

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business.

Mr. BROWN. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent to be joined in a colloquy with Senator MERKLEY of Oregon and Senator COONS of Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DODD-FRANK BILL

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, during the financial crisis, \$13 trillion in household wealth was erased. Nine million jobs were lost, and 5 million Americans, 5 million families and individuals lost their homes. The financial services industry has bounced back, and far too many American families have not.

While many in Washington may have forgotten the financial crisis, millions of Americans haven't forgotten how predatory lending practices contributed to the housing bubble and helped spark this crisis. For them, this was the crisis.

Unscrupulous lenders offered loans that required no documentation, loans with teaser interest rates that later spiked and undermined a borrower's ability to repay, and loans where borrowers never paid down their principal. Borrowers with these higher cost loans were foreclosed upon at almost triple the rate of borrowers with conforming 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.

The crisis revealed a host of other harmful practices, such as steering borrowers to affiliated companies, kickbacks for business referrals, inflated appraisals, and loan officer compensation based on the loan product that they peddled. These practices offered little benefit to the borrower. They were not about helping those families purchase a home they could afford. It is no coincidence that as borrowers' costs increased, so did loan officers' compensation.

These abuses didn't start in 2007 and in 2008. In many communities, predatory lenders began moving in a decade or more before the crisis.

In Ohio, the housing crisis was a slow burn rather than the boom and bust cycle that happened in States such as California and Arizona. From 1995 to 2009—think about this—my State of Ohio had 14 consecutive years where there were more foreclosures than the years before. For 14 years in a row, the number of foreclosures went up and up and up—14 years in a row.

My wife and I live just south of Slavic Village in Cleveland, ZIP Code 44105.

I mention that ZIP Code because in 2007, that ZIP Code had the highest foreclosure rate of any ZIP Code in the United States of America. This wasn't because of speculation. This was a declining industrial base, and this was the kind of predatory lending that tended to settle and sink its talons into communities like Slavic Village. Government policies favoring finance over manufacturing caused steel mills across Northeast Ohio and the rest of the country to shut down and force people to look elsewhere for work. Between 2000 and 2010, the population of Slavic Village dropped 27 percent, down to 20,000 people, and then the subprime lending industry moved in. By 2006 more than 900 of Slavic Village's 3,000 properties—900 out of 3,000—were in foreclosure. If the home next door to you is foreclosed on and abandoned, you can bet the value of your home begins to decline 2 percent, 3 percent, 4 percent, and then the one across the street and then one down the street. One can see what happens to this neighborhood. One in three Ohioans in the height of the crisis—one in three Ohioans' mortgages were underwater. One in every seven mortgageholders was 30 days delinquent or in foreclosure.

Behind every foreclosure is a painful conversation. We don't think much about that here. We think of numbers, policies, and statistics. But imagine if you are a mother or father, and you have a 12-year-old or 13-year-old son and daughter. First, the mother loses her job. Things change around the house. You begin to cut back on things. You begin to take money out of the college fund to send your kid to Cuyahoga Community College. Then the husband loses his job. Then you have to have that discussion. There were 5 million discussions like these that went on in these homes where there were foreclosures. You have to explain to your son or daughter: We aren't going to be living here. We can't afford this house. We are leaving the neighborhood. You are probably going to a different school. We don't know where we are moving. We are going to have to find a new place to live. Maybe we are going to have to give away the family pet. There is a shelter in Parma, OH, that went from 200 to 2,000 dogs and cats that they were housing because so many people gave up their pets because of the foreclosures that so many families endured.

We came together as a result to pass Wall Street reform so families would no longer be forced to spend their lives because a mortgage company preyed upon them. Dodd-Frank established a commonsense rule that requires lenders to ensure that borrowers have the ability to repay their home loans. We created a consumer protection bureau to make sure that never again would consumers be an afterthought.

Much of the CFPB's important work has centered around mortgage regulation. Their rule to streamline forms

will help inform consumers to understand what is happening at the closing table.

The ability to pay. A qualified mortgage rule balances the need for mortgage credit with the need of documentation of income and other borrower protections.

We know there is more to be done. We must ensure that small lenders and community institutions can remain competitive. We know how bank concentrations become more and more of a problem. We must provide homeowners with protections from a broken servicing model that has harmed so many of our communities. We must ensure broad access to affordable housing—the right thing to do for families and communities. We must move forward. We know there will be a clear choice.

