limits on presidential terms; and

(8) calls on Latin American democracies to continue to uphold democratic norms and standards among members states.

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE IMPORTANCE AND VITALITY OF THE UNITED STATES ALLIANCES WITH JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 59, S. Res. 67.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 67) expressing the sense of the Senate on the importance and vitality of the United States alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea, and our trilateral cooperation in the pursuit of shared interests.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution

which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment, and with an amendment to the preamble, as follows:

Whereas the governments and the people of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea share comprehensive and dynamic partnerships and personal friendships rooted in shared interests and the common values of freedom, democracy, and free market economies;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are all free societies committed to the principles of inclusive democracy, respect for human potential, and the belief that the peaceful spread of these principles will result in a safer and brighter future for all of mankind;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are indispensable partners in tackling global challenges and have pledged significant support for efforts to counter violent extremism, combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prevent piracy, improve global health and energy security, promote human rights, address climate change, contribute to economic development around the world, and assist the victims of conflict and disaster worldwide;

Whereas the governments and the people of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all share a commitment to free and open markets, high standards for the free flow of commerce and trade, and the establishment of an inclusive, transparent, and sustainable architecture for regional and global trade and development;

Whereas the United States-Japan and the United States-Republic of Korea alliances are the foundation of regional stability in Asia, including against the threat posed by the regime in Pyongyang;

Whereas cooperation between and among our nations spans economic, energy, diplomatic, security, and cultural spheres;

Whereas the United States and Japan established diplomatic relations on March 31, 1854, with the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Amity;

Whereas the relationship between the peoples of the United States and the Republic of Korea stretches back to Korea's Chosun Dynasty, when the United States and Korea established diplomatic relations under the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation;

Whereas 2019 marks the 74th anniversary of the end of World War II, a conflict in which the United States and Japan were enemies, and the strength of the United States-Japan alliance is a testament to the ability of great countries to overcome the past and to work together to create a more secure and prosperous future;

Whereas the United States-Korea alliance was forged in blood, with United States military casualties during the Korean War of approximately 36,574 killed and more than 103,284 wounded, and with Republic of Korea casualties of more than 217,000 soldiers killed, more than 429,000 soldiers wounded, and 1,000,000 civilians killed or missing;

Whereas, for the past 70 years, the partnership between the United States and Japan has played a vital role, both in Asia and globally, in ensuring peace, stability, and economic development;

Whereas, approximately 54,000 United States military personnel serve in Japan, along with some of the United States most advanced defense assets, including the 7th Fleet and the USS Ronald Reagan, the only United States aircraft carrier to be homeported outside the United States;

Whereas, since the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed in Washington on October 1, 1953, and ratified by the Senate on January 26, 1954, United States military personnel have maintained a continuous presence on the Korean Pe-

ninsula, and approximately 28,500 United States troops are stationed in the Republic of Korea in 2019;

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have stood alongside each other in the four major wars the United States has fought outside Korea since World War II—in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq;

Whereas Japan is the fourth-largest United States trading partner and together with the United States represents 30 percent of global Gross Domestic Product, and Japanese firms have invested approximately \$498,000,000,000 in the United States;

Whereas, the economic relationship between the United States and its sixth-largest trading partner, the Republic of Korea, has been facilitated by the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), which entered into force on March 15, 2012, and was amended as of January 1, 2019, includes 358,000 jobs in the United States that are directly related to exports to the Republic of Korea, and has resulted in approximately \$51,800,000,000 in investments by Korean firms in the United States;

Whereas Japan and the Republic of Korea stand as strong partners of the United States in efforts to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation, commerce, and overflight and to uphold respect for the rule of law and to oppose the use of coercion, intimidation, or force to change the regional or global status quo, including in the maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific, which are among the busiest waterways in the world;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are committed to working together towards a world where the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (in this preamble referred to as the "DPRK") does not threaten global peace and security with its weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation, and illicit activities, and where the DPRK respects human rights and its people can live in freedom;

Whereas section 211 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9231; Public Law 114-122) expresses the sense of Congress that the President "should seek to strengthen high-level trilateral mechanisms for discussion and coordination of policy toward North Korea between the Government of the United States, the Government of South Korea, and the Government of Japan";

Whereas the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) underscores the importance of trilateral defense cooperation and enforcement of multilateral sanctions against North Korea and calls for regular consultation with Congress on the status of such efforts;

Whereas the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea have made great strides in promoting trilateral cooperation and defense partnership, including ministerial meetings, information sharing, and cooperation on ballistic missile defense exercises to counter North Korean provocations;

Whereas Japanese Americans and Korean Americans have made invaluable contributions to the security, prosperity, and diversity of our Nation, including service as our elected representatives in the Senate and in the House of Representatives; and

Whereas the United States Government looks forward to continuing to deepen our enduring partnerships with Japan and the Republic of Korea on economic, security, and cultural issues, as well as embracing new opportunities for bilateral and trilateral partnerships and cooperation on emerging regional and global challenges: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirms the importance of—

(1) the vital role of the alliances between the United States and Japan and the United States and the Republic of Korea in promoting peace, stability, and security in the Indo-Pacific region, including through United States extended deterrence, and reaffirms the commitment of the United States