

being properly labeled. Additionally, this bill will hurt the most vulnerable among us. The provision to include “digital labeling” will withhold valuable information about GMO foods from rural, low-income and elderly Americans who are less likely to own a smart phone or have access to the internet.

That’s over 50 percent of rural and 65 percent of elderly people who will not be able to access the consumer information they need.

Mr. Speaker, American consumers deserve the best information available when it comes to food choices that they make for themselves and their families.

We must continue to address this vital issue because all consumers deserve the right to know what is in their food and how it’s grown.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana). All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 822, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the motion by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CONAWAY).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the order of the House of today, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Ms. Byrd, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed bills of the following titles in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1555. An act to award a Congressional Gold Medal, collectively, to the Filipino veterans of World War II, in recognition of the dedicated service of the veterans during World War II.

S. 2893. An act to reauthorize the sound recording and film preservation programs of the Library of Congress, and for other purposes.

S. 3207. An act to authorize the National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped to provide playback equipment in all formats.

□ 1015

IRAN ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 819, I call up the bill (H.R. 5631) to hold Iran accountable for its state sponsorship of terrorism and other threatening activities and for its human rights abuses, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5631

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Iran Accountability Act of 2016”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 5. Definitions.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

- Sec. 101. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the IRGC.
- Sec. 102. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that support or conduct certain transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned persons.
- Sec. 103. IRGC watch list and report.
- Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions against Mahan Air.
- Sec. 105. Modification and extension of reporting requirements on the use of certain Iranian seaports by foreign vessels and use of foreign airports by sanctioned Iranian air carriers.

TITLE II—IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS

- Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to efforts by Iran to acquire ballistic missile and related technology.
- Sec. 202. Expansion of sanctions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 with respect to persons that acquire or develop ballistic missiles.
- Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ballistic missile program of Iran.
- Sec. 204. Expansion of mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain transactions relating to ballistic missile capabilities of Iran.
- Sec. 205. Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission of activities with certain sectors of Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
- Sec. 206. Regulations.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN’S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

- Sec. 301. Special measures with respect to Iran relating to its designation as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.

TITLE IV—SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

- Sec. 401. Expansion of list of persons involved in human rights abuses in Iran.
- Sec. 402. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect to, certain Iranian individuals.
- Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who conduct transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian individuals.
- Sec. 404. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive technology to Iran.
- Sec. 405. United States support for the people of Iran.
- Sec. 406. United States Special Coordinator on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran.

Sec. 407. Broadcasting to Iran.

Sec. 408. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.

Sec. 409. Sense of Congress on role of the United Nations in promoting human rights in Iran.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On April 2, 2015, in announcing a framework agreement for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, President Obama stated that “other American sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, will continue to be fully enforced”.

(2) On July 14, 2015, President Obama stated that “we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights violations”.

(3) On January 16, 2016, President Obama stated that “We still have sanctions on Iran for its violations of human rights, for its support of terrorism, and for its ballistic missile program. And we will continue to enforce these sanctions, vigorously.”

(4) On January 21, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry admitted that sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would go to terrorist organizations, stating: “I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the IRGC or other entities, some of which are labeled terrorists . . . You know, to some degree, I’m not going to sit here and tell you that every component of that can be prevented.”

(5) Secretary of State John Kerry stated on July 23, 2015, “We will not violate the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)] if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles, or other nonnuclear reasons. And the JCPOA does not provide Iran any relief from United States sanctions under any of those authorities or other authorities.”

(6) Director of National Intelligence James Clapper wrote on February 9, 2016, “[T]he Islamic Republic of Iran presents an enduring threat to U.S. national interests because of its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and the Assad regime, as well as its development of advanced military capabilities. Tehran views itself as leading the ‘axis of resistance’ which includes the Assad regime and sub-national groups aligned with Iran, especially Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militants . . . Tehran might even use American citizens detained when entering Iranian territories as bargaining pieces to achieve financial or political concessions in line with their strategic intentions.”

(7) Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew stated on July 14, 2015, “We harbor no illusions about the Iranian government’s nefarious activities beyond its nuclear program. Make no mistake: we will continue to impose and aggressively enforce sanctions to combat Iran’s support for terrorist groups, its fomenting of violence in the region, and its perpetration of human rights abuses.”

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for terrorism represents a serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle East and Europe, members of the Armed Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United States; and

(2) the United States should impose tough primary and secondary sanctions against any person that directly or indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran, its state sponsorship of terrorism and human rights abuses, as well as against any foreign person or financial institution that engages in transactions or trade that support those efforts.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to continue to impose pressure on the Government of Iran for its role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, its ongoing human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran and other peoples, and its unjust detention of United States citizens; and

(2) to continue to use sanctions as an element of that pressure and to discourage financial institutions and entities from engaging in business and commerce with Iranian entities tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and to Iranian officials involved in human rights abuses.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **ENTITY.**—The term “entity” means any corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society, or any other entity.

(2) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(3) **IRGC.**—The term “IRGC” means—

(A) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and any official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or

(B) any person owned or controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

(4) **OWN OR CONTROL.**—The term “own or control” means, with respect to an entity—

(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity;

(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the entity; or

(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

(5) **PERSON.**—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(6) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS**SEC. 101. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IRGC.**

(a) **AMENDMENTS.**—Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating section 304 as section 306; and

(2) by inserting after section 303 the following new sections:

“SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, ANY OFFICIAL, AGENT, OR AFFILIATE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, AND ANY PERSON OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

“(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and as appropriate thereafter, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

“(1) Sanctions applicable with respect to an organization that is designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

“(2) Sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).

“SEC. 305. DEFINITIONS.

“In this title:

“(1) **ENTITY.**—The term ‘entity’ means any corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society, or any other entity.

“(2) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term ‘foreign person’ means a person that is not a United States person.

“(3) **PERSON.**—The term ‘person’ means an individual or entity.

“(4) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term ‘United States person’ means—

“(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

“(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

“(5) **OWN OR CONTROL.**—The term ‘own or control’ means, with respect to an entity—

“(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity;

“(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the entity; or

“(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.”.

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“Sec. 305. Definitions.

“Sec. 306. Rule of construction.”.

SEC. 102. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.

(a) **IDENTIFICATION.**—Section 302(a)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter,” and inserting “Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 60 days thereafter;”;

(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “, provide significant financial services to, or provide material support to” after “transactions with”;

(3) in subparagraph (C)—

(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting “, provide significant financial services to, or provide material support to” after “transactions with”;

(B) in clause (i), by striking “or” at the end;

(C) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

“(iii) a person designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) or that has provided support for an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act

of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)); or

“(iv) a foreign person whose property and access to property has been blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).”.

(b) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**—Section 302(b) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(b)) is amended by striking “the President—” and all that follows and inserting “the President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property with respect to such foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.”.

(c) **WAIVER OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**—Section 302(d) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(d)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting “for a period of not more than 60 days, and may renew that waiver for additional periods of not more than 60 days,” after “may waive”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) **SUNSET.**—The provisions of this subsection and any waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on December 31, 2018.”.

(d) **WAIVER OF IDENTIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS.**—Section 302(e) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(e)) is amended—

(1) by striking “Notwithstanding” and inserting the following:

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding”;

(2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking “and subject to paragraph (2)”;

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving the margins 2 ems to the right; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) **SUNSET.**—The provisions of this subsection and any waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on December 31, 2018.”.

(e) **APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.**—Section 302(f) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(f)) is amended—

(1) by striking “The following provisions” and inserting the following:

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The following provisions”;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (8) as subparagraphs (A) through (H), respectively, and moving the margins 2 ems to the right; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) **SUNSET.**—Sections 4(c) and 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 shall not apply with respect to the imposition under subsection (b) of sanctions relating to activities described in subsection (a)(1), in accordance with the provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection, after December 31, 2018.”.

SEC. 103. IRGC WATCH LIST AND REPORT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish, maintain, and publish in the Federal Register a list (to be known as the “IRGC Watch List”) of—

(1) each entity in which the IRGC has an ownership interest of less than 25 percent;

(2) each entity in which the IRGC does not have an ownership interest if the IRGC maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity or otherwise influences the

actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity; and

(3) each person that owns or controls an entity described in paragraph (1) or (2).

(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) TREASURY REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to Congress a report that includes—

(i) the list required by subsection (a) and, in the case of any report submitted under this subparagraph after the first such report, any changes to the list since the submission of the preceding such report; and

(ii) an assessment of the role of the IRGC in, and its penetration into, the economy of Iran.

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

(2) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(i) conduct a review of the list required by subsection (a); and

(ii) not later than 180 days after each report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, submit to Congress a report on the review conducted under clause (i).

(B) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST MAHAN AIR.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—

(1) a person that provides, directly or indirectly, goods, services, technology, or financial services, including the sale or provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp assistance, baggage and cargo handling, catering, refueling, ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other services related to flight operations, to or for Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates; or

(2) any person owned or controlled by, or any person that owns or controls, a person described in paragraph (1).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall block, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to subsection (a) that is an alien.

(c) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subsection (b)(2) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

(d) APPLICABILITY OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—A person with respect to which the President imposes sanctions under subsection (a) shall be considered an agent or affiliate of the IRGC for purposes of sections 104 and 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-

tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513 and 8513b).

(e) ADDITIONAL MEASURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall require each covered person to provide a certification to the President that the person does not conduct transactions with any person that provides, directly or indirectly, goods, services, technology, or financial services, including the sale or provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp assistance, baggage or cargo handling, catering, refueling, ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other services related to flight operations—

(A) to Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates;

(B) for aircraft owned or operated by Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates; or

(C) to a person described in section 105(a).

(2) COVERED PERSON DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “covered person” means—

(A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier, as those terms are defined in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code; or

(B) a United States person that exports aircraft or components for aircraft.

(f) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) DNI LIST.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a list of each person described in subsection (e).

(B) FORM OF LIST.—Each list required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

(2) REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes—

(i) a list of countries where aircraft of Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates land;

(ii) a description of the efforts of the President to encourage countries to prohibit aircraft of Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates from landing in the territory of those countries; and

(iii) if the President has not imposed sanctions under section 105(a) with respect to any person described in subsection (e), an explanation for why the President has not imposed such sanctions.

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

(3) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(i) conduct a review of the certifications required by subsection (a), the lists required by paragraph (1), and the reports required by paragraph (2); and

(ii) not later than 180 days after the submission of each list required by paragraph (1) and each report required by paragraph (2), submit to Congress a report on the review conducted under clause (i).

(B) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

SEC. 105. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN IRANIAN SEAPORTS BY FOREIGN VESSELS AND USE OF FOREIGN AIRPORTS BY SANCTIONED IRANIAN AIR CARRIERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8808(a)) is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “2016” and inserting “2019”;

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “and” at the end;

(3) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) a description of all efforts the Department of State has made to encourage other countries to prohibit the use of air space and airports by Iranian air carriers described in paragraph (2) during the period specified in subsection (b).”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 on or after such date of enactment.