As we move forward, we know there are two paths to follow. We can accept the false narrative that inaccurately blames low-income borrowers in the Federal programs, FHA, VA, to maintain their underwriting standards during the boom. In other words, we can blame the victim. We can say: Oh, it was the homeowners who caused this. It was the people who got the mortgages. It was all their fault. They weren't smart enough and they were so irresponsible. And we can blame the government because it is always the government's fault or we can recognize there were flawed incentives encouraged by a lack of regulatory oversight at the heart of our Nation's financial system—flawed incentives that made risk-taking more profitable, flawed incentives that increased loan officers' compensation when they made loans they should not have been making.

We can maintain the 30-year fixed mortgage that has made homeownership more affordable and given so many families an asset upon retirement. We can preserve a strong government role in the mortgage market, but instead too many in this body want to undermine the reforms that we put in place 5 years ago. Republicans and their allies in the financial industry fought Wall Street reform every step of the way. They have been attacking these consumer protections since the day they began.

We have to remember what a top financial services lobbyist said. The day the President signed Dodd-Frank, the top lobbyists in the financial industry said: Well, folks, today is half-time. Today is half-time, meaning, OK, we lost in Congress, but we are going to keep pushing these agencies. We are going to keep lobbying Congress. We are going to try to roll back these rules. We are going to stop these rules. We are going to dilute these rules and make them ineffective.

The bill my Republican colleagues today on the Appropriations Committee brought in—Senator COONS will talk about that. The bill the Republicans brought into Senator MERKLEY's and my banking committee isn't a narrower targeted effort at reform for

small banks. It is a sweeping overhaul that rolls back Wall Street reform. Once again, they want to undermine consumer protection. They want to use small Main Street institutions as cover, but in the end they want to allow special interests and their allies to undermine reform and leave the American people exposed to the problems that happened less than a decade ago. It is unconscionable that this abuse was ever allowed in the first place.

Senator MERKLEY, a leader on this issue, especially in the Volcker rule, will speak about his efforts and what he has seen in the past and particularly looking forward to the future about what we do about predatory loans and people and banks preying on consumers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I appreciate the leadership of my colleague from Ohio, who has brought such a focus on ending predatory activities, helping our financial system work for working Americans. Indeed, that is certainly what all of our effort is about on the fifth anniversary of the Wall Street reform bill, the Dodd-Frank bill. My colleague was talking about the Humble Home mortgage, which was turned into a predatory instrument that instead of building the wealth of the middle class of America was designed to strip that wealth. There was the two-year teaser rates in which interest rates would go from 4 percent to 9 percent, more than doubling. Liar loan underwritings, in which the loan is way too large for a family, were given to a family just to reap the immediate benefits on behalf of the mortgage broker: the immediate commissions, steering payments and kickbacks that were paid to mortgage originators to steer their clients from the prime loan they qualified for into the subprime loan.

Now, thankfully, as the Senator from Ohio outlined, we have ended those predatory practices and we must not let those practices return.

Homeownership has been the foundation for middle-class wealth—homeownership, education, and good-paying jobs. We cannot take away homeownership as a significant part of the American dream, the dream to control your own space, the king or queen of your own castle, and certainly to build the equity that puts your family on a strong financial foundation.

Wall Street added to this particular story because they took these predatory teaser rate loans and put them into securities. One can think about securities as a box full of mortgages. Those mortgages generate a certain cashflow, and you sell the cashflow. That is what a security is. So these securities were only as strong as the mortgages that were in the security box, and those mortgages were deeply flawed. When the interest rate went from 4 percent to 9 percent, a family's payments doubled. They weren't able

to make their payments because the underwriting had been inappropriate from the beginning, and they weren't able to get out of the loan because there was a prepayment penalty if they tried to get out of the loan. That was a steel trap that locked families into these inflated interest rates and eventually destroyed their finances. So we ended all that.

Think about what Wall Street did. They took these mortgages and set up a securities waterfall—AAA, AA, and so forth. They got ratings on these securities as if these home loans were the same sound, good home loans of the past, not these new steering payment, prepayment penalty teaser-rate loans that had started to become so common and such a different instrument. Wall Street said we will make a lot of money selling these securities.

Indeed, there were a couple other factors that came into play. Not only did credit agencies give them great ratings despite the underlying flaws, but there was also insurance that could be bought to protect the security in case it would fail. It was called a credit default swap or CDS. For a few cents you could buy insurance to make sure the security was good. Of course, insurance is only as strong as the insurance company behind it, and the purchasers didn't know the details of that because it went through the middlemen in Wall Street. It turned out that AIG, the American Insurance Group, was issuing this insurance in vast quantities, not doing what an insurance group normally does, which is set aside reserves to cover potential losses. Indeed, they were just on a short-term upward—hey, we can sell these insurance policies called CDS or credit default swaps for a ton of money for short-term profits and long-term irresponsibility.

