

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 243, nays 186, not voting 4, as follows:

[Roll No. 491]

YEAS—243

Abraham	Griffith	Pearce
Aderholt	Grothman	Perry
Allen	Guinta	Pittenger
Amash	Guthrie	Pitts
Amodel	Hanna	Poe (TX)
Babin	Hardy	Poliquin
Barletta	Harper	Pompeo
Barr	Harris	Posney
Barton	Hartzler	Price, Tom
Benishek	Heck (NV)	Ratcliffe
Billirakis	Hensarling	Reed
Bishop (MI)	Herrera Beutler	Reichert
Bishop (UT)	Hice, Jody B.	Renacci
Black	Hill	Ribble
Blackburn	Holding	Rice (SC)
Blum	Hudson	Rigell
Bost	Huelskamp	Roby
Boustany	Huizenga (MI)	Roe (TN)
Brady (TX)	Hultgren	Rogers (AL)
Brat	Hunter	Rogers (KY)
Bridenstine	Hurd (TX)	Rohrabacher
Brooks (AL)	Hurt (VA)	Rokita
Brooks (IN)	Issa	Rooney (FL)
Buchanan	Jenkins (KS)	Ros-Lehtinen
Buck	Jenkins (WV)	Roskam
Bucshon	Johnson (OH)	Ross
Burgess	Johnson, Sam	Rothfus
Byrne	Jolly	Rouzer
Calvert	Jones	Royce
Carter (GA)	Jordan	Russell
Carter (TX)	Joyce	Ryan (WI)
Chabot	Katko	Salmon
Chaffetz	Kelly (MS)	Sanford
Clawson (FL)	Kelly (PA)	Scalise
Coffman	King (IA)	Schweikert
Cole	King (NY)	Scott, Austin
Collins (GA)	Kinzinger (IL)	Sensenbrenner
Collins (NY)	Kline	Sessions
Comstock	Knight	Shimkus
Conaway	Labrador	Shuster
Cook	LaMalfa	Simpson
Costello (PA)	Lamborn	Smith (MO)
Cramer	Lance	Smith (NE)
Crawford	Latta	Smith (NJ)
Crenshaw	LoBiondo	Smith (TX)
Culberson	Long	Stefanik
Curbelo (FL)	Loudermilk	Stewart
Davis, Rodney	Love	Stivers
Denham	Lucas	Stutzman
Dent	Luetkemeyer	Thompson (PA)
DeSantis	Lummis	Thornberry
DesJarlais	MacArthur	Tiberi
Diaz-Balart	Marchant	Tipton
Dold	Marino	Troott
Donovan	Massie	Turner
Duffy	McCarthy	Upton
Duncan (SC)	McCaul	Valadao
Duncan (TN)	McClintock	Wagner
Ellmers (NC)	McHenry	Walden
Emmer (MN)	McKinley	Walker
Farenthold	McMorris	Walorski
Fincher	Rodgers	Walters, Mimi
Fitzpatrick	McSally	Weber (TX)
Fleischmann	Meadows	Webster (FL)
Fleming	Meehan	Wenstrup
Flores	Messer	Westerman
Forbes	Mica	Westmoreland
Fortenberry	Miller (FL)	Whitfield
Fox	Miller (MI)	Williams
Franks (AZ)	Moolenaar	Wilson (SC)
Frelinghuysen	Mooney (WV)	Wittman
Garrett	Mullin	Womack
Gibbs	Mulvaney	Woodall
Gibson	Murphy (PA)	Yoder
Gohmert	Newhouse	Yoho
Goodlatte	Noem	Young (AK)
Gosar	Nugent	Young (IA)
Gowdy	Nunes	Young (IN)
Granger	Olson	Zeldin
Graves (GA)	Palazzo	Zinke
Graves (LA)	Palmer	
Graves (MO)	Paulsen	

NAYS—186

Adams	Gabbard	Norcross
Aguilar	Gallego	O'Rourke
Ashford	Garamendi	Pallone
Bass	Graham	Pascarella
Beatty	Grayson	Payne
Becerra	Green, Al	Pelosi
Bera	Green, Gene	Perlmutter
Beyer	Grijalva	Peters
Bishop (GA)	Gutiérrez	Peterson
Blumenauer	Hahn	Pingree
Bonamici	Hastings	Pocan
Boyle, Brendan F.	Heck (WA)	Polis
Brady (PA)	Higgins	Price (NC)
Brown (FL)	Himes	Quigley
Brownley (CA)	Hinojosa	Rangel
Bustos	Honda	Rice (NY)
Butterfield	Hoyer	Richmond
Capps	Huffman	Roybal-Allard
Capuano	Israel	Ruiz
Cárdenas	Jackson Lee	Ruppersberger
Carney	Jeffries	Rush
Carson (IN)	Johnson (GA)	Ryan (OH)
Cartwright	Johnson, E. B.	Sánchez, Linda T.
Castor (FL)	Kaptur	Sanchez, Loretta
Castro (TX)	Keating	Sarbanes
Chu, Judy	Kelly (IL)	Schakowsky
Cicilline	Kennedy	Schiff
Clark (MA)	Kildee	Schrader
Clarke (NY)	Kilmer	Scott (VA)
Clay	Kind	Scott, David
Cleaver	Kirkpatrick	Serrano
Clyburn	Kuster	Sewell (AL)
Cohen	Langevin	Sherman
Connolly	Larsen (WA)	Sinema
Conyers	Larson (CT)	Sires
Cooper	Lawrence	Slaughter
Costa	Lee	Smith (WA)
Courtney	Levin	Speier
Crowley	Lieu, Ted	Swalwell (CA)
Cummings	Lipinski	Takai
Davis (CA)	Loeb sack	Takano
Davis, Danny	Lofgren	Thompson (CA)
DeFazio	Lowenthal	Thompson (MS)
DeGette	Lowey	Titus
Delaney	Lujan Grisham	Tonko
DeLauro	(NM)	Torres
DeBene	Luján, Ben Ray	Tsongas
DeSaulnier	(NM)	Van Hollen
Deutsch	Lynch	Vargas
Dingell	Maloney, Sean	Veasey
Doggett	Matsui	Vela
Doyle, Michael F.	McCollum	Velázquez
Duckworth	McDermott	Visclosky
Edwards	McGovern	Walz
Ellison	McNerney	Wasserman
Engel	Meeks	Schultz
Eshoo	Meng	Waters
Esty	Moore	Maxine
Farr	Moulton	Watson Coleman
Fattah	Murphy (FL)	Welch
Foster	Nadler	Wilson (FL)
Frankel (FL)	Napolitano	Yarmuth
Fudge	Neal	
	Nolan	