TITLE II—IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS

SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY.

(a) CERTAIN PERSONS.—Section 1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting “, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,” after “nuclear weapons”.

(b) FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting “, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,” after “nuclear weapons”.

SEC. 202. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.

Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in clause (i), by striking “would likely” and inserting “may”; and

(2) in clause (ii)—

(A) in subclause (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and

(C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

“(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the capability to launch ballistic missiles; or”.

SEC. 203. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Subtitle C—Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

“SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—In this subtitle:

“(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term ‘agricultural commodity’ has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

“(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the committees specified in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

“(3) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘correspondent account’ and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

“(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning of that term as determined by the

Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)).

“(5) GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘Government’, with respect to a foreign country, includes any agencies or instrumentalities of that Government and any entities controlled by that Government.

“(6) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term ‘medical device’ has the meaning given the term ‘device’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(7) MEDICINE.—The term ‘medicine’ has the meaning given the term ‘drug’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(b) DETERMINATIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE.—For purposes of this subtitle, in determining if financial transactions or financial services are significant, the President may consider the totality of the facts and circumstances, including factors similar to the factors set forth in section 561.404 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

“SEC. 232. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

“(a) IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying persons that have provided material support to the Government of Iran in the development of the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

“(A) An identification of persons (disaggregated by Iranian and non-Iranian persons) with respect to which there is credible evidence that such persons have provided material support to the Government of Iran in the development of the ballistic missile program of Iran, including persons that have—

“(i) engaged in the direct or indirect provision of material support to such program;

“(ii) facilitated, supported, or engaged in activities to further the development of such program;

“(iii) transmitted information relating to ballistic missiles to the Government of Iran; or

“(iv) otherwise aided such program.

“(B) A description of the character and significance of the cooperation of each person identified under subparagraph (A) with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.

“(C) An assessment of the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.

“(3) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

“(b) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—Not later than 15 days after submitting a report required by subsection (a)(1), the President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person specified in such report that engages in activities described in subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“(2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(d) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“SEC. 233. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH CERTAIN IRANIAN ENTITIES.

“(a) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in paragraph (2) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described in this paragraph is—

“(A) an entity that is owned or controlled—

“(i) by the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakhtiari Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group; or

“(ii) collectively by a group of individuals that hold an interest in the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakhtiari Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group, even if none of those individuals hold a 25 percent or greater interest in the entity; or

“(B) a person that owns or controls an entity described in subparagraph (A).

“(b) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (a).

“(c) IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION WATCH LIST.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of—

“(A) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakhtiari Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group has an ownership interest of more than 0 percent and less than 25 percent;

“(B) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakhtiari Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group does not have an ownership interest but maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity or otherwise influences the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity; and

“(C) each person that owns or controls an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

“(2) REFERENCE.—The list required by paragraph (1) may be referred to as the ‘Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List’.

“(d) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

“(A) conduct a review of each list required by subsection (c)(1); and

“(B) not later than 180 days after each such list is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under that subsection, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the review conducted under subparagraph (A) that includes a list of persons not included in that list that qualify for inclusion in that list, as determined by the Comptroller General.

“(2) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

“SEC. 234. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN BALLISTIC MISSILE ACTIVITIES.

“(a) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a certification that each person listed in an annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), or 1929 (2010) is not directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information relating to ballistic missiles.

“(b) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—If the President is unable to make a certification under subsection (a) with respect to a person and the person is not currently subject to sanctions with respect to Iran under any other provision of law, the President shall, not later than 15 days after that certification would have been required under that subsection—

“(1) in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of that person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person; and

“(2) publish in the Federal Register a report describing the reason why the President was unable to make a certification with respect to that person.

“(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“(2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Paragraph (1)

shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(d) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in property under subsection (b).

“SEC. 235. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

“(a) LIST OF SECTORS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of the sectors of the economy of Iran that are directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information relating to ballistic missiles.

“(2) CERTAIN SECTORS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination as to whether each of the chemical, computer science, construction, electronic, metallurgy, mining, research (including universities and research institutions), and telecommunications sectors of Iran meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1).

“(B) INCLUSION IN INITIAL LIST.—If the President determines under subparagraph (A) that the sectors of the economy of Iran specified in such subparagraph meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1), that sector shall be included in the initial list submitted and published under that paragraph.

“(b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIED SECTORS OF IRAN.—

“(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in paragraph (4) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien that is a person described in paragraph (4).

“(B) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at

Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(3) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—Except as provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person described in paragraph (4).

“(4) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person is described in this paragraph if the President determines that the person, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016—

“(A) operates in a sector of the economy of Iran included in the most recent list published by the President under subsection (a);

“(B) knowingly provides significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person described in subparagraph (A); or

“(C) is owned or controlled by a person described in subparagraph (A).

“(c) HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION.—The President may not impose sanctions under this section with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran.

“SEC. 236. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN IN CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of all foreign persons that have, based on credible information, directly or indirectly facilitated, supported, or been involved with the development of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology information related to ballistic missiles in the following sectors of the economy of Iran during the period specified in subsection (b):

“(1) Chemical.

“(2) Computer Science.

“(3) Construction.

“(4) Electronic.

“(5) Metallurgy.

“(6) Mining.

“(7) Petrochemical.

“(8) Research (including universities and research institutions).

“(9) Telecommunications.

“(10) Any other sector of the economy of Iran identified under section 235(a).

“(b) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in this subsection is—

“(1) with respect to the first list submitted under subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016 and ending on the date that is 120 days after such date of enactment; and

“(2) with respect to each subsequent list submitted under such subsection, the one year period preceding the submission of the list.

“(c) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each list submitted under subsection (a), not later than 120 days after the list is submitted

under that subsection, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(A) an assessment of the processes followed by the President in preparing the list;

“(B) an assessment of the foreign persons included in the list; and

“(C) a list of persons not included in the list that qualify for inclusion in the list, as determined by the Comptroller General.

“(2) CONSULTATIONS.—In preparing the report required by paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with non-governmental organizations.

“(d) CREDIBLE INFORMATION DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘credible information’ has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

“Subtitle D—General Provisions

“SEC. 241. DEFINITIONS.

“In this title:

“(1) ENTITY.—The term ‘entity’ means any corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society, or any other entity.

“(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ means a person that is not a United States person.

“(3) OWN OR CONTROL.—The term ‘own or control’ means, with respect to an entity—

“(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity;

“(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the entity; or

“(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

“(4) PERSON.—The term ‘person’ means an individual or entity.

“(5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘United States person’ means—

“(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

“(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 the following:

“Subtitle C—Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

“Sec. 231. Definitions.

“Sec. 232. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“Sec. 233. Blocking of property of persons affiliated with certain Iranian entities.

“Sec. 234. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons involved in ballistic missile activities.

“Sec. 235. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain sectors of Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.

“Sec. 236. Identification of foreign persons that support the ballistic missile program of Iran in certain sectors of Iran.

“Subtitle D—General Provisions

“Sec. 241. Definitions.”

SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES OF IRAN.

Section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(2)—
 (A) in subparagraph (A)—
 (i) in clause (i), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;
 (ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
 (iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

“(ii) to acquire or develop ballistic missiles and capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic missiles; or”;

(B) in subparagraph (E)(ii)—
 (i) in subclause (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;
 (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and
 (iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

“(II) Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic missiles; or”;

(2) in subsection (f)—
 (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving those subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the right;

(B) by striking “WAIVER.—The” and inserting “WAIVER.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the”;

(C) by adding at the end the following:
 “(2) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of the Treasury may not waive under paragraph (1) the application of a prohibition or condition imposed with respect to an activity described in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (E)(ii)(II) of subsection (c)(2).”.

SEC. 205. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES WITH CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13(r)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(r)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:

“(D) knowingly engaged in any activity for which sanctions may be imposed under section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012;”.

(b) INVESTIGATIONS.—Section 13(r)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking “an Executive order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D)” and inserting “section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, an Executive order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(E)”.

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 13(r)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “subparagraph (D)(iii)” and inserting “subparagraph (E)(iii)”.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 206. REGULATIONS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe regulations to carry out this title and the amendments made by this title.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN’S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

SEC. 301. SPECIAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN RELATING TO ITS DESIGNATION AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.

(a) PROHIBITION ON DIRECT USE OF CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.—A covered financial

institution shall terminate any correspondent account that—

(1) is established, maintained, administered, or managed in the United States for, or on behalf of, an Iranian banking institution; and

(2) is not blocked under any Executive Order issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(b) SPECIAL DUE DILIGENCE MEASURES FOR CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A covered financial institution shall apply special due diligence measures to correspondent accounts of the financial institution that are reasonably designed to guard against the improper indirect use of such accounts by Iranian banking institutions.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The special due diligence measures a covered financial institution is required to apply to correspondent accounts under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum—

(A) notifying the holders of such accounts that the covered financial institution knows or has reason to know provide services to Iranian banking institutions, that such holders generally may not provide Iranian banking institutions with access to such accounts; and

(B) taking reasonable steps to identify any indirect use of such accounts by Iranian banking institutions, to the extent that such indirect use can be determined from transactional records maintained by the covered financial institution in the normal course of business.

(3) RISK-BASED APPROACH.—A covered financial institution shall take a risk-based approach when deciding what, if any, other due diligence measures the financial institution should adopt to guard against the improper indirect use of its correspondent accounts by Iranian banking institutions.

(4) RESPONSE TO INDIRECT ACCESS BY IRANIAN BANKING INSTITUTIONS.—A covered financial institution that obtains credible information that a correspondent account is being used by a foreign bank to provide indirect access to an Iranian banking institution, shall—

(A) take all appropriate steps to prevent such indirect access, including notifying the holder of the account under paragraph (1)(A); and

(B) where necessary, terminate the account.

(c) RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A covered financial institution shall document its compliance with the notice requirement set forth in subsection (b)(2)(A).

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall require a covered financial institution to report any information not otherwise required to be reported by law or regulation.

(d) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress—

(1) the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and

(2) a certification that the Financial Action Task Force has lifted its call for countermeasures against Iran and Iran has become a member of a regional body of the Financial Action Task Force.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT.—The term “correspondent account” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

(2) COVERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “covered financial institution” has the meaning given that term under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1010.605(e) of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

(3) FOREIGN BANK.—The term “foreign bank” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.100(u) of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

(4) IRANIAN BANKING INSTITUTION.—The term “Iranian banking institution” means—

(A) any foreign bank chartered by Iran, including—

(i) any branches, offices, or subsidiaries of such a bank operating in any jurisdiction; and

(ii) any branch or office within Iran of any foreign bank licensed by Iran;

(B) the Central Bank of Iran; and

(C) any foreign bank of which more than 50 percent of the voting stock or analogous interest is owned by two or more foreign banks chartered by Iran.

