

DeLauro	Krishnamoorthi	Price (NC)
DelBene	Kuster (NH)	Quigley
Demings	Langevin	Raskin
DeSaulnier	Larsen (WA)	Rice (NY)
Deutch	Larson (CT)	Richmond
Dingell	Lawrence	Rosen
Doggett	Lawson (FL)	Roybal-Allard
Doyle, Michael	Lee	Ruiz
F.	Levin	Ruppersberger
Engel	Lewis (GA)	Rush
Eshoo	Lieu, Ted	Ryan (OH)
Espallat	Lipinski	Sánchez
Esty (CT)	Loeb sack	Sarbanes
Evans	Loftgren	Schakowsky
Foster	Lowenthal	Schiff
Fudge	Lowe y	Schrader
Gabbard	Lujan Grisham,	Scott (VA)
Gallo	M.	Scott, David
Garamendi	Lujan, Ben Ray	Serrano
Gomez	Lynch	Sewell (AL)
Gonzalez (TX)	Maloney,	Shea-Porter
Green, Al	Carolyn B.	Sherman
Green, Gene	Maloney, Sean	Sires
Grijalva	Matsui	Smith (WA)
Gutiérrez	McCollum	Soto
Hastings	McEachin	Swalwell (CA)
Heck	McGovern	Takano
Higgins (NY)	Meeks	Thompson (CA)
Himes	Meng	Thompson (MS)
Hoyer	Moore	Titus
Huffman	Murphy (FL)	Tonko
Jackson Lee	Nadler	Torres
Jayapal	Napolitano	Tsongas
Jeffries	Neal	Vargas
Johnson (GA)	Nolan	Veasey
Johnson, E. B.	Norcross	Vela
Jones	O'Rourke	Velázquez
Kaptur	Pallone	Visclosky
Keating	Panetta	Walz
Kelly (IL)	Pascrell	Wasserman
Kennedy	Payne	Schultz
Khanna	Peters	Waters, Maxine
Kihuen	Peterson	Watson Coleman
Kildee	Pingree	Welch
Kilmer	Pocan	Wilson (FL)
Kind	Polis	Yarmuth

NOT VOTING—15

Bishop (GA)	Hanabusa	Moulton
Black	Harper	Pelosi
Cheney	Kustoff (TN)	Perlmutter
Ellison	LoBiondo	Sanford
Frankel (FL)	McNerney	Speier

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minute remaining.

□ 1335

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EMMER). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 989 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 6237.

The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WEBER) to preside over the Committee of the Whole.

□ 1337

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6237) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. WEBER of Texas in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time.

General debate shall not exceed 1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

The gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES).

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States Government.

Today, the Intelligence Committee is bringing its annual intelligence authorization bill to the floor. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan product that reflects contributions from all committee members. It was reported out of the committee by a unanimous voice vote.

The legislation provides the intelligence community the necessary resources and authorities to protect and defend the United States. For example, this bill authorizes a committee initiative to streamline defense intelligence related to the Defense Intelligence Agency. It enhances congressional oversight of intelligence activities by mandating intelligence community reports on threats to Federal elections, leaks of classified information, security clearance processing, and other vital activities. Furthermore, the bill increases pay for employees with unique cyber skills and creates a security center at the Department of Energy to protect our energy infrastructure.

Mr. Chairman, the bill authorizes enhanced injury benefits to CIA employees injured overseas due to hostile acts of terrorist activities. Moreover, it reauthorizes the Public Interest Declassification Board, aligns the reporting structure of the intelligence community chief financial officer and chief intelligence officer with statutes that govern other Federal agencies, and codifies longstanding congressional re-

porting requirements regarding the intelligence community information technology environment.

Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community comprises thousands of patriotic Americans who do difficult jobs, sometimes at great personal risk, to keep Americans safe from foreign threats. Today, these threats take many different forms and emanate from various parts of the world.

In the Middle East, the threat from ISIS has not ceased, despite its dramatic loss of territory. In fact, our intelligence professionals now face the daunting task of tracking ISIS fighters fleeing Syria for countries throughout the region and beyond.

Meanwhile, Iran is solidifying its influence, often through armed proxy militias, in its quest to control a Shiite Crescent across a wide swath of the Middle East.

In Asia, China poses numerous security challenges related to its expanding military capabilities, its growing international force projection, and its extensive extraterritorial claims. Additionally, the Chinese regime is engaged in widespread efforts, including licit and illicit means, to acquire critical U.S. national security technologies and intellectual property.

Furthermore, Russia continues to pose a pressing threat to the United States and many of our allies.

This is just a small snapshot of the threats the intelligence community addresses every day.

Additionally, our intelligence professionals confront an array of challenges posed by failed states, cyber warfare, nuclear proliferation, and many other matters.

This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our intelligence community have the funding authorities and support they need to carry out the mission to keep the United States safe, while providing Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight over their actions.

I would like to thank the men and women of this country who serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so many of them in the course of the committee's oversight work.

I would also like to thank all of the committee's members for their contributions to our oversight over the past year, and especially to our subcommittee chairmen and ranking members for their time and their efforts. The many hearings, briefings, and oversight visits our members carry out during the year provide the input for this authorization and the direction of this bill.

Finally, I would like to thank all the committee staff for their hard work and for their daily oversight of the intelligence community.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2018.

Hon. DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN NUNES: I am writing to you regarding H.R. 6237, the "Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019." The bill includes provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.

I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this legislation before the House of Representatives in an expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on Homeland Security will forego action on this bill. However, this is conditional based on our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 6237 at this time does not prejudice the Committee on Homeland Security with respect to the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in this bill or similar legislation.

This waiver is also given with the understanding that the Committee on Homeland Security reserves its authority to seek conferees on any provision within its jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be convened on this or similar legislation, and requests your support for such a request.

I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 6237, and ask that a copy of this letter and your response be included in the Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor. I look forward to working with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as this bill moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

July 11, 2018.

Hon. MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019. As you noted, certain provisions of the bill are related to the jurisdictional interests of the Committee on Homeland Security. I agree that your letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Homeland Security with respect to the appointment of conferees or any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or any similar legislation.

I appreciate your willingness to assist in expediting this legislation for floor consideration. I will include a copy of your letter and this response in the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. Thank you for your assistance with this matter.

Sincerely,

DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I join the chairman in urging support for the combined 2018 and 2019 Intelligence Authorization Act, which has been named in honor of Matthew Young Pollard, a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer who recently passed away, leaving behind a

young son and bereaved colleagues both in the Senate and here in the House.

For well over a year now, considerable attention has been focused on the House Intelligence Committee and the profound disagreements that we have had about the Russia investigation. Those differences remain, and the American people should know that my Democratic colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and I continue the important work of investigating Russia's interference in the 2016 Presidential election.

Despite our disagreements over Russia with the majority, however, I have consistently and publicly maintained that the committee must seek to cord off our disagreements over the Russia investigation and continue with our other work on as bipartisan a basis as possible. We owe the tens of thousands of men and women in the intelligence community nothing less, not only because they put themselves at personal risk every day, but also because their work is so important to the country that it demands the shared responsibility and oversight of the Congress.

□ 1345

The Intelligence Committee has a history of producing bipartisan bills even under the most difficult political circumstances.

I am pleased that our staffs have worked to reach a mutually acceptable final text, and have been able to weed out provisions that would have made it impossible to move forward jointly.

Much of the committee's oversight work is reflected in the bill as classified, but we can discuss some of the 2018-2019 IAA's elements openly, including the fact that the bill helps to better ensure that our elections are free from interference or manipulation.

This is essential to our democracy, and the bill includes important provisions that continue the work that we have been doing in the committee during the course of the work on the Russia investigation, and as a part of our normal oversight to maintain the integrity of our election system.

The bill also provides funding to our intelligence community in order to meet all threats from terrorism to nation-state actors. The bill authorizes funding across a wide range of endeavors that will allow the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to not only respond to threats, but to preempt them.

The bill takes steps to prevent a repeat of the Russian active measures campaign that targeted our 2016 election, by including a minority-authored provision requiring a briefing to key congressional leaders, including members of the intelligence community and committee, if the United States faces a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign directed at a federal election.

The bill also ensures that America's technological advantage remains a pri-

ority for our intelligence services. As such, the bill resources and directs efforts that will promote our advantages across a range of cutting-edge domains, from space to artificial intelligence.

It enhances transparency and allows public access to certain work of the IC. The bill reauthorizes for 10 years the Public Interest Declassification Board which advises the President and executive branch agencies on the review and declassification of IC records of historical importance.

The bill also includes minority provisions related to parental leave, student loan repayment, and diversity and inclusiveness that are intended to make an exceptional workforce even better.

In the end, the men and women who serve in the intelligence community and the Defense Department are the most important factor in the success of our national security.

There are many other provisions in the bill that will build on the work of past years and move us further along technical and other pathways to meet new challenges and those still on the horizon.

This bill advances our national security, reinforces the principle of congressional oversight, and honors our values as a Nation.

Mr. Chair, I urge the support of the House, and look forward to considering amendments that will make a good bill even better. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CONAWAY), the chairman of the Agriculture Committee.

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding and for his dedicated work on the committee leading us through these rather tumultuous times on a lot of fronts, but he has done a terrific job, and I have been proud to serve on the committee with him.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in support of the 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act. Intelligence gathering is of utmost importance in our national security and is essential in keeping Americans safe here at home.

It is imperative that we provide to those dedicated individuals of our intelligence community the tools, resources, and support they need to carry out missions successfully, and Mr. Chairman, this bill does just that.

The successful completion of increasingly difficult missions by these consummate professionals ensures policymakers are provided the crucial information that they need to make the most informed decisions to counter our near-term threats and those peaking on the horizon.

This bill addresses both challenges of a constantly changing threat environment and advances in technology to keep American cybersecurity at the forefront of global efforts and a step ahead of our adversaries.

Mr. Chair, as you and others in the room know as well, our democratic

elections have become the target of foreign influence campaigns, not only here at home, but across the Western world by adversaries seeking to undermine and disrupt one of our most sacred democratic institutions.

Mr. Chair, this bill allows for a path for the IC to advise and inform those on the front lines of our elections of the perceived threats from abroad. In addition, it also ensures that Congress stays informed of ongoing adversarial influence campaigns against democratic elections across the globe and here at home as well, as well as the actions that our IC is taking to counter those threats.

Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of this year's Intelligence Authorization Act. I encourage all of my colleagues to vote for it. I look forward to implementing this in the next year, and the oversight, authorities and tools that it gives Congress to be able to continue to provide the correct oversight for our intelligence agencies across the executive branch.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. CARSON). He is the ranking member on the Emerging Threats Subcommittee and brings a wealth of experience in homeland security to the Congress.

Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to say a few words about this very important bill. I say important because as we face threats around the world, threats like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism, the annual Intelligence Authorization Act is meant to provide our intelligence personnel with the resources and authorities they need to keep America safe.

In some respects, Mr. Chairman, this bill accomplishes that very goal. We refocus our resources on countering our most significant adversary states. We better equip the intel community to counter foreign interference in our elections, which is very critical going into 2018, all the way to 2020.

We give new authorities related to pervasive challenges, including threats to our supply chain, recruitment and development of minority talent, and strengthening of the cyber and technical workforce.

I support these very important developments. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the bill also supports or indicates significant problematic changes to many classified authorities. I am particularly concerned about what this means for the way we conduct counterterrorism operations.

Mr. Chairman, the Trump administration has changed counterterrorism policies in a way that does not make America safer. By expanding the areas where the U.S. Government may be operating and broadening authorities, Mr. Chairman, we are planting the seeds of anger and hate which will fester and grow, increasing the threat of an attack in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in protecting the United States and her allies. But, if two decades of the war against terrorism have taught us anything, it is that we can't fight our way out of this. Yes, we need to target known terrorist leaders, Mr. Chairman, but we also need to actively minimize actions that spur new hatred and drive people to terrorism.

After years of striving for a more comprehensive, targeted, and productive counterterrorism approach, this bill sends us back to the days of broad unrestrained authorities. With so much on the line, Mr. Chairman, we should be using this bill to send a message to this administration that America must maintain her values.