NOT VOTING—4

Cuellar	Maloney, Carolyn	Neugebauer
		Walberg

□ 1416

Messrs. FATTAH, NOLAN, BRADY of Pennsylvania, JEFFRIES, and CARSON of Indiana changed their votes from “yea” to “nay.”

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ATTACKS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 114-58)

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WOODALL) laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and,

together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared in Proclamation 7463 with respect to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, is to continue in effect for an additional year.

The terrorist threat that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emergency continues. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue in effect after September 14, 2015, the national emergency with respect to the terrorist threat.

BARACK OBAMA.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 10, 2015.

FINDING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECTION 2 OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT REVIEW ACT OF 2015

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 412, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 411) finding that the President has not complied with section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the resolution is considered read.

The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. RES. 411

Whereas section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as enacted by section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, defined the term “agreement” as meaning “an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.”;

Whereas section C(14) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action requires Iran to implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program” (referred to as

the “Roadmap”) which was agreed to with the IAEA;

Whereas the Roadmap identifies two separate, confidential agreements between the IAEA and Iran, one to address remaining outstanding issues related to “Possible Military Dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, and another “regarding the issue of Parchin”;

Whereas both of those agreements constitute side agreements within the meaning of section 135(h)(1);

Whereas section 135(a)(1)(A) requires the President to transmit the agreement, including any side agreements, as defined by section 135(h)(1) to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership;

Whereas the Executive Communication numbered 2307 and captioned “A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a letter and attachments satisfying all requirements of Sec. 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-17), as received July 19, 2015”, did not include the text of either side agreement with the IAEA; and

Whereas the President has not subsequently transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership the text of the separate agreements identified in the Roadmap: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That—

(1) the President has not complied with section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 because the communication from the President did not constitute the agreement as defined by section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and

(2) the period for review by Congress of nuclear agreements with Iran under section 135(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has not commenced because the agreement has not yet been transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The resolution shall be debatable for 2 hours, equally divided and controlled by the chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the minority leader or their respective designees.

The gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) will control 1 hour. The gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CUMMINGS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 days to revise and extend and submit extraneous materials on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I think we all know why we are here to debate this resolution today. The bottom line is that, for those of us that were involved in this agreement, we always thought that international inspections were going to be done by international inspectors, not by the Iranians, not by those in the Iranian regime.

Whether you like the Iran agreement or not, one thing I think all Members

can agree on is that sound verification must be the bedrock of any viable agreement.

Iran cannot cheat and get away with it. And the reason this is an issue for us is because Iran has cheated on every past agreement. That is why the verification was so important.

The problem is key aspects of this verification agreement have not been presented to Congress to review. Indeed, there are two separate arrangements agreed to between Iran and an arm of the U.N. here, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

One is regarding the regime’s past bomb work, of which there are a thousand pages of evidence that the IAEA tell us about, and the other involves access to the Iranian military base at Parchin, where that evidence shows that that testing took place.

In order to fully assess the agreement, Members of Congress should have access to these documents. This is especially important since Iran will almost certainly treat these arrangements as setting a standard for future IAEA requests to access any suspicious sites, especially military sites, since they have made it clear nobody is going to their military sites.

Physical access by the IAEA to Parchin is critical to understanding Iran’s past bomb work. This is where “Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel,” to quote the IAEA.

Why did they do it? To conduct experiments related to the development, say the international inspectors, of nuclear weapons. Iran has blocked the international inspectors’ access to Parchin for years.

In the meantime, we are told by those inspectors that they watch on spy satellite as Iran bulldozes and paves over this site and then paves over the site again.

If the international inspectors cannot attain a clear understanding of the experimentation that took place, then the United States will have great difficulty figuring out how long it would take Iran to rush toward a nuclear weapon.

In recent congressional testimony, administration officials expressed confidence in their access to suspicious sites that the agreement provides the IAEA.

