

plan to take those savings away from families.

Worse, this new tax on driving will actually go to fund pie-in-the-sky government boondoggles like California's high-speed rail projects and many other pet projects of the President. That pet project in California has tripled in price since its first inception.

The American people paid a record amount of taxes last year to the Treasury, over \$3.2 trillion, or nearly \$22,000 per working American; yet there are those in government who still want to take more and spend more.

I say "no"—no more taxes on the American family; no more wasted billions of dollars on the President's and California Governor Brown's pet projects.

I urge my colleagues to join me and put this country, instead, on a balanced budget track.

RECOGNIZING MARTIN GROSS

(Ms. KUSTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Ms. KUSTER. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to remember a wonderful man, former mayor of Concord, New Hampshire, Martin Gross. Marty was a pillar of the Granite State community; and, to me, he was a beloved mentor, teacher, and friend.

As mayor of Concord, he gave so much to the city I grew up in. We see the effects of his legacy every day, walking down the streets of the historic city he helped restore and bring to life.

As a prominent lawyer, he was known among his colleagues for being a mentor to young lawyers who looked up to him and strove to follow in his footsteps as they learned to love the law.

As an activist, he inspired generations of Granite Staters to give back to their community, whether through community service, volunteering, or running for office.

As a strategist for generations of New Hampshire politicians, he helped make the dream of public service a reality.

Let's all join together to remember Martin, a man whose friendship, loyalty, kindness, and dedication to his town, State, and community will never be forgotten.

□ 0915

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on the motion to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Any record vote on the postponed question will be taken later.

NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2016

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 757) to improve the enforcement of sanctions against the Government of North Korea, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:

Senate amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016".

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings; purposes.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

TITLE I—INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.

Sec. 102. Investigations.

Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.

Sec. 104. Designation of persons.

Sec. 105. Forfeiture of property.

TITLE II—SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES

Sec. 201. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.

Sec. 202. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions on North Korea.

Sec. 203. Proliferation prevention sanctions.

Sec. 204. Procurement sanctions.

Sec. 205. Enhanced inspection authorities.

Sec. 206. Travel sanctions.

Sec. 207. Travel recommendations for United States citizens to North Korea.

Sec. 208. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation.

Sec. 209. Report on and imposition of sanctions to address persons responsible for knowingly engaging in significant activities undermining cybersecurity.

Sec. 210. Codification of sanctions with respect to North Korean activities undermining cybersecurity.

Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

TITLE III—PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Sec. 301. Information technology.

Sec. 302. Strategy to promote North Korean human rights.

Sec. 303. Report on North Korean prison camps.

Sec. 304. Report on and imposition of sanctions with respect to serious human rights abuses or censorship in North Korea.

TITLE IV—GENERAL AUTHORITIES

Sec. 401. Suspension of sanctions and other measures.

Sec. 402. Termination of sanctions and other measures.

Sec. 403. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 404. Rulemaking.

Sec. 405. Authority to consolidate reports.

Sec. 406. Effective date.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.

(a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Government of North Korea—

(A) has repeatedly violated its commitments to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs; and

(B) has willfully violated multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for North Korea to cease development, testing, and production of weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Based on its past actions, including the transfer of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to state sponsors of terrorism, North Korea poses a grave risk for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(3) The Government of North Korea has been implicated repeatedly in money laundering and other illicit activities, including—

(A) prohibited arms sales;

(B) narcotics trafficking;

(C) the counterfeiting of United States currency;

(D) significant activities undermining cybersecurity; and

(E) the counterfeiting of intellectual property of United States persons.

(4) North Korea has—

(A) unilaterally withdrawn from the Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 1953 (commonly referred to as the "Korean War Armistice Agreement"); and

(B) committed provocations against South Korea—

(i) by sinking the warship Cheonan and killing 46 of her crew on March 26, 2010;

(ii) by shelling Yeonpyeong Island and killing 4 South Korean civilians on November 23, 2010;

(iii) by its involvement in the "DarkSeoul" cyberattacks against the financial and communications interests of South Korea on March 20, 2013; and

(iv) by planting land mines near a guard post in the South Korean portion of the demilitarized zone that maimed 2 South Korean soldiers on August 4, 2015.

(5) North Korea maintains a system of brutal political prison camps that contain as many as 200,000 men, women, and children, who are—

(A) kept in atrocious living conditions with insufficient food, clothing, and medical care; and

(B) under constant fear of torture or arbitrary execution.

(6) North Korea has prioritized weapons programs and the procurement of luxury goods—

(A) in defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013); and

(B) in gross disregard of the needs of the people of North Korea.

(7) Persons, including financial institutions, who engage in transactions with, or provide financial services to, the Government of North Korea and its financial institutions without establishing sufficient financial safeguards against North Korea's use of such transactions to promote proliferation, weapons trafficking, human rights violations, illicit activity, and the purchase of luxury goods—

(A) aid and abet North Korea's misuse of the international financial system; and

(B) violate the intent of the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in paragraph (6)(A).

(8) The Government of North Korea has provided technical support and conducted destructive and coercive cyberattacks, including against Sony Pictures Entertainment and other United States persons.

(9) The conduct of the Government of North Korea poses an imminent threat to—

(A) the security of the United States and its allies;

(B) the global economy;

(C) the safety of members of the United States Armed Forces;

(D) the integrity of the global financial system;

(E) the integrity of global nonproliferation programs; and

(F) the people of North Korea.

(10) The Government of North Korea has sponsored acts of international terrorism, including—

(A) attempts to assassinate defectors and human rights activists; and

(B) the shipment of weapons to terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism.

(b) **PURPOSES.**—The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to use nonmilitary means to address the crisis described in subsection (a);

(2) to provide diplomatic leverage to negotiate necessary changes in the conduct of the Government of North Korea;

(3) to ease the suffering of the people of North Korea; and

(4) to reaffirm the purposes set forth in section 4 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE ORDER.**—The term “applicable Executive order” means—

(A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters), Executive Order 13466 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to continuing certain restrictions with respect to North Korea and North Korean nationals), Executive Order 13551 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13570 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13619 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Burma), Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), or Executive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), to the extent that such Executive order—

(i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for conduct with respect to North Korea;

(ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the Government of North Korea; or

(iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North Korea; and

(B) any Executive order adopted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the extent that such Executive order—

(i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for conduct with respect to North Korea;

(ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the Government of North Korea; or

(iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North Korea.

(2) **APPLICABLE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.**—The term “applicable United Nations Security Council resolution” means—

(A) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or 2094 (2013); and

(B) any United Nations Security Council resolution adopted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that—

(i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for conduct with respect to North Korea;

(ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the Government of North Korea; or

(iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North Korea.

(3) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(4) **DESIGNATED PERSON.**—The term “designated person” means a person designated

under subsection (a) or (b) of section 104 for purposes of applying 1 or more of the sanctions described in title I or II with respect to the person.

(5) **GOVERNMENT OF NORTH KOREA.**—The term “Government of North Korea” means the Government of North Korea and its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.

(6) **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.**—The term “humanitarian assistance” means assistance to meet humanitarian needs, including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies, clothing, and shelter.

(7) **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.**—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

(8) **LUXURY GOODS.**—The term “luxury goods”

(A) has the meaning given such term in section 746.4(b)(1) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(B) includes the items listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 746 of such title, and any similar items.

(9) **MONETARY INSTRUMENTS.**—The term “monetary instruments” has the meaning given such term in section 5312(a) of title 31, United States Code.