TITLE IV—SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF LIST OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514) is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking “CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT” and inserting “PERSONS INVOLVED”;

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT” and inserting “INVOLVED”;

(B) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons the President determines have committed or facilitated, directly or indirectly, human rights abuses or other acts of violence, intimidation, or harassment, on behalf of the Government of Iran on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses or acts occurred in Iran.”; and

(C) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking “this Act” and inserting “the Iran Accountability Act of 2016”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(e) INCLUSION OF ACTIONS THAT VIOLATE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—For purposes of subsection (b)(1), the term ‘human rights abuses’ includes actions that violate the rights listed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted at Paris December 10, 1948.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to section 105 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions on persons involved in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.”.

SEC. 402. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 221 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8727) is amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

“(a) IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of all individuals the President determines are described in subsection (b).

“(b) INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED.—An individual described in this subsection is—

- “(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
- “(2) the President of Iran;
- “(3) a current or former key official, manager, or director of an entity that is owned or controlled after November 14, 1979, by—
 - “(A) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
 - “(B) the Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran;
 - “(C) the President of Iran;
 - “(D) the Office of the President of Iran;
 - “(E) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps;
 - “(F) the Basij-e Motaz’afin;
 - “(G) the Guardian Council;
 - “(H) the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran;
 - “(I) the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran;
 - “(J) the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran;
 - “(K) the Assembly of Experts of Iran;
 - “(L) the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran;
 - “(M) the Ministry of Justice of Iran;
 - “(N) the Ministry of Interior of Iran;
 - “(O) the prison system of Iran;
 - “(P) the judicial system of Iran, including the Islamic Revolutionary Courts; or
- “(Q) any citizen of Iran included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury;

“(4) a citizen of Iran indicted in a foreign country for, or otherwise suspected of, participation in a terrorist attack;

“(5) a person that ordered, controlled, directed, or was otherwise complicit in the kidnapping or politically motivated detention of a United States citizen, including a United States citizen who is also a citizen of another country; or

“(6) a significant foreign political figure associated with an individual described in any of paragraphs (1) through (5) who is not a United States person.

“(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who is on the list required by subsection (a).

“(d) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any individual who is on the list required by subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(e) REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the efforts the President has taken during the 90 days preceding the submission of the report to locate and block all property and interests in property of any individual who is on the list required by subsection (a).

“(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

“(f) EXCEPTIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may not include an individual on the list required by subsection (a) if the President determines that, during the 10-year period preceding the determination, the individual has not in any way engaged in, facilitated, or otherwise supported—

- “(A) human rights abuses;
- “(B) acts of international terrorism; or
- “(C) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

“(2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subsection (c) shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.

“(g) WAIVER.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the application of subsection (c) or (d) with respect to an individual for a period of 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional periods of 180 days, if the President—

“(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national security of the United States; and

“(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal of the waiver, as the case may be, takes effect, submits a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the waiver and the reason for the waiver.

“(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

“(3) SUNSET.—The provisions of this subsection and any waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on December 31, 2018.

“(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) OWN OR CONTROL.—The term ‘own or control’ means, with respect to an entity—

“(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity;

“(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the entity; or

“(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

“(2) SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURE.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘significant foreign political figure’ includes a current or former senior political figure, the immediate family of such a figure, and close associates of such a figure.

“(B) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of subparagraph (A):

“(i) CLOSE ASSOCIATE.—The term ‘close associate’, with respect to a senior political figure—

“(I) means an individual who is widely and publicly known to maintain an unusually close relationship with the senior political figure; and

“(II) includes an individual who is in a position to conduct substantial domestic and international financial transactions on behalf of the senior political figure.

“(ii) IMMEDIATE FAMILY.—The term ‘immediate family’, with respect to a senior foreign political figure, means the parents, siblings, spouse, children, and in-laws of the senior political figure.

“(iii) SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURE.—The term ‘senior political figure’ means a senior official in the executive, legislative, administrative, military, or judicial branches of the

Government of Iran (whether elected or not), a senior official of a major political party in Iran, or a senior executive of an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.”.

“(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by striking the item relating to section 221 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 221. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect to, certain Iranian individuals.”.

SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 221 the following:

“SEC. 221A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

“(a) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF GOODS AND SERVICES.—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to a person that knowingly, on or after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, sells, supplies, or transfers goods or services to an individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).

“(b) FACILITATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by any foreign financial institution that has knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of an individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).

“(c) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) shall apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:

“(1) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.

“(2) Section 8.

“(3) Section 11.

“(4) Section 12.

“(5) Section 13(b).

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

“(1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘account’, ‘correspondent account’, and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

“(2) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 221 the following:

“Sec. 221A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who conduct transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian individuals.”.

SEC. 404. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant financial services for a person that is subject to sanctions under section 105(c), 105A(c), 105B(c), or 105C(a);”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph (F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subsection (a)(3), initiated on or after the date that is 90 days after such date of enactment.

(c) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a).

SEC. 405. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle B of title IV of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8751 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 416. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

“(a) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.—It is the policy of the United States—

“(1) to support the efforts of the people of Iran to promote the establishment of basic freedoms in Iran;

“(2) to lay the foundation for the emergence of a freely elected, open, and democratic political system in Iran that is not a threat to its neighbors or to the United States and to work with all citizens of Iran who seek to establish such a political system;

“(3) to support the emergence of a government in Iran that does not oppress the people of Iran and does not persecute, intimidate, arrest, imprison, or execute dissidents or minorities;

“(4) to advocate on behalf of those in Iran persecuted for their religion or belief;

“(5) to assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and share information freely and safely through the Internet and other media; and

“(6) to defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast signals.

“(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

“(1) the United States should support citizens of Iran that actively work to advance political, economic, and social reforms, including freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and representative government;

“(2) the President should use all available nonviolent means to support citizens of Iran that advocate for pluralistic, prosperous, and participatory societies;

“(3) programs of the Department of State to support reform in Iran have not resulted in a more democratic Iran;

“(4) the Government of Iran continues to play a pernicious role in the Middle East, undermining democratic consolidation in Iraq, supporting international terrorism through

Hezbollah, and aiding the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria;

“(5) the Secretary of State should make every effort to deliver support directly to people working in Iran to implement programs carried out using assistance provided by the Department of State when possible and all possible means of delivering such assistance should be used; and

“(6) oversight, management, and implementation of programs of the Department of State to support reform in Iran should be under the direction of the Special Coordinator on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran established under section 406 of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

“(c) ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT REFORM IN IRAN.—

“(1) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State may provide assistance (including through the award of grants) to individuals and entities working in Iran for the purpose of supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance, civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.

“(2) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Assistance authorized under this subsection should be provided only to a person that—

“(A) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the 4-year period ending on the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016;

“(B) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materiel, and ballistic missiles;

“(C) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;

“(D) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the fundamental equality of women; and

“(E) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.

“(3) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 15 days before each obligation of assistance under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

“(4) TERMINATION.—The authority to provide assistance under this subsection shall expire on December 31, 2020.

“(d) REPORTS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section that includes the following:

“(A) An identification of the actions the President has taken during the 180-day period immediately preceding the submission of the report to advance each of the policies described in subsection (a).

“(B) A clear strategy for advancing political, economic, and social reform in Iran that includes benchmarks for success that lead to a set of identified discrete goals and objectives.

“(C) A plan to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the provision of assistance authorized under subsection (c), including measures of effectiveness.

“(D) The status of the programming of assistance under subsection (c).

“(E) An analysis of any past programming of assistance under subsection (c) and its effectiveness with respect to supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance, civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.

“(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 415 the following:

“Sec. 416. United States support for the people of Iran.”.

SEC. 406. UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

(a) DESIGNATION.—The President shall designate within the Department of State a Special Coordinator on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran (in this section referred to as the “Special Coordinator”).

(b) CONSULTATION AND QUALIFICATIONS.—Before the President designates a Special Coordinator under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with the chairmen and ranking members of the appropriate congressional committees. The role of Special Coordinator should be filled by an official of the Department of State appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the President in a position not lower than Under Secretary on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) DUTIES.—The Special Coordinator shall carry out the following duties:

(1) Coordinate the activities of the United States Government that promote human rights, democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom inside Iran.

(2) Coordinate the activities of the United States Government that promote human rights, political freedom, and religious freedom for Iranian refugees and asylees living outside Iran.

(3) Ensure the comprehensive investigation and designation of Iranian human rights abusers in accordance with section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).

(4) Coordinate the documentation and publicizing of political dissidents and cases of human rights abuse inside Iran.

(5) Coordinate multilateral efforts to build international support for the promotion of human rights, democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran, including broadcasting, Internet access, and dissemination of information.

(6) Encourage the United Nations, multilateral organizations, and human rights nongovernmental organizations to more robustly investigate and report on human rights abuses in Iran.

(7) Encourage foreign governments to downgrade or sever diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran, enact economic sanctions, and assist Iranian dissidents in response to the continued violations of human rights by the Government of Iran.

(8) Encourage foreign governments to expel Iran from international fora and organizations with a human rights component, including the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the International Labour Organization.

(9) Coordinate all programs to promote human rights, democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom inside Iran.

(d) AUTHORITY.—

(1) COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES.—The Special Coordinator shall coordinate all activities related to Iran carried out by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the Department of State, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

(2) COORDINATION OF USE OF FUNDS.—The Special Coordinator shall coordinate and oversee the obligation and expenditure of funds related to human rights, democracy, Internet freedom, and broadcasting activities in Iran, including funds made available for such purposes to the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, and the Near Eastern Regional Democracy Fund.

(e) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, the Special Coordinator shall represent the United States in matters and cases relevant to the promotion of human rights, democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran—

(1) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and other international organizations of which the United States is a member; and

(2) multilateral conferences and meetings relevant to the promotion of human rights, democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran.

(f) CONSULTATIONS.—The Special Coordinator shall consult with Congress, domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, labor organizations, and multilateral organizations and institutions as the Special Coordinator considers appropriate to fulfill the purposes of this section.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 407. BROADCASTING TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America services broadcasting to Iran shall—

(1) provide news and information that is accessible, credible, comprehensive, and accurate;

(2) emphasize investigative and analytical journalism provided by Iranian or pro-Iranian media outlets; and

(3) strengthen civil society by promoting democratic processes, respect for human rights, and freedom of the press and expression.

(b) PROGRAMMING SURGE.—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America programming to Iran shall—

(1) provide programming content 24 hours a day and 7 days a week to target populations using all available and effective distribution outlets, including at least 12 hours a day of original television and video content, not including live video streaming of breaking news;

(2) create mobile platforms with an embedded proxy to offer the people of Iran the opportunity to securely listen to programming;

(3) increase number of staffers based in the region to allow for more direct contact with the people of Iran;

(4) expand the use, audience, and audience engagement of mobile news and multimedia platforms by the Voice of America and the Radio Farda service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, including through Internet-based social networking platforms; and

(5) establish fellowships for Iranian journalists who have fled the country to learn about free, competitive media and be trained in surrogate reporting.