Yet, these separate arrangements have the potential to seriously weaken our ability to verify the agreement as a whole even is true, that Iran is going to do self-inspections here, which is what Iran asserts.

Mr. Speaker, the history of Iranian negotiating behavior, as we know, is to pocket past concessions. And then what do they do? They push for more and more and more.

The separate arrangement agreed to between the IAEA and Iran regarding inspection of the facilities at Parchin will almost certainly be regarded by that government in Iran as a precedent for their IAEA access to future suspicious sites in Iran.

In other words, if you don’t get access to this site, you are not going to get access to other military sites where there is evidence that the same type of thing has occurred.

So if Iran won’t let international inspectors do the international inspecting today, what makes us think that the Iranians will allow intrusive terms to these agreements in the future after sanctions have been lifted when we find evidence of the next site?

I have little doubt that the side deals of today will become central to the agreement’s verification provisions tomorrow. This makes it imperative that these agreements are made available to Congress.

Mr. Speaker, 350 Members of this House, Democrats and Republicans—I think we had the majority of the Democrats, and I think we had every Republican—wrote to Secretary Kerry last fall.

Iran’s willingness to resolve concerns over its bomb work, as we said in that letter, is a fundamental test of Iran’s intention to uphold a comprehensive agreement. That is why we all wrote that letter together, in order to make that point.

The administration once took the same position that we are taking right now on the House floor as well, but it gave that position away in negotiations. It gave away that position.

Reviewing these side agreements is critical to understanding whether Iran intends to pass that test. We need access to those agreements.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, after several years of difficult negotiations with a dangerous and malevolent regime, the administration and representatives of the other P5+1 nations reached an agreement with Iran over its nuclear program.

The primary objective of the United States in the negotiations was to prevent Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. Given the unthinkable consequences of Iran, the world’s foremost sponsor of terrorism, obtaining the bomb, this has been an overriding national security imperative of the United States for decades.

As an American and as a Jew who is deeply concerned about the security of Israel, it is also intensely personal.

I believe our vital interests have been advanced under the agreement, since it would be extremely difficult for Iran to amass enough fissionable material to make a nuclear weapon without giving the United States ample notice and time to stop it.

We will still need to guard against any Iranian effort to obtain nuclear material or technology from proliferators abroad, a reality even if Iran had given up all enrichment.

But the agreement likely gives the world at least a decade and a half without the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon and without going to war to

make that so. That is a major achievement.

The United States realized this objective by securing a number of important provisions in the agreement, including the power to snap back sanctions, in whole or in part, and not subject to a veto in the United Nations.

The United States and its allies also procured an extensive and intrusive inspections regime that lasts for 25 years or more. By applying to the whole chain of the enrichment process, from the ground to the centrifuge, it realistically precludes Iran from developing a hidden and parallel enrichment process.

With respect to those inspections, I think it is very important to clarify something which I often hear the opponents obscure, and that is there are inspections with respect to Iran's prior military work, inspections of known nuclear sites and inspections of other sites which we may suspect Iran may conduct work in the future. And the mechanisms with respect to each are different.

With respect to the known nuclear sites, there are 24/7 eyes on Iran's enrichment activities that would be the most extensive and intrusive inspections any nation has seen of its nuclear program.

□ 1430

With respect to its potential sites—that is sites we don't know, where we suspect in the future they may do work—we will have a mechanism to obtain inspections in a timely way and certainly in a timely enough way that, if they were to ever utilize radioactive material, they would be detected.

Finally, we have the inspections into their prior military work. I will say this with respect to the prior military work, those of us that have reviewed the intelligence know that we have an extensive bank of information about what Iran had been doing in the past. To the degree that we need a baseline for what Iran's work has been, we have that baseline, and I think that is a pivotal consideration going forward.

As recently as yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence stated that he has great confidence that we can determine if Iran fails to comply with the agreement.

For me, it is the size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear enrichment capability after 15 years that is the key challenge. At that point, it is the work necessary to produce the mechanism for the bomb that becomes the real obstacle to a breakout, and that work is the most challenging to detect. Nevertheless, I have searched for a better, credible alternative and concluded that there is none.

When it comes to predicting the future, we are all looking through the glass darkly, but if Congress rejects the deal agreed to by the administration and much of the world, the sanctions regime will, if not collapse, almost certainly erode.

This does not mean that Iran necessarily dashes madly for a bomb, but it will almost certainly move forward with its enrichment program, unconstrained by inspections, limits on research, and development of new centrifuges, metallurgy, or other protections in the deal.

In short, Iran will have many of the advantages of the deal in access to money and trade with none of its disadvantages. Instead of rejecting the deal, therefore, Congress should focus on making it stronger.

First, we should make it clear that, if Iran cheats, the repercussions will be severe.

Second, we should continue to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to detect any form of Iranian non-compliance.

Third, we should establish the expectation that, while Iran will be permitted to have an enrichment capability for civilian use, it will never, never be permitted to produce highly enriched uranium, and if it attempts to do so, it will be stopped with force.

Fourth, we will share with Israel all the technologies necessary to maintain its regional military superiority and, if necessary, to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities no matter how deep the bunker.

Finally, we are prepared to work with Israel and our Gulf allies to make sure that every action Iran takes to use its newfound wealth for destructive activities in the region will prompt an equal and opposite reaction, and we will combat Iran's malignant influence.

