

(2) expresses its deepest condolences to the victims of these attacks and their families;

(3) expresses solidarity with the people of United Kingdom, the Philippines, Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, Australia, and Iran;

(4) recognizes the threat posed by ISIS and recommit to U.S. leadership in the Global Coalition working to defeat ISIS.

SENATE RESOLUTION 189—DESIGNATING THE WEEK OF JUNE 5 THROUGH JUNE 11, 2017, AS “HEMP HISTORY WEEK”

Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. PAUL, Mr. MERKLEY, and Mr. MCCONNELL) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 189

Whereas Hemp History Week will be held from June 5 through June 11, 2017;

Whereas the goals of Hemp History Week are to commemorate the historical relevance of industrial hemp in the United States and to promote the full growth potential of the industrial hemp industry;

Whereas industrial hemp is an agricultural commodity that has been used for centuries to produce many innovative industrial and consumer products, including soap, fabric, textiles, construction materials, clothing, paper, cosmetics, food, and beverages;

Whereas the global market for hemp is estimated to consist of more than 25,000 products;

Whereas the value of hemp imported into the United States for use in the production of other retail products is estimated at approximately \$76,000,000 annually;

Whereas the United States hemp industry estimates that the annual market value of hemp retail sales in the United States is more than \$570,000,000;

Whereas despite the legitimate uses of hemp, many agricultural producers of the United States are prohibited under current law from growing hemp;

Whereas because most hemp cannot be grown legally in the United States, raw hemp material and hemp products are imported for sale in the United States;

Whereas the United States is the largest consumer of hemp products in the world, but the United States is the only major industrialized country that restricts hemp farming; and

Whereas industrial hemp holds great potential to bolster the agricultural economy of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) designates the week of June 5 through June 11, 2017, as “Hemp History Week”;

(2) recognizes the historical relevance of industrial hemp; and

(3) recognizes the growing economic potential of industrial hemp.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 223. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 224. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 225. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 226. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 227. Mr. MCCONNELL (for Mr. MORAN (for himself and Mr. ROBERTS)) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division.

SA 228. Mr. MCCONNELL (for Mr. MORAN (for himself and Mr. ROBERTS)) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, supra.

SA 229. Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. BROWN, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. CASEY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 230. Mr. HELLER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 223. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 31, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:

(7) An assessment of Iran's cyber capabilities, cyber force structure, and hostile cyber activities targeting the United States, United States interests, the interests of allies and partners of the United States, and interests of Iran's regional neighbors, including an assessment of the acquisition, development, and deployment by Iran of cyber personnel and capabilities.

SA 224. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 28, line 18, strike “AND NORTH AFRICA” and insert “NORTH AFRICA, AND SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA”.

On page 29, line 2, strike “and beyond” and insert “South and Central Asia, and beyond”.

SA 225. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 13. CONDITIONS FOR RETURN OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES.

Section 205 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4305) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) Access to the Russian diplomatic facilities in Maryland and New York, which were closed by President Obama in December

2016, in accordance with subsection (b)(3), in response to efforts by the Government of Russia, or its surrogates, to interfere in the 2016 United States presidential campaign, shall be denied to all representatives of the Government of Russia until the Secretary of State, after consultation with Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, certifies to Congress that the Government of Russia is no longer conducting cyber-enabled activities that—

“(1) are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States; or

“(2) have the purpose or effect of—

“(A) harming, or otherwise significantly compromising the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers that support 1 or more entities in the United States in a critical infrastructure sector;

“(B) significantly compromising the provision of services by 1 or more entities in the United States in a critical infrastructure sector;

“(C) causing a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers in the United States;

“(D) causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information in the United States for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain; or

“(E) tampering with, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining United States election processes or institutions.”.

SA 226. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 13. STRENGTHENING ALLIED CYBERSECURITY.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the “Strengthening Allied Cybersecurity Act of 2017”.

