

These types of memorials matter. For many of us, this generation is not the generation that served together on a base. Many of us actually served from different parts of the world. We dropped our jobs and what we were doing, our school sometimes, to join in, leave our families, leave the comfort and safety of the United States to go and defend what we believed was important to this country and to honor our commitment.

Sometimes it is these types of memorials that are the only thing that actually bring us together. I recently was lucky enough to have my 10-year reunion with the guys from Lima Company, and that is the first time I had seen many men that I had lived with for so long. It was a very inspiring as well as moving, and really consoling thing for me.

I believe that having a memorial of this nature would be extremely important for many men and women to be able to see, to be able to come and maybe not necessarily physically meet with their partners, with their comrades, but to at least be able to spiritually have a place to meet with their comrades, with the people that they served with in arms.

Mr. Speaker, I urge everyone to vote “yes,” and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

With this vote, we will begin proceeding on this memorial and begin a process of planning a great work to honor the bravery, sacrifice, and patriotism to those who have defended Western civilization from the medieval barbarism that has reappeared in our time.

But even more importantly, we begin work on a tangible promise for future generations, a promise animated by the heroic deeds of these veterans, the promise of a coming age of liberty and justice, of peace and tolerance that will surely come. I ask for adoption of this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. MCCLINTOCK) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 873.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 481, I call up the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account,

and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, shall be considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered read.

The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 3180

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018”.

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

#### TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.

Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

#### TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

#### TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community contractors.

Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.

#### TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

*Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing environment.

Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.

*Subtitle B—Other Elements*

Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of National Security Agency.

Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

#### TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.

Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.

Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian Federation.

#### TITLE VI—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service officers.

Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.

Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.

Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services jurisdiction.

Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.

Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.

Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities equities process.

Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.

Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of classified information.

#### SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

*In this Act:*

(1) *CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.*—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.*—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

#### TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

##### SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Department of Defense.

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The National Security Agency.

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.

(8) The Department of State.

(9) The Department of the Treasury.

(10) The Department of Energy.

(11) The Department of Justice.

(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

##### SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) *SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.*—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) *AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.*—

(1) *AVAILABILITY.*—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) *DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.*—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) **LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.**—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

#### SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) **AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.**—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element.

(b) **TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(c) **NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

#### SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$526,900,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.

(b) **AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.**—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) **CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.**—

(1) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts made available for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.

(2) **AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.**—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

### TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

#### SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$514,000,000.

#### SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) **COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting “, as determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that position.”;

(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking “12-month” and inserting “2-year”;

(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”;

(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking “one year” each place such term appears and inserting “two years”;

(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; and

(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

“(h) **CONDITIONAL ELECTION OF INSURABLE INTEREST SURVIVOR ANNUITY BY PARTICIPANTS MARRIED AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT.**—

“(1) **AUTHORITY TO MAKE DESIGNATION.**—Subject to the rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the system after the participant's death, except that any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.

“(2) **REDUCTION IN PARTICIPANT'S ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.

“(3) **COMMENCEMENT OF SURVIVOR ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before the designated individual dies.

“(4) **RECOMPUTATION OF PARTICIPANT'S ANNUITY ON DEATH OF DESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL.**—An annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.”.

(2) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**—

(A) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.**—The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by striking “221(h),” and inserting “221(i),”; and

(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by striking “221(k)” and inserting “221(l)”.

(B) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.**—Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking “221(h)(2),

221(i), 221(l),” and inserting “221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),”.

(b) **ANNUITIES FOR FORMER SPOUSES.**—Subparagraph (B) of section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”.

(c) **PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT.**—Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking “October 1, 1990” both places that term appears and inserting “March 31, 1991”.

(d) **REEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.**—Section 273 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) **PART-TIME REEMPLOYED ANNUITANTS.**—The Director shall have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(e) **EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.**—The amendments made by subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

### TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

#### SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

#### SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

#### SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

(a) **OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506J the following new section:

#### “SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

“Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community, the head may not—

“(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract;

“(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract; or

“(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor of such element contacts or meets with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract.”.

(2) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506J the following new item:

“Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.”.

(b) APPLICATION.—The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.**

Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “AUDIT” and inserting “REVIEW”;

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”; and

(3) in paragraph (2), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”.

**TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

**Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence**

**SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.**

Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking “such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;” and inserting “current and former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;”.

**SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER—INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.**

(a) INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.—Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “President” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “President” both places that term appears and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”.

(b) PROGRAM MANAGER.—Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)) is amended by striking “The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the President (at the President’s sole discretion).” and inserting “Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program manager shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

**SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.**

Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security.”.

**Subtitle B—Other Elements**

**SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National Security Agency.

“(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (c) of section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.

**SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.**

(a) INFORMATION REVIEW TASK FORCE.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall be designated as a chairman’s controlled activity.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) IDENTITY INTELLIGENCE PROJECT OFFICE.—

(1) ELIMINATION.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the elimination required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(c) WATCHLISTING BRANCH.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Watchlisting Branch.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this

Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff.

(d) COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE.—

(1) ELIMINATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(e) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on October 1, 2020, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National Intelligence University.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than April 1, 2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such

date shall be transferred to the Director of National Intelligence.