The Iranian people will one day throw off the shackles of their repressive regime, and I hope that this deal will empower those who wish to reform Iranian governance and behavior. The 15 years or more this agreement provides will give us the time to test that proposition.

Then, as now, if Iran is determined to develop the bomb, there is only one way to stop it, and that is by the use of force; but the American people and others around the world will recognize that we did everything possible to avoid war.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, although the Obama administration has pitched the Iran nuclear accord as a way to prevent the Ayatollahs from developing nuclear weapons, the agreement lifts the key restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities after 10 to 15 years. Many of my fellow Members wonder how the administration can be so naive as to pave the way for an Iranian bomb in the course of trying to prevent an Iranian bomb.

Well, the answer is clear to me. The President is gambling. He is betting that the very act of engaging with Iran

will moderate the regime's behavior so that, in a decade or so from now, we won't have to worry about it anymore. He has called his engagement with Iran a calculated risk. Indeed, it is a risk.

As I said, the President is placing a bet; but why would anyone bet on the moderation of the Iranian regime? It has not changed one iota since the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979. Thirty-six years later, Iran is the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It is also responsible for the deaths of thousands of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

Obama has spoken of the Ayatollah Khamenei as possibly seeking to rejoin the community of nations. This is a thin reed to justify giving Iran a path to the bomb in the near future. With their ritual "death to America" chants, I don't know how the Iranians could make it any more clear that they do not want to rejoin the community of nations. They want to blow up the community of nations.

Soon after the Iranian agreement was signed, Khamenei himself tweeted a silhouette image of President Obama holding a gun to his head. I just don't understand what is more clear that this regime could do to make its intentions clearer to the American people, but our President sees things differently.

As he told The New York Times, if the nuclear agreement is signed, "Who knows? Iran may change."

Well, consider this: if you are rolling the dice at a casino, who knows? You may roll a 7. If you are at the roulette wheel, who knows? It may land on your number. When you are gambling, one thing is for sure; in the long run, the casino always wins.

Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, this is not about a casino, nor is it about a gambler losing money. This is about gambling on human lives, U.S. lives and our Western allies' lives.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. LOWEY), the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, reasonable people disagree about the merits and shortcomings of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In the strongest democracy in the world, we have a sacred duty to uphold the high standard of debate and govern responsibly. That is why I am profoundly disappointed by vitriolic personal attacks and character assassinations on both sides of this debate; and I am outraged by the Republicans' attempt to score political points on this critical issue of national and global security.

The threat to pursue wasteful litigation and to tie the hands of our President until the end of his term are particularly outrageous, when the Senate has indicated it will not even consider these measures. I strongly oppose the blatantly irresponsible partisan political measures before the House this week.

As ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on Appropriations and the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, I have participated in dozens of classified and unclassified Iran briefings with the Obama administration, including members of our negotiating team and colleagues in Congress during the last 2 years.

I have thoroughly evaluated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action released in July, met with foreign leaders, nuclear experts, and heard from thousands of thoughtful and passionate constituents.

After careful consideration, I will vote against approval of the agreement. Sufficient safeguards simply are not in place to address the risk associated with this agreement, and it will not dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

First, in 15 years, Iran will become an internationally recognized nuclear threshold state capable of producing highly enriched uranium to develop a nuclear weapon.

Second, relieving U.N. sanctions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles and releasing billions of dollars to the Iranian regime will lead to a dangerous regional weapons race and enable Iran to bolster its funding of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Bashar al-Assad.

Third, the deal does not explicitly require Iran to fully disclose its previous military work before sanctions relief is provided. Inspectors will not have anytime, anywhere access to the most suspicious facilities, particularly the Parchin military complex, with a process that lacks transparency and could delay inspectors access for up to 24 days.

Finally, there are no clear accountability measures regarding punishment for minor violations of the agreement. In recent weeks, the administration has responded to some of my concerns by committing to additional security assistance to Israel and our Gulf partners and to improving international cooperation on countering Iran's non-nuclear destabilizing activities.

I will work in Congress and with the administration to expeditiously implement these commitments to enhance—not just maintain—nonnuclear-related sanctions to establish stronger mechanisms to deter Iran and to ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.

One of my highest priorities will continue to be the protection of Israel's qualitative military edge so that our closest ally in the region can defend itself against all threats from Iran or its proxies.

In the same week, my colleagues, that Congress holds this important vote, Iran's Supreme Leader vowed again to annihilate the Jewish State of Israel and to vilify the Great Satan that he calls the United States of America.

It is my sincere hope that we can work together in a bipartisan way moving forward. The security of the

United States of America and our allies depends on it.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), who chairs the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and was the author of some of the Iran sanctions laws that are in force today.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my esteemed chairman for his leadership on this critical issue. I also want to congratulate Mr. POMPEO, whose resolution we are discussing.

Mr. Speaker, this deal will allow Iran to become nuclear capable in just a short order. It will allow Iran to grow and expand its military. It will allow Iran to continue with its support for terror. These facts are indisputable.

What is also indisputable is that the regime in Tehran detests the United States, the West, and the democratic Jewish State of Israel, our steadfast partner. The Supreme Leader of Iran constantly incites chants of "death to America" and "death to Israel." Are we not listening?

