

economics correct by virtually everybody's economic principles, and take the revenue that is collected from that price on carbon and return it all to the American people. It is a border-adjustable, revenue-neutral carbon fee. Former Republican Treasury Secretaries Baker, Schultz, and Paulson, and former Republican EPA Administrators Ruckelshaus, Thomas, Reilly, and Whitman and leading Republican conservative economists and former Republican Presidential advisers Arthur Laffer, Gregory Mankiw, and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, among many, many others, support a revenue-neutral, border-adjustable carbon fee. It is the market approach of properly pricing this pollution to eliminate that negative externality and to put the cost into the price of the product in the way that Economics 101 suggests it should be to avoid giving this industry this massive subsidy. That is where the Republicans who thought this through want us to be.

On my side, our answer is yes, but here in Congress, are we there yet? We just will not do it. We just will not do it because the shadow of the fossil fuel industry's millions of dollars in deception and political muscle power falls too darkly on this supposedly august institution.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the following nomination: Executive Calendar No. 164.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report nomination.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Henry Kerner, of California, to be Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel, for the term of five years.

Thereupon, the Senate proceeded to consider the nomination.

Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate vote on the nomination with no intervening action or debate; that if confirmed, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table; that the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action; that no further motions be in order; and that any statements relating to the nomination be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there any further debate?

Hearing none, the question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the Kerner nomination?

The nomination was confirmed.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to legislative session and be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(At the request of Mr. SCHUMER, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.)

VOTE EXPLANATION

• Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I was unavailable for rollcall vote No. 217, on the nomination of Callista Gingrich to be Ambassador to the Holy See. Had I been present, I would have voted yea.●

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA, Oct. 12, 2017.

Hon. BOB CORKER,

*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-26, concerning the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Kuwait for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$342.6 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.
Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-26

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* \$0.0 million.
Other \$342.6 million.
Total \$342.6 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None.

Non-MDE: Non-MDE items and services for three years (with option for two additional years) of follow-on support of two (2) C-17 aircraft includes participation in the Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP), contract logistic support, Class I modifications and kits support, in-country contractor support, alternate mission equipment, major modification and retrofit, software support, aircraft maintenance and technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, additional spare and repair parts, technical orders and publications, airworthiness certification support, engine spares, engine maintenance and logistics support, inspections support, on-site COMSEC support, Quality Assurance and other U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics and program support. Required upgrades will include fixed installation satellite antenna, Mode 5, plus installation and sustainment, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (X7-D-QAH).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: KU-D-SAA.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 12, 2017.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kuwait—Continuation of C-17 Logistics Support Services and Equipment

The Government of Kuwait has requested three years (with option for two additional years) of follow-on support of two (2) C-17 aircraft, which includes participation in the Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP), contract logistic support, Class I modifications and kits support, in-country contractor support, alternate mission equipment, major modification and retrofit, software support, aircraft maintenance and technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, additional spare and repair parts, technical orders and publications, airworthiness certification support, engine spares, engine maintenance and logistics support, inspections support, on-site COMSEC support, Quality Assurance and other U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and program support. Required upgrades will include fixed installation satellite antenna, Mode 5, plus installation and sustainment, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$342.6 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country. Kuwait plays a large role in U.S. efforts to advance stability in the Middle East, providing basing, access, and transit for U.S. forces in the region.

This proposed sale is required to maintain the operational readiness of the Kuwaiti Air Force C-17 aircraft. Kuwait's current FMS contract supporting its C-17's will expire in September of 2017. Kuwait will have no difficulty absorbing this support.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the Boeing Company, Chicago, IL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

There is an on-going Foreign Military Sale (FMS) case providing C-17 sustainment services. There are currently nine (9) contractors from Boeing Company (aircraft) in-country providing Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) on a continuing basis.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-26

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. This sale will involve the release of sensitive technology to the Government of Kuwait in the performance of services to sustain two (2) Kuwaiti C-17 aircraft. While much of the below equipment supporting the C-17 is not new to the country, there will be replenishment spares of these following sensitive technologies purchased to support the fleet.

2. The Force 524D is a 24-channel Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) based Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver with Precise Positioning Service (PPS) capability built upon Trimble's next generation GPS technology. The Force 524D retains backward compatibility with the proven Force 5GS while adding new functionality to interface with digital antenna electronics to significantly improve Anti-Jam (AJ) performance. The host platform can select the radio frequency (RF) or Digital Antenna Electronics (DAE) interface. In the digital mode, the Force 524D is capable of controlling up to 16 independent beams. The hardware and software associated with the 524D receiver card is UNCLASSIFIED.