(f) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTICE FOR REPROGRAMMING.**—Not later than 30 days before transferring any funds relating to transferring or eliminating any function under this section, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees notice in writing of such transfer.

(g) **TREATMENT OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—In the case of any function or executive agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or responsibility to another element of the intelligence community.

(2) **EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITY.**—In this subsection, the term “executive agent responsibility” means the specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head of an intelligence community element to provide defined levels of support for intelligence operations, or administrative or other designated activities.

(h) **DEADLINE FOR POLICY UPDATES.**—Not later than October 1, 2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant policies of the intelligence community and Department of Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be made pursuant to this section.

(i) **TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS.**—No transferred functions or assigned responsibility referred to in subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned responsibility.

(j) **REPORTS ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.**—

(1) **NATIONAL CENTER FOR CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT.**—

(A) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(i) the assignment of executive agency for the National Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of the Center;

(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence, in the role of the Director as security executive for the Federal Government, to define in policy the term “Executive Agent” may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical Federal mission of the Center; and

(iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility assessment training, oversight, and research and development, has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on legacy reporting requirements.

(B) **REPORT.**—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on—

(i) the current and projected missions and functions of the National Center for Credibility Assessment;

(ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of National Intelligence; and

(iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.

(2) **UNDERGROUND FACILITIES ANALYSIS CENTER.**—

(A) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the broader intelligence community customer base of the Center;

(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence to define in policy the term “Executive Agent” may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the Center; and

(iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding currently received by the Center.

(B) **REPORT.**—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on—

(i) the missions and functions of the Underground Facilities Analysis Center;

(ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet such requirements;

(iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence; and

(v) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.

(k) **CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “congressional defense committees” means—

(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives.

#### **SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.**

(a) **ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT.**—Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting “Intelligence and” after “The Director of”.

(b) **NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.**—Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting “and Counterintelligence” after “Office of Intelligence”;

(2) by striking subparagraph (F);

(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and

(4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the left.

#### **TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES**

#### **SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.**

(a) **ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include—

(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;

(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referendum;

(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and

(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).

(b) **FORM.**—The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

(c) **RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Russian influence campaign” means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States.

#### **SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.**

(a) **REPORTS REQUIRED.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—As provided in paragraph (2), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following:

(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices.

(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats.

(C) An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.

(2) **SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTAL.**—A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows:

(A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is one year before the date of the election.

(3) **INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.**—A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.

(b) **TREATMENT OF CAMPAIGNS SUBJECT TO HEIGHTENED THREATS.**—If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

#### **SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director

of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of the financing of threat activity by the Russian Federation.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period prior to the date of the report of any threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law.

(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities.

(3) A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.

(4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.

(c) **FORM.**—The report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) **THREAT FINANCE DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “threat finance” means—

(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;

(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;

(3) sanctions evasion; or

(4) other forms of threat financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

## TITLE VI—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

### SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS.

(a) **LENGTH OF PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT.**—Subsection (a) of section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive years.”.

(b) **FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.**—Section 702 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is amended by—

(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(c) **FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.**—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all members of the Service who receive foreign language training in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive tours in positions in which the acquired language is both relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.

“(2) **OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS.**—In carrying out paragraph (1), at least one of the three successive tours referred to in such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.

“(3) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship or in the interest of national security.

“(4) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.**—The Secretary of State shall notify the Committees on

Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph (3) was invoked.”.

### SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

#### “SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

“(a) **IN GENERAL.**—On a semiannual basis, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the preceding 6-month period—

“(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information;

“(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information; and

“(3) of the number of such completed investigations identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.

“(b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘covered official’ means—

“(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and

“(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.

“(2) The term ‘investigation’ means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(3) The term ‘unauthorized public disclosure of classified information’ means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.”.

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the following new item:

“Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.”.

### SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.

Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting “and” after the semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (C);

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS.**—(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed by each such element and shall cover Federal employees and contractor employees.

“(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the year covered by the report:

“(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations opened for new applicants.

“(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-investigations opened for existing employees.

“(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows:

“(i) For 180 days or less.

“(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.

“(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.

“(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.

“(v) For 24 months or longer.

“(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—

“(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and

“(ii) the number of such determinations for which polygraph examinations were required.

“(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic re-investigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.

“(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.

“(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting “and (b)” after “subsection (a)(1)”.

### SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES JURISDICTION.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the feasibility, justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The report shall include—

(1) an explanation of the need for expanding such jurisdiction beyond the 500-foot limit specified in such section 15(a)(1); and

(2) an identification of any comparable departments or agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions exceed 500 feet.

(b) **FORM.**—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

**SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.**

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential foreign investments into the United States.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall—

(1) describe the current process for the provision of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);

(2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director, including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and

(3) include recommendations to improve such process.

**SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.**

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary exchange program between elements of the intelligence community and private technology companies under which—

(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has elected to receive the detailee; and

(2) an employee of a private technology company with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to an element of the intelligence community that has elected to receive the detailee.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program described in such subsection.

(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the exchange program.

(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence community that would result from the exchange program.

**SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESSES.**

(a) **REVIEW.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of the Federal Government for determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.