So let's fast-forward from 2003, when the predatory loans came into popularity, and now we are in 2008 and mortgages are starting to fail, the securities are starting to fail, and then of course the insurance on those securities failed. Meanwhile, you have investment houses. For example, Lehman Brothers in 1998 had \$28 billion in proprietary holdings, and by 2006 that had expanded to \$313 billion against a capital base of just \$18 billion in common equity. Think of that leverage—\$313 billion in holdings and a base of \$18 billion. That enormous leverage meant that if there was just a slight decline in the value of the products they were holding, then the whole firm was going to come tumbling down. Because these securities started to fail, they didn't have just a slight decline, they had a big decline. Suddenly, you have a major investment house, Lehman Brothers, out of business.

That sent shock waves through our entire financial enterprise because a lot of the financing—short-term financing—was done through 24-hour financial transactions called repurchase agreements or repo agreements. Repurchase agreements—you sell an asset for

24 hours, you get the money, you buy it back 24 hours later, and then you resell it. That means every 24 hours you have to come up with the cash to buy back this repo financing. When the underlying value started to go down, the company couldn't come up with the funds to execute the repurchase agreements, so they had to do a fire sale of their assets. Well, if they do a fire sale of their assets, that means for every other company that has similar products, the value of their products now goes down the tube overnight, and then they have problems. So you have a domino effect—a contagion that spreads through the financial industry.

Let's trace this back in simple circumstances. You had healthy homeowner loans, fully amortizing fair loans replaced by predatory teaser-rate loans leading to securities based on these faulty predatory mortgages. These securities became a major financial instrument. That financial instrument collapsed when the mortgages collapsed. There was a domino effect, a contagion that brought down our entire financial house.

The American worker was on the losing end of this house of cards. American workers lost their jobs. American workers lost their retirement savings. These American workers often lost their homes because after losing their jobs, they couldn't pay for their home or because the teaser-rate mortgage doubled in monthly payments, they couldn't make those monthly payments.

That type of destruction in which Wall Street casinos fared so well and American workers were so destroyed must not happen again. That is what the Wall Street reform bill is all about. On the fifth anniversary, we have ended through the Volcker rule the proprietary trading that was basically large hedge funds embodied within banks being essentially done on the backs of Federal deposit insurance; that is, the government was insuring the banks that were engaging in these highly leveraged hedge fund operations. That is just wrong.

If you want to operate a hedge fund, absolutely, get your investors, place your bets, and if you go down, the investors go down, but the banking system doesn't go down. We must not allow these highly leveraged hedge funds to be operating inside of our core banking system.

The phrase that was often used as we were working on this 5 years ago was "Let's make banking boring again." Take deposits, make loans, and through those loans fuel the success of our families and our businesses. But if you want to be a high-risk investor, do it somewhere else.

That is the core story about shutting down the Wall Street casino. This is the Wall Street casino before the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill: Sorry, we are closed; afterwards: Well, I am not sorry they are closed because we

have rebuilt a financial system designed to work for working Americans, and that is a good thing.

I look forward to turning this over to my colleague from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARDNER). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I would like to thank my colleagues from Ohio and Oregon, as we come to the floor today to talk about the 5 years since the passage of the Wall Street reform bill—better known as Dodd-Frank—and what it has meant for our States and for our country.

It is no secret that Delaware, my home State, is also home to a very large financial services industry. The whole range of financial institutions—from small community banks and credit unions, to larger regional banks, to literally some of the largest banks in the world—has a home in my State and employs tens of thousands of my constituents.

So I understand it might be surprising to some to see me come to the floor and join my colleagues in defense of the broad and sweeping Wall Street reform bill that was enacted 5 years ago, but as a Democrat representing these workers in a State that benefits from a robust financial services industry, I also know how important strong, stable, secure, predictable capital markets and well-functioning and well-regulated financial services are to a healthy economy from which we can all benefit. If we don't have a bank we can trust, we can't get a loan or buy a home or finance an education—investments that can serve as foundations to a brighter future for our families. If we don't have robust capital markets, companies cannot get money they need to invest in people and products and services, in growth and in jobs.

If you think of a world without functioning or reliable financial services, you can picture money sitting useless, unaccessible under a mattress. Without the roadways—the banks and financial services—to connect it, this money cannot move and an economy cannot grow. Quite literally, everything grinds to a halt.