(b) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In January 2017, the Director of National Intelligence (referred to in this Act as the “DNI”), in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this Act as the “FBI”), and the National Security Agency, judged with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign aimed at the 2016 United States presidential election.

(2) The DNI report stated, “[The Department of Homeland Security] assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.”.

(3) On January 10, 2017, the DNI stated, in testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, “We can say that we did not see evidence of the Russians altering vote tallies.”.

(4) On March 20, 2017, FBI Director James Comey stated, in testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, “We also, as a government, supplied information to all the states so they could equip themselves to make sure there was no successful effort to affect the vote and there was none, as we said earlier.”.

(5) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, judged that Russia's intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 United States presidential election.

(6) The DNI assessed that the Russian Government's campaign aimed at the United States election featured—

(A) disclosures of data obtained through Russian cyber operations;

(B) intrusions into United States state and local election boards; and

(C) overt propaganda.

(7) Russia's use of public disclosures of Russian-collected data during the United States election was unprecedented.

(8) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, assessed that Russia will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the United States presidential election to influence future elections worldwide, including against United States allies and their election processes.

(9) In May 2016, Germany's domestic intelligence agency assessed that hackers linked to the Russian Government had targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union party and German state computers.

(10) The head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, Bruno Kahl, later asserted that Germany had "evidence that cyber-attacks are taking place that have no other purpose than to elicit political uncertainty. The perpetrators are interested in delegitimizing the democratic process as such, regardless of who that ends of helping. We have indications that [the attacks] come from the Russian region." In November 2016, German Chancellor Merkel, said, "such cyber-attacks, or hybrid conflicts as they are known in Russian doctrine, are now part of daily life and we must learn to cope with them".

(11) On May 9, 2017, Admiral Michael Rogers, United States Cyber Command commander and Director of the National Security Agency, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the United States surveilled Russian hackers attack French computer systems as the French election approached. In his testimony, Rogers said, "We had talked to our French counterparts prior to the public announcements of the events that were publicly attributed this past weekend, and gave them a heads up, 'Look we're watching the Russians, we're seeing them penetrate some of your infrastructure.'".

(12) In February 2017, the United Kingdom's Defence Secretary Fallon stated that—

(A) all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries must support reform "to make NATO more agile, resilient, and better configured to operate in the contemporary environment including against hybrid and cyber-attacks"; and

(B) "NATO must defend itself as effectively in the cyber sphere as it does in the air, on land, and at sea."

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AGENCIES.—The term "appropriate Federal agencies" means—

(A) the Department of Defense;

(B) the Department of Homeland Security;

(C) the Department of Justice;

(D) the Department of the Treasury;

(E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(F) the Department of Commerce

(2) HYBRID WARFARE.—The term "hybrid warfare" means a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular war-

fare, informational warfare, and cyber warfare.

(3) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "relevant congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(C) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(D) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(G) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(H) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

(I) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(J) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(K) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and

(L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(d) TRANS-ATLANTIC CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop, and submit to the relevant congressional committees, a trans-Atlantic cybersecurity strategy, with a classified annex, if necessary, that includes—

(A) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to respond to Russia's hybrid warfare against NATO allies;

(B) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation with European partners, including non-NATO nations, to counter Russia's cyber efforts to undermine democratic elections in the United States and Europe;

(C) an assessment of nonmilitary tools and tactics, including sanctions, indictments, or other actions that the United States can use, unilaterally or in cooperation with like-minded nations, to counter Russia's malicious cyber activity in the United States and Europe; and

(D) a review of resources required by the Department of State and appropriate Federal agencies to conduct activities to build cooperation with NATO allies and European partners on countering Russia's hybrid warfare and disinformation efforts.

(2) CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY.—The Secretary of State shall ensure that the implementation of the strategy described in paragraph (1) is consistent with United States standards for civil liberties and privacy protections.