(10) **NORTH KOREA.**—The term “North Korea” means the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(11) **NORTH KOREAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.**—The term “North Korean financial institution” means any financial institution that—

(A) is organized under the laws of North Korea or any jurisdiction within North Korea (including a foreign branch of such an institution);

(B) is located in North Korea, except for a financial institution that is excluded by the President in accordance with section 208(c);

(C) is owned or controlled by the Government of North Korea, regardless of location; or

(D) is owned or controlled by a financial institution described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), regardless of location.

(12) **SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.**—The term “significant activities undermining cybersecurity” includes—

(A) significant efforts to—

(i) deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an information and communications technology system or network; or

(ii) exfiltrate information from such a system or network without authorization;

(B) significant destructive malware attacks;

(C) significant denial of service activities; and

(D) such other significant activities described in regulations promulgated to implement section 104.

(13) **SOUTH KOREA.**—The term “South Korea” means the Republic of Korea.

(14) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

TITLE I—INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

In order to achieve the peaceful disarmament of North Korea, Congress finds that it is necessary—

(1) to encourage all member states of the United Nations to fully and promptly implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013);

(2) to sanction the persons, including financial institutions, that facilitate proliferation, illicit activities, arms trafficking, cyberterrorism, imports of luxury goods, serious human rights abuses, cash smuggling, and censorship by the Government of North Korea;

(3) to authorize the President to sanction persons who fail to exercise due diligence to ensure that such financial institutions and member states do not facilitate proliferation, arms trafficking, kleptocracy, or imports of luxury goods by the Government of North Korea;

(4) to deny the Government of North Korea access to the funds it uses to develop or obtain nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, cyberwarfare capabilities, and luxury goods instead of providing for the needs of the people of North Korea; and

(5) to enforce sanctions in a manner that does not significantly hinder or delay the efforts of legitimate United States or foreign humanitarian organizations from providing assistance to meet the needs of civilians facing humanitarian crisis, including access to food, health care, shelter, and clean drinking water, to prevent or alleviate human suffering.

SEC. 102. INVESTIGATIONS.

(a) **INITIATION.**—The President shall initiate an investigation into the possible designation of a person under section 104(a) upon receipt by the President of credible information indicating that such person has engaged in conduct described in section 104(a).

(b) **PERSONNEL.**—The President may direct the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as may be necessary to assign sufficient experienced and qualified investigators, attorneys, and technical personnel—

(1) to investigate the conduct described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 104; and

(2) to coordinate and ensure the effective enforcement of this Act.

SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) **PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the President shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on efforts to implement this Act.

(b) **REPORT FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct, coordinate, and submit to Congress a comprehensive report on United States policy towards North Korea that—

(1) is based on a full and complete interagency review of current policies and possible alternatives, including with respect to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, human rights atrocities, and significant activities undermining cybersecurity; and

(2) includes recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the Secretary considers appropriate based on the results of the review.

SEC. 104. DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.

(a) **MANDATORY DESIGNATIONS.**—Except as provided in section 208, the President shall designate under this subsection any person that the President determines—

(1) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into, or from North Korea any goods, services, or technology controlled for export by the United States because of the use of such goods, services, or technology for weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such weapons and materially contributes to the use, development, production, possession, or acquisition by any person of a nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapon or any device or system designed in whole or in part to deliver such a weapon;

(2) knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides training, advice, or other services or assistance, or engages in significant financial transactions, relating to the manufacture, maintenance, or use of any such weapon, device, or system to be imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North Korea;

(3) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports luxury goods to or into North Korea;

(4) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates censorship by the Government of North Korea;

(5) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates serious human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea;

(6) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engages in money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash smuggling, or narcotics trafficking that supports the Government of North Korea or any senior official or person acting for or on behalf of that Government;

(7) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity through the use of computer networks or systems against foreign persons, governments, or other entities on behalf of the Government of North Korea;

(8) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sells, supplies, or transfers to or from the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government, a significant amount of precious metal, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals or aluminum, steel, coal, or software, for use by or in industrial processes directly related to weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems for such weapons, other proliferation activities, the Korean Workers' Party, armed forces, internal security, or intelligence activities, or the operation and maintenance of political prison camps or forced labor camps, including outside of North Korea;

(9) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into, or from North Korea any arms or related materiel; or

(10) knowingly attempts to engage in any of the conduct described in paragraphs (1) through (9).

(b) **ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY DESIGNATIONS.**—

(1) **PROHIBITED CONDUCT DESCRIBED.**—Except as provided in section 208, the President may designate under this subsection any person that the President determines—

(A) knowingly engages in, contributes to, assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material or technological support for, or goods and services in support of, any person designated pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution;

(B) knowingly contributed to—

(i) the bribery of an official of the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that official;

(ii) the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, an official of the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that official; or

(iii) the use of any proceeds of any activity described in clause (i) or (ii); or

(C) knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or provided significant financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(2) **EFFECT OF DESIGNATION.**—With respect to any person designated under this subsection, the President may—

(A) apply the sanctions described in section 204, 205(c), or 206 to the person to the same extent and in the same manner as if the person were designated under subsection (a);

(B) apply any applicable special measures described in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code;

(C) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange—

(i) that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and

(ii) in which such person has any interest; and

(D) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments—

(i) are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and

(ii) involve any interest of such person.

(c) **ASSET BLOCKING.**—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a designated person, the Government of North Korea, or the Workers' Party of Korea, if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(d) **APPLICATION TO SUBSIDIARIES AND AGENTS.**—The designation of a person under subsection (a) or (b) and the blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (c) shall apply with respect to a person who is determined to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.

(e) **TRANSACTION LICENSING.**—The President shall deny or revoke any license for any transaction that the President determines to lack sufficient financial controls to ensure that such transaction will not facilitate any activity described in subsection (a) or (b).

(f) **PENALTIES.**—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).

SEC. 105. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

(a) **AMENDMENT TO PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE.**—Section 981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(1) Any property, real or personal, that is involved in a violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a prohibition imposed pursuant to section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.”.

(b) **AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTE.**—Section 983(i)(2)(D) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), or the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016; or”.

(c) **AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY.**—Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking “or section 92 of” and inserting “section 92 of”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: “, or section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016 (relating to prohibited activities with respect to North Korea);”.

TITLE II—SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES

SEC. 201. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who is responsible for safeguarding the financial system against illicit use, money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has repeatedly expressed concern about North Korea's misuse of the international financial system—

(A) in 2006—

(i) stated, “Given [North Korea's] counterfeiting of U.S. currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts world-wide to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly invisible.”; and

(ii) urged financial institutions worldwide to “think carefully about the risks of doing any North Korea-related business”;

(B) in 2011, stated that North Korea—

(i) “remains intent on engaging in proliferation, selling arms as well as bringing in material”; and

(ii) was “aggressively pursuing the effort to establish front companies.”; and

(C) in 2013, stated—

(i) in reference to North Korea's distribution of high-quality counterfeit United States currency, that “North Korea is continuing to try to pass a supernote into the international financial system”; and

(ii) the Department of the Treasury would soon introduce new currency with improved security features to protect against counterfeiting by the Government of North Korea.