Success at any cost is not success at all, but a foolhardy approach to leverage power. We must keep America safe, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Alabama (Ms. SEWELL). She is the ranking member on the Department of Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture Subcommittee and does a fabulous job for our committee.

Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. This bill recognizes the critical work that every member of the intelligence community performs to protect our Nation: first, by enhancing resources and authorities for our highest priority intelligence initiatives, and secondly, by enforcing and reinforcing the principles of good governance, transparency, and accountability to the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I am a strong advocate for transparency, which is a challenge for the intelligence community because of the need to protect sensitive sources and equities, but a challenge that can be met. One groundbreaking example is the unclassified January 2017 intelligence community assessment that notified Americans about the Russian attack on our democracy in the 2016 election.

This bill directs the intelligence community to continue public awareness reporting related to election security because the threat from Russia is still ongoing.

As a ranking member on the HPSCI Subcommittee on Department of Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture for the last 3 years, one of my priorities is to ensure that the United States achieves and maintains a leadership position in next-generation technologies, especially in space.

Space is an emerging battleground, so it is imperative for our national security that America maintains a strategic advantage in space as well as we do on the ground and at sea. Over the last year, the subcommittee has continued our dialogue with the intelligence community about its accomplishments, but also the challenges it

faces and the resources it needs to meet these challenges.

I am pleased to report that this bill includes provisions that strengthen our Nation's access and resilience in space by investing in next-generation technologies and assets.

Mr. Chairman, I am also a strong believer that the success of our Nation's intelligence operation hinges on our most important asset: our people. As our intelligence missions and objectives continue to evolve, we will undoubtedly require a more diverse workforce in the intelligence community to meet our needs. We must work together to build and promote an intelligence community that is truly representative of the rich diversity and inclusive society that makes our Nation great.

In order to more effectively address these emerging and ongoing threats, we need an agile workforce with a wide range of backgrounds, experiences, skill sets, and talents. For that reason, Congress has invested in American universities and colleges to provide all students with the skills that they need to serve in our intelligence community.

As smart investors, we want to see that the investment is accomplishing the objectives and encouraging qualified graduates to apply to join the intelligence community. This bill directs the Director of National Intelligence to take a more active role in ensuring that one program, in particular, the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence, achieves that objective of diversity.

I also strongly support the Hastings amendment that directs the intelligence community to intensify recruitment outreach at every corner of our Nation. Encouraging geographical diversity in the intelligence community will naturally also enhance racial, gender, cultural, and economic diversity.

I want to see that every interested student, whether in a big city or a small town, is aware of the career opportunities in the intelligence community. It is a path that is most important.

The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Alabama.

Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, I believe for these reasons and others that my colleagues should support this bill.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HECK), someone who we have come to rely on in our committee in a great many areas, but, in particular, the threat posed by foreign actors investing in American technologies, with an eye toward either appropriating our intellectual property, or making use of those

technologies for the purpose of spying on Americans.

Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member. I am here to support the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.

Mr. Chair, I was just placed on the Intel Committee a year ago January, and I have learned an awful lot, most notably, how incredibly difficult it really is to do the work of an intelligence officer. And I want to, frankly, take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the IC for their dedication and service.

For as difficult a job as it is, it is even more difficult, if not impossible, to do it without a security clearance. In the first quarter—you are hearing this number correctly—of this year, the average processing time for a top security clearance was 534 days. That backlog creates difficulties in hiring in the intelligence and defense agencies. And, frankly, it is creating a legacy problem for our future.

And you are hearing this number correctly, too. The backlog of people waiting for those clearances is now over 700,000, and that is what has led the Government Accountability Office to declare this “a high risk issue,” and that means that it is one of the areas that the GAO believes is most in need of reform.

The country cannot wait 2 years to recruit top talent for our IC. Applicants for clearance, of course, should be carefully scrutinized, and the United States should take care that only responsible and trustworthy parties gain access to our Nation’s classified information.

□ 1400

We absolutely should guard it as a national treasure. But we need to give the IC the people it needs to collect, process, analyze, and distribute information, pure and simple. So the bill before us today does, in fact, include language to address the issue of security clearances.

As we progress forward, we must do so methodically, with feedback from the most affected. We have a long process ahead of us, but if we don’t take steps now, frankly, pretty soon it is going to be too late. We must address the security clearance dilemma, and we must pass this bill to begin that process.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER), who is the former ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a great stalwart for the men and women who work within the IC.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bipartisan bill. First and foremost, intelligence is about people.

We cannot collect, analyze, and utilize intelligence effectively unless we can recruit, hire, and retain the best people possible. Therefore, I want to thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF, and their staffs, for working with me to include provisions in this bill that improve parental leave policies of the intelligence community.

These provisions will ensure that these benefits are, to the fullest extent possible, in line with the private sector. Doing so will help the IC develop and retain the workforce required to keep America safe against all our foes, both new and old.

This legislation also takes important steps to ensure the IC provides critical updates to Congress in the event the United States faces a foreign cyber attack or other active measures that threaten the heart of our democracy: our elections. There is no doubt that Russia will continue to exert a malign influence on the heart and soul of our democracy.

This cannot be tolerated, and I strongly support the efforts of the chairman and ranking member to ensure Congress will be informed of the most critical threats to our democracy.

I thank the chairman and ranking member, and the entire intelligence community and staff, for their dedicated oversight of the intelligence community and their commitment to enhancing national security.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I will briefly say that the former ranking member, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, who has many intelligence professionals in his district, is highly regarded in our committee, and I respect and am thankful for his support of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire of the gentleman whether he has any further speakers?

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I will take this opportunity to close, and I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, 1 month ago, the CIA held its annual memorial ceremony to honor its fallen. This year, the agency added four stars to the memorial wall, signifying four officers killed in the line of duty but who cannot be publicly named even in death. That, Mr. Chairman, is the sacrifice that we ask of our intelligence professionals, and it is one that they are prepared to make.

In exchange for that fidelity, it is our job to provide the intelligence community with the tools and authorities that it needs to keep us safe, all while exercising our constitutional authority of oversight and direction. This bill meets that responsibility, and I urge its passage by the House.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and our incredible staff. In particular, I thank Shannon Stuart, Carly Blake, Alan Souza, Mark Stewart,

Wells Bennett, Scott Glabe, Rheanne Wirkkala, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Thomas Eager, Kris Breaux, Christine Bocchino, Maher Bitar, Shannon Green, Linda Cohen, Patrick Boland, and Tim Bergreen.

These staff members labor three floors below the Capitol in a space we affectionately call—and sometimes unaffectionately call—the bunker. They do so for long hours and without daylight. We are very grateful to them and for their service.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I thank the staffs on both the majority and minority sides. They do put in a lot of effort. It is one of the smallest staffs in the Capitol of any committee, so we are thankful that we were able to get this bill done in a bipartisan manner. We look for its passage on the floor this afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on House consideration of H.R. 6237, the “Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 and 2019.”

I thank Chairman NUNES, Ranking Member SCHIFF for their work to bring this bill before the full House of consideration.

Our nation’s national security professionals require our support in words as well as deeds in the form of legislation like the authorization measure we are debating and sufficient funding to carry out the work of protecting our great nation from our enemies.

I offered several Jackson Lee Amendments for consideration under this bill.

I thank the Rules Committee for making in order Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3, designated as No. 33 on the Rules Committee roster for consideration for this bill.

This Jackson Lee Amendment, amends the Sense of Congress already in the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance holder’s association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, or other impermissible factors.

In addition to this amendment, I offered three other Jackson Lee Amendments to H.R. 6237:

The first Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 32 on the Rules Committee roster, and would have amended the Sense of Congress already in the bill that addresses the importance of conducting background checks for retention of security clearances or the issuance of new clearances to also consider an applicant’s membership in a hate group and their participation in activities espoused by hate groups that involve violence or incitement of violence which disrupts civic life.

The second Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 34, on the Rules Committee rosters, and would have amended the Sense of Congress already in the bill on the

importance of review of a security clearance by adding that a security clearance should not be held by an individual who actively engages in violent acts in the United States or its territories that target persons based upon their race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity for the purpose of inflicting physical harm or emotional distress with the objective of normalizing anti-social behavior towards vulnerable groups.

The third Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 38 on the Rules Committee rosters, and would have required that the Director of National Intelligence conduct an assessment and report to Congress on the reliance of intelligence activities on civilian contractors to support Government activities, including intelligence analysis.

Each of these Jackson Lee Amendments sought to strengthen and improve the process of security clearance awards and oversight of contractors engaged in national security work.

The rights and dignity of all Americans must be held dear and protected from assaults that challenge the very freedom we value most.

It is our diversity and our capacity for tolerance of others who are different that is the essence of American exceptionalism.

As a nation we have come through many struggles and challenges to reach a point where we accept the diversity of our nation as a strength and not a weakness.

A period in our history that challenges the very foundation of our nation was framed by a speech given by Abraham Lincoln on the occasion of his nomination to become the Senator from the State of Illinois.

He said: "A house divided against itself, cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South."

He was speaking of the pernicious national shame of slavery that led ultimately to the Civil War that cost more than 600,000 lives over the very question of human rights and human dignity for all persons.

Although the question of equality and justice for all has been asked and answered during pivotal moments in our nation's history today we are facing another challenge to our core beliefs.

I offered these Jackson Lee Amendments to establish that this Congress is not wavering in its commitment to protect the lives, liberties or freedom of Americans from those who seek to do them harm.

Specifically, four of the Jackson Lee Amendments were prompted by the actions of Mr. Miselis who has a security clearance and worked for Northrup Grumman, a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in physical violence against persons protesting racism and white supremacy in Charlottesville, Virginia.

In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in Charlottesville participating in activities

in support of white supremacy, which were captured on video and in photos.

Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital interest to our nation and its defense.

Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at the white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.

The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its members.

The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group whose members believe they are fighting against a "modern world" corrupted by the "destructive cultural influences" of liberals, Jews, Muslims and non-white immigrants.

They refer to themselves as the "premier MMA (mixed martial arts) club of the Alt-Right."

RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.

Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political rallies and demonstrations.

RAM members consider themselves to be part of the "Alt Right."

RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.

RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but rebranded themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.

The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because of the violence associated with its members.

The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with our government.

But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by the ancient wisdom: "Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other person's nose begins."

There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to assemble and that limit is violence.

I know that the work of our intelligence community is difficult and often goes without notice by the American public.

I firmly believe that the actions of those who hold security clearances as they go about their lives should reflect the higher goals and values of nation.

To engage in violent acts against persons engaged in constitutionally protected activity on account of race, religion, color, gender, sexual orientation, language of original, immigration status, or creed is an affront to the framers of the Constitution for this great nation.

The actions of Mr. Miselis put at risk not only his career, but also the reputation of people who hold national security clearances.

The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency should not go unnoticed.

I am committed to the task of building the capacity and resources of the intelligence

community to ensure that our nation's national security and national defense are all that they need to be.

I ask that my colleagues support the Jackson Lee Amendment made in order for consideration of H.R. 6237, and support the underlying bill.

The Acting CHAIR (Mr. POE of Texas). All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommend by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 115–80. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.

The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

H.R. 6237

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the "Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019".

(b) *ORGANIZATION.*—This Act is organized into two divisions as follows:

(1) *DIVISION A.*—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.

(2) *DIVISION B.*—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.

DIVISION A—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This division may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018".

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents for this division is as follows:

Sec. 101. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 102. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 1101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 1102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 1103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.

Sec. 1104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 1201. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 1202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 1301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 1302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 1401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 1402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing environment.

Sec. 1403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.

TITLE V—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

- Sec. 1501. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service officers.
- Sec. 1502. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.
- Sec. 1503. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.
- Sec. 1504. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
- Sec. 1505. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
- Sec. 1506. Report on cyber exchange program.
- Sec. 1507. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
- Sec. 1508. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.
- Sec. 1509. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
- Sec. 1510. Reports on intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
- Sec. 1511. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of classified information.
- Sec. 1512. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

In this division, the terms “congressional intelligence committees” and “intelligence community” have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 1101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

(b) CERTAIN SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION.—Funds appropriated by the Department of Defense Missile Defeat and Defense Enhancements Appropriations Act, 2018 (division B of Public Law 115–96) for intelligence or intelligence-related activities are specifically authorized by the Congress for purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094), as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations pursuant to section 1102, and are subject to such section 504.