(e) FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY LIAISON TO UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall appoint, at the rank of Executive Assistant Director, a cybersecurity liaison for presidential campaigns and major national political party committees, who, at the request of presidential campaigns and major national political party committees, shall—

(1) regularly share cybersecurity best practices and protocols with each presidential campaign, the Democratic National Committee, the Republican National Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Congressional

Campaign Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee; and

(2) provide the timely sharing of cybersecurity threats to such campaigns and committees to prevent or mitigate adverse effects from such cybersecurity threats.

(f) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit an annual report to the relevant congressional committees on the implementation of the trans-Atlantic cybersecurity cooperation strategy developed under subsection (d).

SA 227. Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. MORAN (for himself and Mr. ROBERTS)) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division; as follows:

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

That the Senate—

(1) commemorates "A Century of Service", the 100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division on June 8, 2017;

(2) commends the 1st Infantry Division for continuing to exemplify the motto of the 1st Infantry Division, "No Mission Too Difficult. No Sacrifice Too Great. Duty First!";

(3) honors the memory of the more than 13,000 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division who lost their lives in battle;

(4) expresses gratitude and support for all 1st Infantry Division soldiers, veterans, and their families, including 1st Infantry Division soldiers and their families of the past and future and those who are serving as of May 2017; and

(5) recognizes that the 1st Infantry Division holds an honored place in United States history.

SA 228. Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. MORAN (for himself and Mr. ROBERTS)) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division; as follows:

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas June 8, 2017, is the 100th anniversary of the organization of the 1st Infantry Division;

Whereas the First Infantry Division was established in 1917 as the first permanent combined arms division in the Regular Army and has been on continuous active duty since 1917;

Whereas, from the heroic start of the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division has played an integral part in United States history by serving in—

(1) World War I;

(2) World War II;

(3) the Cold War;

(4) the Vietnam War;

(5) Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm;

(6) the Balkans peacekeeping missions;

(7) the War on Terror; and

(8) as of May 2017, multiple operations around the globe;

Whereas, immediately after its establishment, the 1st Division started to build a prestigious reputation for its service in World War I;

Whereas, in May 1918, the victory of the 1st Division at the Battle of Cantigny, France, was the first United States victory of World War I, and despite suffering more than 1,000 casualties in that battle, the 1st Division seized the village from German forces, defended the village against repeated counterattacks, and bolstered the morale of the Allies;

Whereas, after the Battle of Cantigny, the 1st Division played a central role in other monumental battles of World War I, such as—

- (1) the Battle of Soissons;
- (2) the Battle of Saint-Mihiel; and
- (3) the Meuse-Argonne Offensive;

Whereas 5 soldiers of the 1st Division received the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War I;

Whereas the 1st Division—

- (1) remained on occupation duty in Germany to enforce the Armistice; and
- (2) in September 1919, was the last combat division to return home after World War I;

Whereas, following World War I, the 1st Division was 1 of only 3 United States Army divisions to remain on active duty, which is a strong testament to its accomplishments;

Whereas, in November 1939, the 1st Infantry Division was called to action again and, in August 1942, became 1 of the first United States divisions sent to the European theater during World War II;

Whereas, during World War II, the 1st Infantry Division fought bravely in Algeria, Tunisia, and Sicily in 1942 and 1943 before the courage and resolve of the 1st Infantry Division was tested on Omaha Beach in Normandy, France;

Whereas the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by units of the 29th Infantry Division, made the assault landing on Omaha Beach on D-Day, June 6, 1944, which began the liberation of Western Europe from Nazi control;

Whereas the 1st Infantry Division continued its invaluable service throughout World War II, including in—

- (1) the liberation of France and Belgium;
- (2) the seizing of Aachen, the first city of Nazi Germany to fall to the Allies;
- (3) the Battle of the Huertgen Forest;
- (4) the Battle of the Bulge, in which the 1st Infantry Division held the critical northern shoulder at Butgenbach, Belgium;
- (5) the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen;
- (6) the battles around the Ruhr Pocket in Germany; and
- (7) the offensive into Czechoslovakia, where the 1st Infantry Division liberated Nazi labor camps at Falkenau and Zwodau;