We don't have to look far to see an example of this sort of seizing up of a modern economy. Greece has recently experienced a devastating financial crisis where money stopped flowing into and out of their economy, banks limited the amount of cash people could take out, and the government prohibited people from sending money abroad. The result was widespread panic, disruption of day-to-day lives, and a deep distrust of banks and banking that will take a long time to heal.

Capital markets and financial services that are well regulated and well run are important to us all. That is why we have to do everything we can to protect them. They make up a critical part of our Nation's economic infrastructure and lay the foundation for economic recovery. But just as streets need traffic lights and sharp turns need

speed limits and bridges need guardrails, so, too, financial systems need fair and enforceable regulations. The alternative is what we saw just 5 years ago—the near collapse of our economy.

When the 2008 financial crisis unfolded, I was a local elected official in Delaware, not a Senator. As our mortgage system, our banking system, and our markets collapsed, I saw the real wreckage in my own home community. I saw thousands of folks who lost their jobs, who lost their life savings, who lost their homes, and the painful and lasting impact on them and on our whole community.

The 2008 crisis proved that a poorly regulated market left everyone exposed to risk, from consumers to financial services workers. Worst of all, it sparked a widespread distrust in our economy and our banks both here at home and abroad that we are still working to recover from today. The devastation caused by the great recession proved our financial system needed stronger regulations to protect consumers, families, businesses, and to make sure our capital markets are liquid, trustworthy, and reliable globally to instill faith back into our economy and system.

So I believe it was in our national best interest for there to be adopted fair, predictable rules to make sure we could all drive on the road safely, metaphorically, regardless of what size car we drove or what side of the road we were driving on. That is why, 5 years ago, in the wake of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress's groundbreaking Wall Street reforms needed to become law. Those reforms took important steps to strengthen the rules of the road and prevent another significant crisis for our economy.

Congress created an agency, the CFPB, or Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with a simple important mission: to protect consumers from abusive financial products. By helping to ensure that consumers have accurate financial information about the risks and benefits of financial products, CFPB works to prevent risky lending practices. An essential feature of CFPB is that it is an independent agency with only one responsibility; that is, protecting consumers.

Second, Wall Street reform limited risky and unsafe investment practices at the highest levels of finance. It set strong capital standards so banks have a sturdy backstop in times of need and ensured that regulators have the tools to scrutinize banking practices that are far more complicated than ever before—in fact, at the very limits of what is capable of regulatory oversight.

Congress required banks to perform risk testing, to improve oversight and make sure they can withstand turbulence in the same way first responders are required to perform regular safety drills to make sure everything works properly in the case of a crisis or a fire. Banks are now required to make sure

they have the protocols and the policies and the resources in place to respond effectively to a renewed financial crisis.

Last, the financial crisis made it clear that although there is much we can do to limit risk and protect consumers, banks—particularly big banks—can still fail. When they do, it is critical they are wound down, they are resolved, they are closed in a way that is responsible, does not spread contagion and harm the larger economy, and does not require an expensive taxpayer bailout. That is why Wall Street reform gave the government new abilities to responsibly wind down banks so they do not cause a financial earthquake, much in the way the government has done with smaller banks through the FDIC for more than 80 years.

While I believe these reforms took much needed steps toward making sure our financial system is strong and healthy, I also believe we can build upon these reforms.

One of its key authors, Senator Dodd, said just yesterday—former Senator and Chairman Dodd said just yesterday at a public event: It wasn't the Ten Commandments that was crafted; it was a law, and a law that needs to be improved.

I know it might be difficult to believe Democrats and Republicans can find common ground on Wall Street reform, but there are, in fact, changes we can agree on that will make sure these reforms protect consumers and financial services. For example, we ought to lighten the regulatory burden on community banks so smaller banks can provide lending that their neighborhoods really need to grow and thrive. That is why Senator MERKLEY and I have cosponsored Senator BROWN's important bill, the Community Lender Regulatory Relief and Protection Act, which would help smaller banks by streamlining exams, by helping credit unions develop more diverse sources of capital, and by reducing onerous privacy notification rules.

Many of the proposals in this bill have bipartisan support. I am eager to work with my colleagues to implement those and other improvements. But unfortunately, rather than looking for ways to strengthen and sustain the broad architecture of Wall Street reform, too many of our Republican colleagues have continued to try to roll back the clock. We have seen how Republicans in the House have continued efforts to dismantle these bills, in particular in recent appropriations legislation. They have supported significant, harmful cuts to the regulatory agencies that are charged with rule-making and with oversight—the most important entities in the financial services realm. They have also tried to undermine and undercut the CFPB's independence.

Just today, Senate Republicans have proposed similarly misguided legislation. I plan to do everything I can to

protect those agencies and stop efforts to fundamentally undo important Wall Street reform.