(b) **REPORT.**—

(1) **SUBMISSION.**—Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the results of the review under subsection (a).

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.

(B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including elements of the intelligence community, in making such determination.

(C) With respect to the period covered by the review—

(i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal Government pursuant to such process, including—

(I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence community that were reviewed; and

(II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number for which information was shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public;

(ii) an assessment of whether there were any vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process, and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a review; and

(iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber intrusion.

(D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing such process.

(E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national security, transparency of such process.

(F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines appropriate.

(3) **FORM.**—The report may be submitted in classified form.

(c) **VULNERABILITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “vulnerability” means, with respect to information technology, a design, configuration, or implementation weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or application that can be exploited or triggered to cause unexpected or unintended behavior.

**SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.**

(a) **REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.**—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other practices and procedures relating to intelligence community whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.

(b) **OBJECTIVE OF REVIEW.**—The objective of the review required under subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

(c) **CONDUCT OF REVIEW.**—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

**SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.**

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds that section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” about all “intelligence activities” of the United States, and to “furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities. . . which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an official of an adversary foreign government using methods other than established intelligence channels; and

(2) each such notification should include—

(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified information covered by the notification;

(B) a description of such classified information;

(C) identification of the individual who made such disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made; and

(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) The term “adversary foreign government” means the government of any of the following foreign countries:

(A) North Korea.

(B) Iran.

(C) China.

(D) Russia.

(E) Cuba.

(2) The term “covered classified information” means classified information that was—

(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; or

(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.

(3) The term “established intelligence channels” means methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence community.

(4) The term “individual in the executive branch” means any officer or employee of the executive branch, including individuals—

(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the Constitution;

(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive service (or similar service for senior executives of particular departments or agencies).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill, H.R. 3180.



The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is a good, bipartisan bill that we have worked all year putting together in a bipartisan manner. I thank all of my colleagues not only on the Intelligence Committee, but also those colleagues who came down to review the bill. Hopefully they got all the information from our staff to provide all the answers that they may need so that they understand the classified nature of the bill and the importance of this bill to our Nation's intelligence community and our warfighters.

I want to highlight just a few things in the bill, because we did debate this bill on Monday, so I will go through this quickly.

The legislation provides the intelligence community authorization needed to protect and defend the United States. It supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign nations.

The total funding authorized in the bill is slightly below the President's budget request, and is consistent with the House Budget Committee-passed fiscal year 2018 budget resolution.

H.R. 3180 enables the intelligence community to carry out its vital work protecting Americans in the most complex threat environment since 9/11.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a solid, bipartisan bill, one that garnered unanimous approval in the committee by voice vote.

I thank my committee colleagues and the entire HPSCI staff for their collaborative efforts in crafting the measure that we consider here today.

In the 114th Congress, this committee worked in a similar bipartisan fashion to pass into law four key pieces of national security legislation. I am proud of our past legislative accomplishments, which testify to the virtues of substantive deliberation and reasoned compromise without needing to compromise the security of the American people or of our brave servicemembers.

Reflecting on the past year, on Russia's assault on Western democracies, and on other challenges as well, from everything to include North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of a strategic nuclear capability, we owe the American people a deliberate process.

I wish the bill had come to the floor with a rule that allowed Members to offer amendments. That opportunity is commensurate with the importance of the intelligence bill and the need for vigorous oversight of the IC by the whole Congress.

Nonetheless, the manifest shortcomings in the process cannot take precedence over the imperative of discharging our duty and authorizing the operations of the intelligence community. On its merits, I urge all Members to vote "yes" on H.R. 3180 today.

The Intelligence Committee oversees some of the most sensitive and highly classified aspects of U.S. intelligence operations and programs. The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is the primary means by which we can guarantee an appropriate balance between our Nation's national security imperatives and the civil liberties and privacy rights enshrined in the Constitution.

H.R. 3180 does just that by funding, equipping, and giving policy direction to the intelligence community and military intelligence elements of the Defense Department. It sustains support for key national security priorities and programs, and represents a slight decrease from the President's budget request from 2018.

This bill features a number of provisions championed by my Democratic colleagues, some of which redouble the IC's focus on the scope and nature of the threat, both overt and covert, that Russia poses to our interests and American political institutions.

H.R. 3180 also mandates public reporting about counterintelligence and cyber threats against future U.S. elections; bolsters oversight of our policy guiding counterterrorism actions outside of declared areas of hostilities; and seeks more information about the executive branch's process for determining when and to whom to reveal information about vulnerabilities in computers and networks.

At the same time, and unlike IAAs of years past, this bill omits problematic language regarding Guantanamo detentions and the role of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

I am less supportive of some elements in this legislation, but the bill's merits outweigh any misgivings I may have, and I was proud to cosponsor the bill along with the chairman. Through it, our committee and the Congress as a whole serves as a guardrail against any excesses, transgressions or abuses. That has always been a solemn obligation, but at this uncertain and unprecedented moment in our national life, it carries even more responsibility for all of us.