Whereas 17 members of the 1st Infantry Division received the Congressional Medal of Honor for their service during World War II;

Whereas, in recognition of exemplary service during World War II, the 1st Infantry Division was the recipient of—

- (1) 2 French Croix de Guerre with Palm, and Streamers embroidered with “Kasserine” and “Normandy”;
- (2) the World War II French Fourragere;
- (3) the Belgian Fourragere; and
- (4) the subordinate units of the 1st Infantry Division earned numerous Presidential Unit Citations;

Whereas the 1st Infantry Division guarded the Nuremberg Trials and remained on occupation duty in Germany before returning home to Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1955;

Whereas, in 1965, the 1st Infantry Division was 1 of the first 2 divisions sent to the Vietnam War, and the 1st Infantry Division remained in Vietnam for 5 years, during which the 1st Infantry Division—

- (1) protected the capital, Saigon, from attack by the North Vietnamese Army;
- (2) conducted hundreds of—

(A) offensive operations between Saigon and Cambodia against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units; and

(B) civil action and pacification operations to protect and assist the Vietnamese people; and

- (3) responded to the 1968 Tet Offensive by clearing Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base of enemy forces, securing Saigon and counter-attacking vigorously;

Whereas 12 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division earned the Congressional Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War;

Whereas, in recognition of exemplary service during the Vietnam War—

(1) the 1st Infantry Division was the recipient of—

(A) the United States Army Meritorious Unit Commendation;

(B) the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm for the period of 1965 to 1968; and

(C) the Republic of Vietnam civic Action Honor Medal, First Class; and

(2) the subordinate units of the 1st Infantry Division earned numerous Presidential unit citations and other Army awards;

Whereas, from 1970 to 1990 the 1st Infantry Division—

(1) was a key component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deterrent strategy;

(2) maintained a forward-stationed brigade in Germany and deployed additional elements annually to Germany on major exercises that demonstrated United States resolve to friend and foe alike; and

(3) contributed directly to the peaceful end of the Cold War;

Whereas, in November 1990, the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Saudi Arabia and played a key role in the famous “left hook” attack of the US VII Corps through the deserts of western Iraq to destroy the Tawakalna Division of the vaunted Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, among many other enemy forces;

Whereas the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Bosnia for 31 months between 1996 and 2000, to Macedonia for 4 months in 1999, and to Kosovo for 22 months between 1999 and 2003—

(1) to enforce international peace agreements;

(2) to halt the worst ethnic violence in Europe since the Holocaust; and

(3) to bring peace and stability to the Balkans;

Whereas, in 2004, the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom as Task Force Danger and conducted sophisticated counterinsurgency operations that led to the first free and fair elections in Iraqi history in 2005;

Whereas, between 2005 and 2014, the brigade combat teams and other major headquarters and units of the 1st Infantry Division have deployed repeatedly to Iraq and Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn;

Whereas Specialist Ross A. McGinnis, a 1st Infantry Division soldier, is 1 of the very few people of the United States to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the War on Terror;

Whereas, in the defense of United States interests, the 1st Infantry Division deployed its units and soldiers to Africa in 2015 and Kuwait in 2016;

Whereas, since November 2016, the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division has been in Iraq, where the 1st Infantry Division is—

(1) engaged in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS); and

(2) providing the leadership structure for the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command—Operation Inherent Resolve;

Whereas, as of May 2017—

(1) the Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, is deployed to Afghanistan and is conducting combat aviation operations in support of the Afghan and international security forces battling the Taliban;

(2) the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, is deployed to South Korea, where it bolsters United States deterrence against North Korea; and

(3) the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, is at Fort Riley, Kansas, where it is honing its combat-readiness in preparation for deployment; and

Whereas, since the establishment of the 1st Infantry Division in 1917—

(1) the 1st Infantry Division has been present all over the world, assisting in combat and noncombat missions for 100 years;

(2) more than 13,000 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division have sacrificed their lives in combat; and

(3) 35 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division have received the Medal of Honor: Now, therefore, be it

SA 229. Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. BROWN, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. CASEY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 13. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TO THE MEMBER NATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) The principle of collective defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members pledge that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”.