SEC. 1102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 1101 and, subject to section 1103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 1101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 1103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 1102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed—

(1) 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element; or

(2) 10 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element for the purposes of converting the performance of any function by contractors to performance by civilian personnel.

(b) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 1102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—Not later than 15 days prior to the exercise of an authority described in subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) a written notice of the exercise of such authority; and

(2) in the case of an exercise of such authority subject to the limitation in subsection (a)(2), a written justification for the contractor conversion that includes a comparison of whole-of-Government costs.

SEC. 1104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$546,900,000.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 797 positions as of September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 1102(a).

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 1102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 1201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$514,000,000.

SEC. 1202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting “, as determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that position.”;

(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking “12-month” and inserting “2-year”;

(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”;

(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking “one year” each place such term appears and inserting “two years”;

(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; and

(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

“(h) CONDITIONAL ELECTION OF INSURABLE INTEREST SURVIVOR ANNUITY BY PARTICIPANTS MARRIED AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT.—

“(1) AUTHORITY TO MAKE DESIGNATION.—Subject to the rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the system after the participant’s death, except that any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to the participant’s spouse shall only be effective if the participant’s spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the participant’s reduced annuity.

“(2) REDUCTION IN PARTICIPANT’S ANNUITY.—The annuity payable to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.

“(3) COMMENCEMENT OF SURVIVOR ANNUITY.—The annuity payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before the designated individual dies.

“(4) RECOMPUTATION OF PARTICIPANT’S ANNUITY ON DEATH OF DESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL.—An

annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.”.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(A) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.—The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by striking “221(h),” and inserting “221(i),”; and

(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by striking “221(k)” and inserting “221(l)”.

(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.—Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking “221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),” and inserting “221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),”.

(b) ANNUITIES FOR FORMER SPOUSES.—Subparagraph (B) of section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”.

(c) PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT.—Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking “October 1, 1990” both places that term appears and inserting “March 31, 1991”.

(d) REEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.—Section 273 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) PART-TIME REEMPLOYED ANNUITANTS.—The Director shall have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.—The amendments made by subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 1301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 1302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEC. 1401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking “such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;” and inserting “current and former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;”.

SEC. 1402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER—INFORMATION-SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

(a) INFORMATION-SHARING ENVIRONMENT.—Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “President” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “President” both places that term appears and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”.

(b) PROGRAM MANAGER.—Section 1016(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking “The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the President (at the President’s sole discretion).” and inserting “Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program manager shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 1403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.”.

TITLE V—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 1501. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS.

(a) LENGTH OF PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT.—Subsection (a) of section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive years.”.

(b) FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.—Section 702 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is amended by—

(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(c) FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all members of the Service who receive foreign language training in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive tours in positions in which the acquired language is both relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.

“(2) OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), at least one of the three successive tours referred to in such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.

“(3) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship or in the interest of national security.

“(4) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph (3) was invoked.”.

SEC. 1502. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.

(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,

the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include—

(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;

(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referenda;

(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and

(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).

(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

(c) RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Russian influence campaign” means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States.

SEC. 1503. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—As provided in paragraph (2), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following:

(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices.

(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats.

(C) An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.

(2) SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTAL.—A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows:

(A) In the case of a report regarding a special election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2019, not later than the date that is 60 days before the date of such special election.

(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is 1 year before the date of the election.

(3) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.

(b) TREATMENT OF CAMPAIGNS SUBJECT TO HEIGHTENED THREATS.—If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a

heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

SEC. 1504. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating security clearances persists, both within elements of the intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even more;

(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions of such elements;

(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different opportunities;

(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and

(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and consistent with national security, permitting new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security clearances, work that either does not require a security clearance or requires only a low-level interim clearance.

(b) IN GENERAL.—Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting “and” after the semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (C);

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS.—(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.

“(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the report:

“(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations sponsored for new applicants.

“(B) The total number of security clearance periodic reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.

“(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows:

“(i) For 180 days or less.

“(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.

“(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.

“(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.

“(v) For 24 months or longer.

“(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—

“(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred during the period covered by the report; and

“(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph requirement.

“(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.

“(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.

“(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (a)(1)” and inserting “subsections (a)(1) and (b)”.

SEC. 1505. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of—

(A) officials of the Government of Russia;

(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;

(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law; or

(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.

(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph (1) and associated entities.

(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of Russia.

(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.

(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.

(6) An identification of—

(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and associated entities into the United States;

(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and financial system, including specific sectors, which have been or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat finance activities; and

(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the threat to the United States financial system and United States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized crime.

(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) THREAT FINANCE DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat finance” means—

(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;

(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat actors;

(3) sanctions evasion; and

(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

SEC. 1506. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary exchange program between elements of the intelligence community and private technology companies under which—

(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has elected to receive the detailee; and

(2) an employee of a private technology company with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to an element of the intelligence community that has elected to receive the detailee.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the feasibility of establishing the exchange program described in such subsection.

(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the exchange program.

(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence community that would result from the exchange program.

SEC. 1507. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.

(a) REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other practices and procedures relating to intelligence community whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.

(b) OBJECTIVE OF REVIEW.—The objective of the review required under subsection (a) is to

identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

(c) **CONDUCT OF REVIEW.**—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

SEC. 1508. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential foreign investments into the United States.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description of the current process for the provision of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);

(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director, including the sufficiency of resources and personnel to prepare such materials; and

(3) recommendations to improve such process.

SEC. 1509. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

“(a) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTING.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once every 6 months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.

“(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, the following:

“(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(C) Of the number of such completed investigations identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.

“(b) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORTING.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the status of each referral made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was made.

“(2) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a minimum, the following:

“(A) The date the referral was received.

“(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was substantiated by the Department of Justice.

“(C) A statement indicating the highest level of classification of the information that was revealed in the unauthorized disclosure.

“(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal investigation related to the referral is active.

“(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges have been filed related to the referral.

“(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized disclosure to a particular entity or individual.

“(c) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified annex.

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) COVERED OFFICIAL.—The term ‘covered official’ means—

“(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and

“(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.

“(2) INVESTIGATION.—The term ‘investigation’ means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(3) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term ‘unauthorized disclosure of classified information’ means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any recipient.

“(4) UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term ‘unauthorized public disclosure of classified information’ means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the following new item:

“Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.”.

SEC. 1510. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

(a) **REPORTS ON PROCESS AND CRITERIA UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS.**—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report describing—

(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence community—

(i) the title of the official or officials responsible for determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for

review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(ii) the process used by such element to make such determination; and

(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process.

(2) CHANGES TO PROCESS OR CRITERIA.—Not later than 30 days after any significant change is made to the process and criteria used by any element of the intelligence community for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such change.

(3) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once each calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report containing, with respect to the previous year—

(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;

(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the vulnerabilities excluded from review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph 5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document.

(2) UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that contains—

(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process known to have been patched.

(3) NONDUPLICATION.—The Director of National Intelligence may forgo submission of an annual report required under this subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph 4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document already has been submitted to Congress, and such annual report contains the information that would otherwise be required to be included in an annual report under this subsection.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS DOCUMENT.—The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document” means the executive branch document entitled “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process” dated November 15, 2017.

(2) VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.—The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Process” means the interagency review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.

(3) VULNERABILITY.—The term “vulnerability” means a weakness in an information system or its components (for example, system security procedures, hardware design, and internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.

SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds that section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence

committees “fully and currently informed” about all “intelligence activities” of the United States, and to “furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an official of an adversary foreign government using methods other than established intelligence channels; and

(2) each such notification should include—

(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified information covered by the notification;

(B) a description of such classified information;

(C) identification of the individual who made such disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made; and

(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADVERSARY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term “adversary foreign government” means the government of any of the following foreign countries:

(A) North Korea.

(B) Iran.

(C) China.

(D) Russia.

(E) Cuba.

(2) COVERED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term “covered classified information” means classified information that was—

(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; or

(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.

(3) ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.—The term “established intelligence channels” means methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence community.

(4) INDIVIDUAL IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.—The term “individual in the executive branch” means any officer or employee of the executive branch, including individuals—

(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the Constitution;

(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive service (or similar service for senior executives of particular departments or agencies).

SEC. 1512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

(a) NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT.—

(1) CLARIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.—Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2402(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.

(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.—Section 3233(b) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2423(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking “Administration” and insert-

ing “Department”; and

(B) by inserting “Intelligence and” after “the Office of”.

(b) ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT.—Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting “Intelligence and” after “The Director of”.

(c) NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.—Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting “and Counterintelligence” after “Office of Intelligence”;

(2) by striking subparagraph (F);

(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and

(4) in subparagraph (H), as so redesignated, by realigning the margin of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left.

DIVISION B—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this division is as follows:

Sec. 201. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 202. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.

Sec. 2304. Repeal of Joint Intelligence Community Council.

Sec. 2305. Permanent enhanced procurement authority to manage supply chain risks.

Sec. 2306. Intelligence community information technology environment.

Sec. 2307. Development of secure cellular voice solution for intelligence community.

Sec. 2308. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.

Sec. 2309. Submission of intelligence community policies.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 2401. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.

Sec. 2402. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 2411. CIA subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations.

Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments for CIA personnel.

Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Subtitle C—Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department of Energy

Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.

Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive Committee and budget reporting requirement.

Subtitle D—Other Elements

Sec. 2431. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security personnel at field locations.

Sec. 2432. Framework for roles, missions, and functions of Defense Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 2433. Consultation by Secretary of Defense with Director of National Intelligence for certain functions.

Sec. 2434. Construction of National Security Agency East Campus Building 3.

Sec. 2435. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance Office.

TITLE V—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 2501. Public Interest Declassification Board.

Sec. 2502. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

Sec. 2503. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices.

Sec. 2504. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related programs.

Sec. 2505. Comptroller General of the United States report on senior executives of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 2506. Briefings on counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Sec. 2507. Briefing on FBI offering permanent residence to sources and cooperators.

Sec. 2508. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

In this division, the terms “congressional intelligence committees” and “intelligence community” have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Department of Defense.

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The National Security Agency.

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.

(8) The Department of State.

(9) The Department of the Treasury.

(10) The Department of Energy.

(11) The Department of Justice.

(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) **SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.**—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.

(b) **AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.**—

(1) **AVAILABILITY.**—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) **DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.**—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) **LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.**—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2019 the sum of \$514,524,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2020.

(b) **CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM**SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2019 the sum of \$514,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS**SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR CYBER POSITIONS.

Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049a) is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

“(a) **SPECIAL RATES OF PAY FOR POSITIONS REQUIRING EXPERTISE IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS.**—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding part III of title 5, United States Code, the head of each element of the intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of positions in such element that require expertise in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics—

“(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and

“(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection (b) or (c), as applicable.

“(2) **TREATMENT.**—The special rate supplements resulting from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States Code.”;

(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections (c) through (g), respectively;

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) **SPECIAL RATES OF PAY FOR CYBER POSITIONS.**—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Director of the National Security Agency may establish a special rate of pay—

“(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or

“(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the Vice President of the United States under section 104 of title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced skills and competencies and that perform critical functions that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.

“(2) **PAY LIMITATION.**—Employees receiving a special rate under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay limitation that parallels the limitation established in section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that—

“(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and

“(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate established for the Vice President of the United States under section 104 of title 3, United States Code.

“(3) **LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS.**—The number of individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.

“(4) **LIMITATION ON USE AS COMPARATIVE REFERENCE.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may not be used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).”;

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “A minimum” and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (b), a minimum”;

(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting “or (b)” after “by subsection (a)”;

(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017” and inserting “Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019”; and

(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting “or (b)” after “subsection (a)”.

SEC. 2304. REPEAL OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

(a) **REPEAL.**—Section 101A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022) is hereby repealed.

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 101A.

(c) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by striking “and, after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council”.

SEC. 2305. PERMANENT ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS.

Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–87; 125 Stat. 1875; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking subsection (g).

SEC. 2306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.