(2) The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body whose purpose is to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, has repeatedly—

(A) expressed concern at deficiencies in North Korea's regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;

(B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of action to address significant deficiencies in those regimes and the serious threat those deficiencies pose to the integrity of the international financial system;

(C) urged all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks emanating from North Korea;

(D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with North Korea, including North Korean companies and financial institutions; and

(E) called on all jurisdictions—

(i) to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade countermeasures and risk mitigation practices; and

(ii) to take into account money laundering and terrorist financing risks when considering requests by North Korean financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their respective jurisdictions.

(3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, which—

(A) welcomed the Financial Action Task Force's—

(i) recommendation on financial sanctions related to proliferation; and

(ii) guidance on the implementation of such sanctions;

(B) decided that United Nations member states should apply enhanced monitoring and other legal measures to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of property that could contribute to activities prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

(C) called upon United Nations member states to prohibit North Korean financial institutions from establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with financial institutions in their respective jurisdictions to prevent the provision of financial services if such member states have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such activities could contribute to—

(i) activities prohibited by an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution; or

(ii) the evasion of such prohibitions.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE DESIGNATION OF NORTH KOREA AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.**—Congress—

(1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to impose limitations on, and to require the enhanced monitoring of, transactions involving North Korean financial institutions that could contribute to sanctioned activities;

(2) urges the President, in the strongest terms—

(A) to immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and

(B) to adopt stringent special measures to safeguard the financial system against the risks posed by North Korea's willful evasion of sanctions and its illicit activities; and

(3) urges the President to seek the prompt implementation by other countries of enhanced monitoring and due diligence to prevent North Korea's misuse of the international financial system, including by sharing information about activities, transactions, and property that could contribute to—

(A) activities sanctioned by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; or

(B) the evasion of such sanctions.

(C) DETERMINATIONS REGARDING NORTH KOREA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and in accordance with section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, shall determine whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.

(2) ENHANCED DUE DILIGENCE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—If the Secretary of the Treasury determines under paragraph (1) that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary, in consultation with the Federal functional regulators (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809)), shall impose 1 or more of the special measures described in section 5318A(b) of title 31, United States Code, with respect to the jurisdiction of North Korea.

(3) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Treasury makes a determination under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the reasons for such determination.

(B) FORM.—The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 202. ENSURING THE CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) All member states of the United Nations are obligated to implement and enforce applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions fully and promptly, including by blocking the property of, and ensuring that any property is prevented from being made available to, persons designated for the blocking of property by the Security Council under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(2) As of May 2015, 158 of the 193 member states of the United Nations had not submitted reports on measures taken to implement North Korea-specific United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094.

(3) A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO-15-485)—

(A) finds that officials of the United States and representatives of the United Nations Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), which monitors and facilitates implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea, “agree that the lack of detailed reports from all

member states is an impediment to the UN's effective implementation of its sanctions”; and

(B) notes that “many member states lack the technical capacity to enforce sanctions and prepare reports” on the implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.

(4) All member states share a common interest in protecting the international financial system from the risks of money laundering and illicit transactions emanating from North Korea.

(5) The United States dollar and the euro are the world's principal reserve currencies, and the United States and the European Union are primarily responsible for the protection of the international financial system from the risks described in paragraph (4).

(6) The cooperation of the People's Republic of China, as North Korea's principal trading partner, is essential to—

(A) the enforcement of applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

(B) the protection of the international financial system.

(7) The report of the Panel of Experts expressed concern about the ability of banks to detect and prevent illicit transfers involving North Korea if such banks are located in member states with less effective regulators or member states that are unable to afford effective compliance.

(8) North Korea has historically exploited inconsistencies between jurisdictions in the interpretation and enforcement of financial regulations and applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to circumvent sanctions and launder the proceeds of illicit activities.

(9) Amrogang Development Bank, Bank of East Land, and Tanchon Commercial Bank have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union as having materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(10) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury and the European Union as having materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(11) The Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for facilitating transactions on behalf of persons linked to its proliferation network and for serving as “a key financial node”.

(12) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for activities prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, including the use of deceptive financial practices to facilitate transactions on behalf of persons linked to North Korea's proliferation network.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should intensify diplomatic efforts in appropriate international fora, such as the United Nations, and bilaterally, to develop and implement a coordinated, consistent, multilateral strategy for protecting the global financial system against risks emanating from North Korea, including—

(1) the cessation of any financial services the continuation of which is inconsistent with applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(2) the cessation of any financial services to persons, including financial institutions, that present unacceptable risks of facilitating money laundering and illicit activity by the Government of North Korea;

(3) the blocking by all member states, in accordance with the legal process of the state in which the property is held, of any property required to be blocked under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) the blocking of any property derived from illicit activity, or from the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, officials of the Government of North Korea;

(5) the blocking of any property involved in significant activities undermining cybersecurity by the Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly, against United States persons, or the theft of intellectual property by the Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly from United States persons; and

(6) the blocking of any property of persons directly or indirectly involved in censorship or human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea.

(c) STRATEGY TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS NORTH KOREA-SPECIFIC SANCTIONS.—The President shall direct the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop a strategy to improve international implementation and enforcement of United Nations North Korea-specific sanctions. The strategy should include elements—

(1) to increase the number of countries submitting reports to the United Nations Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), including developing a list of targeted countries where effective implementation and enforcement of United Nations sanctions would reduce the threat from North Korea;

(2) to encourage member states of the United Nations to cooperate and share information with the panel in order to help facilitate investigations;

(3) to expand cooperation with the Panel of Experts;

(4) to provide technical assistance to member states to implement United Nations sanctions, including developing the capacity to enforce sanctions through improved export control regulations, border security, and customs systems;

(5) to harness existing United States Government initiatives and assistance programs, as appropriate, to improve sanctions implementation and enforcement; and

(6) to increase outreach to the people of North Korea, and to support the engagement of independent, non-governmental journalistic, humanitarian, and other institutions in North Korea.

(d) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the actions undertaken to implement the strategy required by subsection (c).

SEC. 203. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION SANCTIONS.

(a) EXPORT OF CERTAIN GOODS OR TECHNOLOGY.—A validated license shall be required for the export to North Korea of any goods or technology otherwise covered under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)). No defense exports may be approved for the Government of North Korea.

(b) TRANSACTIONS IN LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall withhold assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to the government of any country that provides lethal military equipment to the Government of North Korea.

(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibition under paragraph (1) with respect to a government shall terminate on the date that is 1 year after the date on which the prohibition under paragraph (1) is applied to that government.

(c) WAIVER.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State may waive the prohibitions under this section with respect to a country if the Secretary—

(1) determines that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and

(2) submits a written report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes—

(A) the steps that the relevant agencies are taking to curtail the trade described in subsection (b)(1); and

(B) why such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(d) **EXCEPTION.**—The prohibitions under this section shall not apply to the provision of assistance for human rights, democracy, rule of law, or emergency humanitarian purposes.

SEC. 204. PROCUREMENT SANCTIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in this section, the head of an executive agency may not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from any person designated under section 104(a).

(b) **FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code, shall be revised to require that each person that is a prospective contractor submit a certification that such person does not engage in any activity described in section 104(a).

(2) **APPLICABILITY.**—The revision required under paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) **REMEDIES.**—

(1) **INCLUSION ON LIST.**—The Administrator of General Services shall include, on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, each person that is debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination of a false certification under subsection (b).

(2) **CONTRACT TERMINATION; SUSPENSION.**—If the head of an executive agency determines that a person has submitted a false certification under subsection (b) after the date on which the Federal Acquisition Regulation is revised to implement the requirements of this section, the head of such executive agency shall—

(A) terminate any contract with such person; and

(B) debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts for a period of not longer than 2 years.