(2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening the security of the United States and all 28 other member nations.

(3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its commitment to collective defense.

(4) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the importance of an international alliance to combat hostile nation states and terrorist groups.

(5) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting and supporting one another from external adversaries, which bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.

(b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate—

(1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as it continues to serve as a critical deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist organizations;

(2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and

(3) to affirm that the United States remains fully committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5.

SA 230. Mr. HELLER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to

Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

Beginning on page 31, strike line 16 and all that follows through page 35, line 25.

At the end, add the following:

TITLE II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN

SEC. 200. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act”.

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On April 2, 2015, President Barack Obama said, “Other American sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, will continue to be fully enforced.”.

(2) On July 7, 2015, General Martin Dempsey, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “Under no circumstances should we relieve the pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities.”.

(3) On July 29, 2015, in his role as the top military officer in the United States and advisor to the President, General Dempsey confirmed that his military recommendation was that sanctions relating to the ballistic missile program of Iran not be lifted.

(4) The Government of Iran and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps have been responsible for the repeated testing of illegal ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device, including observed tests in October and November 2015 and March 2016, violating United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(5) On October 14, 2015, Samantha Power, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, said, “One of the really important features in implementation of the recent Iran deal to dismantle Iran's nuclear program is going to have to be enforcement of the resolutions and the standards that remain on the books.”.

(6) On December 11, 2015, the United Nations Panel of Experts concluded that the missile launch on October 10, 2015, “was a violation by Iran of paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010)”.

(7) On January 17, 2016, Adam Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated, “Iran's ballistic missile program poses a significant threat to regional and global security, and it will continue to be subject to international sanctions. We have consistently made clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions against Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—including those related to Iran's support for terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights abuses, and ballistic missile program.”.

(8) On February 9, 2016, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, testified that, “We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs.”.

(9) On March 9, 2016, Iran reportedly fired two Qadr ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles and according to public reports, the missiles were marked with a statement in Hebrew reading, “Israel must be wiped off the arena of time.”.

(10) On March 11, 2016, Ambassador Power called the recent ballistic missile launches

by Iran “provocative and destabilizing” and called on the international community to “degrade Iran's missile program”.

(11) On March 14, 2016, Ambassador Power said that the recent ballistic missile launches by Iran were “in defiance of provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231”.

(12) Iran has demonstrated the ability to launch multiple rockets from fortified underground facilities and mobile launch sites not previously known.

(13) The ongoing procurement by Iran of technologies needed to boost the range, accuracy, and payloads of its diverse ballistic missile arsenal represents a threat to deployed personnel of the United States and allies of the United States in Europe and the Middle East, including Israel.

(14) Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, testified in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate on July 7, 2015, that, “[T]he reason that we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the I in ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability to fly from Iran to the United States, and we don't want that. That's why we oppose ICBMs.”.

(15) Through recent ballistic missile launch tests the Government of Iran has shown blatant disregard for international laws and its intention to continue tests of that nature throughout the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

(16) The banking sector of Iran has facilitated the financing of the ballistic missile programs in Iran and evidence has not been provided that entities in that sector have ceased facilitating the financing of those programs.

(17) Iran has been able to amass a large arsenal of ballistic missiles through its illicit smuggling networks and domestic manufacturing capabilities that have been supported and maintained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and specific sectors of the economy of Iran.

(18) Penetration by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps into the economy of Iran is well documented including investments in the construction, automotive, telecommunications, electronics, mining, metallurgy, and petrochemical sectors of the economy of Iran.

(19) Items procured through sectors of Iran specified in paragraph (18) have dual use applications that are currently being used to create ballistic missiles in Iran and will continue to be a source of materials for the creation of future weapons.