Through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran seeks to make this threat into a reality. Earlier this week, the Supreme Leader threatened that Israel will no longer exist in just 25 years.

Because of this agreement, Mr. Speaker, the regime will now have the weapons; it will now have the capabilities to pose an even greater threat to us, to Israel, and to our interests in the region. Giving a regime that openly calls for and works toward our destruction and the destruction of Israel is insane. We are providing Iran a path to nuclear weapons and increased conventional weapons capability.

This isn't just bad policy. It is dangerous. It is naive to think that this nuclear deal with Iran won't make us and the world less safe, less secure, and less peaceful. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, we must reject it.

I thank Chairman ROYCE and Mr. POMPEO for this resolution.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. CLYBURN), the distinguished assistant Democratic leader.

Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated between the United States, the permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, the European Union, and Iran.

I support this deal because it is the best available option to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, an outcome that all of us agree must be prevented. The opponents of this agreement say that Iran supports terrorism. I don't disagree with that.

This deal, however, is about only one issue—the issue that the entire world agrees is by far the most pressing—preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. It is precisely because Iran is so nefarious that this deal is so important.

□ 1445

As dangerous as Iran is and may remain, Iran would be far more dangerous if they acquired a nuclear weapon. This deal is the best way to prevent that unacceptable outcome.

The opponents of this agreement say that we can't trust the Iranians to abide by the agreement's strict restrictions on their nuclear program. That may be true. And I wouldn't be supporting the agreement if it required us to trust the Iranians, but it doesn't.

This deal is built around the strictest verifications ever devised. If Iran tries to dash toward a bomb, we will be more likely to catch them using the verification procedures under this deal than we would be without it.

With this deal in place, if you do catch Iran dashing toward a nuclear weapon, all options will be on the table to stop them. But military force must always be a last resort. I have not heard any of the opponents of this agreement present any realistic diplomatic alternative that would be anywhere near as likely to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and if we reject this deal, military action will become more likely.

Whenever we send Americans into harm's way, we must be able to look them and their families in the eye and honestly tell them that we have exhausted every other option. This deal is a diplomatic option we must exhaust. This deal's opponents present no other.

The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, said: "You don't make peace with friends. You make it with unsavory enemies."

We are now faced with three choices: this deal, a drastically increased likelihood of military confrontation, or a nuclear Iran. I support this deal, and I ask my colleagues to join me in doing so.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, what was previously unacceptable, an Iranian nuclear state, is now inevitable under the terms and conditions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential threat to Israel and other friends in the region—and is a significant risk to the United States.

Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium—a previous nonnegotiable red line was no enrichment whatsoever—but under this agreement, Iran will be able to assemble an industrial-scale nuclear program once the agreement begins to sunset in as little as a decade.

And make no mistake about it, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of Israel

shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of Israel reported that Iran's Supreme Leader said to Israel, "You will not see the next 25 years," adding that the Jewish state will be hounded until it is destroyed.

Mr. Speaker, inspections are anything but anytime or anywhere, the Obama administration's previous pledge to the Nation and the world. We have learned that the IAEA has entered into a secret agreement that precludes unfettered, robust inspection. That also violates the Corker law. We have not gotten that information.

Mr. Speaker, Iran is the world's leading supporter of terrorism. This agreement provides tens of billions of dollars for weapons and war-making material.

The Supreme Leader also criticized any call to end its ballistic missile program, another eleventh hour concession. The Supreme Leader called that stupid and idiotic, and that they should mass produce such weapons and means of delivery.

Countries build ICBMs, Mr. Speaker, to deliver nukes.

The administration was reluctant, but I held two hearings and the chairman held several hearings on the Americans being held hostage. Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson remain in jail—abused, tortured, or missing. Why are they not free?

President Obama continues to tell Congress and the American people that the Iran nuclear agreement is the best deal possible and advances peace. Such boasting collapses under scrutiny. What was previously unacceptable—an Iranian nuclear state—is now inevitable under the terms and conditions of what is officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential threat to Israel, our allies in the region—and even poses significant risks to the United States.

Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium—a previous nonnegotiable redline was no enrichment whatsoever—under this agreement, Iran will not be required to dismantle its bomb-making technology and will have an internationally recognized, industrial-scale nuclear program once the agreement begins to "sunset" in as little as a decade.

And make no mistake, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of Israel shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of Israel reported that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said to Israel: "You will not see (the) next 25 years," adding that the Jewish state will be hounded until it is destroyed.

On the inspections front, Supreme Leader Khamenei has stated that he will "never" permit inspectors to inspect Iran's military bases. Even after the agreement was signed, the Iranian Minister of Defense reportedly said that "Tehran will not allow any foreigner to discover Iran's defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the country's military sites."

Inspections under this agreement are anything but "anytime, anywhere"—the Obama Administration's previous pledge to the nation

and the world. We have learned that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into a secret side agreement to preclude unfettered, robust inspection, and in another bizarre concession by the Administration and our negotiating partners, even allows Iran to self-monitor in certain circumstances.

Yet the agreement itself contains many limits on access by IAEA inspectors to suspected sites, including a 24-day period in which Iran is allowed to continue to refuse the IAEA's request to visit a facility followed by a very long process needed to increase pressure on Iran to permit access if it still blocks access by inspectors. During this period, Iran will have sufficient time to remove, cover up, or destroy any evidence. "Managed access" would be better called "manipulated access" as inspectors will get access to suspected sites only after consultations between the world powers and Iran, over nearly a month.