(3) **APPLICABLE PROCEDURES.**—Any debarment or suspension under paragraph (2)(B) shall be subject to the procedures that apply to debarment and suspension under subpart 9.4 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

(d) **CLARIFICATION REGARDING CERTAIN PRODUCTS.**—The remedies specified in subsection (c) shall not apply with respect to the procurement of any eligible product (as defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)) of any foreign country or instrumentality designated under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)).

(e) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the head of an executive agency or any other official of the Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false certification under subsection (b).

(f) **EXECUTIVE AGENCY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “executive agency” has the meaning given such term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code.

SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies foreign ports and airports at which inspections of ships, aircraft, and conveyances originating in North Korea, carrying North Korean property, or operated by the Government of North Korea are not sufficient to effectively prevent the facilitation of any of the activities described in section 104(a).

(b) **ENHANCED CUSTOMS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS.**—The Secretary of Homeland Security may require enhanced inspections of any goods entering the United States that have been trans-

ported through a port or airport identified by the President under subsection (a).

(c) **SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE.**—A vessel, aircraft, or conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described in section 104(a) under the jurisdiction of the United States may be seized and forfeited under—

(1) chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code; or

(2) title V of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.).

SEC. 206. TRAVEL SANCTIONS.

The Secretary of State may deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deny entry into the United States of, any alien who is—

(1) a designated person;

(2) a corporate officer of a designated person; or

(3) a principal shareholder with a controlling interest in a designated person.

SEC. 207. TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO NORTH KOREA.

The Secretary of State shall expand the scope and frequency of issuance of travel warnings for all United States citizens to North Korea. The expanded travel warnings, which should be issued or updated not less frequently than every 90 days, should include—

(1) publicly released or credible open source information regarding the detention of United States citizens by North Korean authorities, including available information on circumstances of arrest and detention, duration, legal proceedings, and conditions under which a United States citizen has been, or continues to be, detained by North Korean authorities, including present-day cases and cases occurring during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act;

(2) publicly released or credible open source information on the past and present detention and abduction or alleged abduction of citizens of the United States, South Korea, or Japan by North Korean authorities;

(3) unclassified information about the nature of the North Korean regime, as described in congressionally mandated reports and annual reports issued by the Department of State and the United Nations, including information about North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs, illicit activities, international sanctions violations, and human rights situation; and

(4) any other information that the Secretary deems useful to provide United States citizens with a comprehensive picture of the nature of the North Korean regime.

SEC. 208. EXEMPTIONS, WAIVERS, AND REMOVALS OF DESIGNATION.

(a) **EXEMPTIONS.**—The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under sections 104, 206, 209, and 304:

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other international agreements.

(3) Any activities incidental to the POW/MIA accounting mission in North Korea, including activities by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency and other governmental or nongovernmental organizations tasked with identifying or recovering the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces in North Korea.

(b) **HUMANITARIAN WAIVER.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may waive, for renewable periods of between 30 days and 1

year, the application of the sanctions authorized under section 104, 204, 205, 206, 209(b), or 304(b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination that the waiver is necessary for humanitarian assistance or to carry out the humanitarian purposes set forth section 4 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).

(2) **CONTENT OF WRITTEN DETERMINATION.**—A written determination submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to a waiver shall include a description of all notification and accountability controls that have been employed in order to ensure that the activities covered by the waiver are humanitarian assistance or are carried out for the purposes set forth in section 4 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802) and do not entail any activities in North Korea or dealings with the Government of North Korea not reasonably related to humanitarian assistance or such purposes.

(3) **CLARIFICATION OF PERMITTED ACTIVITIES UNDER WAIVER.**—An internationally recognized humanitarian organization shall not be subject to sanctions under section 104, 204, 205, 206, 209(b), or 304(b) for—

(A) engaging in a financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes pursuant to a waiver issued under paragraph (1);

(B) transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a waiver; or

(C) having merely incidental contact, in the course of providing humanitarian assistance or aid for humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a waiver, with individuals who are under the control of a foreign person subject to sanctions under this Act.

(c) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, for renewable periods of between 30 days and 1 year, the application of the sanctions authorized under section 104, 201(c)(2), 204, 205, 206, 209(b), or 304(b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination that the waiver—

(1) is important to the national security interests of the United States; or

(2) will further the enforcement of this Act or is for an important law enforcement purpose.

(d) **FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR HUMANITARIAN AND CONSULAR ACTIVITIES.**—The President may promulgate such regulations, rules, and policies as may be necessary to facilitate the provision of financial services by a foreign financial institution that is not a North Korean financial institution in support of activities conducted pursuant to an exemption or waiver under this section.

SEC. 209. REPORT ON AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS TO ADDRESS PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWINGLY ENGAGING IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes significant activities undermining cybersecurity aimed against the United States Government or any United States person and conducted by the Government of North Korea, or a person owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government.

(2) **INFORMATION.**—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) the identity and nationality of persons that have knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided material support to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity described in paragraph (1);

(B) a description of the conduct engaged in by each person identified;

(C) an assessment of the extent to which a foreign government has provided material support

to the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity; and

(D) a United States strategy to counter North Korea's efforts to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity against the United States, that includes efforts to engage foreign governments to halt the capability of the Government of North Korea and persons acting for or on behalf of that Government to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity.

(3) SUBMISSION AND FORM.—

(A) **SUBMISSION.**—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter.

(B) **FORM.**—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) **DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.**—The President shall designate under section 104(a) any person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) that knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity through the use of computer networks or systems against foreign persons, governments, or other entities on behalf of the Government of North Korea.

SEC. 210. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—United States sanctions with respect to activities of the Government of North Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of that Government, or persons located in North Korea that undermine cybersecurity provided for in Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea) or Executive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), as such Executive Orders are in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress a certification that the Government of North Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of that Government, and persons owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by that Government or persons acting for or on behalf of that Government, are no longer engaged in the illicit activities described in such Executive Orders, including actions in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013).

(b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA, AND JAPAN.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(1) should seek to strengthen high-level trilateral mechanisms for discussion and coordination of policy toward North Korea between the Government of the United States, the Government of South Korea, and the Government of Japan;

(2) should ensure that the mechanisms specifically address North Korea's nuclear, ballistic, and conventional weapons programs, its human rights record, and cybersecurity threats posed by North Korea;

(3) should ensure that representatives of the United States, South Korea, and Japan meet on a regular basis and include representatives of the United States Department of State, the United States Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and representatives of counterpart agencies in South Korea and Japan; and

(4) should continue to brief the relevant congressional committees regularly on the status of such discussions.

(b) **RELEVANT COMMITTEES.**—The relevant committees referred to in subsection (a)(4) shall include—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

TITLE III—PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

SEC. 301. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7814) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(d) **INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STUDY.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2015, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report that sets forth a detailed plan for making unrestricted, unmonitored, and inexpensive electronic mass communications available to the people of North Korea.”.

SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO PROMOTE NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that details a United States strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international awareness of and to address the human rights situation in North Korea.

(b) **INFORMATION.**—The report required under subsection (a) should include—

(1) a list of countries that forcibly repatriate refugees from North Korea; and

(2) a list of countries where North Korean laborers work, including countries the governments of which have formal arrangements with the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government to employ North Korean workers.