(20) In order to curb future illicit activity by Iran, the Government of the United States and the international community must take action against persons that facilitate and profit from the illegal acquisition of ballistic missile parts and technology in support of the missile programs of Iran.

SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the ballistic missile program of Iran represents a serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle East and Europe, members of the Armed Forces deployed in the those regions, and ultimately the United States;

(2) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the international community;

(3) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran would use ballistic missiles

as its “preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons”; and

(4) the Government of the United States should impose tough primary and secondary sanctions against any sector of the economy of Iran or any Iranian person that directly or indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran as well as any foreign person or financial institution that engages in transactions or trade that support that program.

SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY.

(a) CERTAIN PERSONS.—Section 1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting “, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,” after “nuclear weapons”.

(b) FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting “, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,” after “nuclear weapons”.

SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.

Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in clause (i), by striking “would likely” and inserting “may”; and

(2) in clause (ii)—

(A) in subclause (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and

(C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

“(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the capability to launch ballistic missiles; or”.

SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Subtitle C—Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

“SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—In this subtitle:

“(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term ‘agricultural commodity’ has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

“(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ means—

“(A) the committees specified in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and

“(B) the congressional defense committees, as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.

“(3) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘correspondent account’ and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

“(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)).

“(5) GOOD.—The term ‘good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

“(6) GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘Government’, with respect to a foreign country, includes any agencies or instrumentalities of that Government and any entities controlled by that Government.

“(7) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term ‘medical device’ has the meaning given the term ‘device’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(8) MEDICINE.—The term ‘medicine’ has the meaning given the term ‘drug’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(b) DETERMINATIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE.—For purposes of this subtitle, in determining if financial transactions or financial services are significant, the President may consider the totality of the facts and circumstances, including factors similar to the factors set forth in section 561.404 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

“SEC. 232. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

“(a) IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying persons that have knowingly aided the Government of Iran in the development of the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

“(A) An identification of persons (disaggregated by Iranian and non-Iranian persons) that have knowingly aided the Government of Iran in the development of the ballistic missile program of Iran, including persons that have—

“(i) knowingly engaged in the direct or indirect provision of material support to such program;

“(ii) knowingly facilitated, supported, or engaged in activities to further the development of such program;

“(iii) knowingly transmitted information relating to ballistic missiles to the Government of Iran; or

“(iv) otherwise knowingly aided such program.

“(B) A description of the character and significance of the cooperation of each person identified under subparagraph (A) with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.

“(C) An assessment of the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.

“(3) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

“(b) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after submitting a report required by subsection (a)(1), the President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person specified in such report if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under section 202 of the International Emer-

gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this subsection.

“(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“(2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(d) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“SEC. 233. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH CERTAIN IRANIAN ENTITIES.

“(a) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in paragraph (3) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this subsection.

“(3) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described in this paragraph is—

“(A) an entity that is owned, directly or indirectly, by a 25 percent or greater interest—

“(i) by the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group; or

“(ii) collectively by a group of individuals that hold an interest in the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group, even if none of those individuals hold a 25 percent or greater interest in the entity;

“(B) a person that controls, manages, or directs an entity described in subparagraph (A); or

“(C) an individual who is on the board of directors of an entity described in subparagraph (A).

“(b) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180

days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (a).

“(c) IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION WATCH LIST.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and publish in the Federal Register a list of—

“(A) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group has an ownership interest of more than 0 percent and less than 25 percent;

“(B) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group does not have an ownership interest but maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity or otherwise influences the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity; and

“(C) each person that controls, manages, or directs an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

“(2) REFERENCE.—The list required by paragraph (1) may be referred to as the ‘Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List’.

“(d) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

“(A) conduct a review of each list required by subsection (c)(1); and

“(B) not later than 60 days after each such list is submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress under that subsection, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the review conducted under subparagraph (A) that includes a list of persons not included in that list that qualify for inclusion in that list, as determined by the Comptroller General.