It is time for my colleagues to stop proposing spending bills on a wide range of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee that have no chance of passing and that continue to push us closer to an inevitable government shutdown that would devastate our economy and I think cause real harm to our working families. I have heard those very same colleagues argue that by doing so, they are on the side of banks and they are on the side of increasing the forward growth of our economy and that is why they want to dismantle regulations. But what I hear from business leaders and bank leaders in my home State is that the biggest threat they face are more manufactured crises here in Congress that chip away at the confidence in the American economy that serves as a bedrock of our prosperity.

As the leading Democrat on the committee charged with overseeing the financial services funding bills here in the Senate, I think it is critical that we work together to improve Wall Street reforms where we can rather than reverse what progress we have made. Whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, a consumer or a banker, a CEO or a small business owner, a family member or a financial services worker, we can all agree that we do not want another financial crisis. Nobody wants another bailout to banks.

I strongly believe you can be pro-business, pro-financial services, and still believe in smart, strong, sensible regulation to keep everyone in our financial services system healthy and our overall system and economy safe. I believe a well-regulated financial system is critical to sustaining this sector into the future and ensuring that it is a trusted place for businesses and consumers to invest in from at home or abroad. A strong, secure, stable economy has long been the hallmark of America's global leadership, so I think we must work together to make sure it remains that way for decades to come.

Wall Street reform was the result of a lot of hard work and compromise just 5 years ago. I look forward to working with my colleagues to continue strengthening the financial rules of the road as we go further into the future together.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate

stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 4:28 p.m., recessed subject to the call of the Chair and reassembled at 6:19 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. PERDUE).

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to proceed to the motion to reconsider vote No. 250, the vote by which cloture was not invoked on the motion to proceed to H.R. 22.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to proceed.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R. 22.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to proceed to Calendar No. 19, H.R. 22, an act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt employees with health coverage under TRICARE or the Veterans Administration from being taken into account for purposes of determining the employers to which the employer mandate applies under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Mitch McConnell, Roger F. Wicker, Shelley Moore Capito, Rob Portman, John Cornyn, James M. Inhofe, Daniel Coats, John Boozman, Johnny Isakson, Pat Roberts, John Barrasso, Mike Rounds, Mike Crapo, Roy Blunt, Thom Tillis, Deb Fischer, Richard Burr.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum call has been waived.

The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the motion to proceed to H.R. 22, Hire More Heroes Act of 2015, shall be brought to a close, upon reconsideration?

The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CORNYN. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. BOOZMAN) and the Senator from Alaska (Ms. MURKOWSKI).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. BOOZMAN) would have voted "yea."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARDNER). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 62, nays 36, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 251 Leg.]

YEAS—62

Alexander	Fischer	Moran
Ayotte	Flake	Nelson
Barrasso	Gardner	Perdue
Blunt	Graham	Portman
Boxer	Grassley	Risch
Burr	Hatch	Roberts
Capito	Heitkamp	Rounds
Cassidy	Heller	Sanders
Coats	Hoeven	Sasse
Cochran	Inhofe	Schatz
Collins	Isakson	Scott
Corker	Johnson	Sessions
Cornyn	King	Shaheen
Cotton	Kirk	Sullivan
Crapo	Klobuchar	Tester
Daines	Lankford	Thune
Donnelly	Leahy	Tillis
Durbin	Manchin	Vitter
Enzi	McCain	Whitehouse
Ernst	McCaskill	Wicker
Feinstein	McConnell	

NAYS—36

Baldwin	Gillibrand	Peters
Bennet	Heinrich	Reed
Blumenthal	Hirono	Reid
Booker	Kaine	Rubio
Brown	Lee	Schumer
Cantwell	Markey	Shelby
Cardin	Menendez	Stabenow
Carper	Merkley	Toomey
Casey	Mikulski	Udall
Coons	Murphy	Warner
Cruz	Murray	Warren
Franken	Paul	Wyden

NOT VOTING—2

Boozman Murkowski

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 62, the nays are 36.

Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in the affirmative, upon reconsideration, the motion is agreed to.

HIRE MORE HEROES ACT OF 2015—MOTION TO PROCEED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the motion to proceed.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Motion to proceed to Calendar No. 19, H.R. 22, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt employees with health coverage under TRICARE or the Veterans Administration from being taken into account for purposes of determining the employers to which the employer mandate applies under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

MORNING BUSINESS

RECOGNIZING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS SCHOOL OF NURSING

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the 50th anniversary of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, UNLV, School of Nursing.

The UNLV School of Nursing has been an important part of Nevada's