3. The C-17 aircraft will be equipped with the GPS Anti-Jam System (GAS-1) antenna which consists of a multi-element Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA) and separate antenna electronics which is able to recognize multiple sources of deliberate jamming and other electrical interference allowing the navigation equipment to function safely, accurately, and efficiently in the presence of multiple jammers. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED.

4. The GPS Inertial Reference Unit (IRU) is a type of inertial sensor which uses only gyroscopes to determine a moving aircraft's change in angular direction over a period of time. Unlike the inertial measurement unit, IRUs are generally not equipped with accelerometers, which measure acceleration forces.

IRUs are used for altitude control and navigation of vehicles with relatively constant acceleration rates, such as larger aircraft as well as geosynchronous satellites and deep space probes. The GPS IRU is UNCLASSIFIED.

5. Crypto appliquéd for Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), which includes hardware that is UNCLASSIFIED.

6. Software, hardware, and other data/information, which is sensitive, is reviewed prior to release to protect system vulnerabilities, design data, and performance parameters. Potential compromise of these systems is controlled through management of the basic software programs of highly sensitive systems and software-controlled weapons on systems on a case-by-case basis.

7. Kuwait is both willing and able to protect United States Classified Military Information (CMI). Kuwaiti physical and document security standards are equivalent to U.S. standards. Kuwait has demonstrated its willingness and capability to protect sensitive military technology and information released to its military in the past. Kuwait is firmly committed to its relationship with the U.S. and to its promise to protect CMI and prevent its transfer to a third party. The Government of Kuwait signed a Technical Security Arrangement (TSA) with the USG on 01 January 1989 that commits them to the protection of CMI.

8. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware or software source code in this proposed sale, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of systems with similar or advanced capabilities. The benefits to be derived from this sale in the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, as outlined in the Policy Justification, outweigh the potential damage that could result if the sensitive technology were revealed to unauthorized persons.

9. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Kuwait.

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION

AGENCY,

Arlington, VA, October 11, 2017.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-47, concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the Czech Republic for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$575 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-47

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the Czech Republic.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$335.9 million.

Other \$239.1 million.

Total \$575.0 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Twelve (12) UH-1Y Utility Helicopters. Twenty-five (25) T-700 GE 401C Engines (twenty-four (24) installed, one (1) spare). Thirteen (13) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) (twelve (12) installed, one (1) spare). Twelve (12) 7.62mm M240 Machine Guns.

Non-MDE includes: Brite Star II FLIR system, Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) (includes the AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning and Laser Detection System, AN/ALE-47 Counter Measure Dispensing System (CMDS) and the AN/APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)), Joint Mission Planning Systems, Helmet Mounted Displays, communication equipment, small caliber gun systems including GAU-17A and GAU-21, electronic warfare systems, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 4/5 transponder, support

equipment, spare engine containers, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy.

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 11, 2017.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Czech Republic—UH-1Y Utility Helicopters

The Government of the Czech Republic has requested the possible sale of twelve (12) UH-1Y utility helicopters, twenty-five (25) T-700 GE 401C engines (twenty-four (24) installed, one (1) spare), thirteen (13) Honeywell Embedded GPS/INS (EGI) (twelve (12) installed, one (1) spare), and twelve (12) 7.62mm M240 Machine Guns. This request also includes Brite Star II FLIR system, Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) (includes the AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning and Laser Detection System, AN/ALE-47 Counter Measure Dispensing System (CMDS) and the AN/APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)), Joint Mission Planning Systems, Helmet Mounted Displays, communication equipment, small caliber gun systems including GAU-17A and GAU-21, electronic warfare systems, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 4/5 transponder, support equipment, spare engine containers, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$575 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO partner that is an important force for ensuring peace and stability in Europe. The proposed sale will support the Czech Republic's needs for its own self-defense and support NATO defense goals.

The Czech Republic intends to use these helicopters to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. This will contribute to the Czech Republic's military goal of updating its capabilities while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other NATO allies. The Czech Republic will have no difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.