SEC. 408. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United States citizens, including dual citizens, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that includes—

(1) information regarding any officials of the Government of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and

(2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has taken to secure the swift release of those United States citizens, including United States citizens who are also citizens of other countries.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

SEC. 409. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United Nations has a significant role to play in promoting and improving human rights in Iran;

(2) the United States should continue to support the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(3) the egregious human rights violations in Iran warrant country-specific attention and continued reporting by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes, and consequences, of the United Nations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016.

This week marks the first anniversary of President Obama's agreement with Iran. I wish I could say that it has been a win, or the win that the proponents had hoped for. But a sober assessment is that both the short-term and long-term national security interests of the United States have been deeply impacted here. We have suffered as a result of this agreement.

Under the deal, the Obama administration promised that we would be in a position to verify all of Iran's commitments under the agreement. This just has not been the case. A year later, we have less public information about Iran's nuclear activities than we did before the pact.

International inspectors were to have full and unrestricted access to any military or suspicious location in Iran. Now, it turns out that the deal included an unprecedented arrangement that relies on Iran to “self-inspect” its Parchin military complex.

The administration insisted that a U.N. Security Council resolution would continue to prohibit Iran's ballistic missile development. The reality is that it has a loophole big enough for Iran to shoot an intercontinental ballistic missile through, and Iran has shot through that loophole. Some of those tested missiles that they have shot through that loophole are marked “Israel must be wiped off the Earth.” That is what is in writing in Farsi on the side of them. And if anybody should not get the message, it is also written in Hebrew.

When the Obama administration was strong-arming its allies in the other body to save its Iran deal, many promises were made. Central to the White House story line was the President's claim that sanctions on Iran for terrorism, sanctions for human rights, and sanctions on the ballistic missiles, in their words, “will continue to be fully enforced.”

This, unfortunately, has not happened. Unfortunately, the administration's words have not matched its actions. The administration has meekly responded to Iran's provocative acts, thanks in part to the weak U.N. Security Council language in which we watered down the previous language on ballistic missiles. That was agreed to by the administration. And just one, only one Iranian, one sole individual, has been sanctioned for human rights abuses since negotiations began—one.

Indeed, last month, a top Treasury official publicly proclaimed that terrorism and missile sanctions would undermine the Iran agreement. That is not what this committee was originally told before this agreement was voted on. We were told exactly the opposite.

By now, every Member should know the pattern, and the pattern is this. If

Iran objects, the administration bends over backwards to accommodate. Effectively, the Supreme Leader now holds the veto pin over future congressional action. This policy of what I call “walking on egg shells” in deference to Tehran hurts our U.S. national security interest.

And it doesn't have to be this way. The nuclear agreement permits sanctions on the Iranian regime for activities such as missile tests, terrorism, and human rights abuses. Indeed, that is what the administration said they would do after they struck their deal. This legislation before the House holds the administration to their promises to us.

Among other provisions, this legislation increases sanctions against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. That is what we call the IRGC. It expands sanctions against Iran for its ballistic missile development, and we should. It stresses the fundamental human rights of the Iranian people as key to our national security concerns.

I would just say Congress has an obligation to look for ways to stem the tide of Iranian aggression in the region and to stem the tide of its repression of the Persian, of the Iranian people at home.

I strongly urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.

I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE, I am writing with respect to H.R. 5631, the “Iran Accountability Act of 2016.” As a result of your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 5631 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, I agree to waive consideration of this bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the mutual understanding that by forgoing consideration of H.R. 5631 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation, and requests your support for such request.

Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.

Sincerely,

KEVIN BRADY,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. KEVIN BRADY,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Af-

fairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of that bill.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PER-
MANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN-
TELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. ED ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE: On July 6, 2016, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“the Committee”) received a referral for H.R. 5631, the “Iran Accountability Act of 2016.”

In order to expedite the House's consideration of this important legislation, the Committee will forego consideration of the measure. This waiver is, however, conditioned on our mutual understanding that it does not diminish or otherwise affect any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in the bill or any similar legislation.

Please place a copy of this letter and your response acknowledging the Committee's jurisdictional interest into any committee report on H.R. 5631 and into the Congressional Record during its floor consideration. I would also appreciate your support for the appointment of Committee members to any House-Senate conference on this legislation. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of that bill.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. JASON CHAFFETZ,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of that bill.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COM-
MITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV-
ERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. EDWARD ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Wash-
ington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write concerning H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016. As you know, the Committee on Foreign Affairs received an original referral and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a secondary referral when the bill was introduced on July 6, 2016. I recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this legislation before the House of Representatives in an expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the bill.

The Committee takes this action with our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5631 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation. Further, I request your support for the appointment of conferees from the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform during any House-Senate conference convened on this or related legislation.

I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on H.R. 5631 be included in the bill report filed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as in the Congressional Record during floor consideration, to memorialize our understanding.

Sincerely,

JASON CHAFFETZ,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, DC, July 12, 2016.

Hon. ED ROYCE
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE: I am writing concerning H.R. 5631, the “Iran Accountability Act of 2016.”

As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on Financial Services concerning provisions in the bill that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to forgo action on the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with our mutual understanding that, by foregoing

consideration of H.R. 5631 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as this or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation, and requests your support for any such request.

Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 5631 and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during consideration of the bill.

Sincerely,

JEB HENSARLING,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Hon. JEB HENSARLING
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of that bill.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in opposition to this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I just walked here from our hearing room where the Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 13 measures. We had a committee meeting this morning. Some were written by Republicans, some by Democrats. When these bills and resolutions were first introduced, a lot of Members had questions and concerns. But the committee went to work ironing out differences, and now all 13 pieces of legislation have been favorably reported with bipartisan support.

That is how our committee works. That is how our chairman, ED ROYCE, runs things. That is why we say that the Foreign Affairs Committee is the most bipartisan committee in the entire Congress, and I am proud of that as a ranking member.

I believe, and we believe, that partisanship should end at the water's edge. When it comes to fighting for our country, there should be no Democrats and Republicans. We should be working together on this. Partisanship should end at the water's edge. And that is our best how we legislate, especially when

it comes to advancing American interests and security overseas. So it is rather jarring, Mr. Speaker, to walk onto the floor to debate the majority leader's bill—80 pages of new sanctions on the Iranian regime, introduced literally in the middle of the night last week, rammed through the Rules Committee, brought to the floor without any chance to improve it or any input from the Foreign Affairs Committee.

That is a disappointment, Mr. Speaker, because there are plenty of us on both sides of the aisle who think we should be doing more to hold Iran's leaders accountable for their bad behavior. After all, Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. Iran props up the Assad regime, detains Americans on trumped-up charges, and has racked up the worst record on human rights you could imagine.

Congress could speak with a unified voice on these issues, but not with the bill we are considering today. I don't like the regime. Everyone knows I oppose the deal with Iran. I think if we work together, we can move forward on legislation; but not this way, not ramming it through the Rules Committee so it doesn't get to the Foreign Affairs Committee and it gets to the floor where nobody had any kind of input whatsoever. That is not how we should be running this house. So it is not with the bill we are considering today. My friends on the other side know that. This isn't a serious bill. It would force the United States to violate our obligations under the nuclear deal.

Now, I think that is a mistake. As I said before, I opposed the Iran nuclear deal, but I was on the losing side of that debate. We shouldn't relitigate this issue. We shouldn't have 62 votes again and again to try to upend this issue, like we do with the Affordable Care Act. We should not relitigate this issue. Our work now should be to hold Iran to its obligations and make sure the deal is being fully implemented.

One of the ways we could do this is to ensure there is a viable snapback of sanctions if Iran violates the deal. That is why I have been saying we should reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act before it expires by the end of the year.

But here in front of us in this 80-page bill, what is missing?

A reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. That shows me that this isn't a serious undertaking.

Regardless of what I think, we know that this bill has zero chance of becoming law. It most certainly won't pass the Senate. If it did, the White House would veto it. So we can only conclude, Mr. Speaker, that this is a political exercise, and that troubles me.

One of our greatest traditions in American foreign policy is that politics and partisanship stop at the water's edge. That principle has been especially true in the way Congress has dealt with Iran in recent years. That principle has guided our work on the Foreign Affairs Committee. Maybe

that is why the Foreign Affairs Committee was cut out of this process. We have avoided letting foreign policy turn to everyday politics. But make no mistake, what we are doing today is politics, plain and simple.

I worry about that precedent. I worry about what it means when Iran sees us playing politics with global security, when Iran's leaders see us engage in political grandstanding instead of serious policymaking. I also worry about what it means for the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Our committee's jurisdiction gives us oversight of diplomacy, development, foreign assistance, war powers. Yet, here we are debating a major, major sanctions bill that never passed through the doors of our committee room. Yesterday, the House voted on another Iran bill that completely bypassed our committee as well. The House just approved the Defense Authorization Act that includes dozens of provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Who knows how many foreign policy riders will find their way into our spending bills this year, all without the Foreign Affairs Committee saying a word.

This is a bad trend, Mr. Speaker. This is not regular order, which the Speaker promised us. By the way, I wonder what our friends in the Freedom Caucus and Liberty Caucus have to say about the process that got this bill to the floor. I wonder what happened to the Speaker's commitment to regular order that put the gavel in his hands in the first place. I didn't see a lot of concern over regular order as this bill was being rushed through the Rules Committee.

We have a legislative process that cut out the most experienced legislators on this issue. We have an important foreign policy concern turned into a political football. We have a bill that has no chance of becoming law. I am starting to think this has something to do with the calendar. Today, when we finish our business, Members will rush to the exits. But next week, many of my friends on the other side will descend on Cleveland for their convention.

Now, let me say a bit with tongue and cheek that I sympathize with my friends on the other side. Their standard-bearer has some pretty unusual ideas about foreign policy. He thinks more countries should get nuclear weapons. He wants to withdraw from our alliances. He thinks we ought to be neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and start a trade war with China. He looks to people like Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un, and Saddam Hussein as apparent role models.

If I were in the majority's shoes, I would want to change the conversations, too. But this bill is the way to do it. This bill doesn't make the majority appear strong on foreign policy. It only makes Congress appear to be divided on

issues on which we cannot afford division. This bill weakens us as a Congress when Congress should be finding ways to make Americans safer.

I oppose this measure, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I always prefer to work things out with the ranking member. Working together, we put three bipartisan bills on the President's desk this last week alone. In this Congress, Mr. ENGEL and I, working together on the Foreign Affairs Committee, have seen some 14 bills signed into law. So he is right, this isn't the norm.