(c) **STRATEGY.**—The report required under subsection (a) should include—

(1) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral outreach, including sustained engagement with the governments of partners and allies with overseas posts to routinely demarche or brief those governments on North Korea human rights issues, including forced labor, trafficking, and repatriation of citizens of North Korea;

(2) public affairs and public diplomacy campaigns, including options to work with news organizations and media outlets to publish opinion pieces and secure public speaking opportunities for United States Government officials on issues related to the human rights situation in North Korea, including forced labor, trafficking, and repatriation of citizens of North Korea; and

(3) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to raise awareness and provide assistance to North Korean defectors throughout the world.

SEC. 303. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN PRISON CAMPS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to each political prison camp in North Korea, to the extent information is available—

(1) the camp's estimated prisoner population;

(2) the camp's geographical coordinates;

(3) the reasons for the confinement of the prisoners;

(4) the camp's primary industries and products, and the end users of any goods produced in the camp;

(5) the individuals and agencies responsible for conditions in the camp;

(6) the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care, working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of prisoners; and

(7) imagery, to include satellite imagery of the camp, in a format that, if published, would not compromise the sources and methods used by the United States intelligence community to capture geospatial imagery.

(b) **FORM.**—The report required under subsection (a) may be included in the first human rights report required to be submitted to Congress after the date of the enactment of this Act under sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)).

SEC. 304. REPORT ON AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR CENSORSHIP IN NORTH KOREA.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(A) identifies each person the Secretary determines to be responsible for serious human rights abuses or censorship in North Korea and describes the conduct of that person; and

(B) describes serious human rights abuses or censorship undertaken by the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government in the most recent year ending before the submission of the report.

(2) **CONSIDERATION.**—In preparing the report required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall—

(A) give due consideration to the findings of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea; and

(B) make specific findings with respect to the responsibility of Kim Jong Un, and of each individual who is a member of the National Defense Commission of North Korea or the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, for serious human rights abuses and censorship.

(3) **SUBMISSION AND FORM.**—

(A) **SUBMISSION.**—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for a period not to exceed 3 years, and shall be included in each human rights report required under sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)).

(B) **FORM.**—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(C) **PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—The Secretary of State shall publish the unclassified part of the report required under paragraph (1) on the website of the Department of State.

(b) **DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.**—The President shall designate under section 104(a) any person listed in the report required under subsection (a)(1) that—

(1) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates censorship by the Government of North Korea; or

(2) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates serious human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea.

(c) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) seek the prompt adoption by the United Nations Security Council of a resolution calling for the blocking of the assets of all persons responsible for severe human rights abuses or censorship in North Korea; and

(2) fully cooperate with the prosecution of any individual listed in the report required under subsection (a)(1) before any international tribunal that may be established to prosecute persons responsible for severe human rights abuses or censorship in North Korea.

TITLE IV—GENERAL AUTHORITIES**SEC. 401. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.**

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Any sanction or other measure required under title I, II, or III (or any amendment made by such titles) may be suspended for up to 1 year upon certification by the President to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of North Korea has made progress toward—

(1) verifiably ceasing its counterfeiting of United States currency, including the surrender or destruction of specialized materials and equipment used or particularly suitable for counterfeiting;

(2) taking steps toward financial transparency to comply with generally accepted protocols to cease and prevent the laundering of monetary instruments;

(3) taking steps toward verification of its compliance with applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) taking steps toward accounting for and repatriating the citizens of other countries—

(A) abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government of North Korea; or

(B) detained in violation of the Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 1953 (commonly referred to as the “Korean War Armistice Agreement”);

(5) accepting and beginning to abide by internationally recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of humanitarian aid; and

(6) taking verified steps to improve living conditions in its political prison camps.

(b) *RENEWAL OF SUSPENSION.*—The suspension described in subsection (a) may be renewed for additional, consecutive 180-day periods after the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of North Korea has continued to comply with the conditions described in subsection (a) during the previous year.

SEC. 402. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.

Any sanction or other measure required under title I, II, or III (or any amendment made by such titles) shall terminate on the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of North Korea has—

(1) met the requirements set forth in section 401; and

(2) made significant progress toward—

(A) completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantling all of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons programs, including all programs for the development of systems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons;

(B) releasing all political prisoners, including the citizens of North Korea detained in North Korea’s political prison camps;

(C) ceasing its censorship of peaceful political activity;

(D) establishing an open, transparent, and representative society; and

(E) fully accounting for and repatriating United States citizens (including deceased United States citizens)—

(i) abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government of North Korea; or

(ii) detained in violation of the Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 1953 (commonly referred to as the “Korean War Armistice Agreement”).

SEC. 403. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—There are authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2017 through 2021—

(1) \$3,000,000 to carry out section 103 of the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7813);

(2) \$3,000,000 to carry out subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 104 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7814);

(3) \$2,000,000 to carry out subsection (d) of such section 104, as add by section 301 of this Act; and

(4) \$2,000,000 to carry out section 203 of the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7833).

(b) *AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.*—Amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 404. RULEMAKING.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—The President is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act (which may include regulatory exceptions), including under section 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1704).

(b) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.*—Nothing in this Act, or in any amendment made by this Act, may be construed to limit the authority of the President to designate or sanction persons pursuant to an applicable Executive order or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

SEC. 405. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.

Any and all reports required to be submitted to appropriate congressional committees under this Act or any amendment made by this Act that are subject to a deadline for submission consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such deadline. The consolidated reports must contain all information required under this Act or any amendment made by this Act, in addition to all other elements mandated by previous law.

SEC. 406. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, for 3 years the Committee on Foreign Affairs that I chair has worked with great determination to build support for this North Korea sanctions legislation.

I want to thank my Democratic colleagues, and I especially want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL), our ranking member, for his support in this legislation.

I also thank Senators CORKER, CARDIN, and GARDNER, for their leadership in the Senate and for their strong additions, particularly on human rights and on cyber attacks by the brutal and hostile North Korean regime.

Today Congress—Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate—unites to put this North Korean sanctions legislation on the President’s desk. Last

month this bill passed the House with 418 votes, and this week it passed the Senate 96–0.

Mr. Speaker, these overwhelming votes reflect bipartisan frustration with our North Korea policy, a policy of strategic patience that isn’t working. Today Congress unites to say it is time for a new approach.

Mr. Speaker, last month North Korea conducted its fourth known nuclear test, and last weekend it concluded a long-range missile test. On Tuesday, our Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified that North Korea has restarted a plutonium reactor and expanded that production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

The threat to the United States and our allies is real. The tyrannical regime of Kim Jong-un has developed increasingly destructive weapons: its miniaturized nuclear warheads that fit onto its most reliable missiles. We cannot stand by any longer.

The legislation we consider today, H.R. 757, is the most comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation to come before this body. My bill uses targeted financial and economic pressure to isolate Kim Jong-un and his top officials from the assets they maintain in foreign banks and from the hard currency that sustains their rule.

These assets are gained, in part, from illicit activities on the part of North Korea, like counterfeiting U.S. currency and selling weapons around the world, and they are used to advance the North Korean nuclear program.

They also pay for the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling elites and the continued repression of the North Korean people by their police state.

In 2005, the Treasury Department blacklisted a small bank in Macao called Banco Delta Asia, which not only froze North Korea’s money in the bank, but also scared away other financial institutions from dealing with the Government of North Korea for fear that they, too, would be blacklisted. Unfortunately, this effective policy was shelved for ill-fated negotiations, but this bill can get us back to a winning strategy.