So, again, I urge my colleagues today to vote with me to advance the Intelligence Authorization Act and see that it is enacted into law.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HIMES), one of our subcommittee ranking members.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank both the chairman and ranking member for the strong bill that has been of-

fered up today and for the bipartisan manner in which it was developed and enacted and, hopefully, will be passed.

I rise in strong support of this bill, but would note for my colleagues that this authorization bill is an odd one. To fully understand it, you need to go deep into the basement of this Capitol and review it behind heavy metal doors.

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The bill is full of acronyms and code words and classified information. As such, it can be hard to understand, and things that are hard to understand sometimes cause anxiety and fear. Let me take a moment to describe what this bill does.

This bill has the strong bipartisan support of my fellow committee members, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, because it provides the lifeblood to a truly remarkable group of people who work behind the scenes and in the dark to keep us safe and to keep us free.

The unheralded and unacknowledged warriors of the intelligence community never stop in the work that they do around the world. As we speak, North Korea is feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to American shores. Our intelligence community is watching, evaluating, and planning against this mortal threat.

As we speak, for the first time in a generation, Iran is not feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to our shores. Our intelligence community is making sure that that stays true.

As we speak, Mr. Speaker, for the umpteenth time, terrorists in places like Afghanistan and Libya and Syria are spending their time desperately trying to stay alive instead of spending their time planning to attack our airlines, our cities, and our people.

As we speak, Mr. Speaker, Russia lurks, seeking advantage, promoting instability, and working to erode international norms and instability. We should make no mistake about Russia as an adversary, because there is a lot of noise about this. Russia is a country that invades neighboring sovereign countries, it murders political opponents, it bombs Syrian hospitals, and, yes, it conducted an unprecedented attack on the very core of our Democratic system: our free and fair elections.

This bill funds the warriors who are watching that, who are standing up against that, in order to keep our system what we all like it to be.

Mr. Speaker, because these activities are carried out secretly in the dark of night and usually unacknowledged, there is always the possibility for abuse. These activities, by their nature, run up against the lines of those values that make us Americans. This is surveillance. It is other things that are worthy of debate. The members of this committee spend their days in good argument about what the limits of those

activities should be, and we will have additional arguments around things like the reauthorization of the section 702 surveillance programs. These are terrific arguments that we have in a constructive way. These are not arguments that are present in this bill. Just as we did on section 215, we will have a robust discussion of the section 702 international authorities. These are authorities that raise questions and that should be subject to the debate of this Chamber.

But this bill, this bill today, is about the lifeblood of a remarkable group of people who don't always get it right any more than we do, but who are patriots, who respect the Constitution, and who need our support in the work that they do to keep us safe and keep us free.

I would like to, again, thank the majority, the chairman, the ranking member, and especially the staff who worked diligently to make this a bill that we would unanimously support and suggest to my colleagues in this Chamber that we don't see a lot of bills like this one, but this one is worthy of their support.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, Mr. HIMES, for his kind comments, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI.)

Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time, and I join our colleague in saluting the committee for bringing this bipartisan legislation to the floor—so many issues that the committee has to deal with. I know that full well as a previous ranking member.

I know that we all agree that every chance we get we want to salute the patriotic men and women of the intelligence community for their ceaseless heroism and unblinking vigilance to keep the American people safe. I thank them for all they do for force protection and conflict prevention. The quiet professionals of the U.S. intelligence community work every day, again, to keep this country safe and our leaders informed. Respect for their work is essential.

I thank Ranking Member SCHIFF and members of the committee—Mr. SCHIFF, for his leadership, and commend all the members of the committee for their dedication to those same goals.

I am sorry that this bill is coming up under a closed rule so that Members cannot offer amendments. One such amendment might be about an independent commission. It is the judgment of the intelligence community, as expressed in the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a multifaceted active-measures campaign to sow discord in our political process and help one Presidential candidate and hurt the other.

For this reason, we continue to ask for an outside, independent commission to look forward on how to prevent Russia and others from meddling in our election system again. The Swalwell-Cummings legislation to establish that commission has 200 bipartisan cosponsors.

I also want to salute our Homeland Security Committee ranking member, BENNIE THOMPSON, for his leadership to strengthen the preparedness of the election infrastructure of the United States to identify and withstand a foreign attack.

Our election systems are part of the critical infrastructure of our country, some of the most critical infrastructure of our democracy itself. We must protect it.

The United States must reject foreign interference in our elections, no matter which party it helps or which party it hurts. Our oath of office is to protect and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Working with the intelligence community to better ensure the integrity of our elections is vital to that goal.

Madam Speaker, I urge a “yes” vote on this bipartisan legislation and salute the members of the committee. I especially want to acknowledge the tremendous leadership of our ranking member, Mr. SCHIFF from California.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I want to express my agreement with Leader PELOSI's comments on the continuing need for the appointment of an independent commission. An independent commission would have the dedicated focus, the distance from any potential political interference, and the resources to prepare a report of the caliber that we saw of the 9/11 Commission. I think that would be a very sound and important complement to what we are doing in Congress and what Special Counsel Mueller is doing.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HECK), my wonderful colleague on the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. HECK. Madam Speaker, I rise to support the 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act, but first I would like to tender a point of personal privilege.

Happy birthday, Madam Speaker.

