

Government and independent investigative journalists that we know that Mr. Khashoggi was murdered, a crime punishable by death in Saudi Arabia and many other countries. In fact, far lesser crimes—even some nonviolent crimes—are punishable by death in Saudi Arabia.

While we owe thanks to the Turkish Government for exposing the facts about Mr. Khashoggi's case, we cannot ignore that Turkey's President Erdogan is also responsible for widespread repression, including the arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of journalists, civil servants, and thousands of other critics who have been convicted and locked away after unfair trials. Torture is rampant in Turkey's jails, as it is in Saudi Arabia.

We know that multiple Saudi officials, including the Foreign Minister, Minister of Interior, Ambassador to the United States, and others—all members of the royal family—lied to the world, including on international television, repeatedly changing their story about what happened to Mr. Khashoggi. Perhaps most revealing was how cavalierly and shamelessly they lied, clearly assuming that their lies would be accepted at face value.

According to press reports the impulsive Crown Prince, while disclaiming any involvement in or knowledge of the crime, shortly after Mr. Khashoggi's disappearance referred to him as a "dangerous jihadist," which was also false.

The Saudis have yet to say what happened to Khashoggi's remains, except that they were turned over to a "local collaborator." Who and where is that person? What more are they hiding?

Reports indicate that the Saudis sent a team to Istanbul to destroy evidence of the crime, during the very period when the White House and State Department were insisting that the Saudi Government deserved more time to determine the facts. Instead, the Saudis were trying to cover their tracks.

There is every reason to believe that the Saudi royal family is still lying about who was involved.

We also know that, before murdering Mr. Khashoggi, the Saudi Government has had a long history of abducting, imprisoning, and executing dissidents and others after sham trials in violation of international law.

In the United States, the media's attention, for a time, was diverted by President Trump's racist rants about a so-called migrant invasion, his made-up claims of voter fraud, his partisan lies about Democrats, his steady stream of vitriolic and divisive rhetoric that has incited others to violence here and abroad, premeditated election frenzy, and now its aftermath.

I mention this because, for the past few weeks, the murder of Mr. Khashoggi had been eclipsed by other headlines. No longer. The vote on S.J. Res. 54 is the Senate's initial answer to the Saudi royal family and to the Trump administration.

This crime, on top of everything else, was so wicked, so repulsive, that no amount of money, no amount of oil, and no amount of lies can obscure it.

The Trump administration lobbied hard against the resolution, warning that, despite the Saudi royal family's many transgressions the U.S.-Saudi relationship is too important to risk. No one is seeking to sever relations with Saudi Arabia. But far more important is that the United States stands for the truth, for justice, for the laws of war, and that we don't stand by when top officials of another government, whether ally or adversary, conspire to murder a journalist or dissident and lie about it.

As of today, the Saudi authorities continue to ignore appeals to reveal what happened to Khashoggi's remains. After so many lies, they insist that the 18 men under arrest are the only ones involved in Mr. Khashoggi's murder. No one who knows anything about the Saudi royal family, which controls the Saudi Government with an iron fist, believes that.

President Trump, who has been loath to say anything that might implicate the Saudi royal family, at one point said there would be "very severe" consequences if investigations conclude that the Saudis are responsible. Since then, even as it has become obvious that the Saudis, including the Crown Prince, are responsible, he has said nothing further about what those consequences would be. To the contrary, he said "maybe he was, maybe he wasn't," but either way, it doesn't matter to President Trump.

Secretary Pompeo has said that Saudi Arabia has made a "serious commitment" to hold senior leaders and officials accountable for the murder of Mr. Khashoggi; yet so far, no senior Saudi leader or official has been arrested, and the Saudis appear to have rejected the Turkish Government's demand that the 18 individuals who have been arrested be turned over to face justice where the crime occurred.

According to press reports, the conclusion of U.S. intelligence experts is that such a heinous, premeditated crime by Saudi agents inside the Saudi consulate could not have taken place without the Crown Prince's knowledge and support. Does anyone seriously believe otherwise? Yet yesterday, the CIA Director was barred by the White House from meeting with Senators to answer questions about this. Knowing what we do about this White House, the inescapable conclusion is that whatever she would have told us would have contradicted the President's defense of the Saudi Government.

Despite all the Saudis' phony denials, the President appears disposed to ignore his own intelligence experts and rely instead on the Saudi royal family to investigate itself. Why? To protect billions of dollars in contracts for U.S. weapons purchased by the Saudis for use in Yemen. The White House has apparently concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will ride out

this storm and remain in power for years to come.

Journalists the world over face unprecedented dangers. Those who criticize corrupt, repressive governments do so at great risk to their own safety and the safety of their families. They are regularly the targets of harassment, threats, and assassination for nothing more than doing their job. If the Saudi royal family can escape punishment for the premeditated murder of a Washington Post journalist, what does that say to journalists everywhere? What does it say about the United States, if we are willing to accept that?