Earlier this year, there were intense discussions with the minority on legislation to push back on Iran's missile program. I compromised more than I wanted, inserting a waiver. We were close, but at the end of the day, it became clear that the White House would aggressively fight any legislation with the words "Iran" written on it.

For the White House, it is accommodation of Iran at all costs, and that includes essentially giving the Supreme Leader the veto pen over steps Congress might press the administration to take. So on this, we are stuck. Until the Democratic leadership is ready to look past this President's legacy, I imagine we will be stuck.

Lastly, I would note that these pieces of legislation are tightly focused on Iran's behavior outside of the nuclear agreement. That is the point. Whether one was for the agreement or against the agreement, these are outside of the nuclear agreement.

□ 1030

These bills do not undo or kill the Iran deal but, instead, press back on the administration's promises when campaigning for their deal.

This goes to the issue of what we were told, what was in the talking points on the floor of the House, in terms of how this deal would be implemented and that it would not impact our ability to stop this ballistic missile testing by Iran and these other abuses.

I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. MCCARTHY), the majority leader.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, today marks the 1-year anniversary of the signing of the administration's Iran deal—1 year, and the world has already become a more troubled place.

I personally think the deal sets a dangerous precedent. It strengthens the largest state sponsor of terror in the world and gives that state sponsor of terror a pathway to nuclear weapons at some point in its future.

I think that all of the arguments to defend this deal can't stand against the great weight of reality, including the fact that Iran isn't holding up its side of the bargain and is more interested in embarrassing American military men

and women than in becoming a responsible nation.

I understand a few people disagree. However, there is something we have always agreed on from the start. Deal or no deal, good or bad deal, we have always agreed to hold Iran accountable for terrorism, for its development of ballistic missiles, and for its human rights abuses committed against its own people.

In April alone, President Obama said we have to "hold Iran to account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to rules and norms."

Secretary Kerry said last year, "We will never, ever stop standing up for the Iranian people's rights."

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew also said last year, "We are going to continue to prosecute our unilateral sanctions on things like terrorism, on things like regional destabilization and human rights."

What about today? Iran has conducted eight ballistic missile tests since the deal was signed. The State Department's own Stephen Mull said in May, "There have not been any sanctions imposed for human rights grounds since July of last year." Iran continues to imprison journalists—Americans—and to torture its people.

In February, the administration's Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said, "Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and partners worldwide."

Those are the facts right there, Mr. Speaker.

What has the Obama administration done? How has the administration held Iran accountable, as they said they would? The administration has done nothing.

And it only gets worse. German intelligence has found that Iran is violating its pledges under this nuclear deal. Iran is procuring material for nuclear weapons in what is "by international standards, a quantitatively high level." Coupled with its missile program, the report reads, "It is safe to expect that Iran will continue its intensive procurement activity."

Wasn't this deal supposed to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Where is the accountability? Where is the administration when they so clearly said they would hold them accountable? Where is the bipartisanship in the sanctions now?

Now, I understand on the other side, Mr. Speaker, some will accuse Republicans of engaging in a purely partisan exercise and never intending to work with our friends on the other side of the aisle.

Well, you know that is just not true. You know for the last 6 months we worked with the other side of the aisle, we worked in a bipartisan manner with the chairmen on both sides. But every time we would deal with the missiles and the ballistic sanctions against them, the White House would thwart any bipartisan effort.

So why are we here today? It is because, for 6 months, he found every reason to say "no." For 6 months, he went back on every word that was said about holding them accountable when the facts stood before us.

Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I don't understand opposition to this bill. We are simply holding Iran accountable, which is exactly what the administration said they would do.

We have had tremendous leaders in this country, and we have learned the lessons time and again. Ronald Reagan taught us this lesson: that peace without freedom is meaningless. Human nature craves that we all have peace, but you cannot secure peace without freedom. We have watched in history when leaders have failed. Chamberlain, "peace for our time," but there was no freedom in that.

Ronald Reagan had this same dilemma late in his second term, in Iceland, when he stood across from Gorbachev, trying to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons. He was securing almost everything that he had asked for, but Gorbachev asked for one last item. He asked that America would end their SDI program. Reagan didn't say no. He said, we will share it with you so the world can be safe. But Gorbachev said no.

Reagan had a decision to make. He could have signed that deal, and I am sure the elite would have probably given him the Nobel Peace Prize. Other Presidents have won them. But he realized there was no freedom in that agreement. So he got up, he held the Soviet Union accountable, and he walked away.

Had he not, would the Berlin Wall have collapsed? Had he not, would the Soviet Union have collapsed?

Words have meaning, and words have consequences. The quotes from this administration and from around the world were to hold Iran accountable. That is what is happening today.

Mr. Speaker, there are going to be some Members in this Chamber who will sit back and say, "But it didn't happen just the way I wanted it to before it came to the floor."

I don't want you to look your grandchildren in the eyes and explain to them why we don't have freedom in the world. I want you to look your grandchildren in the eyes and say you stood up—you stood up for the words and what that meant when we were to hold Iran accountable.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. CICILLINE), a very respected member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631.

Nothing is more important to our national security interests in the Middle East than continuing to prevent a nuclear Iran while, at the same time, effectively containing Iran's influence

and confronting their destabilizing activities in the region.

Iran's ongoing ballistic missile program and its continued support for terrorism constitute an existential threat to our allies in the Middle East, including Israel. In its blatant disregard for human rights, we can hear the echoes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and other failed totalitarian regimes that now reside in the dustbin of history.

It is imperative that we do more to exert pressure on the Iranian regime to change its behavior, including meaningful sanctions for human rights and ballistic missile violations and terrorism. But any steps that we take cannot undermine the progress that we have already made over the past year to deny Iran a nuclear weapons program.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is working. Since its implementation, Iran has dismantled two-thirds of its installed uranium enrichment capacity, ended all uranium enrichment activity at its Fordow facility, and removed the core of the Arak heavy water reactor and rendered its only source of weapons-grade plutonium permanently useless.

Iran is now complying with the most comprehensive transparency and monitoring regime ever negotiated in the nuclear age. Israel's Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, has called this agreement "a historic turning point. It is a big change in terms of the direction that Iran was headed and in the way we saw things."

There is no question that the world is safer today and that our allies in the Middle East, especially in Israel, are more secure because the JCPOA has denied Iran the opportunity to develop a nuclear weapon. We can and should continue to build on this work and confront the Iranian regime's behavior without undermining the JCPOA.

We should impose sanctions for ballistic missiles, for human rights violations, and for terrorism, but these sanctions must be carefully drawn, must be carefully written to protect the agreement that denies Iran a nuclear weapon.

The bill that we are voting on today does not do this. As a result, it won't make us safer. It will, in fact, undermine every single achievement we have made over the past year.

It will impose insurmountable limits on the President's ability to work with our allies around the world and to implement effective sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers, their ballistic missile program, and their support for terrorism. If this bill becomes law, it will immediately put Iran back on a path to develop a nuclear weapon.

I sit on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have attended dozens and dozens of hearings on Iran. I have heard hours and hours of testimony from expert witnesses on how we can effect change in Iran. But no one asked for our input on this bill. It was intro-

duced by the Republican leadership in the dead of night, entirely bypassing the Foreign Affairs Committee, and came straight to the floor.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. CICILLINE. Let's call this bill for what it is: a cynical proposal that is designed to score political points in an election year even at the expense of our national security interests.

Mr. Speaker, we need serious, thoughtful strategies to confront the Iranian regime, not partisan politics. The stakes are too high.

I urge my colleagues to protect this agreement that prevents Iran from having a nuclear weapon, to work with us in a bipartisan way, to impose sanctions that are carefully drawn with the full participation of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to reject this bill in its current form.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

I would just counter with some observations.

First, the nuclear deal does not dismantle key aspects of Iran's nuclear program. That, in fact, is its fatal flaw.

At its essence, this agreement traded permanent comprehensive sanctions relief for temporary, limited constraints on Iran's nuclear program. Under this deal, Iran will keep much of its nuclear infrastructure and continue to develop advanced centrifuges, gaining the ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.

Due to the deal's fatal flaw—and that is the sunset clause—the ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be just steps away from a nuclear weapon. All he has to do is wait 10 or 15 years until the deal expires.

We cannot be sure that Iran is truly living up to its obligations under this agreement. I heard the assertion that it was. It is certainly not. In its annual report, published last month, the German intelligence reports:

The illegal proliferation-sensitive procurement activities by Iran in Germany, registered by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, persisted in 2015 at what is, even by international standards, a quantitatively high level. This holds true in particular with regards to items which can be used in the field of nuclear technology.

If this deal is working, why is Iran secretly violating it? Why is Iran buying nuclear technology?

□ 1045

Now, the point is that these activities we are curtailing aren't related to the nuclear deal, and that is the other point I would make.

Unlike the administration, I am not willing to be able to be held hostage to the nuclear deal, doing nothing as Iran develops ICBMs in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

We realize what is happening here, I hope, is the ayatollah, on a weekly basis, leads these chants of "death to Israel," "death to America" and as-

serts that it is every military man's responsibility to figure out how to mass-produce intercontinental ballistic missiles. When he is talking about "intercontinental," that means between continents; that means between there and here.

"Death to America" is not a confusing thing that we might be misinterpreting. And it is worth noting that, in the last week, it surfaced that Iran continued trying to illegally procure nuclear equipment.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PRICE).

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this and the other two bills before the House this week regarding Iran, all of which would weaken our national security and our international standing, and all of which the President has rightly threatened to veto.

If there is a silver lining in this debate, it is that the majority has given us an opportunity to acknowledge the 1-year anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has made the world safer by severely constraining Iran's nuclear activities and subjecting them to unprecedented international oversight.

Yet, instead of celebrating this landmark achievement, the majority is seeking to undo it. H.R. 5119, H.R. 4992, and H.R. 5631, collectively, would deny Iran even the limited access to foreign investment and other meaningful incentives that encourage compliance with the JCPOA.

These are just the latest in a series of Republican efforts to undermine this historic agreement negotiated with the world's major powers. Since the deal was finalized, Republicans have tried again and again and again to undermine not just the JCPOA, but also the credibility of the President of the United States on the international stage.

It appears the Iran nuclear agreement has become the ObamaCare of foreign policy. What I mean is that Republicans proclaim it a failure repeatedly, despite its objective success. They call for its immediate repeal without offering any viable alternatives, despite the potentially disastrous consequences of such action; and they continue to clutter the congressional calendar with so-called message votes about Iran, instead of addressing the major issues facing our Nation.

Now, these legislative antics continue even though opponents of the JCPOA know full well that strong sanctions on Iran remain in place targeting the country's human rights violations, ballistic missile development, and support of terrorism.

The bill before us, H.R. 5631, would impose additional mandatory sanctions on Iran for these same violations. There is no one in this Chamber about to let Iran off the hook for its egregious human rights violations or its

proliferation of terrorism and ballistic missile technology. And our Republican friends know full well that if a violation of the JCPOA were to occur, we can put sanctions like these in place immediately.