This Intelligence Authorization Act has very strong bipartisan language. I just want to highlight two areas where the IAA furthers what I believe to be high priorities for our national security.

First, section 605, which I had the honor to author, sets in motion how to change the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, we also call it CFIUS, to better protect our keystone technologies.

This IAA provision dovetails with some broader work that we are doing in the Financial Services Committee, in fact, across the aisle with Congressman PITTENGER and myself and others.

It would modernize the process to better protect and prevent strategic foreign adversaries like China or Russia from taking advantage of our open markets in a way that undermines our national security.

America's technological edge is, in fact, a cornerstone of our national security, but our strategic adversaries know that, too. They are increasingly seeking to obtain these critical technologies and resources through commercial transactions, i.e., they are buying them. CFIUS is a place to safeguard us against this risk, but it needs modernization, more resources, and authority and support from the intelligence community.

Russian meddling in the 2017 election showed us what happens when an adversary tries to exploit our political openness. Now they are trying to exploit our economic openness. Our intelligence community is vital in protecting against both of those threats.

Let me also underscore this point: The fiscal year 2018 IAA takes steps to safeguard our Nation's edge, our advantage in space, which is, I am sorry to say, increasingly threatened by adversary nations. To mitigate that risk, the bill supports some truly cutting-edge space technologies and invests in and oversees programs to ensure the resiliency of overhead architecture. At the same time, it keeps up with the Intelligence Committee's long-running efforts to stimulate innovation.

In particular, the committee report accompanying today's legislation asks the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to examine new approaches to public and private sector collaboration, with the goal of fostering the faster, smarter development of automation, artificial intelligence, and similar technologies.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to support this legislation. I hope all my colleagues will join me in both wishing the Speaker a happy birthday and in voting “yes” on this bill.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I wasn't aware it is your birthday, but happy birthday, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, happy birthday.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CASTRO), who will now sing Happy Birthday for you.

Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will spare you that.

Madam Speaker, I voice my support for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.

The men and women of America's intelligence community, the best in the world, protect our country every day. They serve beyond the front lines of conflict to collect and analyze intelligence on our adversaries.

In addition to being highly effective, America's intelligence community adapts as the threats our country faces shift on a daily basis. Their effectiveness is amplified when they are in close



cooperation and coordination with policymakers.

I want to thank my fellow members on the committee, especially Ranking Member SCHIFF and Chairman NUNES, for working with me to add language into this bill requiring the intelligence community to brief Congress on our intelligence capabilities in the South China Sea.

Over \$5 trillion in ship-borne commerce flows through the region each year, including the vast majority of sea-borne energy imports by close U.S. partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The security of the United States and those of these partners is closely linked to the ability of the United States to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Our ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea threaten the principles of a rules-based order and the security of the United States and our allies.

The language in the IAA allows Congress to more effectively understand the needs of the intelligence community. It allows for a two-way conversation so that Congress can act to provide the intelligence community the tools and authorities it needs to inform policymakers.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY).

Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act.

Good intelligence safeguards our Nation from adversaries. It is used to support our Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our homeland security professionals.

The men and women of the U.S. intelligence community make enormous sacrifices on behalf of our country. While others seek the limelight, they shun publicity and self-promotion. They are silent warriors and quiet heroes.

I want to highlight section 609 of this legislation. It is a version of a bill that I authored called the Prevention and Oversight of Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act, or the POISE Act.

I introduced the POISE Act in May after the President disclosed highly sensitive information to senior Russian officials during a White House meeting. This information had been entrusted to the U.S. by key allies.

Under Federal law, the executive branch is required to inform the congressional intelligence committees of U.S. intelligence activities. The POISE Act would specify that the executive branch must notify the committees when a member of the executive branch, including the President, intentionally or inadvertently discloses top-secret information to adversary foreign government.

□ 1215

It is dangerous for a U.S. official to share classified information with an adversary, especially outside of established intelligence channels. The adversary could use the information to harm the United States or its allies. Moreover, our partners might decide to stop sharing critical intelligence with us if they lose confidence in our capacity to keep it confidential.

The congressional notification requirement in the POISE Act would help deter inappropriate disclosures of classified information to adversaries. Once formally notified of the disclosure, Congress would be in a position to take any appropriate oversight action.

I am so pleased that the core of the POISE Act is contained in section 609. I want to thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF for including the provision in the bill, and I urge the bill's swift passage.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SWALWELL).

Mr. SWALWELL of California. Madam Speaker, happy birthday to you.

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the ranking member and our chair.

I think this IAA represents the best of what we do together in the committee, and I am really just thrilled on behalf of the men and women who serve this country in our military and in our intelligence services that they have an authorization, act, that respects what they do, that enables what they do and understands that we have trying days ahead.

Press reports right now are showing that North Korea may have just launched another ballistic missile, and so people who we represent at home are counting on us to do everything we can to protect this great country. It has been a privilege to work with Mr. SCHIFF and the chairman on this bill.

Of particular interest for me is that this bill also has our intelligence agencies report back to Congress just what efforts the Russians are taking not just in America, but across the globe to interfere and meddle in other countries' elections. We have seen an escalating pattern of this over the past few decades, certainly culminating in our recent 2016 election.