(a) **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.**—

(1) **DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating the performance by elements of the intelligence community of IC ITE, including each of the following:

(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable IC ITE rules and regulations.

(B) Ensuring IC ITE measurable performance goals exist.

(C) Documenting IC ITE standards and practices.

(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence community related to any disagreements arising out of the implementation of IC ITE.

(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the intelligence community and carrying out such other responsibilities as are necessary for the effective implementation of IC ITE.

(2) **KEY SERVICE PROVIDERS.**—Key service providers shall be responsible for—

(A) providing key services, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence; and

(B) providing the Director with information requested and required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director under paragraph (1).

(3) **USE OF KEY SERVICES.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), each element of the intelligence community shall use key services when such services are available.

(B) **EXCEPTION.**—The Director of National Intelligence may provide for a written exception to the requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a compelling financial or mission need for such exception.

(b) **MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or more accountable IC ITE executives to be responsible for—

(1) IC ITE management, financial control, and integration;

(2) ensuring the performance of each key service, including establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;

(3) ensuring independent testing of each IC ITE core service, including testing by the intended users, to evaluate performance against measurable service requirements and to ensure the capability meets user requirements; and

(4) coordinate IC ITE transition or restructuring efforts, including phase out of legacy systems.

(c) **SECURITY PLAN.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

Director of National Intelligence shall develop and maintain a security plan for IC ITE.

(d) **LONG-TERM ROADMAP.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall include each of the following:

(1) A description of the minimum required and desired key service requirements, including—

(A) key performance parameters; and
(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.

(2) IC ITE implementation milestones, including each of the following:

(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of key service capabilities during each of the following phases:

(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity demonstration.

(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.

(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.

(iv) System retirement.

(B) Dependencies of such key service capabilities.

(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to incorporate key service capabilities.

(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued capabilities to be phased out.

(3) Such other matters as the Director determines appropriate.

(e) **BUSINESS PLAN.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of the following:

(1) A uniform approach to identify IC ITE key service funding requests within the proposed budget, including multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection (d).

(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy information technology or alternative capabilities where IC ITE services will also be available.

(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify transition and restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring IC ITE services, as well as IC ITE services that have changed designations among core service, service of common concern, and agency unique service.

(4) A fair and equitable rate structure for use of IC ITE.

(f) **QUARTERLY PRESENTATIONS.**—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates regarding ongoing implementation of IC ITE as compared to the requirements in the most recently submitted security plan required by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by subsection (d), and business plan required by subsection (e).

(g) **ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy changes related to or affecting IC ITE, new initiatives or strategies related to or impacting IC ITE, and changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by subsection (d), and business plan required by subsection (e).

(h) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) The term “agency unique service” means a capability that is unique to and used only within one element of the intelligence community.

(2) The term “core service” means a capability that is available to multiple elements of the intelligence community and required for consistent operation of IC ITE.

(3) The term “intelligence community information technology environment” or “IC ITE” means all of the information technology services across the intelligence community, including the data sharing and protection environment across multiple classification domains.

(4) The term “key service” is a core service or service of common concern, but is not an agency unique service.

(5) The term “key service provider” is the entity responsible and accountable for implementing a key service within the IC ITE.

(6) The term “service of common concern” means a capability available across IC ITE that is of interest to two or more elements of the intelligence community.

(i) **SUNSET.**—The section shall have no effect on or after September 30, 2024.

SEC. 2307. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE CELLULAR VOICE SOLUTION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall certify and approve the operation of a National Intelligence Program enterprise-wide secure voice cellular solution that leverages commercially available technology and operates on existing commercial cellular networks.

(b) **POLICY.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community policy for the cellular voice solution required by subsection (a) that addresses each of the following:

(1) Determinations regarding eligibility to use a device covered by such cellular voice solution.

(2) The appropriate classification levels associated with the use of secure cellular phones.

(3) Measures that should be taken prior to initiating or receiving a secure cellular call.

(4) Appropriate methods for storage of secure devices when not in the physical possession of an authorized user.

(5) Such other matters as the Director determines appropriate.

(c) **COSTS.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that annual operating costs of the secure cellular solution requirement in subsection (a), excluding initial development and deployment, are born on a cost-reimbursable basis by each relevant element of the intelligence community.

SEC. 2308. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.

(a) **POLICY REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider threat standards.

(b) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall implement the policy established under subsection (a).

SEC. 2309. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.

(a) **SUBMISSION OF POLICIES.**—

(1) **CURRENT POLICY.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees using the electronic repository all non-publicly available policies, directives, and guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in effect as of the date of the submission.

(2) **CONTINUOUS UPDATES.**—Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, modifies, or rescinds a policy, directive, or guidance of the intelligence community, the Director shall—

(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of such addition, modification, or removal; and

(B) update the electronic repository with respect to such addition, modification, or removal.

(b) **ELECTRONIC REPOSITORY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “electronic repository” means the electronic distribution mechanism, in

use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees information.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 2401. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: “The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.”

SEC. 2402. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: “The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.”

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 2411. CIA SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.

Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “(50 U.S.C. 403–4a).” and inserting “(50 U.S.C. 403–4a).”;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking “and” at the end;

(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):

“(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated by the Agency as an austere location.”

SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR CIA PERSONNEL.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 19 the following new section:

“SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

“(a) **ADJUSTMENT OF COMPENSATION FOR CERTAIN INJURIES.**—

“(1) **INCREASE.**—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may increase the amount of monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may determine the amount of each such increase by taking into account—

“(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;

“(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee became injured; and

“(C) the seniority of the covered employee.

“(2) **MAXIMUM.**—Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.

“(b) **COSTS FOR TREATING QUALIFYING INJURIES.**—The Director may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, or other provision of Federal law.

“(c) **TREATMENT OF AMOUNTS.**—For purposes of section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this section

shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code.

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) COVERED DEPENDENT.—The term ‘covered dependent’ means a family member of a covered employee who, on or after September 11, 2001—
“(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
“(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(2) COVERED EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘covered employee’ means an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(3) COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—The term ‘covered individual’ means an individual who—

“(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency from other agencies of the United States Government or from the Armed Forces; or
“(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director; and

“(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(4) QUALIFYING INJURY.—The term ‘qualifying injury’ means the following:

“(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury incurred—

“(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities occurring during a period in which the covered dependent is accompanying the covered employee to an assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
“(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of the covered dependent.

“(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered individual, an injury incurred—

“(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities occurring during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign country; and
“(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of the covered employee or the covered individual.”.

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees such regulations.

(c) APPLICATION.—Section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to—

(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code, beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “POLICEMEN” and inserting “POLICE OFFICERS”; and

(2) in paragraph (1)—

(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “500 feet;” and inserting “500 yards;”; and

(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking “500 feet.” and inserting “500 yards.”.

SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT.—Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).

(b) CONFORMING REPEAL OF REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Section 611 of the Intelligence Author-

ization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).

Subtitle C—Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department of Energy SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as follows:

“OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

“SEC. 215.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—There is in the Department an Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be under the National Intelligence Program.

“(b) DIRECTOR.—(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.

“(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

“(c) DUTIES.—(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.

“(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and activities at the Department.

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘intelligence community’ and ‘National Intelligence Program’ have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”.

(b) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 216 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and 216 and inserting the following new item:

“215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.”.

SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.

Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):

“(d) ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.—(1)(A) The President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.

“(B) The Secretary shall appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security Center.

“(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be located within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

“(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States:

“(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to

the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.

“(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies have full access to and receive intelligence support needed to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and perform independent, alternative analyses.

“(C) Establishing a central repository on known and suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the United States, including with respect to any individuals, groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.

“(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate committees of Congress.

“(3) The President may waive the requirements of this subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President determines that such requirements do not materially improve the ability of the United States Government to prevent and halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall include a description of how the missions and objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.

“(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure Security Center.”.

SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended—

(1) by striking “(a) DUTY OF SECRETARY.—”; and

(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).

Subtitle D—Other Elements

SEC. 2431. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.

Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall transfer not less than 40 personnel who are stationed, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, at the Department of Homeland Security headquarters located at Nebraska Avenue Northwest, Washington, District of Columbia, to locations at least 30 miles from such headquarters in order to collocate such personnel with and provide support for Department of Homeland Security operational units from Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or other elements of the Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 2432. FRAMEWORK FOR ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a framework to ensure the appropriate balance of resources for the roles, missions, and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency in its capacity as an element of the intelligence community and as a combat support agency. The framework shall include supporting processes to provide for the consistent and regular reevaluation of the responsibilities and resources of the Defense Intelligence Agency to prevent imbalanced priorities, insufficient or misaligned resources, and the unauthorized expansion of mission parameters.

(b) MATTERS FOR INCLUSION.—The framework required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) A lexicon providing for consistent definitions of relevant terms used by both the intelligence community and the Department of Defense, including each of the following:

- (A) Defense intelligence enterprise.
 - (B) Enterprise manager.
 - (C) Executive agent.
 - (D) Function.
 - (E) Functional manager.
 - (F) Mission.
 - (G) Mission manager.
 - (H) Responsibility.
 - (I) Role.
 - (J) Service of common concern.
- (2) An assessment of the necessity of maintaining separate designations for the intelligence community and the Department of Defense for intelligence functional or enterprise management constructs.

(3) A repeatable process for evaluating the addition, transfer, or elimination of defense intelligence missions, roles, and functions, currently performed or to be performed in the future by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which includes each of the following:

(A) A justification for the addition, transfer, or elimination of a mission, role, or function.

(B) The identification of which, if any, element of the Federal Government performs the considered mission, role, or function.

(C) In the case of any new mission, role, or functions—

(i) an assessment of the most appropriate agency or element to perform such mission, role, or function, taking into account the resource profiles, scope of responsibilities, primary customers, and existing infrastructure necessary to support such mission, role, or function; and

(ii) a determination of the appropriate resource profile and an identification of the projected resources needed and the proposed source of such resources over the future-years defense program, to be provided in writing to any elements of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense affected by the assumption, transfer, or elimination of any mission, role, or function.

(D) In the case of any mission, role, or function proposed to be assumed, transferred, or eliminated, an assessment, which shall be completed jointly by the heads of each element affected by such assumption, transfer, or elimination, of the risks that would be assumed by the intelligence community and the Department if such mission, role, or function is assumed, transferred, or eliminated.

(E) A description of how determinations are made regarding the funding of programs and activities under the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program, including—

(i) which programs or activities are funded under each such Program;

(ii) which programs or activities should be jointly funded under both such Programs and how determinations are made with respect to funding allocations for such programs and activities; and

(iii) the thresholds and process for changing a program or activity from being funded under one such Program to being funded under the other such Program.

SEC. 2433. CONSULTATION BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS.

Section 105(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3038(b)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting “, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,” after “the Secretary of Defense”.

SEC. 2434. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EAST CAMPUS BUILDING 3.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that in carrying out the construction at the National Security Agency East Campus, the Director of the National Security Agency

should prioritize the consolidation of national intelligence mission activities on such campus and away from disparate leased facilities in the Washington-Baltimore region.

(b) INCREMENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF EAST CAMPUS BUILDING 3.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National Security Agency may provide for the construction of East Campus Building 3, as authorized in section 2102, in increments, subject to annual appropriations, except that the total amount expended on the construction of East Campus Building 3 may not exceed \$775,000,000.

(2) FISCAL YEAR 2019.—The authorization of appropriations for East Campus Building 3 under section 2102 is an authorization to proceed with the construction of East Campus Building 3. The Director of the National Security Agency shall conduct necessary activities during fiscal year 2019 to avoid delays in project completion.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for the construction of East Campus Building 4 and East Campus Building 5. Such plan shall include—

(1) a list of commercial leases in the Washington-Baltimore region that could be terminated if Congress authorizes the construction of East Campus Building 4 and East Campus Building 5; and

(2) an analysis of options to accelerate East Campus construction efforts.

SEC. 2435. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) ADVISORY BOARD.—

“(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section referred to as the ‘Board’).

“(2) DUTIES.—The Board shall—

“(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to space, overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and

“(B) advise and report directly the Director with respect to such matters.

“(3) MEMBERS.—

“(A) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.—The Board shall be composed of 5 members appointed by the Director from among individuals with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the National Reconnaissance Office.