Given Iran's repeated cover-ups of its clandestine nuclear program, its refusal to give the IAEA access to its Parchin military facility (where Iran is believed to have tested detonators for nuclear warheads), and its stonewalling the IAEA concerning evidence that it had done extensive research and development on a nuclear explosive device, verification is fundamental to ensure that Iran is abiding by the agreement's terms. Secretary of State John Kerry, after an Iranian history of refusal to allow inspections at Parchin, would only assure us of inspections there "as appropriate," whatever that means.

Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has said that pledges by Obama Administration officials that the agreement would guarantee "anywhere, anytime" inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities were only "rhetorical." Mere words without substance? Why would our allies in the region trust us if our word—and negotiating positions—are indeed only rhetorical flourish?

The key restriction on Iran's nuclear program—the ability to enrich at high levels—begins to expire in as little as 10 years. Once these restrictions expire, Iran could enrich on an industrial scale and the U.S. and its allies will be left with no effective measures to prevent Iran from initiating an accelerated nuclear program to produce the materials needed for a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Speaker, the IAEA has uncovered significant evidence that Iran has engaged in activities related to the development of a nuclear weapon. Despite many agreements with the IAEA in which Iran has pledged to provide satisfactory information, the IAEA has repeatedly said that Iran has given it virtually nothing. Secretary Kerry has said that the U.S. has "absolute knowledge" of Iran's past military activities regarding its nuclear program, but Gen. Michael Hayden, the former Director of the CIA, recently testified to Congress that the U.S. did not have that capability.

Furthermore, as witnesses testified at a joint hearing in July by three Foreign Affairs subcommittees, there is ample evidence that Iran has a longstanding nuclear collaboration with North Korea. In light of the abundant evidence they will present, what gives the Administration certainty that the Iranians won't at some point during this agreement acquire fissile material beyond what they are allowed to produce for themselves or actual warheads from North Korea?

Why was the Iran-North Korea nuclear collaboration not factored into the Iran nuclear

agreement? Surely Secretary Kerry is aware of the Iran-North Korea nuclear linkage. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Douglas Frantz, previously a high-ranking Kerry Senate aide, wrote a 2003 article about Iran's ties to the North Korean nuclear program. Are we to believe Frantz and Kerry never discussed this issue? He dodged the question at today's committee hearing.

Mr. Speaker, in March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1747 which, *inter alia*, established an embargo on the export from Iran of all arms and related materials, thereby banning all states and groups from purchasing or receiving arms from Iran. The resolution also called on all states to "exercise vigilance and restraint" in their supply of any items covered by the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms to Iran.

However, reports indicate that Russia is eager to sell massive amounts of military hardware to Iran. Major General Qassem Suleimani, Iran's Revolutionary Guard leader, recently visited Russia. How will this shape other regional conflicts in which Iran is currently involved, including Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? After the conventional arms embargo is lifted in just 5 years, what limitations, if any, will there be on Iran's ability to export arms, specifically heavy weapons? Besides Russia, who else will sell weapons to Iran? China?

Moreover, the Administration and its supporters of the Iranian nuclear agreement downplay the possibility of Saudi Arabia, for example, producing a nuclear weapon as part of a Middle East arms race. However, the Saudis are building King Abdullah City for Atomic Renewable Energy to train nuclear scientists and already have greater science and mathematics capacity than Pakistan had when it developed nuclear weapons. Why couldn't and why wouldn't the Saudis join the nuclear arms race when faced with a more nuclear and conventionally armed Iran? Secretary Kerry would have us believe that the Saudis and others in the region would prefer the current agreement to an effort to achieve a more effective one and would agree not to pursue nuclear weapons even though Iran is on the path to develop or acquire its own.

Mr. Speaker, ballistic missiles are a central component of any country's nuclear weapons program as they allow for the quick, accurate delivery of nuclear weapons over long distances. While the agreement calls for Iran to abide by all U.N. Security Council resolutions—including the requirement that "Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons," Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's criticized the call for Iran to end its ballistic missile program, characterizing it as "a stupid, idiotic expectation" and claiming "The Revolutionary Guards should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the present level. They should mass produce."

In an 11th hour concession by the Obama Administration and others, the agreement "sunset" U.N. sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program after 8 years, and also requires that the European Union do the same. U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Congress has received expert testimony that "no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain" a costly, long-range missile program.

Simply put, countries build ICBMs to deliver nukes.

Under this agreement, the Iranians have stated they are under no obligation to stop developing ballistic missiles. In fact, this agreement would allow them the two things they need to advance their program: money and foreign assistance.

Iran dared to insert ballistic missiles and conventional weapons into the nuclear negotiations without fear of disturbing the talks. Meanwhile, the Administration was reluctant to use its leverage during the negotiations to free the four Americans held hostage in Iran today. Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson remain in jail—abused, tortured or missing.

Mr. Speaker, the agreement requires “full implementation” by October 15 of the commitments in the “roadmap” made by Iran to the IAEA in their 2011 agreement, following which the IAEA is to provide its “final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues.” However, there is no stated penalty if Iran continues to refuse to provide sufficient information to fully answer the IAEA’s questions, which Iran cannot do without admitting it had a secret nuclear weapons program.