“(2) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

“SEC. 234. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN BALLISTIC MISSILE ACTIVITIES.

“(a) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a certification that each person listed in an annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), or 1929 (2010) is not directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information relating to ballistic missiles.

“(b) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—If the President is unable to make a certification under subsection (a) with respect to a person and the person is not currently subject to sanctions with respect to Iran under any other provision of law, the President shall, not later than 15 days after that certification would have been required under that subsection—

“(A) in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of that person if such property and interests in property are in the United States,

come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person; and

“(B) publish in the Federal Register a report describing the reason why the President was unable to make a certification with respect to that person.

“(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this subsection.

“(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“(2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(d) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“SEC. 235. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

“(a) LIST OF SECTORS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and publish in the Federal Register a list of the sectors of the economy of Iran that are directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information relating to ballistic missiles.

“(2) CERTAIN SECTORS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a determination as to whether each of the automotive, chemical, computer science, construction, electronic, energy, metallurgy, mining, petrochemical, research (including universities and research institutions), and telecommunications sectors of Iran meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1).

“(B) INCLUSION IN INITIAL LIST.—If the President determines under subparagraph (A) that the sectors of the economy of Iran specified in such subparagraph meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1), that sector shall be included in the initial list submitted and published under that paragraph.

“(b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIED SECTORS OF IRAN.—

“(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, in accordance with the International Emer-

gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in paragraph (4) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(B) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this paragraph.

“(2) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien that is a person described in paragraph (4).

“(B) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(3) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—Except as provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person described in paragraph (4).

“(4) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person is described in this paragraph if the President determines that the person, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act—

“(A) operates in a sector of the economy of Iran included in the most recent list published by the President under subsection (a);

“(B) knowingly provides significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person described in subparagraph (A); or

“(C) is owned or controlled by a person described in subparagraph (A).

“(c) HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION.—The President may not impose sanctions under this section with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran.

“SEC. 236. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN IN CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and publish in the Federal Register a list of all foreign persons that have, based on credible information, directly or indirectly facilitated, supported, or been involved with the development of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information related to ballistic missiles in the following sectors of the economy of Iran during the period specified in subsection (b):

“(1) Automotive.

“(2) Chemical.

“(3) Computer Science.

“(4) Construction.

“(5) Electronic.

“(6) Energy.

“(7) Metallurgy.

“(8) Mining.

“(9) Petrochemical.

“(10) Research (including universities and research institutions).

“(11) Telecommunications.

“(12) Any other sector of the economy of Iran identified under section 235(a).

“(b) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in this subsection is—

“(1) with respect to the first list submitted under subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act and ending on the date that is 120 days after such date of enactment; and

“(2) with respect to each subsequent list submitted under such subsection, the one-year period preceding the submission of the list.

“(c) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each list submitted under subsection (a), not later than 120 days after the list is submitted under that subsection, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

“(A) an assessment of the processes followed by the President in preparing the list;

“(B) an assessment of the foreign persons included in the list; and

“(C) a list of persons not included in the list that qualify for inclusion in the list, as determined by the Comptroller General.

“(2) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

“(d) CREDIBLE INFORMATION DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘credible information’ has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 the following:

“Subtitle C—Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

“Sec. 231. Definitions.

“Sec. 232. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“Sec. 233. Blocking of property of persons affiliated with certain Iranian entities.

“Sec. 234. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons involved in ballistic missile activities.

“Sec. 235. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain sectors of Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“Sec. 236. Identification of foreign persons that support the ballistic missile program of Iran in certain sectors of Iran.”.

SEC. 206. EXPANSION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES OF IRAN.