“(B) TERMS.—Each member shall be appointed for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more than 3 terms.

“(C) VACANCY.—Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the member’s predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the expiration of that member’s term until a successor has taken office.

“(D) CHAIR.—The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be appointed by the Director from among the members.

“(E) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.

“(F) EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.—The Director may appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.

“(4) MEETINGS.—The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.

“(5) REPORTS.—Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board shall submit to the Direc-

tor and to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the activities of the Board during the preceding year.

“(6) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.—The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Board.”.

(b) INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5 members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a), as added by subsection (a).

TITLE V—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 2501. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended by striking “2018” and inserting “2028”.

SEC. 2502. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) CORRECTING LONG-STANDING MATERIAL WEAKNESSES.—Section 368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby repealed.

(b) ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY.—Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 813; 50 U.S.C. 3222) is amended by striking subsection (c).

(c) DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.—Section 601 of such Act (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 827) is hereby repealed.

(d) INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP.—Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and

(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated—

(A) in paragraph (8), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and

(B) by striking paragraph (9).

(e) INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.—Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (g); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections (g) and (h), respectively.

SEC. 2503. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.

(a) DETERMINATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS.—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (b) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—

(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and

(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.

(b) BRIEFING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees

and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.

(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.

(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.

(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.

(2) **ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE BRIEFINGS.**—With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.

(3) **PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS.**—This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.**—The term “active measures campaign” means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.

(2) **CANDIDATE, ELECTION, AND POLITICAL PARTY.**—The terms “candidate”, “election”, and “political party” have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(3) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(4) **CYBER INTRUSION.**—The term “cyber intrusion” means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.

(5) **ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.**—The term “electronic election infrastructure” means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:

(A) The Federal Government.

(B) A State or local government.

(C) A political party.

(D) The election campaign of a candidate.

(6) **FEDERAL OFFICE.**—The term “Federal office” has the meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(7) **HIGH CONFIDENCE.**—The term “high confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.

(8) **MODERATE CONFIDENCE.**—The term “moderate confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

(9) **OTHER APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “other appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 2504. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT AND RELATED PROGRAMS.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, for employees of the intelligence community;

(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;

(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the ability of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions; and

(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly promoted by each element of the intelligence community to both current employees of the element as well as to prospective employees of the element.

(b) **REPORT ON POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY-WIDE PROGRAM.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the heads of any other appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing and carrying out an intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, as described in subsection (a).

(2) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the financial resources that the elements of the intelligence community would require to establish and initially carry out the program specified in paragraph (1).

(B) A description of the practical steps to establish and carry out such a program.

(C) The identification of any legislative action the Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such a program.

(c) **ANNUAL REPORTS ON ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the covered programs. Each such report shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:

(A) The number of personnel from each element of the intelligence community who used each covered program.

(B) The total amount of funds each element expended for each such program.

(C) A description of the efforts made by each element to promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel of the element of the intelligence community and to prospective personnel.

(2) **COVERED PROGRAMS DEFINED.**—In this subsection, the term “covered programs” means any loan repayment program, loan forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar programs, established pursuant to title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other provision of law that may be administered or used by an element of the intelligence community.

SEC. 2505. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT ON SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior Executive Service positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service positions for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the mission of the Office.

(3) A discussion of how the levels of the Senior Executive Service positions in the Office compare to the number of senior positions at other elements of the intelligence community.

(c) **COOPERATION.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Comptroller General any information requested by the Comptroller General to carry out this section by not later than 5 business days after the date on which the Comptroller General makes such request.

(d) **SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE POSITION DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Senior Executive Service position” has the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and includes any position above the GS-15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title.

SEC. 2506. BRIEFINGS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

(a) **QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on a quarterly basis thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall include, at a minimum, an overview and update of—

(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;

(2) matters of counterintelligence concern; and

(3) any other information relating to the counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the Director determines necessary to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed as required by section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091).

(b) **GUIDELINES.**—The Director, in coordination with the Attorney General and in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, shall develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings provided under subsection (a).

SEC. 2507. BRIEFING ON FBI OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in counterintelligence or other national security-related investigations. The briefing shall address the following:

(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers, whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies and departments of the United States Government, including a discussion of the authorities provided by section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law under which the Bureau may make such offers.

(2) *An overview of the policies and operational practices of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.*

(3) *The sufficiency of such policies and practices with respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as sources for such investigations, or both.*

(4) *Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions to improve such policies and practices, particularly with respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.*

SEC. 2508. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

(a) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—*

(1) *by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the following new item:*

“Sec. 3. Definitions.”;

(2) *by striking the item relating to section 107;*
(3) *by striking the item relating to section 113B and inserting the following new item:*

“Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathematics positions.”;

(4) *by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and*

(5) *by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the following new item:*

“Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.”.

(b) *OTHER TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.—Such Act is further amended—*

(1) *in section 102A—*

(A) *in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g), by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and*

(B) *in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;*

(2) *in section 106—*

(A) *by inserting “SEC. 106” before “(a)”;* and

(B) *in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b), by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;*

(3) *by striking section 107;*

(4) *in section 108(c), by striking “in both a classified and an unclassified form” and inserting “to Congress in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary”;*

(5) *in section 112(c)(1), by striking “section 103(c)(7)” and inserting “section 102A(i)”;*

(6) *by amending section 201 to read as follows:*

“SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

“Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.”;

(7) *in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;*

(8) *in section 206, by striking “(a)”;*

(9) *in section 207, by striking “(c)”;*

(10) *in section 308(a), by striking “this Act” and inserting “sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act”;*

(11) *by redesignating section 411 as section 312;*

(12) *in section 503—*

(A) *in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)—*

(i) *by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and*

(ii) *by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and*

(B) *in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and*

(13) *in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the right.*

The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except

those printed in House Report 115-815. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING), I offer amendment No. 1.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 17, line 2, insert “Russian,” after “Korean.”.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer this amendment on behalf of its author, Mr. KEATING of Massachusetts, who is one of our fine members who has great experience in public safety prior to coming to the Congress.

This amendment builds on an initiative from Chairman NUNES to extend tour lengths of deployed U.S. Government personnel, particularly those who are proficient in difficult languages such as Arabic, Farsi, Chinese, and Korean. Specifically, the amendment adds the Russian language to that list.

In view of the continuing threat to our national security posed by the aggressive action of the Russian Government, the U.S. Government must fully engage its cadre of personnel proficient in the Russian language.

I am a slow talker. I am talking even more slowly, and my colleague has arrived. I want to thank my colleague for his work.

Mr. Chairman, I urge support of this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the amendment, and I strongly encourage Members to support this amendment.

I have no further comments at this time, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.

KEATING), who is the author of the amendment.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank my two colleagues from California.

Mr. Chairman, I am here rising in support of my amendment to H.R. 6237.

The underlying bill requires all members of the Foreign Service to serve three consecutive terms if they have received language training in certain languages. My amendment adds the Russian language to that list.

Extending Foreign Service officers' length of service in these positions is vital to our foreign policy and national security objectives. Through this continuity of service, they can develop and deploy their cultural and language expertise to make the most of our diplomatic efforts in-country. Putin has become one of the greatest antagonists of the United States. He attacked our elections and those of our allies, and he is behind a number of cyber-related incidents recently.

He has invaded sovereign nations when they looked toward strengthening ties with the West. His government and government-controlled entities spread lies and misinformation about the United States—not only in Russia, but here in the U.S. as well—through fake social media accounts that attempt to sow division among all Americans.

He seeks to undermine all aspects of civil society and a free political process that challenge him and his control over the Russian Government and its people.

Putin presents a serious security threat to the United States and our interests. We must respond to these actions through sanctions, indictments, and other means, whether related to election interference, incursions into Ukraine, or human rights violations.

However, we must also keep our eyes on the long game. Russian language is broadly spoken around the globe, not just in Russia, but across Eastern Europe and many parts of Central Asia as well.

Representing the United States and our ideals abroad means being able to actually have meaningful person-to-person exchanges with local communities and build the relationships that will help us combat Putin's misinformation apparatus.

It means we can talk to local press in-country to clarify misunderstandings and to communicate directly with the local population about what we actually stand for. It means having the most accurate understanding of real-time security information, so that the United States can respond quickly and appropriately.

Today, we are not operating at full capacity in this regard when it comes to Russia, and, frankly, we cannot afford to keep looking the threat from Russia and Putin in the face and refusing not to do everything we can about it.

We have heard many times that the Russian people themselves have great

concern and great antagonism to Putin and his leadership. We need to have skilled people fluent in the language and understanding the culture there and on the front lines of our efforts to encourage them to stand up within their own country, and to make sure that our allies in Europe know that we are there, using every tool at our disposal to stop his aggression and interference.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment passes.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage also, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. SCHNEIDER

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 20, line 7, before the period insert “, including an identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or entity to which such threat has been attributed”.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, we are still uncovering more troubling evidence on the extent of Russia's interference in our most recent election. These Russian actions were an attack on our democracy, and we need to respond both to hold them to account for past actions and to protect against future aggressions. With our next national election less than 4 months away, we must act now.

So I am pleased this bill takes steps to require a publicly available advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats facing our Federal elections. This joint report from the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI will help campaigns identify and counter these threats.

My amendment strengthens the reporting requirements to ensure we are publicly identifying the foreign state or nonstate actors that our intelligence officials identify as responsible for these threats.

The American people deserve to know who is trying to interfere in our democratic process, and they deserve a government that will hold these countries and these groups to account.

Protecting the integrity of our elections from outside influence by malign

foreign actors is of paramount importance. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to help ensure that we treat the threat of foreign election interference with the seriousness it demands.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), who is the ranking member.

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Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for offering this amendment.

I am pleased to rise in support. This amendment clarifies section 1503 of the bill dealing with foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.

The current provision directs that, for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, and the FBI will make publicly available a report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to our elections.

Section 1503 strengthens our elections by providing information to the public about these threats by providing information about best practices and resources which may be used to counter these threats.

Mr. SCHNEIDER's amendment adds to the publicly available report the identification of the foreign actor, when possible. This public attribution can be very powerful, not only in terms of protecting the public, but also in deterring any foreign intervention in our democratic affairs.

I want to thank my colleague again for his work, and I am happy to support the amendment.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, though I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON LEE

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 115-815.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 22, line 16, strike “and”.

Page 23, line 2, strike the period and insert “; and”.

Page 23, after line 2, insert the following new paragraph:

(6) an immediate review of a clearance may be triggered when a security clearance holder is reported to have engaged in violent acts against individuals, property, or public spaces based on the security clearance holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, based on factors including, at a minimum, race, religion, national origin, or disability.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the ranking member and the chairman for bringing this bill to the floor and working on some very important items, including diversity, outreach, HBCUs, issues of which I have worked on as well. So I thank them very much, because bringing the expertise of diversity to the national security and intelligence community can only make us stronger.

Mr. Chairman, I have just left the Judiciary Committee where we have been spending a period of time dealing with questions that wrap themselves around the intelligence community and the importance of preserving confidential sources and as well the importance of the intelligence community as it relates to the ongoing Russian investigation.

Equally important, of course, is to ensure that we have a community that is well-recognized to have security clearances that are not impacted by actions or views that would do harm to the American people.

My amendment adds to the sense of Congress in the bill that a re-review of a security clearance holder's credentials can be triggered by his or her association or empathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence or any other illegal or unconstitutional means in an effort to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, or other impermissible factors, which maybe include LGBTQ, and whether one is, in essence, considered different. That is the basis of I think a very positive addition to this legislation.

Mr. Chair, I include in the RECORD an article published on July 6, 2018, by PBS FRONTLINE about Michael Miselis, an active member of the California-based Rise Above Movement, RAM, as a well-known violent white supremacist group.

HE IS A MEMBER OF A VIOLENT WHITE SUPREMACIST GROUP; SO WHY IS HE WORKING FOR A DEFENSE CONTRACTOR WITH A SECURITY CLEARANCE?

This story is part of an ongoing collaboration between ProPublica and FRONTLINE that includes documentaries scheduled to begin on PBS in August 2018.