It is very important that the Congress knows and that the American people and our allies know what continued efforts will look like. So I appreciate the majority's willingness to work with us.

We have seen, I think, in just the past few days, a bicameral effort to come together and say that we are not going to tolerate Russia's aggression in the world. The sanctions that were recently passed in this House and across the way in the Senate, I think, showed the world that we are serious, that this is our democracy, and it is still a de-

mocracy that is worth protecting. I think part of the IAA reflects that spirit as well.

So, again, I thank the chairman for his work. I thank the staff on the majority side and the Members on the majority side, as well as our ranking member and our own staff, for working so hard to put this forward to protect and defend this great country.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This year's Intelligence Authorization Act was a bipartisan effort, and I am pleased to vote for it today. With this legislation, we reaffirm that all of our government's activities, including ones that are, by necessity, classified, must be maximally effective and bound by law. I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on this year's IAA.

I do want to take this opportunity, also, to commend our committee's outgoing fellow from the Los Alamos National Lab, Phil Tubesing. For 2 years, Phil has worked alongside the entire HPSCI staff, imparting his scientific expertise about nuclear weapons and the other significant national security work that our national labs undertake.

Phil, we thank you for your service to the committee and wish you every success in the future.

Finally, I want to extend a closing word to all of the men and women of the intelligence community. The work that you do keeps us safe. Your mission is to speak truth to power, to give policymakers objective, rigorously vetted and diligently produced intelligence, and you do that in magnificent fashion. Thank you for your commitment and resolve in the face of a challenging global threat landscape. With this legislation, we believe that we provide you with the adequate tools, authorities, and funding, while making sure that our congressional oversight remains robust.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I want to thank both the majority and minority members of our committee for working in a bipartisan manner this year to complete this bill, which I believe is a really good product and will support the men and women doing very difficult work to protect the American people.

I do want to thank the staff not only from the minority side, but also from the majority side, specifically: Shannon Stuart, Nick Ciarlante, Scott Glabe, Bill Flanigan, Allen Souza, Lisa Major, Jacqueline Tame, Mark Stewart, Chelsey Campbell, Andrew House, Marissa Skaggs, Angel Smith, Kash Patel, Doug Presley, Steve Keith, George Pappas, and Jack Langer for helping craft this bill with the minority; as well as the committee-shared staff of Brandon Smith, Kim Kerr, and Kristin Jepson.

I would also like to take another moment, as Mr. SCHIFF just did, our ranking member, and thank our fellow who

will be leaving us this year, who has been here a couple of years, Mr. Phil Tubesing, who will be going back and ending his congressional fellowship. We thank him for all of his work.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to pass this bill and send an overwhelming message to the men and women who protect this country that this Congress stands ready to support them.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I rise in support of H.R. 3180, the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018," which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC) with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain capable of protecting and defending the United States.

Our intelligence community is facing unprecedented threats from our adversaries around the world as this Administration struggles with the basics of leading this great nation.

The Obama Administration left the nation with a stable and growing economy; several important international coalition wins that include the Iranian Nuclear Arms Deal; the Russia Sanctions; and the Paris Climate Agreement.

The work of our intelligence community is a key asset in our efforts to thwart our adversaries when they seek to do Americans or our interests harm.

Following the Election, President-elect Trump was critical of the intelligence community.

In December 2016, he attacked the CIA over its assessment that Russian hacks on Democratic political targets were intended to help him win the White House.

In January of this year just prior to his inauguration, he compared our intelligence community to Nazi Germany, while making an unfounded accusation that the intelligence community leaked an unconfirmed dossier of sensitive information regarding him compiled by a private investigator.

President Trump's disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence to Russian officials during a visit they had in the oval office raises grave concerns among our allies regarding sharing information with our intelligence community and the disclosure threatened to fracture his already-delicate relationship with the intelligence community.

The revelation that President Trump met a second time in secret with Russian President Putin was not disclosed to the public, but came to light due to investigative journalism.

The New York Times reported that lawyers and aides to President Trump are investigating the investigators hired by special counsel Robert Mueller, by scouring their records for potential conflicts of interest in an attempt to discredit their work.

There is a pressing need for not only funding the work of the intelligence community, but to also provide additional protections to guard this national asset from undue interference from an Administration with too many entanglements with the Russian government that are under investigation.

This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national security and the IC's ability to protect it.

As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.

This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical national security programs, particularly those focused on countering terrorism and cyberattacks.

Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal elections.

It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC contractors can meet freely with Congress.

Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring the IC to provide reports on:

Investigations of leaks of classified information;

Security clearance processing timelines;

The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities for retention or potential release;

And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and threat finance activities.

Madam Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its operatives.

The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking efforts have come to light.

In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.

Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal government.

H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve: clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.

This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee compensation and authorizing \$514 million in appropriations for the CIA's Retirement and Disability System.

Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence workforce.

At the same time, we must continue to ensure that Congress can exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies that comprise the IC.

I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core democratic values.