Section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(2)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

(iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

“(ii) to acquire or develop ballistic missiles and capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic missiles; or”; and

(B) in subparagraph (E)(ii)—

(i) in subclause (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and

(iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

“(II) Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic missiles; or”; and

(2) in subsection (f)—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving those subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the right;

(B) by striking “WAIVER.—The” and inserting “WAIVER.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of the Treasury may not waive under paragraph (1) the application of a prohibition or condition imposed with respect to an activity described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (E)(ii)(II) of subsection (c)(2).”.

SEC. 207. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES WITH CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13(r)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(r)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:

“(D) knowingly engaged in any activity for which sanctions may be imposed under section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012; or”.

(b) INVESTIGATIONS.—Section 13(r)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking “an Executive order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D)” and inserting “section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, an Executive order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(E)”.

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 13(r)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “subparagraph (D)(iii)” and inserting “subparagraph (E)(iii)”.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 208. REGULATIONS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe regulations to carry out this title and the amendments made by this title.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I have 8 requests for committees to meet during today’s session of the Senate. They have the approval of the Majority and Minority leaders.

Pursuant to rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a), of the Standing Rules of the Sen-

ate, the following committees are authorized to meet during today’s session of the Senate:

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017 at 10 a.m. to conduct a hearing entitled, “Fostering Economic Growth: The Role of Financial Institutions in Local Communities”.

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is authorized to hold a meeting during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017, at 10 a.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate in order to hold a hearing on Thursday, June 8, 2017 at 10 a.m. in Room 366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC.

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Committee on Finance is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017, at 9:45 a.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct a hearing entitled “The President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget.”

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017 at 10 a.m., to hold a hearing entitled “Beyond Iraq and Syria: ISIS’ Global Reach.”

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

The Committee on the Judiciary is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on June 8, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., in SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct an executive business meeting.

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is authorized to meet during the session of the 115th Congress of the U.S. Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017 from 10 a.m., in room SH-216 of the Senate Hart Office Building to hold an open hearing entitled “Open Hearing with Former CIA Director James Comey.”

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is authorized to meet during the session of the 115th Congress of the U.S. Senate on Thursday, June 8, 2017 from 1 p.m., in room SH-219 of the Senate Hart Office Building to hold a closed hearing.

PRIVILEGES OF THE FLOOR

Ms. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that privileges of the floor be granted to my interns

for the remainder of the month of June 2017. Those interns are Claire Faulkner, Fiona Kelty, Jackson Blackwell, Jaden Frazier, James Flemings, Kinani Halvorsen, Mary Crowley, Tasha Elizarde, Taylor Holman, Tristan Douville, Fatos Redzepi, and Aimee Bushnell.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONDEMNING THE DEADLY ATTACK ON MAY 26, 2017, IN PORTLAND, OREGON

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S.J. Res. 45, submitted earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the joint resolution by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 45) condemning the deadly attack on May 26, 2017, in Portland, Oregon, expressing deepest condolences to the families and friends of the victims, and supporting efforts to overcome hatred, bigotry, and violence.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be considered read a third time and passed, the preamble be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 45) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The joint resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

S.J. RES. 45

Whereas, on May 26, 2017, 3 brave community members—Rick Best, Taliesin Myrddin Namkai-Meche, and Micah David-Cole Fletcher—were stabbed as they protected 2 young women who were the targets of threatening anti-Muslim hate speech while riding on the Metropolitan Area Express Light Rail (commonly known as the “MAX”) in Portland, Oregon;

Whereas Rick Best and Taliesin Myrddin Namkai-Meche lost their lives and Micah David-Cole Fletcher was gravely injured as a result of the attack;

Whereas acts of heroism and sacrifice for the safety and sake of others in the face of acts of domestic terrorism were demonstrated by the deceased and surviving victims;

Whereas Oregonians and people across the United States grieve for the families of all people affected by this needless tragedy; and

Whereas the people of the United States stand in solidarity against terrorism, white supremacy, hate, and intolerance: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress—

(1) condemns the deadly attack on May 26, 2017, in Portland, Oregon, in which 2 innocent people were killed and 1 other person