If you've witnessed or experienced hate crimes, harassment or incidents of bias, you can use this form to send information to FRONTLINE, ProPublica and other partners in the Documenting Hate project.

Update, July 6, 2018: One day after being exposed as a member of a violent white supremacist group, Michael Miselis has lost his job as an aerospace engineer. In an email, company spokesman Tim Paynter told ProPublica and FRONTLINE that Miselis "is no longer an employee of Northrop Grumman." Paynter did not say whether Miselis was fired or resigned from his position.

There likely isn't such a thing as a "typical" violent white extremist in America in 2018. Still, Michael Miselis—a University of California, Los Angeles doctoral student with a U.S. government security clearance to work on sensitive research for a prominent defense contractor—makes for a pretty unusual case.

For months, ProPublica and FRONTLINE have been working to identify the white supremacists at the center of violent demonstrations across the country, including the infamous Unite the Right rally last August in Charlottesville, Virginia. The Rise Above Movement, a Southern California group that expresses contempt for Muslims, Jews, and immigrants, became a focus of that effort. ProPublica and FRONTLINE were able to quickly identify a number of the group's leaders, and find evidence that put them in the middle of violence in Charlottesville and Berkeley, California, among other places.

But one seeming member of RAM was harder to nail down. In video shot in Charlottesville, a bearded, husky man is seen in a red Make America Great Again hat with his hands wrapped in tape that came in handy for the brawling that occurred that day. During one encounter, the unidentified man in the red hat pushed an African-American protester to the ground and began pounding on him, video of the episode shows; moments later, a known RAM member choked and bloodied a pair of female counter-protesters. The possible RAM member also had turned up in video shot during hours of combat at a Trump rally in Berkeley, as well. Wearing protective goggles to ward off pepper spray, the man fought alongside RAM members, wrestling one protester to the ground and punching others.

Ultimately, ProPublica and FRONTLINE determined the man in the violent footage was Miselis, a 29-year-old pursuing a Ph.D. in UCLA's aerospace engineering program. Miselis was identified using video footage and social media posts, and reporters confirmed his identity in an encounter with him outside his home. In interviews, a number of California law enforcement officials said Miselis was a member of RAM.

In addition to his scholarly pursuits, Miselis works as a systems engineer for Northrop Grumman, the giant defense contractor with a plant in Redondo Beach, California.

When approached by ProPublica and FRONTLINE in front of his home in Lawndale, a small city south of Los Angeles, Miselis said he "didn't know anything" about what happened in Charlottesville.

"I think you got the wrong guy," he said before driving off in his car.

Miselis did not respond to questions about his involvement with RAM. He did not answer additional questions sent by email.

Several current and former employees at Northrop Grumman told ProPublica and FRONTLINE that Miselis has received a security clearance to work in a computer modeling and simulation group within Northrop's aerospace division. Such security clearances are typically issued in a two-step process. The federal Office of Personnel Man-

agement conducts an investigation into the individual. The agency's findings are then forwarded to a special unit within the Department of Defense, which makes the final determination on whether the person should receive a clearance, a status that often allows the person access to classified or otherwise sensitive information concerning national security.

Public affairs officers at the Defense Department declined to comment about Miselis and his security clearance. The federal personnel management office referred questions regarding Miselis to Northrop Grumman.

Northrop Grumman did not respond to several requests for comment. However, interviews with current and former Northrop employees, as well as an internal email, make clear the company knows of Miselis' actions in Charlottesville and involvement with RAM. Miselis informed his superiors about his contact with reporters from ProPublica and FRONTLINE, as is required by any individual who holds a higher-level security clearance, the people said.

So far, it seems, the company has taken no action against Miselis, who remains employed.

Keegan Hanks, an analyst with the Southern Poverty Law Center who follows RAM closely, said he was surprised that nothing has been done about Miselis' employment and security clearance.

"It's ridiculous," Hanks said.

"They're openly motivated by racism," he added of RAM.

As ProPublica has previously reported, RAM first surfaced publicly last spring and has quickly established itself as one of the violent groups in the resurgent white supremacist scene; members, who regularly train in boxing and martial arts, have been documented engaging in a string of melees. Founded in early 2017 by Robert Rundo, a Queens, New York, native who served an 18-month prison sentence for stabbing a rival gang member six times during a 2009 street fight, the group's core membership is small—15 to 20 young men—but capable of real menace, ProPublica's reporting has shown.

Rundo has recruited followers from the Orange County and San Diego chapters of the Hammerskin Nation, the country's largest Nazi skinhead gang, and one the authorities say has been behind at least nine murders. One of the Hammerskins who joined up with RAM, Matthew Branstetter, went to prison in California in 2011 on hate crime charges for robbing and assaulting a Jewish man in an Orange County park. The attack left the victim with "a concussion, broken jaw, eye socket fracture, broken nose, cracked ribs, severe facial bruising, and cuts and bruises to his body and face," according to a news release issued by county prosecutors at the time. Other RAM members have spent time in prison and Los Angeles County jail on charges for robbery, firearms possession and other offenses.

The FBI has taken notice. Several law enforcement officials familiar with the bureau's work said agents have opened a formal investigation into RAM. In a statement, the FBI said: "While the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of an investigation, our agents investigate activity which may constitute a federal crime or pose a threat to national security. Our focus is not on membership in particular groups but on criminal activity. The FBI cannot initiate an investigation based solely on an individual's race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and we remain committed to protecting those rights for all Americans."

Since last August, local prosecutors have brought charges against a handful of participants in the Charlottesville rally, success-

fully convicting several men so far, including activists on both sides of the clashes. Now federal authorities are targeting neo-Nazi James Alex Fields, the man accused of killing counter-protester Heather Heyer and injuring more than two dozen others. Federal prosecutors recently filed 30 charges against Fields, including 28 hate crime charges.

A native of Stockton, California, Miselis earned a bachelor's of science degree in mechanical engineering from UCLA in 2011. UCLA's website today lists Miselis as a Ph.D. candidate in the engineering department's hypersonics and computational aerodynamics group. After FRONTLINE and ProPublica began making inquiries about Miselis, the school issued a brief statement saying only that he is technically on leave from the doctoral program.

Miselis was clearly prepared for the unrest in Berkeley in the spring of 2017. At the Trump rally he wore protective goggles to ward off pepper spray or tear gas, taped his hands up like a boxer, and wore a gray active-wear uniform, as did several other RAM members that day. In video footage reviewed by ProPublica and FRONTLINE, Miselis can be seen fighting alongside other RAM members.

The event turned into a multi-hour street battle pitting Trump supporters, including fascists and extreme-right activists, against counter-protesters, some of them militant anti-fascists. Police made 20 arrests, confiscating knives, pepper spray, a stun gun, an axe-handle and many wooden dowel rods, which were used as clubs by participants. At least seven people were transported to the hospital for their injuries. Rundo, RAM's founder, was arrested and detained for assault on a police officer, but Alameda County District Attorney Nancy O'Malley declined to file charges. "We determined we didn't have enough evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt," said Teresa Drenick, an Alameda County deputy district attorney.

After the Berkeley rally, Miselis traveled across the country to take part in the massive white supremacist convergence in Charlottesville, where his activities were photographed and recorded on video, both by professional journalists and other people equipped with smart phones. At the rally on Aug. 12, pictures taken by photojournalist Jason Andrew show Miselis walking alongside two other RAM members previously identified by ProPublica, Tom Gillen and Ben Daley.

At roughly 10 a.m., Miselis and the other RAM members confronted counter-protesters a few steps away from Emancipation Park, where white supremacists had gathered beneath a statue of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee.

Daley attacked two female counter-protesters, kicking and punching them, a scene captured in video obtained by ProPublica and FRONTLINE. He wrapped both hands around the throat of one woman, throttling her until she fell to the ground, blood seeping from a gash on her temple. The other woman emerged from the incident with a laceration across her forehead. On video, she screams as blood drips across her face.

Miselis jumped into the fracas. In addition to FRONTLINE and ProPublica, National Geographic produced video documenting the brawl.

A sequence of pictures shot by photojournalist Edu Bayer, who was on assignment for The New York Times, show Miselis hurling what appears to be a can of soda at counter-protesters. In one photo he flexes his biceps muscles in celebration.

It's this sort of street combat that worries the SPLC's Hanks. In his view, such brazen

criminal activity should be a red flag for both Northrop Grumman and the Pentagon.

"I can't believe that participation in an organized white supremacist group focused on street-level violence wouldn't jeopardize your security clearance," Hanks said.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, this gentleman was at Charlottesville speaking loudly, intimidating my fellow alumni and students, having gone to the University of Virginia School of Law. I spoke to the president and officers there, and the students were patiently and conspicuously intimidated and frightened. But more importantly, this individual had a security clearance, and he worked for a defense contractor.

My amendment would ensure that the American people have strong national security, a strong intelligence community, but individuals who receive a clearance can receive it appropriately and that they themselves will not be a jeopardy to the citizens of the United States.

Mr. Chair, the Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3, designated as No. 33 on the Rules Committee rosters, amends the Sense of Congress already in the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, or other impermissible factors.

Mr. Miselis has a security clearance and worked for Northrup Grumman, a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in physical violence against persons protesting racism and white supremacy in Charlottesville, Virginia.

In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in Charlottesville participating in activities in support of white supremacy, which were captured on video and in photos.

Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital interest to our nation and its defense.

Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.

The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its members.

The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group whose members believe they are fighting against a "modern world" corrupted by the "destructive cultural influences" of liberals, Jews, Muslims and non-white immigrants.

They refer to themselves as the "premier MMA (mixed martial arts) club of the Alt-Right."

RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.

Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political rallies and demonstrations.

RAM members consider themselves to be part of the "Alt-Right."

RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.

RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but re-branded themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.

The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because of the violence associated with its members.

The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with our government.

But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by the ancient wisdom: "Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other person's nose begins."

There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to assemble and that limit is violence.

The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency should not go unnoticed.

This Jackson Lee Amendment is an opportunity to make a clear statement to government contractors that the awarding of contracts that involve the security of our nation should not be taken lightly and that Congress will not tolerate the allocation of federal funds to contractors who employ persons who advocate or participate in acts against persons on account of their race, creed, religious beliefs, or gender who engage in constitutionally protected activities.

I ask that my colleagues support this Jackson Lee Amendment to H.R. 6237.

Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, though I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Texas has 2¼ minutes remaining.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1¼ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Texas, Congresswoman SHEILA JACKSON LEE.

This amendment complements other provisions in the bill focused on improving the security clearance process in the Intelligence Committee. Specifically, Ms. JACKSON LEE's amendment recognizes that an immediate review may be called for when a security

clearance holder is reported to have engaged in certain violent acts against individuals, property, or public spaces based on an association or sympathy with persons or organizations seeking to prevent others from exercising their constitutional rights. Such rights include those related to race, religion, national origin, or disability.

I thank the gentlewoman for offering this amendment. I am pleased to support it, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to accept the amendment, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, RAM, the group that I have indicated in the letter I submitted for the RECORD, of which the gentleman in the article was a member of, is characterized as operating like a street fighting club. Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological foes and have been involved in violent clashes during political rallies and demonstrations.

RAM members consider themselves a part of the alt-right. RAM's membership has deep roots in California, with the Skinheads and other individuals who face serious criminal charges. But more importantly, RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazi racist Skinheads.

It is not an emphasis on that group. This amendment is broadly structured to deal with protecting the security clearance process and the American people. I join with my colleagues in hoping and helping the intelligence community to be able to have the resources for the backlog of thousands and thousands of those seeking security clearance, so that they can be particular and astute to ensure that for the people who receive it, it is a benefit. It is, in essence, a gift. It is an honor to receive a security clearance.

The clearance that I and Members of Congress have, we hold with the highest respect and dignity. Therefore, if it is given to anyone, it should be given in that manner.

Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I will just close by saying that the security clearance process needs a lot of work. So we support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 4 OFFERED BY MR. VARGAS

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 29, line 13, after “methods” insert “, including the use of virtual currencies.”.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from California (Mr. VARGAS) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to support my amendment to H.R. 6237.

By adding the use of virtual currencies to section 1505, we will ensure it is included in the assessment of threat financing related to Russia.