Iran has repeatedly agreed to answer the IAEA’s questions regarding extensive evidence that it had a secret research and development program regarding a nuclear device, including fitting it onto a ballistic missile. All that resulted was the Iranians stonewalling the inspectors.

Is the failure to resolve the possible military dimensions as required by the IAEA a violation of the agreement? Why would Iran provide any information now when there is nothing in the agreement to compel it to do so?

Iran currently is the world’s leading supporter of terrorism, and this agreement provides funding that will drastically expand Iran’s regional destabilization efforts—from Israel to Iraq to Yemen to Lebanon and elsewhere. The Administration disputes the figure of \$150 billion to be released to Iran, but even a portion of that amount would provide significant resources to fund Iran’s terrorism in the region—threatening our allies in the region and global security.

Moreover, the Administration underestimates the revenue from both rising oil prices at some point and the tax revenues from increased commercial investment and activity.

Congress should oppose in any way possible the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reinstate comprehensive, robust sanctions and direct the executive branch to resume the struggle to craft an enforceable accord to ensure no nuclear weapons capability for Iran—ever.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. VISCLOSKEY), the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for the Iran nuclear agreement.

As the ranking member of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, I am acutely aware of the harmful influence Iran

and its proxies have on the security situation in the greater Middle East. However, despite my clear and deep distrust of Iran, I firmly support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, given the improvement it works.

This hard-fought multilateral agreement will severely limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions, establish a verifiable and robust inspection regime, allow for the timely reinstatement of sanctions for violations of this agreement, and in no way limit U.S. military options.

I cannot argue that the agreement is perfect, and I am frustrated at its limited scope. However, in any negotiation, especially one among sovereign nations, each having their own economic and security considerations, some compromise is necessary. Critically, I believe the agreement reached accomplishes the goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

I concur with the sentiments of my esteemed friend and former Senator Richard Lugar, who recently wrote that congressional rejection of the Iran deal would “kill the last chance for Washington to reach a verifiable Iranian commitment not to build a nuclear weapon” and “destroy the effective coalition that brought Iran to the negotiating table.”

I believe it is vital for the duration of the agreement that the U.S. leads the international community to maintain focus on Iran’s compliance and ensure that Iran does not undermine regional stability through other pathways. To accomplish this, we must remain steadfast in our commitments to Israel and all our regional partners.

I ask all to constructively work to improve the security situation in the Middle East, rather than using all of their energy to undermine the agreement. We cannot rely on force of arms alone to bring lasting stability to any region of the world.

In conclusion, I do hope that the exhaustive multilateral negotiation that led to this agreement will serve as a template for future U.S. and international engagement on other outstanding issues that have led to instability and violence in the region.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.

Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the chairman, the gentleman from California, for his leadership on this critical national security issue.

Mr. Speaker, this Iranian deal promises peace—peace in our time—by guaranteeing a nuclear weaponized Iran in our children’s time.

Anyone who has read the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act should support this legislation before us. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Act, known as the Corker bill, is to allow representatives of the American people—us—to read what is in the deal before we vote on the deal. The nuclear deal with Iran may be the most important international agreement in our lifetime.

The Corker bill is crystal clear when it comes to defining exactly what the President needs to provide Congress before the review period of 60 days begins. The President is obligated under the law—and let me read a portion of the law that the President signed. Here is what it says:

Congress is allowed to have the agreement itself and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements.

The logic behind this requirement is simple and essential: Congress cannot review an agreement without having access to everything, including the fine print. We need to see all the secret side deals, Mr. Chairman.

Testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Kerry, who was making the deal for us, said that even he had not seen the secret side deals. And these secret deals are not just technical formalities. The deals I am talking about are the IAEA agreement to let Iran inspect itself at the Parchin military facility. The Parchin facility is known as the place where Iran has worked to build nuclear warheads.

There is absolutely nothing normal about allowing Iran to inspect itself. That is what this side agreement apparently does, if we ever get to see the whole thing.

I was a judge in Texas for a long time. It is like having a burglar coming to trial and saying: “Judge, I want 12 burglars on my jury.” We would never let that happen, but we will let Iran inspect itself? We want to see these secret deals.

And these revelations may be only the tip of the iceberg. What else is included in these secret deals, these side deals? Well, we really don’t know because we haven’t been furnished—by law—these deals.

It is the legal right of Congress to know all of those details before voting to approve or disapprove this nuclear agreement. We in Congress are the representatives of the people. Isn’t it about time we start reading all the information before we vote? I don’t know that Congress has learned that lesson.

The citizens of this country have a right to know absolutely about these side deals. The President signed the Corker bill. It is the law. He has to live by it, whether he likes it or not.

And that is just the way it is.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY).

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. In 2002, the President of the United States and this Congress voted to address the perceived threat of a mushroom cloud coming from Iraq by going to war, a war that unleashed massive violence in the Middle East and threatens the world even today.

The Obama administration, faced with the actual threat of a nuclear weaponized Iran, has chosen, instead,

the path of diplomacy, the path of peace, and I am proud to support this historic agreement.

As the President said: "This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change—change that makes our country, and the world, safer and more secure."