So why are we doing this bill now? Must we conclude that our colleagues are more interested in unravelling one of President Obama's signature accomplishments than they are with the facts of the matter?

Let's look at the facts: Because of this agreement, an Iranian nuclear weapon is not an imminent threat to the United States or our allies, including Israel. Because of this agreement, the breakout time for Iran to develop enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear weapon went from 2 or 3 months to a year or more. The international community has 24/7 access to Iran's nuclear sites, and we possess an enforcement mechanism to verify Iran's compliance.

By all objective accounts, Iran has upheld its end of the bargain, and it is vital that we uphold ours. This isn't just my opinion. This week a bipartisan group of more than 75 national security experts sent a letter to the President stating that "Iran has remained in compliance with its commitments" and "all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon have been blocked."

I include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this letter in its entirety.

THE IRAN PROJECT,

New York, NY, July 12, 2016.

Letter to the President on the Anniversary of the Nuclear Agreement with Iran.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the first anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, Americans should be proud of your leadership in bringing about this landmark diplomatic agreement.

As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon have been blocked, thereby providing greater security to our friends and partners in the region and to the world. From November 2013, when the interim nuclear agreement was reached, until today, Iran has remained in compliance with its commitments as verified by regular reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We applaud your Administration's commitment to the rigorous verification of Iran's compliance and remaining in close contact with the U.S. negotiating partners on the JCPOA implementation. This will be essential to ensure their cooperation should action be required to respond to an Iranian violation. As your policies have shown, it will also be essential for the U.S. to continue to assure Israel and the Gulf states of its resolute commitment to their security as our traditional partners in the region. It will be necessary to ensure adequate long-term funding for the IAEA so that it can carry out its inspection and reporting functions as required by the JCPOA.

Future relations with Iran can improve or get worse and become dangerous for U.S. interests in the region as Iran continues to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah. The U.S. should develop policies that increase the chances of cooperation with Iran, minimize confrontation, and influence Iran's actions in the region. We acknowledge that opportunities will be limited for testing Iran's

willingness to work directly with the U.S. due to the political uncertainties in both countries in the coming year, but engagement should be the U.S. government's long-term goal.

Your diplomatic undertaking with Iran was to seek a safer world and stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To achieve those ambitious goals you engaged in prolonged and intense diplomatic negotiations that enabled you to deal directly with Iran and to test its willingness to work with the U.S. and others in some areas of common purpose. The alternative strategy would be to return to an earlier era of treating Iran as America's principal enemy in the region, thereby: risking the unraveling of the JCPOA; drawing strong opposition from negotiating partners; returning to a period of nuclear danger; missing important opportunities for collaboration in the fight against ISIS and the search for solutions to other regional problems; and risking another armed conflict involving the U.S. in the Middle East.

We, therefore, encourage your Administration to put in place an institutional structure for conducting relations with Iran in all areas essential to U.S. interests. We suggest several channels that could be set up for your successor:

A direct diplomatic channel at the deputy level to continue the communications currently being conducted between the Secretary of State and Iranian Foreign Minister. Without such continuity during the transition period, the next Administration will lack the diplomatic means to enlist or pressure Iran in the management of important and urgent issues such as ISIS, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where the U.S. and Iran have some common but often clashing interests.

An emergency communications capability with Iran's government to avoid misunderstandings or the escalation of incidents or accidents.

A regular and direct bilateral channel between the U.S. Treasury and Iranian Central Bank to address all U.S. and Iranian questions about the implementation of sanctions relief commitments under the JCPOA. Treasury and State will need to stay in close harmony in talks with Iran on sanctions relief.

Iran's leaders appear reluctant now to engage the U.S. beyond the implementation of the JCPOA, and Iran's actions in the region may make engagement difficult for the U.S. But the one lesson learned from your diplomatic efforts with Iran is that persevering patiently in pursuit of careful diplomacy can lead to progress. A variety of channels with Iran will be needed to drive home messages and to improve mutual understanding on our positions on issues of importance to the U.S.—including regional security questions and the treatment of dual nationals—among others.

You have shown that well-conceived and tough-minded diplomacy can protect U.S. national security interests. Given the stakes, the U.S. will need more, not less, engagement with Iran.

With respect,

Amb. (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador to Thailand and Turkey

Graham Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Les AuCoin, U.S. Representative

Amb. (ret.) Barbara K. Bodine, Ambassador to Yemen

David Bonior, U.S. Representative

BGen Stephen A. Cheney (ret.), U.S. Marine Corps

Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund

Amb. (ret.) James F. Collins, Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States and to the Russian Federation

Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, Nobel Laureate Physics

Amb. (ret.) Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Amb. (ret.) James B. Cunningham, Ambassador to Israel, Afghanistan, and the United Nations

Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, Senate Majority Leader

Suzanne DiMaggio, Director and Senior Fellow at New America

Amb. (ret.) James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Freeman Dyson, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

Major General Paul D. Eaton (ret.), U.S. Army, Managing Director Vet Voice Foundation

Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, the Secretary of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control

Harold A. Feiveson (ret.), Senior Research Scientist, Princeton University

Richard L. Garwin, Chair of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board

F. Gregory Gause III, Chairman and Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

Leslie H. Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control at the Department of Defense

Amb. (ret.) Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador to Turkey

Morton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning and Arms Control

Lee H. Hamilton, U.S. Representative, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Gary Hart, U.S. Senator, Special Envoy to Northern Ireland

Amb. (ret.) William C. Harrop, Ambassador to Israel, Inspector General of the State Department

Stephen B. Heintz, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund

James Hoge, Former Editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine

Amb. (ret.) Robert Hunter, National Security Council Director of Middle East Affairs and Ambassador to NATO

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Arlen D. Jameson, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Commander U.S. Strategic Command

J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator

Nancy Landon Kassebaum, U.S. Senator

LTG. Frank Kearney (ret.), U.S. Army, Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counter-Terrorism Center

LTG. Claudia J. Kennedy (ret.), U.S. Army, Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Amb. (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Ambassador to Israel and Egypt

Ellen Laipson, Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council, President Emeritus of Stimson Center

Carl Levin, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Mel Levine, U.S. Representative

Amb. (ret.) John Limbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran

Amb. (ret.) Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Ambassador to China, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State

Amb. (ret.) William H. Luers, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Venezuela

Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Suzanne Maloney, Policy Planning Department of State, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution

Jessica T. Mathews, Director of the Office of Global Issues, National Security Council

Gen. (ret.) Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force, Chief of Staff

Amb. (ret.) William G. Miller, Ambassador to Ukraine

Amb. (ret.) Cameron Munter, Ambassador to Pakistan and Serbia

Amb. (ret.) Richard W. Murphy, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Vali Nasr, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Richard Nephew, Director for Iran at the National Security Council, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the Department of State

Amb. (ret.) Ronald E. Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria, and Bahrain

Gen. (ret.) Lloyd Fig Newton, U.S. Air Force, Commander, Air Education and Training Command

Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council

Admiral (ret.) Eric Olson, U.S. Navy, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command

Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, El Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan

Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia

Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan, Philippines, and Zambia

Joe R. Reeder, Deputy Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Panama Canal Commission

Amb. (ret.) Francis J. Ricciardone, Ambassador to Egypt, Turkey, the Philippines, and Palau

Burton Richter, Professor Emeritus, Stanford University; Nobel Laureate in Physics

Barnett R. Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Gary S. Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Senior Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council

Gen. Brent Scowcroft (ret.), U.S. National Security Advisor

Patricia Schroeder, U.S. Representative

Gary Sick, Director of the Office of Iran and the Persian Gulf of the National Security Council

Jim Slattery, U.S. Representative

Mark Udall, U.S. Senator

Amb. (ret.) Bill vanden Heuvel, Ambassador to the European Office of the United Nations, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Frank N. von Hippel, Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Jane Wales, Special Assistant to the President, Senior Director of the National Se-

curity Council, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates

James Walsh, Research Associate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program

Frank Wilczek, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nobel Laureate in Physics

Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator

Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs; Ambassador to India, Egypt, the Philippines, and Zambia.

The signers of this statement are either former senior officials of the U.S. government or prominent national security leaders who have not held senior government positions. The positions listed after the names of the former government officials are the senior posts held while in government. The positions listed after the names of those who were not from the government are listed with their current position.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this agreement is too important and the stakes are too high to treat this issue as just another political football. The safety and security of the United States, of Israel, and of the region depend on the successful implementation and diligent enforcement of the JCPOA.

Instead of scoring political points, or seeking to deny the President a significant achievement, we should be working together in a bipartisan fashion to ensure the agreement's success.

We should be working together to explore ways to enhance coordination and cooperation with Israel and the international community to address unacceptable Iranian behavior, such as support for Hezbollah and abuse of human rights. Yet we find ourselves here, 1 year after the agreement's announcement, still dealing with ObamaCare-style gamesmanship.

It is beneath this institution. The world is watching. We may think a bill that has no chance of being signed into law doesn't matter; but to the leaders of China or Russia or Iran, it sends a signal from our country of hesitation and disunity.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and any bills that come before us with similar intent and to focus, instead, on ensuring the success of the JCPOA and reinforcing the agreement's role in making the world a safer place.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ZELDIN), a valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, it is a little insulting to hear the remarks that were just made, as if any objection not toeing the line of this President, having objections to this arrangement, is partisan politics.

The gentleman may have misspoken when he suggested that the Iran nuclear deal was signed. I would offer that the Iran nuclear deal actually hasn't been signed. The President has acknowledged not only is this not a treaty, but Secretary Kerry, when he was before the House Foreign Affairs

Committee, said it is not even an executive agreement. It is a political commitment, a signed letter from the State Department saying that this is an unsigned political commitment. Now, we are allowed to have objections to that.

I would suggest that the best interest of national security is to join in support of this bill and putting that over party politics.

I rise today in support of the Iran Accountability Act introduced by House Majority Leader KEVIN MCCARTHY.

I also commend Chairman ED ROYCE for all of his incredibly valuable leadership, chairing the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and I also commend Ranking Member ELIOT ENGEL, who I know is deeply passionate about U.S. security and the relationship with and accountability with Iran and strengthening our relationship with Israel. I know his heart is absolutely in the right place.

So it is not a difficult position for all the Democratic colleagues who voted against the Iran nuclear agreement. I know that that takes an incredible amount of courage to stand up to a President of your own party. You did it for all the right reasons, putting national security over party politics.

That wasn't partisanship. It was actually a bipartisan vote in this House to disapprove of that Iran nuclear deal. Democrats who decided to put American security first voted against the Iran nuclear deal, an unsigned political commitment.

Why were the Iranians at the table? Sanctions relief. It is not because we asked nicely, not because they want to be good world citizens. It is because they wanted the money.

Then we gave them the money. They got through their election.