This assessment includes officials of the government of Russia, persons subject to sanctions with respect to Russia, Russian nationals subject to sanction, and Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.

Mr. Chairman, as you may know, a virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded.

Since the creation of Bitcoin, the first and most widely known example of a cryptocurrency, thousands of cryptocurrencies have emerged that are designed to serve a variety of purposes.

Just as virtual currencies have grown in use in legitimate commerce, they have become an increasingly popular financial payment method for criminals and other transnational bad actors.

Virtual currencies have been and continue to be exploited to pay for goods and services associated with illicit activities and as an effective tool to launder money or avoid sanctions.

If we are to craft effective solutions to combat Russia's threat finance, we need to fully understand how virtual currencies may be used to finance activities against the United States and our allies, especially NATO. By including the use of virtual currencies in the report, we will ensure a robust analysis that will help us to impede Russian financing of cyber operations.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY).

Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, Mr. VARGAS, for yielding, and I support his amendment.

I also support this bill more generally because it supports the quiet heroes in our intelligence community. They don't seek public praise; in fact, they shun it. While others enjoy the limelight, they work hard in the shadows.

Section 1511 is a version of legislation I wrote called the POISE Act. I filed it after the President disclosed highly sensitive information to Russian officials at a White House meeting. This information had been entrusted to the U.S. by a key ally.

Section 1511, drawing on the POISE Act, says Congress must be notified when a member of the executive branch, including the President, dis-

closes top secret information to an adversary government outside established intelligence channels.

As a former specialist at the Department of Defense, I know these disclosures are dangerous because our adversary could use it to harm U.S. interests. Our partners could stop sharing intelligence if they don't trust us to keep it confidential.

The congressional notification requirement will deter irresponsible disclosures and enable Congress to conduct oversight and limit any damage caused by the disclosure.

I also wanted to express my disappointment on a matter of national security. Congressman CURBELO and I offered a bipartisan amendment to require the DNI to report to Congress on the national security threat posed by deep fake technology and how the intelligence community will counter it. Deep fake technology is the digital falsification of images, video, and audio to portray an individual as having done or said something he or she didn't do or say.

Senator RUBIO has raised alarms about how foreign intelligence service could use deep fake technology to undermine our Nation's security and democracy.

Frankly, I was dismayed our amendment was not ruled in order, despite being supported by the Intelligence Committee. I know the Rules Committee often makes decisions for reasons unrelated to policy. But the exclusion of this amendment was a serious mistake, and I will look for other ways to ensure our country is prepared for the emerging threat posed by deep fake technology.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, though I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I would simply then urge my colleagues to support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. VARGAS).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MRS. TORRES

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. NORTH KOREA FOLLOW THE MONEY ACT.

(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of

this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include revenue from the following sources:

- (1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
- (2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean territorial waters.
- (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores of value.
- (4) Trade in textiles.
- (5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.

(6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other associated purposes.

(7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

(8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner intended to generate significant revenue, directly or indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.

(9) The provision of non-humanitarian goods (such as food, medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.

(10) The provision of services, including banking and other support, including by entities located in the Russian Federation, China, and Iran.

(11) Online commercial activities of the Government of North Korea, including online gambling.

(12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and counterfeit goods.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall include an identification of each of the following:

- (1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
- (2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through which North Korea accesses the United States and international financial systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods, and services; and

(3) the global financial institutions, money services business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with financial transactions.

(c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of the assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of such assessment.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. TORRES) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

□ 1430

Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer my amendment to H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

Mr. Chairman, nearly 1 year and 3 months ago today, the North Korean regime announced that it had successfully executed an intercontinental ballistic missile test launch. That announcement raised the real possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on American soil.

President Trump, rightly, has spent much of last year seeking a deal for the

denuclearization of North Korea. Secretary Pompeo is actively engaged in finding a solution, and Congress should be providing him with all of the resources we can to ensure a solution is meaningful and effective.

To prevent advancement of their nuclear weapons program, we need to obtain specific information regarding North Korean revenue sources; however, the U.S. Government does not have a sufficient understanding of this critical question. That is why I have offered this amendment, which is modeled after my North Korea Follow the Money Act.

This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate of the revenue sources of North Korea. Any effective agreement between the U.S. and North Korea must consider all of the sources of funding, both legitimate and illegitimate, that have enabled this North Korean regime.

I am proud to offer this bipartisan amendment with Representative WAGNER, who has been a longtime partner of mine on this legislation, and I also appreciate Chairman NUNES and his staff and Ranking Member SCHIFF and his staff for working with me on this amendment.

Mr. Chair, I am hopeful that we can continue to work together for the security of our Nation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER).

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this amendment, of which I am a proud cosponsor.

Nearly 1 year ago, I traveled to Korea, Japan, and China. I visited the DMZ and the Chinese border town of Dandong. I watched as trucks loaded with goods drove across the China-Korea Friendship Bridge into North Korea.

Mr. Chair, 70 percent of North Korea's trade passes over that bridge, and it was a stark reminder that, in order to change North Korea's malign behavior, we need sanctions that undermine the financial networks that keep the Kim regime afloat.

Over the past year, the President has taken tremendous steps towards disrupting North Korean cash flows, but we still have an imperfect understanding of where and how North Korea gets its revenue, and our limited knowledge has weakened international sanctions.

This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to study North Korean financial and trade networks, weapons sales, labor exports, and supply chains to better understand the sources of the regime's revenue. It

would aid the international community in closing gaps in sanctions against North Korea. The report will help us support our diplomats as they seek to restore stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this critical amendment.

Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Until we know where the North Korean regime gets its money, we won't know how much money they have to spend.

Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" and equip Secretary Pompeo with the tools that he needs to act in the best interests of our national security, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. TORRES).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MR. HASTINGS

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.

In order to further increase the diversity of the intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are more fully and consistently represented in such elements' employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such plan shall be implemented.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, my staff and I worked with Democratic staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and received input from the majority staff to craft what I believe is a common-sense amendment that will increase diversity throughout the intelligence community.

Mr. Chair, I just want to depart from my prepared remarks to say a word about the young man who is seated with me, Tony Matthews. It is a good indication of what the Brookings Institution does when they send us fellows

from either the Democratic or Republican side, and I am very pleased that he has been with my office and, in many respects, is the author of this amendment.

The amendment directs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to, in consultation with heads of other intelligence community agencies, create and implement a plan that will successfully expand the intelligence community's recruitment efforts so that rural and underserved regions in the United States are more fully represented in these efforts.

It is my belief that this amendment will provide a unique opportunity for the intelligence community agencies to actively join forces in order to broaden their respective recruitment efforts and, by so doing, increase the diversity among their ranks. Although we have seen improvement in some areas—for instance, an increase in minority hiring for fiscal year 2017 over that of fiscal year 2016—we have also seen a disappointing decrease in the percentage of women hired over that same period of time. I believe that we can do better in both metrics, and I think one smart way of doing that is getting agencies to broaden their searches geographically.

This country's strength is born from its dedication to the rule of law, the belief that the best form of government is one that is of the people, by the people, and for the people—and from its diversity.

It is time for our intelligence community agencies to more fully commit to reaching all American people in an effort to let them know that inspiring and important work awaits them in the intelligence community. Indeed, by more fully tapping into this diversity, we can be assured of at least one result: the strengthening of our intelligence community. If the intelligence community is to succeed in its global mission, it must have a global force.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a "yes" vote on my amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the distinguished ranking member with whom I had the pleasure of serving on the Intelligence Committee when I was there some 100 years ago.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is a great pleasure to team up with the gentleman again in pursuit of important priorities for the intelligence community and for our committee.

Enhancing diversity in the intelligence community is a continuing priority for the House and, unfortunately, remains a continuing challenge for the IC. While there are many intelligence professionals who are sincerely working to create a culture of inclusion, they acknowledge that progress is slow.

Mr. HASTINGS' amendment, together with initiatives championed by committee colleagues, Representatives TERRI SEWELL and ANDRÉ CARSON, will help ensure that the Director of National Intelligence increases geographic outreach in IC recruitment efforts.

As coordinator of the IC, the DNI and his team are well postured to consolidate the separate recruitment activities of each IC entity into a comprehensive recruitment campaign that reaches every corner of our Nation, especially underserved regions that have had little interaction with the intelligence community.

With the DNI's leadership, smart division of labor among IC agencies, and innovative use of virtual communications vehicles, I am confident that a comprehensive recruitment campaign can cover the Nation more effectively and attract a workforce that is more representative of America.

Once again, I want to thank my colleague, Mr. HASTINGS, as well as my HPSCI colleagues for their commitment to diversity, and I encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. I think we should expand more capabilities into rural areas and do more recruitment in rural areas. I appreciate this amendment. It has my full support.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. SCHNEIDER

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to

Israel, other United States regional allies, and other specified interests of the United States as a result of such support.

(b) **MATTERS FOR INCLUSION.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall include information relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:

(1) A description of arms or related material transferred by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number of such arms or related material and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.

(2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, including the number and geographic distribution of such personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders with Syria and Lebanon.

(3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.

(4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in Lebanon for non-state actors, including whether such facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.

(5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production facilities, including the geographic distribution of such foreign and domestic supply chains.

(6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.

(7) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant financial support or arms or related material to Hizballah.

(8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of arms or related material or other support offered to Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.

(c) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) **DEFINITION.**—In this section, the term "arms or related material" means—

(1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons or materials or components of such weapons;

(2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or components of such weapons;

(3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);

(5) defense information, as that term is defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or

(6) items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of my bipartisan amendment to require the Director of National Intelligence to report on Iran's support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon.

I thank my colleague from North Carolina, MARK MEADOWS, for his partnership in this endeavor, as well as KYRSTEN SINEMA and NORMA TORRES for cosponsoring this amendment.

Mr. Chair, Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East are no secret, and, of late, their malign influence has grown dramatically across the region, including in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Specifically with respect to Syria, Iran is menacingly working to develop a permanent foothold in the country, increasing the threat to our key allies Jordan and, in particular, Israel. They are also assisting terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in supporting Assad. Battle-tested Hezbollah fighters are subsequently returning to Lebanon more capable and more dangerous than ever before.

Additionally, with assistance from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah has been able to amass nearly 150,000 rockets and missiles on the border with Israel. This figure is a staggering increase from the, roughly, 15,000 rockets they had in 2006.

Iran has exploited several means of transferring weapons to Hezbollah, including by land and by air. Israel has often targeted these transfers to stop the weapons from reaching Lebanon. To eliminate the susceptibility of these transfers to interdiction, Iran is reportedly building missile production facilities in Lebanon to enable indigenous rocket-producing capability for Hezbollah.

A domestic missile production capability in Lebanon would enable Hezbollah to more easily continue to build its rocket arsenal not only with more weapons, but more sophisticated, more deadly weapons, and with less reliance on risky transits.

That is why I am offering my amendment today, to focus our intelligence community on this urgent threat. A DNI report would help us better understand the extent of Iran's support for terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah and the threat this support poses to Israel and other U.S. regional allies.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important amendment.

Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the ranking member.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I am proud to support the amendment offered by Representatives SCHNEIDER, MEADOWS, TORRES, and SINEMA.

Mr. Chair, it is imperative that our Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees with oversight of Iran's role in Syria and Lebanon stay informed of proxy forces operating there and the strategic threat posed to

Israel, our other allies, and our Nation's interests in the region.

Requiring that the Director of National Intelligence report on areas such as arms transfers from Iran to Hezbollah and other militias, weapons facilities, supply chains, and financial capabilities will help us gain greater understanding of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon proliferation in the region.

I thank my colleagues for offering the amendment. I appreciate Mr. SCHNEIDER's leadership on this issue, and I urge the House to support it.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER).

The amendment was agreed to.

□ 1445

AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. BERA

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.

(a) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the national security of the United States.

(b) CONTENT.—The briefing under subsection (a) shall assess—

(1) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the United States and the international political and economic system;

(2) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the United States and the international political and economic system; and

(3) contributing trends and factor to the matters assessed under paragraphs (1) and (2).

(c) EXAMINATION OF RESPONSE CAPACITY.—In examining the risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and a possible transnational pandemic under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall

also examine in the briefing under subsection (a) the response capacity within affected countries and the international system. In considering response capacity, the Director shall include—

(1) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic;

(2) the role and capacity of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and

(3) the effectiveness of current international frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.