Equally important to the strong sanctions in this bill are its critical human rights provisions. North Korea operates a brutal system of gulags that hold as many as 120,000 men, women, and children.

If a North Korean is suspected of any kind of dissenting opinion, even telling a joke about the regime, his entire family for three generations is punished. North Korea is a human rights house of horrors.

Two years ago the U.N. Commission of Inquiry released the most comprehensive report on North Korea to date, and their finding was that the Kim Jong-un regime and the whole family regime has, for decades, pursued policies involving crimes—and this is the words of the United Nations report—crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.

This amended version requires the administration to develop a strategy to promote North Korean human rights, including a list of countries that use North Korean slave labor.

The implementation of this bill will help sever a key subsidy for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, for only when the North Korean leadership realizes that its criminal activities are untenable will the prospects for peace and security in northeast Asia improve.

I reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of this measure.

First of all, let me thank Chairman ROYCE for authoring the bill. I am proud to be the lead Democratic cosponsor, and I am glad that we are almost to the finish line.

Just over a month ago we passed this bill and sent it to the Senate. The Senate acted quickly to make minor adjustments, and today we will pass this bipartisan legislation and send it to the President's desk.

This process is a great example of what we can accomplish when we work in a bipartisan way to advance American security. As I have said many times before, I am proud of the members on both sides of the aisle of the Committee on Foreign Affairs because we have worked in a bipartisan manner.

I would caution all Members about leveling political charges when it comes to North Korea. I am reminded of the old adage that people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

We all know North Korea is a problem, but let's not kid ourselves. This problem has grown under many administrations, in Congresses of both parties. So when we talk about how we got here, we need to really focus in a bipartisan manner. That is what we are trying to do.

The Kim regime is dangerous. North Korea's nuclear program threatens regional stability and global security. It worries me to think what North Korea's leaders plan to do with their nuclear arsenal or who they might be willing to sell nuclear material to.

While it is bad enough on its own, North Korea's nuclear program is just the top item on a long list of dangerous and illegal activity by that regime.

From cyber attacks to money laundering and counterfeiting, from human rights abuses, as Chairman ROYCE has pointed out, to the regular attacks on South Korea, the Kim regime runs roughshod over the rules and norms that guide the global order. Yet, they haven't been deterred by some of the toughest sanctions imaginable or the near-universal condemnation of the global community or the deepening isolation of North Korea from the rest of the world. So we are left to tighten the screws even further. That is what we are trying to do today.

We need to work with South Korea and Japan on a tough, coordinated re-

sponse. We need to take every opportunity to collaborate on this issue with the Chinese, who wield considerable influence over North Korea, and we need to dial up our own sanctions and toughen sanctions enforcement. That is exactly what this bill does.

North Korea is always looking for ways to get around our sanctions. The sanctions in this bill would focus especially on North Korean elites who conduct shady transactions with shell corporations, then cover up the money trail. In Pyongyang, the capital, these cronies of the Kim regime pocket the cash while the rest of the North Korean people suffer.

I have been to North Korea twice, and it is just sickening that the regime and its friends profit from these crimes while the rest of the country is literally starving.

On that point, this bill includes important exceptions for the humanitarian aid that benefits the North Korean people. Our anger is not with the people of North Korea. In fact, the United States does a great deal to provide aid to this oppressed population.

But they deserve better from their leaders. That is why we should send this bill to the President. That is why we should continue to make North Korea a top foreign policy priority.

The Kim family has ruled North Korea for many, many, many years. Kim Jong-un seems to be the worst of the lot, with the repressions, the assassinations, the political stranglehold that he keeps the whole country in, and the fact that many people get caught, as Chairman ROYCE pointed out, in the gulag. Families are oppressed. It is just a nightmare of horrors.

The North Korean people deserve better from their leaders. That is why we should send this bill to the President and why we should continue to make North Korea a top foreign policy priority.

I am proud to support this bill. I am proud to be the lead Democrat on the bill. I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to our next speaker, I also want to note that this bill effectively reauthorizes and extends the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which I have worked to support for more than a dozen years.

That groundbreaking law, which was reauthorized in 2008 and again in 2012 by our chairman emeritus, ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, emphasized that human rights, the free flow of information, and the protection of those who escaped are not only important to the people of North Korea, they are also critical to changing North Korea's strategic calculus and trying to force that rogue regime to address the needs of its own people instead of threatening its neighbors.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.

SMITH), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations.

□ 0930

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, the North Korean dictatorship is an existential threat that requires significantly enhanced vigilance and response.

The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016, authored by Chairman ED ROYCE, will ensure that the Obama administration takes meaningful action to mitigate North Korea's cruelty, human rights abuse, and military danger.

The U.S. can no longer sit on the sidelines while Kim Jong-un proliferates nuclear and missile technology and abuses and starves the North Korean people.

North Korea violates every single human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. North Korea is listed by the State Department as a tier 3 country with respect to human trafficking. It is designated as one of eight Countries of Particular Concern for engaging in egregious violations of religious freedom.

Mr. Speaker, I have chaired four hearings on human rights abuses in North Korea. It is, as Chairman ROYCE noted, a house of horrors.

The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on North Korea recommended that the U.N. impose targeted sanctions on North Korean leaders responsible for these crimes against humanity. However, China blocks effective U.N. actions. This, in part, is why the Congress and the administration must act now. North Korean human rights abusers must be identified and listed so that sanctions can be appropriately applied.

North Korea's launch of a long-range rocket last week reenergized concern over that country's intercontinental ballistic missile program. The launch was strongly condemned by the U.N. Security Council, which vowed to apply further sanctions. Hopefully, the Security Council's investigation now underway will also look at partner nations who purchase North Korean missile technology.

Iran, to whom the administration has just released billions of dollars, is one of North Korea's nuclear partners. We should be very concerned about that. At some point, the Iranians will acquire fissile material beyond what they are allowed to produce, they may clandestinely purchase actual warheads from North Korea, or, perhaps, Iran will get enriched uranium—their stash—back from Russia.

At a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing yesterday, Mr. Speaker—and Chairman ROYCE has had well over 35 oversight hearings on Iran—I asked President Obama's coordinator for implementation of the Iran nuclear deal where Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium was sent. Where did it go? Is it in

Russia? What city? Do we—or the IAEA—have onsite access to where it is stored for verifications purposes? Remember President Reagan? He said: Trust and verify. Onsite verification.

Shockingly, Ambassador Mull said he didn't know where the enriched uranium is. He did say it was on a Russian ship somewhere heading to a port or to a final destination. But its specific location—we don't have a clue.

Yesterday's revelation was yet another flaw in an egregiously flawed Iran nuclear deal. We know that there is a connection between North Korea and Iran. So our vigilance must be stepped up significantly. This bill is a major step. It is in fact bipartisan: ELIOT ENGEL, again, working side-by-side with the chairman to make sure a good bill is produced.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. I thank Chairman ED ROYCE for his leadership on freedom and liberty.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016.

Recently, we have seen overwhelming evidence that the monarchy in North Korea, led by an unstable dictator, has become increasingly hostile, threatening its neighbors, which are American allies.

Sadly, just last week, it successfully tested a long-range rocket which is capable of reaching California. This recent missile test comes after years of ignoring nonproliferation agreements and conducting nuclear tests without facing any meaningful consequences.

As America continues to fight the global war on terrorism, we should not allow an unpredictable rogue leader to continue unchecked. We must change course to a strategy of peace through strength to protect American families.