This proposed sale of equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Bell Helicopter, Textron, Fort Worth, Texas; and General Electric Company, Lynn, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements proposed in conjunction with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to participate in program and technical reviews plus training and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for a period of twenty-four (24) months. It will also require three (3) Contractor Engineering Technical Service (CETS) representatives to reside in country for a period of two (2) years to support this program.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-47

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The following components and technical documentation for the program are classified as listed below:

a. The UH-1Y-model has an Integrated Avionics System (IAS) which includes two (2) mission computers and an automatic flight control system. Each crew station has two (2) 8 x 6-inch multifunction liquid crystal displays (LCD) and one (1) 4.2 x 4.2-inch dual function LCD display. The communications suite will have COMSEC ARC-210 Ultra High Frequency Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) radios with associated communications equipment. The navigation suite includes Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) w/Precise Positioning Service (PPS), a digital map system, a low-airspeed air data subsystem, and an AN/APX-123/A(V) IFF Transponder.

b. The crew is equipped with the Optimized Top Owl (OTO) helmet-mounted sight and display system. The OTO has a Day Display Module (DDM) and a Night Display Module (NDM). The UH-1Y has survivability equipment including the AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning and Laser Detection System, AN/ALE-47 Counter Measure Dispensing System (CMDS) and the AN/APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) to cover countermeasure dispensers, radar warning, incoming/on-way missile warning and on-fuselage laser-spot warning systems.

c. The following performance data and technical characteristics are classified as follows for the UH-1Y Airframe: countermeasure capability—up to SECRET, counter-countermeasures capability—SECRET, vulnerability to countermeasures—SECRET, vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse from nuclear environmental effects—SECRET.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system effectiveness.

3. The consequences of the loss of this technology to a technologically advanced or competent adversary could result in the compromise of equivalent systems, which in turn could reduce those weapons systems' effectiveness, or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that the Czech Republic can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale of the UH-1Y helicopter and associated weapons will further U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of the Czech Republic.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY
Arlington, VA, Oct. 11, 2017.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-46, concerning the Air Force's proposed

Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the Netherlands for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$53 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.
Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-46

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: The Government of the Netherlands.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$48 million.
Other \$5 million.
Total \$53 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty-six (26) AIM-120 C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). One (1) AMRAAM Spare Guidance Section.

Non-MDE: Twenty (20) AMRAAM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, control section spares, weapon systems support, test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training, training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (X7-D-YAE).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: NE-D-YME for two hundred (200) AIM-120B.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 11, 2017.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Government of the Netherlands—AIM-120 C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)

The Government of the Netherlands has requested a possible sale of twenty-six (26) AIM-120 C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), one (1) AMRAAM Guidance Section Spare (MDE items), twenty (20) AMRAAM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, control section spares, weapon systems support, test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training, training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total case value is \$53 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO ally which continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe.

The proposed sale will improve the Netherlands' capabilities for mutual defense, regional security, force modernization, and U.S. and NATO interoperability. This sale will enhance the Royal Netherlands Air Force's ability to defend the Netherlands against future threats and contribute to current and future NATO operations. The Netherlands maintains the AIM-120B in its inventory and will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government personnel or contractor representatives to the Netherlands.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-46

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is a radar-guided missile featuring digital technology and micro-miniature solid-state electronics. AMRAAM capabilities include look-down/shoot-down, multiple launches against multiple targets, resistance to electronic counter measures, and interception of high flying, low flying, and maneuvering targets. The AMRAAM is classified CONFIDENTIAL, major components and subsystems range from UNCLASSIFIED to CONFIDENTIAL, and technology data and other documentation are classified up to SECRET.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary obtains knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

3. A determination has been made that the Government of the Netherlands can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.

4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of the Netherlands.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA, Oct. 6, 2017.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-28, concerning the Missile Defense Agency's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$15 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA Director.
Enclosure.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-28

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$ 9 billion.

Other \$ 6 billion.

Total \$15 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Launchers.

Three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles.

Sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical Station Group. Seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars.

Non-MDE:

Also included are THAAD Battery maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, facilities construction, studies, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Departments: Missile Defense Agency (XX-I-W1B, XX-I-W1C); Army (XX-B-TFP, XX-B-BDP, XX-B-ZAO, XX-B-DAH, XX-B-ZAQ, XX-B-OZY, XX-B-HFA); NSA (XX-M-AAG).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-I-WIA Basic, 2 February 2015; Amendment 1, 25 August 2016.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 6, 2017.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia—Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Related Support Equipment and Services

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers, three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles, sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical Station Group, seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars. Also included are THAAD Battery maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, facilities construction, studies, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$15 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a friendly country. This sale furthers U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and supports the long-term security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region in the face of Iranian and other regional threats. This potential sale will substantially increase Saudi Arabia's capability to defend itself against the growing ballistic missile threat in the region. THAAD's exo-atmospheric, hit-to-kill capability will add an upper-tier to Saudi Arabia's layered missile defense architecture and will support modernization of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF). Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors for the THAAD system are Lockheed Martin Space Systems

Corporation, Dallas, TX, Camden, AR, Troy, AL and Huntsville, AL; and Raytheon Corporation, Andover, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require one hundred eleven (111) contractor representatives and eighteen (18) U.S. Government personnel in country for an extended period of time.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-28

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL/SECRET components and critical/sensitive technology. The THAAD Fire Unit is a ground-based, forward deployable terminal missile defense system that represents significant technological advances. The THAAD system continues to hold a technology lead over other terminal ballistic missile systems. THAAD is the first weapon system with both endo- and exo-atmospheric capability developed specifically to defend against ballistic missiles. The higher altitude and theater-wide protection offered by THAAD provides more protection of larger areas than lower-tier systems alone. THAAD is designed to defend against short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The THAAD system consists of four major components: Fire Control/Communications, Radar, Launchers, and Interceptor Missiles.