I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important legislation.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. CHENEY). All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on passage of H.R. 3180 will be followed by a 5-minute vote on passage of S. 114.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 380, nays 35, not voting 18, as follows:

[Roll No. 437]

YEAS—380

Abraham	Carbajal	Dingell
Adams	Cárdenas	Doggett
Aderholt	Carson (IN)	Doyle, Michael
Aguilar	Carter (GA)	F.
Allen	Carter (TX)	Duffy
Amodei	Cartwright	Duncan (SC)
Arrington	Castor (FL)	Dunn
Babin	Castro (TX)	Emmer
Bacon	Chabot	Engel
Banks (IN)	Cheney	Eshoo
Barletta	Cicilline	Españolat
Barr	Cleaver	Estes (KS)
Barragán	Clyburn	Esty (CT)
Barton	Coffman	Evans
Beatty	Cohen	Farenthold
Bera	Cole	Faso
Bergman	Collins (GA)	Ferguson
Beyer	Comer	Fitzpatrick
Biggs	Comstock	Fleischmann
Bilirakis	Conaway	Flores
Bishop (GA)	Connolly	Fortenberry
Bishop (MI)	Cook	Foster
Bishop (UT)	Cooper	Fox
Black	Correa	Frankel (FL)
Blackburn	Courtney	Franks (AZ)
Blum	Cramer	Frelinghuysen
Blunt Rochester	Crawford	Fudge
Bonamici	Crist	Gaetz
Bost	Crowley	Gallagher
Boyle, Brendan	Cuellar	Gallego
F.	Culberson	Garamendi
Brady (PA)	Curbelo (FL)	Garrett
Brady (TX)	Davidson	Gianforte
Brat	Davis (CA)	Gibbs
Bridenstine	Davis, Danny	Gohmert
Brooks (AL)	Davis, Rodney	Gonzalez (TX)
Brooks (IN)	DeFazio	Goodlatte
Brown (MD)	DeGette	Gosar
Brownley (CA)	Delaney	Gottheimer
Buchanan	DeLauro	Gowdy
Buck	Demings	Granger
Bucshon	Denham	Graves (GA)
Budd	Dent	Graves (LA)
Burgess	DeSantis	Green, Al
Bustos	DeSaulnier	Green, Gene
Butterfield	DesJarlais	Griffith
Byrne	Deutch	Grothman
Calvert	Diaz-Balart	Guthrie

Hanabusa Matsui  
 Handel McCarthy  
 Harper McCaul  
 Harris McClintock  
 Hartzler McCollum  
 Hastings McEachin  
 Heck McHenry  
 Hensarling McKinley  
 Herrera Beutler McMorris  
 Hice, Jody B. Rodgers  
 Higgins (LA) McNeerney  
 Higgins (NY) McSally  
 Hill Meadows  
 Himes Meehan  
 Holding Meeks  
 Hoyer Meng  
 Hudson Messer  
 Huizenga Mitchell  
 Hultgren Moolenaar  
 Hunter Mooney (WV)  
 Hurd Moore  
 Issa Moulton  
 Jackson Lee Mullin  
 Jeffries Murphy (FL)  
 Jenkins (KS) Murphy (PA)  
 Jenkins (WV) Nadler  
 Johnson (LA) Neal  
 Johnson (OH) Newhouse  
 Johnson, E. B. Noem  
 Johnson, Sam Nolan  
 Jordan Norcross  
 Joyce (OH) Norman  
 Kaptur Nunes  
 Katko O'Halleran  
 Keating Olson  
 Kelly (IL) Palazzo  
 Kelly (MS) Pallone  
 Kelly (PA) Palmer  
 Kennedy Panetta  
 Kihuen Pascrell  
 Kildee Paulsen  
 Kilmer Payne  
 Kind Pearce  
 King (IA) Pelosi  
 Kinzinger Perlmutter  
 Knight Perry  
 Krishnamoorthi Peters  
 Kuster (NH) Peterson  
 Kustoff (TN) Pingree  
 LaHood Tsongas  
 LaMalfa Pittenger  
 Lamborn Poe (TX)  
 Lance Poliquin  
 Langevin Posey  
 Larsen (WA) Price (NC)  
 Latta Quigley  
 Lawrence Raskin  
 Lawson (FL) Ratcliffe  
 Levin Reed  
 Lewis (MN) Reichert  
 Lieu, Ted Renacci  
 Lipinski Rice (NY)  
 LoBiondo Rice (SC)  
 Loeb sack Richmond  
 Long Roby  
 Loudermilk Roe (TN)  
 Love Rogers (AL)  
 Lowenthal Rogers (KY)  
 Lowey Rohrabacher  
 Lucas Rokita  
 Luetkemeyer Rooney, Francis  
 Luján, Ben Ray Rooney, Thomas  
 Lynch J.  
 MacArthur Ros-Lehtinen  
 Maloney, Carolyn B. Rosen  
 Maloney, Sean Maloney, Sean  
 Marchant Maloney, Sean  
 Marino Marchant  
 Marshall Marino  
 Mast Marshall  
 Mast Mast

## NAYS—35

Amash Gomez  
 Bass Grijalva  
 Blumenauer Gutiérrez  
 Capuano Huffman  
 Chu, Judy Jayapal  
 Clark (MA) Johnson (GA)  
 Clarke (NY) Jones  
 Conyers Khanna  
 DeBene Labradar  
 Duncan (TN) Lee  
 Ellison Lewis (GA)  
 Gabbard Lofgren