In 2003, I was one of the few Members of Congress to visit Pyongyang, North Korea, along with Ranking Member ELIOT ENGEL and Chairman JEFF MILLER. I saw firsthand the struggle and oppression its citizens have endured under Communist totalitarian rule. Compared to the dynamic capital of South Korea, North Korea is the ultimate example of another socialist failure.

The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act strengthens our Nation's ability to sanction the agents, government, and financial institutions that enable North Korea's dangerous activities.

I am grateful to Chairman ED ROYCE for introducing the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, unanimously supported in the U.S. Senate with bipartisan support, which puts pressure on the regime by restricting them from

selling weapons of mass destruction, importing and exporting conventional weapons, and engaging in further cyberattacks. It also directs the State Department to hold the administration accountable by creating a strategy to improve enforcement of existing sanctions.

This legislation is an important first step to achieving peace through strength in the region. I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee to promote positive change and stability in Northeast Asia so that all Koreans can have a bright future.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I want to also reiterate the bipartisan ship in which this legislation has been brought to the floor through the work of the chairman and the ranking member, who are experts in foreign affairs and especially countries like North Korea.

Mr. Speaker, when I had a chance last year to visit with the Pacific Command, I talked to the four-star Admiral in Pacific Command and asked him this question: Of the five entities that are threats to the United States—Russia, China, Iran, ISIS, and North Korea—which of those concerns you the most? He quickly said: North Korea. Because they are an unstable regime.

This legislation will help, hopefully, have that unstable dictator, who murders his own people, is trigger happy, and is developing all types of weapons and puts them on the open market to sell them to other nations that want to cause mischief in the world, stop this conduct in North Korea.

Yes, North Korea has nuclear weapons. They are developing missiles to deliver those nuclear weapons. About a year or a year and a half ago, the dictator of North Korea said he wanted that first intercontinental ballistic missile to go to Austin, Texas. I take that a little personal, Mr. Speaker. I don't know why he picked Austin. Anyway, they are working on their delivery capability. They have no intention of stopping.

So, the international community must tell the dictator of North Korea: You can't do this. You can't be a menace to not only your own people, or the people in South Korea and the entire region, but the world.

This legislation is an important step in stopping the mischief-making and trigger-happy dictator of North Korea. And that is just the way it is.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me first start with Mr. JOE WILSON of South Carolina, who was on the trip with me, as he mentioned, to North Korea.

We drove in from the airport on a bus. JOE was sitting at the front of it.

We saw all these hostile billboards. We couldn't, of course, read it—it was in Korean—but we could look at the pictures.

One of the pictures had an American soldier on the ground and a North Korean soldier with a bayonet right through the American soldier's head. The reason why we knew it was an American soldier is because it said USA on the soldier's uniform.

Mr. WILSON sat in the front and very carefully maneuvered his camera and snapped a picture. We have that picture. If the North Koreans had known what we were doing, they probably would have confiscated the camera, but they didn't. I just wanted to mention that.

There were, I believe, six of us on that trip. It was a bipartisan trip. It was an eye-opener. I went back a few years later, but I remember the gentleman from South Carolina sitting there and very skillfully maneuvering that camera. That is a good picture that we should probably blow up and let our colleagues see so that they understand the regime they are dealing with. This was not Kim Jung-un. His father was in power at the time.

So, it seems to be getting progressively worse. The father was known as the "Dear Leader." The grandfather, who was the person most responsible for their revolution, was also heralded. Wherever we went in North Korea, there were pictures of the two of them on the walls, whether it was in schools or at the hotel. It is a very eerie feeling.

It kind of brings you back, for those who read the book "Nineteen Eighty-Four" when we were kids, which was in the future and now is in the past. But for those people who read that book, to me, that sort of describes the Korean regime. It is really a scary, scary thing.

The work we are doing here today is so important. It is so important to send a message. It is so important to let the world know that we haven't forgotten this. This remains a bipartisan priority for the U.S. Congress.

The Kim regime must understand that if it continues to defy the global consensus and ignore its obligation under international law, there will be consequences. The elites in North Korea must be shown that if they try to skirt sanctions, we will find new ways to go after them. Anyone who wants to do business with North Korea must be warned that we will crack down on those who help sustain this brutal regime.

The only way forward for North Korea is for its leaders to give up their illegal and dangerous pursuits and come back to the negotiating table.

I am proud that Congress is sending this bill to the President, and I hope we will ramp up engagement with our partners and allies and make it clear that North Korea's present course can only lead to deeper isolation for the country's leaders and, sadly, continued suffering for the country's people.

I think the most stark difference that I have seen in all the years I have been in Congress was when we went to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and then traveled to the capital of South Korea—Seoul—where Congressman WILSON's wife and other spouses were waiting.

Seoul is a city that is vibrant. It is much like New York City, Chicago, or any of the big cities in our country, where the people are well-dressed and well-fed and shops are open. It looks like a real western-style city. Of course, it is Asia, but it reminds one of Tokyo or cities like that.

When you go to North Korea, it is just like going back into 1950's East Germany. That is just the feeling that you get. You see hotels and buildings that were constructed poorly and couldn't be occupied. When we came back about 18 months later, it was still just the way it was 18 months before. You hardly see a car. Traffic lights don't work. It is just bizarre—I think that is the word—and the poor North Korean people are the ones who are really suffering. The contrast between Pyongyang, which is the capital of North Korea, and Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was just unbelievable. It was like night and day. It is on the same peninsula, it is the same Korean people, and yet it is like night and day.

□ 0945

I think they say pictures are worth a thousand words. There is a picture of the Korean Peninsula at night. It was taken by satellite, and if you take a look, you see that South Korea is vibrant. There are all kinds of lights. It is lit up. North Korea is absolutely black, absolutely dark—no lights, no energy, no power.

What a contrast—two Koreas, same people. One is a bastion of democracy in South Korea—the chairman and I have visited South Korea—and one, a brutal, brutal dictatorship.

So I hope that this bill overwhelmingly passes. I hope that we have strong support from both sides of the aisle.

We want to let the people of North Korea know that we are with them, not with the brutal regime, and that is why we are doing this legislation today.

So I thank Chairman ROYCE. I urge everyone to vote "yes."

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to again thank Ranking Member ELIOT ENGEL for his leadership on this issue. He is my coauthor on this bill.

I would just like to concur in his thoughts about the shocking nature of this totalitarian regime, not just in terms of the way it has treated its people, but also its hostility towards South Korea and towards the United States and to the West; and to just share the thought, as he has expressed, this level of struggle that the people themselves in North Korea live in under this totalitarian state.

When I was in North Korea, I had an opportunity to see something that struck me just in terms of the malnutrition. The NGO community tells us that close to 50 percent of those children are malnourished. What I saw in terms of the malnourishment, the NGO community says malnourished to the point that it affects their ability to learn.

The malnourishment can be seen everywhere. The actual height differential between the average person in North Korea, it is 4 inches shorter than in South Korea. That is a really stark thing to see as you are in North Korea.

But the other observation that Mr. ENGEL made was the overt hostility shown to the United States and, of course, to South Korea and to the rest of the world.

I remember seeing the Cheonan. This is a corvette. This was a South Korean ship on which 46 South Koreans lost their lives, over 50 were injured. It was split in half by a torpedo from a North Korean submarine. And they actually lifted the two halves out of the water. Inspecting that and looking at the letters, the last letters that some of those young South Korean sailors had sent home before they perished, it is just a reminder, it is a reminder of how brutal that regime can be on its own people, but also on those against whom it has ill intent. So the South Koreans have suffered from this.