2. The THAAD BMD System contains sensitive/critical technology, primarily in the area of defense and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain critical components. Information on operational effectiveness with respect to countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, low observable technologies, selective software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET.

3. The THAAD BMD System contains Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI) that are used for both system internal links and for external communications. These items consist of key loading devices, network encryptors, secure telephones, voice radios, tactical data radios, and mission data radios. Specific CCI used for the Saudi Arabia case will be determined through the COMSEC Release Request (CRR) process, initiated through USCENTCOM once an interoperability requirement has been established. NSA will identify releasable items, in parallel with staffing and validation of the CRR by the Joint Staff. The Committee for National Security Systems (CNSS) reviews and provides final approval of the items and quantities.

4. AN/VCR-90, AN/VCR-91, AN/VCR-92 are different configurations of the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) family. SINCGARS is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant voice and data communications of command, control, targeting, and technical information for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated by potential adversaries for use or interference with other countries

possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they would have the potential to intercept operational command, control, and targeting information. This potential problem is mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure information passed over the radio network using a commercial grade security capability equivalent to an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption system whose keys are controlled by the customer country.

5. As with the SINCGARS family of radios, the AN/PRC-117 is a tactical radio providing ECCM jam-resistant secure communications for exchange of command, control, and targeting information within the THAAD system tactical radio network. ECCM capabilities are sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for these jam-resistant waveforms are unique to the customer country. Unlike the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC-117 uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded with U.S. crypto keys, the system is then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. Should a potential adversary come into possession of one of these radios, the customer country can quickly remotely rekey remaining radios, preventing potential adversaries from understanding received command, control, and targeting information.

6. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map background displaying the user's location. Unlike commercial grade GPS receivers capable of receiving Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS satellite signals provide significantly more accurate location data than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGRs is possible due to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within the DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM capabilities are sensitive due to the system's ability to access restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and to prevent spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of potential adversaries to exploit the system is limited.

7. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are also resident in the THAAD GPS timing system. The THAAD system requires highly precise timing hacks in order accurately track and engage targets. The PPS signals generated by GPS satellites provide this precise timing information. The SAASM device resident in the timing system permits receipt of this precise PPS timing data. The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display incorrect data. The SAASM capability within the timing system is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED.

8. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

9. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can provide substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.

10. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

KEEP AMERICA'S REFUGES OPERATIONAL ACT

Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, in celebration of National Wildlife Refuge Week, Senator BARRASSO and I introduced legislation just prior to the recent recess to reauthorize the National Wildlife Refuge System's volunteer and partnerships program. I want to share with our colleagues some information about S. 1940, the Keep America's Refugees Operational Act, and ask for their support.

The Keep America's Refugees Operational Act reauthorizes the volunteer and partnerships program, with no increase, at \$2 million per year. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service will use this authorization of Federal funding to provide volunteer uniforms, training, equipment, and necessary travel. The bill also allows volunteer groups to use this modest funding for administrative expenses directly related to the program.

For example, these groups will now be able to use funding to complete administrative requirements of cooperative agreements with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Cooperative agreements enable volunteers to assist the agency in technical activities, such as bird banding, other wildlife tagging, and research.

Our National Wildlife Refuge System is an exceptional network of public lands and waters dedicated to fish and wildlife conservation. More than 40 million people visit our refuges each year to explore, fish, hunt, and view and study wildlife. This ecotourism industry strongly supports local economies.

Volunteers are critical to refuge operations, making up 20 percent of the refuge system's workforce. Volunteers assist with fish and wildlife surveys, restoring habitat, and supporting refuge office functions. Without volunteers and partner groups, refuges may have to cut back on public programs and reduce hours of operation.

In my home State of Delaware, we have two beautiful refuges: the Prime Hook National Wildlife Refuge and the Bombay Hook National Wildlife Refuge. The two refuges employ only 10 full time staff, and both refuges are highly dependent upon volunteers.