By the way, those who say that the most moderate members were elected, that is discounting the fact that the 12,000 most moderate members weren't even allowed access to the ballot. There were only the hardliners left on the ballot.

So the Iranians get the money; they get past their elections; and here we are today. And you are insulting us in this Chamber by saying that any concern that we have, if it doesn't toe the President's party line, is partisan politics.

I don't care who the President is, whether it is Republican or Democrat, this one or the next one, the fact is what brought the Iranians to the table, the leverage, was the sanctions relief. And the sanctions relief that they received is now gone.

So as they test-fire intercontinental ballistic missiles in violation of international law, they unjustly imprison Americans as they commit their human rights abuses. Everything that they are doing today, we take exception with and we are acting on, and that's why I rise.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, everything that we come to this well on this day to vote in favor of this legislation and Chairman ROYCE's legislation, three pieces of legislation to hold the Iranians accountable, it is the fact that, if we want the Iranians to come back to the table, we need to put the leverage back on the table. They are not coming back if we ask nicely. They haven't changed who they are. They are not good world citizens.

I am not going to sit here and allow this script of a White House taxpayer-funded fiction writer, Ben Rhodes, going to the media to spread whatever false lies and narratives to help sell the Iran nuclear deal.

We are here to represent our constituents and the American public. This is not about a narrative of a President and his legacy. This is about American security and doing what is best and doing what is right for our constituents and the American public.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN), the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this bill is more than deeply troubling. You talk about bipartisanship, and you come forth with a bill that completely breaks it down. This issue is too essential to become a total tool of partisan jockeying. Our relationship with Israel is too vital to become a total political plaything.

I refer, as my colleague from North Carolina did, to the statement of 75 national security leaders. I quote:

"Dear Mr. President,

"On the first anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, Americans should be proud of your leadership in bringing about this landmark diplomatic agreement.

"As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon have been blocked, thereby providing greater security to our friends and partners in the region and to the world. From November 2013, when the interim nuclear agreement was reached, until today, Iran has remained in compliance with its commitments as verified by regular reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

This letter is signed by 75, including Brent Scowcroft.

Why don't you totally partisan Republicans, who are approaching a convention and a Presidential race, listen to very much-respected people within your own party? Instead, you are thumbing your nose like this at them and at all of those who endeavor to bring about an effective policy regarding nuclear weaponry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, today is simply unmasked political chicanery.

This issue deserves better than the majority leader coming here without any notice, really, and putting forth a resolution that does nothing but harm what used to be a centerpiece of foreign policy: bipartisanship when it comes to the Middle East and the security of Israel.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CARTER).

□ 1100

Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5631 to hold Iran accountable for its state sponsorship of terrorism and for its human rights abuses.

As a Member of Congress, I believe one of our most important duties is to ensure that Americans continue to remain secure from other countries that wish to harm us.

Last year, President Obama entered into an agreement with Iran, which now allows Iran to advance their nuclear energy program. In turn, the President has allowed sanctions against Iran to be removed even though entities of the Iranian Government continue to conduct human rights violations. In addition, Iran continues to refine their ballistic missile program and support terrorism, which represents a serious threat to the United States and our allies.

It should be the clear intent of this body that the continued use of economic sanctions against the country of Iran is necessary to ensure Iran does not have the resources necessary to harm or even eliminate our country or its allies. H.R. 5631 does this. It ensures that the policy of this country is to continue to take aggressive action against Iran to prevent the development of weapons that could harm our country or our allies.

We must also continue to ensure that it is the policy of this country that efforts be taken to prevent human rights violations by any country.

I would like to thank my colleague, Majority Leader MCCARTHY, for bringing this bill to the floor, and I encourage all of my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time remains on both sides?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 13½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 12 minutes remaining.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTCH), a very hardworking and respected member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, this week we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, the agreement negotiated by

the P5+1 countries over Iran's illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons. One year later, Iran remains far outside the community of responsible countries. Iran continues to sponsor terrorism around the region. It funds and supports the murderous Assad regime. It spouts anti-Semitic and anti-Israel vitriol. It foments unrest in other countries. It denies basic human rights to its citizens, and it unlawfully detains American citizens. Iran has still not returned my constituent, Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007 and is now the longest-held American hostage.

My friends on the other side of the aisle know that, and I commend Chairman ROYCE for his diligence in looking for ways to strengthen our sanctions regime and to vigilantly enforce the Iran nuclear deal in order to keep the pressure on Iran.

Iran's subversive actions have not relented despite the agreement. Iran has explicitly and repeatedly violated U.N. Security Council resolutions by testing its ballistic missile technology, weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads. In addition, recent intelligence reports from Germany expose that Iran sought technology related to the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. So there is a lot that needs to be done to keep the pressure on Iran.

For all of these reasons, Congress needs to reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, the law that actually serves as the foundation for our sanctions policy. We have to pass new sanctions to address Iran's repeated ballistic missile tests, and we have to crack down on Iran's financial support for terrorism. These are items that have always enjoyed broad bipartisan support. All of the areas that Iran is doing harm throughout the region—support for terrorism, violation of the human rights of their people, ballistic missile tests—everything that falls outside of the nuclear deal, we should be working together to strengthen with this bipartisan support.

But rushing through legislation that is designed to undermine the JCPOA and put the United States in violation of our commitments under the JCPOA not only fail to punish Iran's malfeasance—which is our goal, and it is the shared goal—but it weakens America's ability to lead a global effort against Iran's destabilizing efforts throughout the world. We can't do this on our own. We need to work with our allies. We need to lead our allies. That is the role that the United States has always played.

Mr. Speaker, I did not support the Iran nuclear agreement, but it is in effect, and it must be enforced with vigilance.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CURBELO of Florida). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend.

Mr. Speaker, we have to maintain immense pressure on the Iranian regime so long as it violates human rights, supports terrorism, and tests ballistic missiles; but failure by the United States to uphold the deal will only weaken—I repeat for my colleagues who share my commitment to standing up to Iran, it will only weaken—our efforts to lead the international community in taking strong action to counter Iran's actions both under and outside of the JCPOA.

These three bills this week that have been rushed to the floor without having the opportunity to discuss them, to debate them, and to develop broad bipartisan support on them in ways that will not jeopardize our role under the JCPOA weaken our ability to lead. That is why I oppose them, and that is why I urge my colleagues to oppose them as well.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), our Democratic whip.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I rise to oppose this bill. I have historically and repeatedly worked in a bipartisan fashion to bring bills to this floor that were supported by both parties as it relates to the security of Israel.

This bill comes to the floor as we take stock of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal. This bill, disappointingly, was written without any input from Democrats or any committee or through regular order. By not acting in a bipartisan manner, we are missing the opportunity to send an important message to Iran of our steadfast resolve in holding it accountable both to their commitments under the JCPOA and under applicable U.S. laws and U.N. resolutions.

We need to remember that it was toughness born from bipartisan unity that brought Iran to the table in the first place. That, again, is what will be required to ensure its full compliance. As much as Iran has mostly complied with the letter of the deal, it has pushed the limits when it comes to its spirit.

One of my major concerns about the deal from a year ago remains, and it is that the deal is limited in scope only to Iran's nuclear activities. It does not cover the other areas in which Iran has proven to be a dangerous and threatening actor.

Mr. Speaker, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented the JCPOA, called for Iran to halt its ballistic missile program. Instead, Iran has continued to develop and test missiles that could carry a nuclear payload. There have also been reports that it is attempting to acquire ballistic missile technology in violation of U.N. Resolution 2231.

Iran's sponsorship of global terror has continued unabated, and its arms

and fighters stream into Syria, exacerbating the instability there and threatening regional security. Hamas and Hezbollah continue to threaten Israel with Iranian arms and financial support, and Iran's leaders continue to call for the end of the Jewish State of Israel.

That is why, even as Iran has received sanctions relief through the JCPOA, it was always understood that we would need and be able to increase pressure on Iran with additional sanctions targeting its ballistic missile program and other destabilizing actions. We must not allow Iran to violate the nuclear deal.

If Iran does not feel that it is sufficiently benefiting from the nuclear deal, frankly, that is because its malign activities and its outdated banking system are continuing to deter foreign investment.

Iran and the world need to understand that it is not America's job to fix the problems that Iran has created for itself. That is why, as Iran continues to flaunt its obligations and sponsor terrorism around the world, its leaders must know with certainty that there will be real consequences from the United States and our allies for those actions.

I am opposing this bill and urging that Democrats and Republicans—and my friend, Mr. ROYCE, has done that repeatedly throughout his leadership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs—return to our successful bipartisan partnership, as we have in the past, to reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act as soon as possible, and then work toward enacting sanctions targeting Iran's ballistic missile program.

Let's come back here with legislation that sends a powerful message to Iran that there is no daylight between the parties in Congress when it comes to our shared resolve that Iran must abandon its sponsorship of terror, end its ballistic missile program, and comply fully with the JCPOA. My friends, Chairman ROYCE, Ranking Member ENGEL, and my colleagues, our commitment to Israel and international peace and security demands no less.

Let us return to bipartisanship on which Israel has relied and the message that we sent was stronger, firmer, and more effective. Let us defeat this partisan legislation and return to the bipartisan table.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The goal of the Iran Accountability Act, the goal of this measure we are talking about today is not to force the administration to violate its flawed Iran deal. The goal here, the goal of this bill is to call upon the President to uphold his pledge to remain vigilant and respond to Iran's continued support for its ballistic missile program and terrorism and its human rights abuses. Okay?

The sanctions in this bill would force the administration to act decisively with respect to the twin threats of

Iran's effort to develop and acquire ballistic missiles and to support terrorism. It would seek to bolster the effect of secondary sanctions that apply outside the United States on Iran's development of ballistic missiles in the wake of the administration's wholesale retreat from multilateral sanctions regarding ballistic missiles.

If the administration was actually involved in enforcing this, this legislation would not be necessary. Last July, Secretary of State John Kerry testified that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented the deal, contains the exact same language prohibiting Iran from developing ballistic weapons as the previous resolution. That sounded pretty encouraging to us. Oh, if only it were true. If only it had been true.

The text of the resolution appears to suggest it is quite the opposite. In U.N. SCR 2231, Iran is nonbindingly called upon—those are the words, “called upon”—to refrain from developing ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. By contrast, the original resolution bindingly stated that Iran shall not—shall not—develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

Now, here is where we have to focus, my friends. Here is where we have to focus. This past spring, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif bragged on this very point, and here are his words. He said that he negotiated a loophole. He negotiated a loophole that would enable the regime to continue to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. That is why we are here debating this today.

What did he say?

The new resolution, he claimed—and these are his words—doesn't call upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. No. It calls upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles that were designed to be capable.

And he adds: “That word took me about 7 months to negotiate, so everybody knew what it meant.”

As such, Iran could develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead but then claim it was not designed for that specific purpose.