And now, to see them move forward and try to expand this nuclear weapons program, each new launch brings them closer. They say they can hit the West Coast of the United States. They are claiming that they will be able to hit the entire U.S. with their ICBM program. These placards that you see and these posters actually show their missiles coming down on the United States.

So, at this point, I think it is critical, and our colleagues in the Senate feel the same way. I want to thank our Senate colleagues for building upon the House bill which ELIOT ENGEL and I have authored. And I also appreciate the cooperation of the bipartisan House leadership to ensure this bill's quick scheduling. It is just back from the Senate.

In the wake of North Korea's fourth nuclear test and its recent missile launch, many of our allies also are trying to tighten the screws now on that regime in order to slow its capability to deliver this type of weapon. Only days ago, South Korea shuttered the Kaesong Industrial Complex because, as they observed, it was giving the North Korean regime the hard currency it needed in order to move forward its weapons programs. This will end a very important revenue for the North Korean regime. Japan has issued a new set of sanctions as well, and China and Russia should take notice and follow this example.

It is time for the United States to stand with our partners in northeast Asia as we press China and Russia to

follow suit, and this bill sends the message to that regime in North Korea that they must reform and they must disarm this nuclear weapons program. By cutting off Kim Jong-un's access to the hard currency he needs for his army and his weapons, H.R. 757 will return us to the one strategy that has worked: financial pressure on the North Korean regime. So I urge the passage of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to add my strong support to H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016, a critical bill to target the rogue Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea. I want to thank Chairman ED ROYCE for drafting this important piece of legislation with Ranking Member ELIOT ENGEL and moving swiftly to bring it for a final vote here in the House before sending it on to the President. North Korea needs to know that it cannot pursue a nuclear program without a tough response from the United States and our allies in the region.

This latest nuclear test and missile launch test fly in the face of current international sanctions and against years and years of negotiation to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

By their actions, it is clear that North Korea has every intention to continue advancing its nuclear and missile programs, in an effort to strengthen both domestic and international positions. This must stop here.

This bill before us today will seize assets connected with North Korea's proliferation program. It will staunch the flow of cash from anyone involved in arms trafficking, luxury goods, money laundering, and other means of weapons proliferation in North Korea.

H.R. 757 will also target the regime's horrendous and appalling human rights abuses, by requiring the Administration to develop a strategy that would protect human rights in North Korea and identify those in the North Korean regime who violate basic human rights and dignity.

The time is now to take action and punish the North Korean regime for its destructive behavior. The time to act is now. We cannot wait for another nuclear test, another missile launch, another island shelling, another ship sinking, or another hacking attack. If the Administration will not act to hold the North Korean regime to account, then the Congress must.

I am proud to vote in favor of H.R. 757 and strongly encourage all of my House colleagues to join me.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 757.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

COMMON SENSE NUTRITION
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 2015

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GUTHRIE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 2017, including an exchange of letters between the Committees on Energy and Commerce and the Judiciary.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WILSON of South Carolina). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 611 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2017.

The Chair appoints the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. GRAVES) to preside over the Committee of the Whole.

□ 0954

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2017) to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to improve and clarify certain disclosure requirements for restaurants and similar retail food establishments, and to amend the authority to bring proceedings under section 403A, with Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. GUTHRIE) and the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. GUTHRIE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2017, the Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act, sponsored by Conference Chair CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS and Representative LORETTA SANCHEZ.

This legislation, first and foremost, is about making menu labeling work for the American people and American businesses. Providing accurate information to consumers when they are deciding what to order is at the heart of this bill. This is not about hiding the calorie information. This bill is about making menu labeling requirements work for the entire industry.

It seems obvious to me that a one-size-fits-all solution will not work for all restaurant chains; yet FDA's menu labeling recommendation does just that, and its burdensome rules have raised alarm bells with businesses across the country.

Convenience stores, grocery stores, take-out restaurants, pizza restaurants, movie theaters, amusement parks, bowling alleys, and chain res-

taurants, I think it is fair to say, can be very different. Expecting these distinct businesses to all comply with the same standards is simply not reasonable; in fact, it is ridiculous.

Furthermore, FDA's existing regulations force businesses to provide information that is often useless to the consumer. The Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act provides calorie information to the customers when it would actually be helpful before they order. Knowing how many calories are in your meal at the point of purchase is not going to help anyone. Having calorie information when you place your order will help customers make healthier decisions.

The current FDA menu labeling rules also will expose restaurants and retailers to harsh penalties. This bill makes sure that employees don't get penalized for an inadvertent error. This bill would also help protect businesses from frivolous lawsuits.

Our bill also addresses other impractical, unworkable aspects of FDA's regulation. For example, flyers and advertisements were never meant to be considered menus; yet, through guidance, the FDA confirmed that they consider flyers and advertisements menus. FDA had their chance to make corrections and they did not. This must be fixed, and our bill does just that.

This bill came through our Subcommittee on Health with a voice vote. In full committee, it passed with a bipartisan vote of 36-12-1. I look forward to passing H.R. 2017 through the House with an even stronger bipartisan vote. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2017.

I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, February 10, 2016.

Hon. FRED UPTON,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN UPTON: I am writing with respect to H.R. 2017, the "Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2015," which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

As you know, H.R. 2017 contains provisions that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and in order to expedite the House's consideration of H.R. 2017, the Committee on the Judiciary will not assert its jurisdictional claim over this bill by seeking a sequential referral. However, this is conditional on our mutual understanding and agreement that doing so will in no way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary with respect to the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation.

I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 2017, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during Floor consideration of H.R. 2017.

Sincerely,

BOB GOODLATTE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
Washington, DC, February 11, 2016.

Hon. BOB GOODLATTE,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN GOODLATTE: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 2017, the "Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2015."

I appreciate your willingness to forgo seeking a sequential referral of the bill, and I agree that your decision will in no way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary with respect to the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation.

I will include a copy of your letter and this response in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 2017 on the House floor.

Sincerely,

FRED UPTON,
Chairman.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2017, the so-called Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act.

Far from common sense, this unnecessary legislation would deny consumers critical information about the food that we eat.

I began my career a long time ago as a consumer advocate, joining together with a small group of housewives to get retailers to put expiration dates on the products they sell. This was way back in 1970, when every single item in the grocery store was code dated. Now expiration dates are on nearly every single product because this change was good not only for consumers, but it was good for the retailers. They were able to control their inventory much better—less waste because dates are on the food. We can also control our refrigerators a little bit better as well.

□ 1000

Consumers can make better decisions with better information, and retailers can better control their inventory. Similarly, I believe menu labeling would be helpful to both consumers and retail food establishments, as more and more people are asking for this information and making smart decisions.

At a time when over 78 million adult Americans are obese and the estimated cost of obesity in the United States is \$147 billion a year, we should be embracing efforts to reduce this enormous cost to our healthcare system.

In fact, a recent Harvard study found restaurant menu calorie labeling could save over \$4.6 billion in healthcare costs over 10 years. That is not chump change.

Countless consumer and public health organizations oppose H.R. 2017. That includes the American Diabetes Association, the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the American Public Health Association, and the Center for Science in the Public Interest.

Supporters claim that menu labeling requirements would be too difficult to implement. That is what I heard from my colleague. But we know this isn't