(d) FORM.—The briefing under subsection (a) may be classified.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from California (Mr. BERA) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, as a doctor, I know that understanding and managing infectious diseases is one of the most important parts of our security and our national security. The intelligence community has found that a country's health is directly linked to their stability and their well-being. We are reminded of this every few years through mass pandemics that are not going away.

In 2014, we saw the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and just 2 years ago, we witnessed the Zika outbreak in Central and South America. And, unfortunately, as a doctor, I know we are going to continue to see these and other diseases again and again, and we need to be prepared.

So we offer this amendment as a way of getting the intelligence community to help us with that preparedness, to inform us and make sure we are not just protecting lives overseas, but we are also protecting our national interests and our national security.

Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY).

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from California for his leadership in this very important amendment, and I am proud to be an original cosponsor with him.

This amendment would require an intelligence briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious diseases and pandemics. These threats have serious implications for the national security of the country.

Just ask Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, who earlier this year warned that the increase in the frequency and diversity of reported disease outbreaks probably will continue, including the potential of a severe global health emergency that could lead to major economic and societal disruptions, strain governmental international resources, and increase calls to the United States for support.

An outbreak in a remote village can spread to major cities in all six continents in less than 36 hours. Such an event can lead nations to close borders, disrupting the flow of people, goods, and services, and incurring grave economic, social, political, and security costs.

Nearly 70 percent of the world's nations are underprepared to manage and control such outbreaks.

These are not just hypotheticals. SARS, for example, spread across four continents, infected 8,100 people, killed more than 700, and cost the global economy \$40 billion between February and July of 2003. The Ebola and Zika outbreaks cost the American taxpayers more than \$6 billion.

Understanding the ability, Mr. Chairman, of affected nations and international organizations to detect and manage infectious diseases and transnational pandemics is a vital step to ensuring an effective response. I urge all of our colleagues to support Mr. BERA's and my amendment.

I thank Mr. BERA for his leadership.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the ranking member.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

One hundred years ago, the great influenza pandemic, often called the Spanish flu, caused about 50 million deaths worldwide, between 3 to 6 percent of the global population, and far more than the deaths from combat casualties in World War I. Public health officials have warned that we are overdue for another pandemic that will likely spread even more virulently in our globalized world.

While global health may not be a topic that leaps to mind when thinking of the roles and missions of the intelligence community, the IC does play a pivotal role in defending us from microscopic threats. The IC's unique capabilities can be as valuable in combating disease as the other threats we face.

During the Ebola crisis, NGA and other IC agencies provided geospatial and other intelligence to health workers battling the outbreak. Ensuring

that we are prepared for any potential pandemic will be essential to saving American lives.

I wholeheartedly support the bipartisan amendment by my colleagues from California, Virginia, and Washington, and I thank them for working with the committee staff to refine and perfect it.

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional comments, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. BERA).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MR. KENNEDY

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the potential establishment of a center, to be known as the “Foreign Malign Influence Response Center” that—

(1) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements of the intelligence community, including elements with related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;

(2) has access to all intelligence and other reporting acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts to influence, through overt and covert malign activities, United States political processes and elections;

(3) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and warning, of such activities; and

(4) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment to United States policy makers.

(b) CONTENTS.—The Report required by subsection (a)—

(1) shall contain, at a minimum, a discussion of the desirability of the establishment of such center and any barriers to such establishment; and

(2) may contain any recommendations the Director determines appropriate.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman and Ranking Member SCHIFF for all their support and advocacy to make this amendment possible today.

Mr. Chairman, just a few weeks ago, DNI Director Dan Coats warned our

Nation and the world that “we continue to see Russian targeting of American society in ways that could affect our midterm elections.”

It is indisputable that Russia succeeded in meddling in our election in 2016. It is indisputable that their success, with little consequence, will inspire similar attacks in the future. And it is indisputable that our response to these threats has been inadequate.

States, cities, and towns have scrambled to secure their own elections without enough guidance and support from our national intelligence community.

Voters continue to face a torrent of misinformation online.

Candidates for Congress, city council, and school boards race towards November 6 uncertain that they will become Putin’s next target.

The multiple Federal agencies that are responsible for our Nation’s response rarely coordinate or receive little guidance from our Nation’s government at the highest levels.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps to begin to consolidate and concentrate our response to foreign efforts to influence our political processes and elections with one center drawing expertise across all relevant sectors of our government.

If anything, our adversaries have grown more confident in their ability to sway our elections and sow discord and dysfunction at every level of our society.

Our urgency lies now in one simple truth: Our democracy stands tall when our elections stand secure.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment because those who put ballot boxes in our crosshairs do not ascribe to one political party or the other.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 10 OFFERED BY MISS RICE OF NEW YORK

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in House Report 115-815.

Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

SEC. 2509. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act”.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall include the following elements:

(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism use virtual currencies.

(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to the use by such organizations and States of other forms of financing to support operations, including an assessment of the collection posture of the intelligence community on the use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.

(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting information on or helping prevent the use of virtual currencies by international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by such organizations and States.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from New York (Miss RICE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and submit a threat assessment report on the use of virtual currencies by terrorist organizations.

In the 17 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil, identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will be brought to justice.

We know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it was 17 years ago. It is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need to evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have introduced this amendment.

In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their operations. In 2016, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies investigated a terrorist funding campaign in which a terrorist group in the Gaza Strip received donations through the virtual currency bitcoin. Last year, Indonesian authorities also reported that a Syria-

based Indonesian national with ties to ISIL used virtual currency to fund attacks in Indonesia.

Virtual currencies offer high-speed, low-cost financial networks with access to users across the globe. Many also offer their users anonymity, making it difficult for law enforcement to track transactions. These factors have made virtual currencies an increasingly appealing tool for terrorists seeking to circumvent American law enforcement and financial institutions.

Research suggests that terrorists' use of virtual currencies have so far been limited to a handful of instances, but, as terrorist organizations and lone-wolf attackers become more technologically sophisticated and virtual currencies become more widely accessible, the conditions are ripe for this threat to significantly increase in a very short period of time. That is why it is critical that we act now to assess and understand this emerging threat.

There is no denying it: Virtual currencies have exposed deep vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts, and, unfortunately, right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy to address this threat.

My amendment would direct the Director of National Intelligence and the Treasury Department to report to Congress on how terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism could use virtual currencies to finance terrorism, gaps in Federal and State regulations that could be exploited by terrorists, and recommendations to update regulations to more effectively address these vulnerabilities.

Enacting this amendment would give counterterrorism and law enforcement officials at all levels the information and strategies they desperately need to confront this threat head-on with 21st century solutions.

I want to thank Congressman PETER KING for cosponsoring my amendment. This is a commonsense bipartisan priority, and I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR (Mr. BOST). Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding, and I rise in support of the amendment offered by the Representatives from New York, Rice and King.

This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence, with the Department of the Treasury, submit to Congress a report on the pos-

sible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors, including state sponsors of terrorism.

It has long been said that if you wish to uncover the truth about malign activity, then follow the money. This remains true with the development and use of virtual currencies.

The IC must always remain one step ahead of our adversaries, and this amendment will help ensure that they continue to do just that.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF for supporting the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from New York for working in a bipartisan manner with a longtime member of our committee, Mr. KING, and I urge passage of this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Miss RICE). The amendment was agreed to.

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AMENDMENT NO. 11 OFFERED BY MR. LIPINSKI

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title V of division B, add the following new section:

SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside the country, including each of the following:

(1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities providing support for—

- (A) Hezbollah;
- (B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
- (C) Hamas;

(D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or

(E) any other entity or country the Director determines to be relevant.

(2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic missile research and testing or other activities that the Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East region.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LIPINSKI) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair and ranking member of

the committee for their work on this bill. This bill is very important to help make America more secure.

My amendment will help to address the threat of Iran better in this bill.

According to the State Department, Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. In spite of Iran's weak economy and U.S.-imposed sanctions in response to their support for terrorism, abuse of human rights, and acquisition of prohibited weapons, Iran continues to support violent groups abroad.

As our diplomatic and military leaders determine how best to respond to Iran's ongoing destabilization, they should have a detailed accounting of the amounts spent by Iran to support specific terrorist groups and foreign military. This is especially important in light of the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran-backed forces in Syria, which has only gotten worse in the last couple of days. This information will send a clear message to Iran and our allies that we do not tolerate support of terrorism.

In addition, the nonclassified version of this report will shed light on Iran's behavior for all the world to see.

Specifically, my amendment will require an annual report from the Director of National Intelligence, describing Iranian expenditures on military and terrorist activities outside the country, including support for Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, proxy forces in Iraq and Syria, and any other entity or country the Director determines relevant.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the ranking member of the committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleague from Illinois, Congressman LIPINSKI.

This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence submit a report to Congress describing spending by Iran on military and terrorist activities outside of the country, including spending to support Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and proxy forces elsewhere.

The intelligence community rightly remains focused on Iran's support for malign foreign military and terrorist activities abroad.

This amendment helps ensure that Congress has full visibility into the judgments and assessments of the IC

on Iran's spending to support these groups, and for that reason I support the amendment.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF for their support of this amendment, and I thank them for their work on this important bipartisan bill.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for working with our committee to get support from both sides of the aisle for this amendment, I urge its passage, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LIPINSKI).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 12 OFFERED BY MR. DAVIDSON

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in House Report 115-815.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title V of division B, add the following new section:

**SEC. 2509. INCLUSION OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
IN ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO
SECTION 702.**

Section 707(b)(1)(G)(ii) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881f(b)(1)(G)(ii)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon the following: “, including whether disciplinary actions were taken as a result of such an incident of noncompliance and the extent of such disciplinary actions”.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, today, I offer an amendment that is very straightforward. It simply takes an already existing reporting requirement within the section 702 program and adds an additional layer of congressional oversight. This will ensure that the Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee have insight into how the intelligence community enforces its own internal guidelines for handling sensitive data.

Currently, the attorney general provides these committees with semi-annual reports about incidents of intelligence community noncompliance with the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures within the 702 program. These are important features that ensure the collection and use of data is solely for targeting dangerous terrorists and does not threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans.

However, this report is lacking because it does not describe what, if any, disciplinary actions are taken by agencies in response to noncompliance. My amendment would simply require that this report include information about disciplinary action.

For example, was a violation simply flagged for agency records? Or was someone given additional training, disciplinary suspension, termination, or, perhaps, even prosecution?

My amendment intends to provide Congress with a high-level look at how agencies address the incidents they are already reporting on.

The privacy safeguards contained in the section 702 program are critical for protecting the constitutional rights of everyday Americans, and, indeed, the high functioning capability of this important program for national security.

Congress has the responsibility to make sure agencies are taking steps to mitigate abuse and enforce statutes, guidelines, and court orders relevant to this powerful surveillance tool.

This is a commonsense amendment that I have drafted in coordination with the House Intelligence Committee, and I urge my colleagues to support its adoption.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, though I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR (Mr. LAMBORN). Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the thing I would emphasize is that it is important for us to understand: A) we should preserve the 702 program; and B) there are some incremental reforms that could make the program high functioning, and also give the American people peace of mind that their Fourth Amendment rights are protected.

It is also important for the intelligence community to know that the programs they have are working, and it can send an important message that there are disciplinary actions for those who don't follow the guidelines.

This will give Congress insight into how well that system is functioning and what disciplinary actions, if any, are taken.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank all of the Members who offered amendments today. This is a critical piece of legislation, and I look forward to working with the Senate to send this bill to the President.

This year's bill is named after Matthew Young Pollard, who passed away earlier this year while carrying out the work of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Matt was a friend to many on

both sides of the aisle of our committee, a dedicated staff member, and a member of the Army National Guard. While his loss is devastating to us, we honor his service to the United States by naming this bill in his memory.

I thank the ranking member for his support on this bill, I urge passage of the amendment, and urge passage of H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON).

The amendment was agreed to.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. BOST) having assumed the chair, Mr. LAMBORN, Acting Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 6237) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 989, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment reported from the Committee of the Whole?

If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.