## NOT VOTING—18

Clay Costa  
 Collins (NY) Costello (PA)

Graves (MO) Hollingsworth  
 King (NY) King (NY)  
 Larson (CT) Larson (CT)

□ 1245

Mmes. SCHAKOWSKY, VELÁZQUEZ, and CLARKE of New York changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

Ms. ADAMS, Messrs. CROWLEY and KIND changed their vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS BONUS TRANSPARENCY ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the vote on passage of the bill (S. 114) to amend title 38, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to submit an annual report regarding performance awards and bonuses awarded to certain high-level employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 414, nays 0, not voting 19, as follows:

[Roll No. 438]

YEAS—414

Abraham Bustos  
 Adams Butterfield  
 Aderholt Byrne  
 Aguilar Calvert  
 Allen Capuano  
 Amash Carbajal  
 Amodei Cardenas  
 Arrington Carson (IN)  
 Babin Carter (GA)  
 Bacon Carter (TX)  
 Banks (IN) Cartwright  
 Barletta Castor (FL)  
 Barr Castro (TX)  
 Barragán Chabot  
 Barton Cheney  
 Beatty Chu, Judy  
 Bera Cicilline  
 Bergman Clark (MA)  
 Beyer Clarke (NY)  
 Biggs Cleaver  
 Bilirakis Clyburn  
 Bishop (GA) Coffman  
 Bishop (MI) Cohen  
 Bishop (UT) Cole  
 Black Collins (GA)  
 Blackburn Comer  
 Blum Comstock  
 Blumenauer Conaway  
 Blunt Rochester Connolly  
 Bonamici Conyers  
 Bost Cook  
 Boyle, Brendan F.  
 Brady (PA) Cooper  
 Brady (TX) Correa  
 Brat Courtney  
 Bridenstine Cramer  
 Brooks (AL) Crawford  
 Brooks (IN) Crist  
 Brown (MD) Crowley  
 Brownley (CA) Cuellar  
 Buchanan Culberson  
 Buck Curbelo (FL)  
 Bucshon Davidson  
 Budd Davis (CA)  
 Burgess Davis, Danny  
 Davis, Rodney  
 DeFazio DeFazio

Garrett Loudermilk  
 Gianforte Love  
 Gibbs Lowenthal  
 Gohmert Lowey  
 Gomez Lucas  
 Gonzalez (TX) Luetkemeyer  
 Goodlatte Luján, Ben Ray  
 Gosar Lynch  
 Gottheimer MacArthur  
 Gowdy Maloney,  
 Granger Carolyn B.  
 Grijalva Maloney, Sean  
 Grothman Marchant  
 Guthrie Marino  
 Gutiérrez Marshall  
 Herrera Beutler Massie  
 Hice, Jody B. Mast  
 Higgins (LA) Matsui  
 Higgins (NY) McCarthy  
 Hill McSally  
 Himes McNeerney  
 Holding Meadows  
 Hoyer Meehan  
 Hudson Meeks  
 Huffman Moolenaar  
 Huizenga Mooney (WV)  
 Hultgren Moore  
 Hunter Mullin  
 Hurd Murphy (FL)  
 Issa Murphy (PA)  
 Jackson Lee Nadler  
 Jayapal Neal  
 Jeffries Newhouse  
 Jenkins (KS) Noem  
 Jenkins (WV) Nolan  
 Johnson (GA) Norcross  
 Johnson (LA) Norman  
 Johnson (OH) Nunes  
 Johnson, E. B. O'Halleran  
 Jones O'Rourke  
 Jordan Olson  
 Joyce (OH) Palazzo  
 Kaptur Pallone  
 Katko Palmer  
 Keating Panetta  
 Kelly (IL) Pascrell  
 Kelly (MS) Paulsen  
 Kelly (PA) Payne  
 Kennedy Pearce  
 Kihuen Pelosi  
 Kildee Perlmutter  
 Kilmer Perry  
 Kind Peters  
 King (IA) Peterson  
 Kinzinger Pingree  
 Knight Pittenger  
 Krishnamoorthi Pocan  
 Kuster (NH) Poe (TX)  
 Kustoff (TN) Poliquin  
 Labrador Polis  
 LaHood Posey  
 LaMalfa Price (NC)  
 Lamborn Quigley  
 Langevin Raskin  
 Larsen (WA) Ratcliffe  
 Latta Reed  
 Lawrence Reichert  
 Lawson (FL) Renacci  
 Lee Rice (NY)  
 Levin Rice (SC)  
 Lewis (GA) Richmond  
 Lewis (MN) Roby  
 Lieu, Ted Roe (TN)  
 Lipinski Rogers (AL)  
 LoBiondo Rogers (KY)  
 Loeb sack Rohrabacher  
 Lofgren Rokita  
 Long Rooney, Francis  
 Long Rooney, Thomas  
 Long J.  
 Long Ros-Lehtinen

## NOT VOTING—19

Bass Costa  
 Clay Costello (PA)  
 Collins (NY) Cummings  
 Donovan  
 Graves (MO)  
 Hollingsworth