□ 1115

Later reports indicated that the United States and its European allies issued a joint letter. Now, remember, Iran has now fired off eight tests. The last test, on the ballistic weapons, on the side of them, it said “Death to Israel” in Farsi and in Hebrew. And that joint letter stated that Iran's recent ballistic missile tests were—what was the word used by the United States now?—were inconsistent with, rather than a violation of, the resolution. So which is it?

Ultimately, the U.N. fails to impose new sanctions despite Iran's continued missile tests. During this entire debate on the floor this House, the talking points indicated that Iran would be

prevented from developing and using and testing these ballistic missiles for the next 8 years. Now we find out that, apparently, the administration intends to allow this continued buildup of their capabilities of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Thus, what this legislation seeks to restore is the necessary deterrent effect with respect to ballistic missiles and correct the administration's debilitating mistakes.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY), a very respected and hardworking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL).

I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631, the so-called Iran Accountability Act.

The majority has decided, on its own, without any bipartisanship, to co-opt traditional action on a bipartisan basis to counter Iran by fast-tracking sharply partisan legislation that would undermine not only the Iran nuclear agreement but fracture the very delicate international coalition that allowed us to reverse the nuclear development in Iran. I guess that is something that happens when amateurs write a bill without any foreign policy background.

This bill was drafted, as Mr. HOYER indicated, with no input from the minority and was brought to the floor under a closed rule. How can anyone, much less our adversary Iran, take this seriously?

If the majority really cared about countering Iran, it would safeguard longstanding bipartisan consensus and bring to the floor a clean reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, which I would support and I am sure most people on my side of the aisle.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Instead, the majority is scrambling to pass at the last hour of this part of our session, just before a 7-week recess, the bill before us today.

It is a farce. It is a dangerous gambit by the majority to play election-year politics at the expense of U.S. bipartisan foreign policy.

I urge rejection of this ill-considered bill.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

You know, the question is not whether Iran is a good player. Iran is not a good player. The question is: What should be our response to it? It is not a question of whether the Iranian regime is good or bad. Of course it is bad. I opposed the Iran deal. The question is: How do we react to it?

Mr. Speaker, we had an opportunity to work on meaningful legislation that would have held Iran's feet to the fire

and ensured the nuclear deal was being fully, fairly implemented. It could have been a reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. It could have been another bipartisan approach.

But, instead, we are going to vote on this bill, which will pass mostly on partisan lines, and then skip town for 7 weeks. I think that is a shame, because I don't think we have done our job. And there is no job more important than protecting America's security.

Ramming through partisan bills that don't stand a chance of becoming law is just irresponsible. It diminishes Congress' role in making foreign policy. It certainly diminishes the Foreign Affairs Committee's role.

So I hope when we return from the break we can hit the reset button on the way we deal with these issues. I think it is important for us to work together in a bipartisan fashion. As I have said so many times on this floor, it has been a pleasure working with Chairman ROYCE on the committee in a bipartisan fashion.

Give the committee a chance to formulate a bill that will hold Iran's feet to the fire. It is a terrible regime. It is a bloody regime. We are all united on both sides of the aisle in wanting to confront that regime. The question is how to do it. You don't do it by ramming through a partisan bill. You do it by working in a bipartisan fashion.

For now, we should reject this bill, go back to the drawing board, and work together to confront the Iranian murderous regime. They are a regime that we need to confront. Nobody disagrees on that on both sides of the aisle. The question is: Should we do it together?

Let's do it together. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been a bipartisan mecca of how Congress should work. Let's go back to that, particularly with foreign policy. Let's go back to that.

So I urge my colleagues to reject the bill. We have good people on both sides of the aisle. We all want to see the same thing. Let's put our heads together and come up with a consensus and confront Iran. Reject the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The first point I would make, Mr. Speaker, is that, under the agreement, Iran has kept much of its nuclear infrastructure. It continues to develop advanced centrifuges. It continues to gain the ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.

This means, if we are looking at the long haul on enforcement and challenges ahead, that the ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be just steps away from a nuclear weapon when the clock runs out.

In the meantime, tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief is now starting to flow to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Now, the assurances that we have been given—and these underlying con-

cerns, by the way, are why so many Members, including many from the Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed the administration's deal with Iran in the first place.

But these long-term problems now of Iran beginning to use that money for terrorist activity, for the IRGC, and for support for Hezbollah is what is prompting our effort now to try to get some kind of an enforcement, not necessarily on the deal itself, but on original assurances we had been given by the President.

For example, when he presented this deal, he claimed that the United States would remain vigilant in countering Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its support for proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its threats against America's friends and allies, like Israel.

Some of us supported the nuclear deal with Iran; some of us didn't. But, regardless, I don't think any of us thought that Iran should be given carte blanche to continue and even escalate its dangerous hostility in that region and its hostility to us and our allies and hostility to the Iranian people, frankly, which is another issue. That is not what the administration told us last year.

It makes sense to do all we can to check this very dangerous trend in Iranian activity. The problem is that the administration refuses to do this. This is what drives us to bring the bill to the floor. The administration refuses to negotiate, as I said before, on anything with the word "Iran" in it. So that is why we are here.

I would ask my colleagues who oppose this measure: We were told, all right, we are going to hold them on human rights. How many Iranian officials has the administration designated for human rights abuses since the negotiations ended? The answer to that is zero. There have been no human rights designations in the past year. Talk about walking on eggshells.

Despite the fact that Iran's Minister of Justice and head of the judiciary—they are clear human rights violators, but they have not been designated, as the number of executions inside Iran go up.

Iranian regional aggression has increased exponentially since this agreement was reached. The administration has been reluctant to act decisively on that.

In March, the CENTCOM Commander, General Joe Votel, testified that Iran has become more aggressive in the days since the agreement.

Similarly, our Director of National Intelligence says Iran—in his words, the foremost state sponsor of terrorism—continues to exert its influence in regional crises in the Middle East through the International Revolutionary Guard Corps, through the Quds Force, its terrorist partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and its proxy groups. It also provides military and economic aid to its allies in the region. Iran and

Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and partnerships worldwide.

Now, if the IRGC ends up with \$100 billion—because it is the International Revolutionary Guard Corps that, in fact, nationalized most of the companies inside Iran. If they get their hands on this money and if this terrorist-sponsoring organization continues its proliferation, then Hezbollah is going to be the primary beneficiary of the sanctions relief.

We were assured that steps were going to be taken on that point. That was supposed to be our end goal, right?

Secretary Kerry even admitted immediately after the implementation day, “I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the IRGC or other entities, some of which are labeled ‘terrorists.’ You know, to some degree, I am not going to sit here and tell you that every component of that can be prevented.”

Okay, it can’t all be prevented, but surely some of it can. The Secretary of State was basically saying that there was nothing the U.S. could do to prevent the IRGC and terrorists from benefiting exponentially from sanctions relief. No wonder Iran’s efforts to destabilize the region are picking up steam.

Consider Iran’s smuggling of weapons to militants throughout the region. According to the State Department, Iran arms Hezbollah with advanced, long-range Iranian manufactured missiles, in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolution. We are trying to do something to at least say: Stop that.

Just days after the announcement of the JCPOA, here is what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah asserted that that deal would not stand in the way of Iranian support for Hezbollah.

How right he was, because in June 2016 Nasrallah boasted that all of Hezbollah’s weapons and rockets came from the Islamic Republic of Iran—150,000 rockets pointed at our ally, Israel. And now they say they are going to be able to target those with GPS technology. Aren’t we going to stand in the way of that?

Similarly, Iran continues to destabilize our partners in the Gulf. They already overthrew the Government in Yemen with their support for the Shiite Houthis there; particularly, also, in Bahrain, where they carry out a low-level insurgency as well.

I beg to differ with the Secretary of State. There is something we can do. We can act on the administration’s stated commitment to our allies and hold Iran’s feet to the fire on this issue.

The Iran deal should not come at the cost of the domestic security of our regional allies. We could have the original deal, and we could still enforce what we were told on this floor would be enforced.

For 8 years, they were not supposed to be proliferating or developing ballistic missiles. For 5 years, they were

not supposed to be transferring to Hezbollah additional weapons capability.

Now we are turning a blind eye. Now we are walking on eggshells with respect to their treatment of their own people, as the human rights violations and the executions become worse and as they hold two more Americans.

Frankly, that is why this legislation is before us on the House floor. I urge an “aye” vote.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1130

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the previous question is ordered on the bill.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

UNITED STATES FINANCIAL SYSTEM PROTECTION ACT OF 2016

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 819, I call up the bill (H.R. 4992) to codify regulations relating to transfers of funds involving Iran, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. YODER). Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4992

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “United States Financial System Protection Act of 2016”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS, SENSE OF CONGRESS, AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On November 8, 2011, the Department of the Treasury identified the Islamic Republic of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global financial system.

(2) On November 6, 2008, the Department of the Treasury announced that it was revoking the “U-turn” license for Iran, stating that “as a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the United States today fulfilled its obligation to strengthen measures

to protect the financial sector from the risks posed to the international financial system by Iran”.

(3) On February 19, 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism which has determined that Iran is a “non-cooperating country or territory” in the fight against money laundering and terror financing since 2008, stated that, “the FATF remains particularly and exceptionally concerned about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system”.

(4) United States and foreign businesses operating or seeking to operate in Iran run significant risks, as corruption in Iran is endemic, with Transparency International ranking Iran 130 out of 168 countries.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the entire financial sector of Iran, including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran, poses illicit finance risks for the global financial system due to its proliferation, support for terrorism, and other illicit conduct.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) deny Iran access to funds denominated in United States dollars, including through any offshore United States dollar clearing system for transactions involving the Government of Iran or an Iranian person; and

(2) deny Iran access to United States dollars through any offshore United States dollar clearing system conducted or overseen by a foreign government or a foreign financial institution for transactions involving the Government of Iran or an Iranian person.

SEC. 3. CODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSFERS OF FUNDS INVOLVING IRAN; CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS TO FOREIGN DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN REGISTERED BROKERS AND DEALERS.

(a) CODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS.—Section 560.516 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 2016, shall apply with respect to transfers of funds to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of an Iranian person or the Government of Iran, for the period beginning on or after January 1, 2016, and ending on the date on which the President makes the certification to the appropriate congressional committees under section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).

(b) CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS TO FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN REGISTERED BROKERS AND DEALERS.—

(1) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Subsection (a) of section 560.516 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 2016, shall apply with respect to foreign financial institutions to the same extent and in the same manner as such subsection applies with respect to United States depository institutions if the funds that are to be transferred as described in such subsection are funds that are denominated in United States dollars.

(2) FOREIGN REGISTERED BROKERS AND DEALERS.—Subsection (b) of section 560.516 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 2016, shall apply with respect to foreign registered brokers or dealers in securities to the same extent and in the same manner as such subsection applies with respect to United States registered brokers or dealers in securities if the funds that are to be transferred as described in such subsection are funds that are denominated in United States dollars.