Yesterday, the vote to discharge S.J. Res. 54 showed that we do not and will not accept it. If the Saudi royal family hopes to salvage its tattered reputation and relations with the United States, it will need to take far more decisive action to end the mayhem in Yemen and bring to justice all those responsible for murdering Jamal Khashoggi.

REMEMBERING LUIGI TELARA

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to pay tribute to Luigi Telara, who passed away earlier this year on April 1. An Italian sculptor who hailed from the marble quarries of Carrara, Italy, Luigi's life was one of hard work, dedication, and beauty. While he spent a majority of his life in Italy, Luigi lived in Proctor, VT, where he worked for the Vermont Marble Company for 6 years. Although his time in America was short, the impact of his work can still be seen today in Vermont, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and even right here in the U.S. Capitol.

Although fostered and honed in his home country, Luigi's love for the art of sculpting spread far beyond his European roots. After attending Professional Institute for Marble, Industry, and Crafts—l'Istituto Professionale per l'Industria e l'Artigianato del Marmo—and later on Magistero d'Arte in Florence, the State of Vermont was lucky enough to become a second home and a source of inspiration for Luigi's grand marblework and refined artistry. He joined the Vermont Marble Company in 1955, where he was able to sculpt pieces we continue to feature here today, on the steps of our Capitol.

It was during his 6 years at the Vermont Marble Company that Luigi Telara made his mark on our great democratic institution with his assistance in the creation of the plaster models of the god of war and goddess of peace statues that stand atop the Capitol steps. "War" is a male figure with his head slightly titled and his gaze fixed ahead, ready to conquer what is ahead of him. To the right of "War" is "Peace," standing in a contrapposto pose, holding a fruit-bearing olive branch in her left hand, extending it towards "War."

Luigi's work should serve as a subtle reminder of what is at stake when you

are a Member of the Senate, the Nation's conscience. An important message that is too often overlooked. Next time you are running up the steps to make it for a vote, take a second to appreciate the dedication to detail that was put into the statues by Luigi, by Francesco Tonelli, by Franco Marchini, and by Geno Fregosi at the Vermont Marble Company.

Following his tenure at the Vermont Marble Company, Luigi went back to his hometown of Carrara where he became a teacher at the Instituto d'Arte Felice Palama di Massa and held the position of chair for 30 years. He never lost his passion for the art of sculpting, as he would continue to carve as a private practice.

Although not a citizen on paper, Luigi exemplified what it means to be an American. The United States is a country of immigrants after all, a great melting pot of cultures, and as Luigi's life and work demonstrated, our democratic institutions are the better for their service. Legacies like Luigi's serve as a reminder of what we as a nation lose when we put up walls and close our doors to those seeking to do what our ancestors did before us. We must not turn inward. We must continue to shine our great light and be the beacon of hope for the rest of the world.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-07 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Poland for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$655 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to

issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREGORY M. KAUSNER
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-07

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Poland.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* \$335 million.
Other \$320 million.
Total \$655 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty (20) High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 Launchers.

Thirty-six (36) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary.

Nine (9) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead.

Thirty (30) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) M57 Unitary.

Twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS).

Twenty (20) Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers.

Twenty-four (24) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).

Nine (9) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheel Vehicles (HMMWVs).

Non-MDE: Also included are twenty (20) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, communications equipment, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, personnel training and equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support, training, sensors, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (PL-B-UDJ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Service Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 29, 2018.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Poland—High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Related Support and Equipment

Poland has requested to buy twenty (20) High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 Launchers, thirty-six (36) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M31 Unitary, nine (9) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warheads, thirty (30) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) M57 Unitary, twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), twenty (20) Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers, twenty-four (24) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), and nine (9) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheel Vehicles (HMMWVs). Also included are twenty (20) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, com-

munications equipment, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, personnel training and equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support, training, sensors, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$655 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

Poland intends to use these defense articles and services to modernize its armed forces and expand its capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. This will contribute to Poland's interoperability with the United States and other allies. Poland will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, Grand Prairie, TX. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to Poland for program management reviews to support the program. Travel is expected to occur approximately twice per year as needed to support equipment fielding and training.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

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Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) is a highly mobile, all-weather indirect area fire artillery system. The HIMARS mission is to supplement cannon artillery to deliver a large volume of firepower within a short time against critical time-sensitive targets. At shorter ranges, HIMARS complements tube artillery with heavy barrages against assaulting forces as well as in the counter-fire, or defense suppression roles. The highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale, production, or by testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal SECRET information. Launcher platform software, weapon operational software, command and control special application software, and command and control loadable munitions module software are considered UNCLASSIFIED. The system specifications and limitations are classified SECRET. Vulnerability data is classified up to SECRET. Countermeasures, counter-countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are classified SECRET.

2. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary M31A1 uses a Unitary High Explosive (HE) 200 pound class warhead along with GPS aided Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based guidance and control for