Each year, people come to our refuges to observe the federally threatened Red Knot shorebird, which stops along the Delaware Bay to refuel on horseshoe crab eggs along its migration journey. Volunteers make sure these visitors have memorable experiences.

When people can see these pristine habitats and the many species that call them home, they are inspired to be good stewards of our planet for the enjoyment and benefit of future generations.

I want to ensure that these opportunities abound, in Delaware and around the country. A small annual investment in the refuge system volunteer and partnerships program goes a long way. Every \$1 appropriated to coordinate these volunteers translates to \$10 worth of volunteer services.

These appropriations also help cut government costs. In fiscal year 2016, 40,000 volunteers donated 1.4 million hours, with donated time equaling that of 649 full-time employees.

I want to thank Senator BARRASSO for cosponsoring this commonsense legislation. I look forward to working with him and our colleagues in the House to pass the Keep America's Refugees Operational Act and enact it into law.

Thank you.

CONFIRMATION OF AJIT PAI

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. President, I do not believe Chairman Pai should have been confirmed to serve a full 5-year term as Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, FCC. Since assuming the leadership role at the Commission, Chairman Pai has systematically advanced policies that advance corporate interests at the expense of American consumers.

Chairman Pai's decision to open an NPRM that will eventually reverse the 2015 open internet order is an egregious example of his misplaced priorities. In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit confirmed that the open internet order was a lawful exercise of the Commission's regulatory authority. Broadband service providers must provide fair and equal access to all users, regardless of socioeconomic status. Over 18 million Americans submitted comments urging the Commission to maintain regulations that impose transparency and prevent ISPs from throttling or discriminating against certain data. Numerous polls have shown that Americans, across the political spectrum, overwhelmingly support regulations that would prevent broadband companies from discriminating against certain data.

Chairman Pai claims that the 2015 order caused a decrease in broadband investment, but the evidence suggests otherwise. I wrote to Chairman Pai about the evidence that he frequently cites to support his allegations of depressed investment—evidence, which I believe, is incomplete and inconclusive. As technology develops and consumers become even more dependent upon internet access, it is imperative that the FCC ensures that the internet is not divided between the have and the have-nots.

I was also disappointed by Chairman Pai's support for Congress's actions to repeal the Federal Communications Commission's broadband privacy rules. These rules are especially important in light of recent data breaches. Every website we visit and every link we click leaves an unintended trail that

tells a story about our lives. ISPs can collect information about our location, children, sensitive information, family status, financial information, Social Security Numbers, web browsing history, and even the content of communications. ISPs sell this highly sensitive and highly personal data to the highest bidder without consumer's consent or knowledge. The Commission's rules empowered consumers and gave them tools to protect their privacy through transparency, choice, and data security. In supporting the rule's repeal, Chairman Pai demonstrated that he does not believe that Americans should have control over their data.

The rise of the internet of things, telehealth, and smart agriculture means that American consumers need an FCC that is on watch and committed to protecting their interests. I hope that Chairman Pai will reverse course and will stop putting the interests of big corporations ahead of the interests of American consumers.

REMEMBERING LIEUTENANT THOMAS F. BURKHART AND VETERANS OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. President, this week my constituent Caroline Burkhardt of Baltimore, MD, is on a historic trip to Japan of remembrance and reconciliation. A guest of the Japanese Government, she will follow the journey of her father, Thomas F. Burkhardt, who was a prisoner of war of imperial Japan 75 years ago. Her trip will include a visit to the site of the camp in which her father was held as a POW.

At the start of WWII, Lieutenant Burkhardt served in the Philippines with the Headquarters Company of the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, an elite U.S. Army unit composed of American officers and Filipino enlisted men. After Japan's December 8, 1941, invasion of the Philippines, his battalion helped defend the withdrawal of American forces on Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula. Barely a month after being promoted to first lieutenant, on January 24, 1942, Lieutenant Burkhardt earned a Silver Star for "Gallantry in Action" at the Battle of Abucay Hacienda, January 15 to 25, 1942, which maintained the first battle position on Bataan.

Sick with malaria, Lieutenant Burkhardt was in the open-air general hospital No. 1 near the tip of Bataan when Major General Edward King surrendered the peninsula to Japanese forces on April 9, 1942. Soon thereafter, the patients were taken by truck, boxcar, and foot up to Camp O'Donnell, an overcrowded, makeshift POW camp. In early June, the Japanese, fearing the deaths of the prisoners from the horrific conditions in the camp, began to release their Filipino POWs and transfer the others to a new facility at Cabanatuan. It is estimated that 1,550 Americans and 22,000 Filipinos died at Camp O'Donnell, the overwhelming majority within the first 8 weeks.