Voices inside and outside the Congress are calling for a rejection of this historic agreement, among them the same neocons who stampeded the United States into war with Iraq. They were wrong then, and they are wrong now. Iran is now 2 to 3 months from being able to produce a nuclear weapon, and yet the critics have offered no credible alternative to a deal that blocks all the paths to a nuclear weapon.

Now, we know this deal is not perfect. Iran is a bad actor. The President and all of us would have much preferred a deal that prohibits Iran from enriching any uranium forever and maintains sanctions until Iran changes its behavior and becomes a responsible member of the world community. But that deal didn't happen—because it never could have happened.

This deal greatly improves the outlook for peace by blocking all of Iran's paths to a nuclear weapon, and this is carefully spelled out in the agreement itself, often in very technical language: Iran's stockpiles of rich uranium will be reduced from enough for 10 bombs to less than 1; the number of Iran's installed centrifuges is reduced by over two-thirds; and far from trusting Iran, the deal demands the most robust, intrusive inspections regime ever in an international agreement.

We heard yesterday, many of us, from the ambassadors from five of our allies in the P5+1. These ambassadors said if the United States walks away, the deal collapses. Iran would be without any constraints to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program. All paths would be open. There would be no inspections whatsoever, no insight into Iran's activities. The ability of the United States to build meaningful international coalitions would be eroded for the foreseeable future.

I view this upcoming vote on Iran as one of the most important of my career, and, my colleagues, I would say that is true for everyone. It is one of the most important of my life. For me, the choice is clear: diplomacy over war.

Colleagues, let's remember, nothing is off the table. But why wouldn't we choose peace and give peace a chance?

□ 1500

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Part of diplomacy is making certain that you have verification, and our problem here is that the Iranians are boasting right now that the U.S. is not going to have access—or any other international inspectors are going to have access—to their military sites

where they do this work. The problem is that inspectors don't get 24 hours' notice; they get 24 days' notice, and then they go through a process in which Iran and China and Russia can block.

The former head of the CIA Michael Hayden testified in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee that we never believed that the uranium at Iran's declared facilities would ever make its way into a weapon. We always believed that that work would be done somewhere else, in secret.

So again, if you cannot get international inspectors into Parchin where they did that work, what makes you think, what makes us believe, that in the future we are going to have international inspectors, once that is the established premise, go anywhere else, go anywhere else?

As Hayden said, requiring consultations between the world powers in Iran takes inspections from the technical level and puts it at the political level, which he calls a formula for chaos, obfuscation, ambiguity, and doubt.

And we do not even know how bad the capitulation was in the site agreements, a capitulation that will undermine the ability to catch Iranian cheating. That is why we are concerned about the way this was negotiated.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. POMPEO), the author of H. Res. 411.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Chairman ROYCE. A great deal about what we have learned has come out of your committee, about what we have learned about this deal and what the Iranians' objectives are. So thank you for all the hard work that the Foreign Affairs Committee has done related to this agreement.

Mr. Speaker, there are lots of things to say about the Iranian deal that this President has set up, but this bill is very narrow and very simple and very straightforward. It is aimed to establish a simple precedent, which says, if the President signs something into law, he is going to fulfill the obligation which he has made for himself.

I have listened to the debate so far today. I can tell you that we have not had any Member of this House stand up and tell you that they have read the entire agreement. I suspect that we will not. That is because there is no American who has read the entire agreement. That is right—not the President of the United States, not the Secretary of State, not Undersecretary Sherman. No Member of Congress, no member of the public, no American citizen has read this entire agreement. And yet we have got Members who say: This a great deal, and I am excited to vote for it.

I don't know how one can feel that way about an agreement that one has not read.

We have Members of Congress stand up and demand that they see the text of bills that rename post offices, and yet this is a historic agreement, and

many of my colleagues are saying they are going to vote for it without even knowing what the details are about important components of how we are going to verify whether the Iranian regime has complied with this agreement. I think that is deeply troubling.

I think, as Representatives, we have a moral obligation to understand what it is we are voting on. I think we have a constitutional duty to require that the President comply with his obligations, and I know there is a legal obligation for the President to turn over every element of this deal.

Mr. Speaker, in July, Senator COTTON and I traveled to Vienna, where we were informed by the Deputy Director of the IAEA of these two secret side deals. He looked us straight in the eye and said he had read them but I wasn't going to get to.

I think that is wrong. I think that makes it impossible for a Member of Congress to support this agreement.

He informed me—that is, the Deputy Director of the IAEA informed me—that Iranians had read these two secret side deals, but Senator COTTON and I weren't going to get to read them.

I have spent the intervening 50 days asking, cajoling, demanding, praying that this President would do what he is required to do under Corker-Cardin and what every Member of Congress is entitled to have—that is, provide us with the deal. Well, we don't have that.

H. Res. 411 simply says we, as Members of Congress, are going to demand that this President comply with what Corker-Cardin sets out. Show us the terms of the deal. Allow us the opportunity to read the agreement so that we can form judgments and the American people can form judgments about its scope.

In the absence of that, H. Res. 411 makes clear that the President can't lift sanctions. That was the deal. In exchange for not demanding that this be a treaty, Corker-Cardin said what we want is simple transparency; just show us the simple terms of the deal. And this President couldn't do it.

I ask all of my colleagues to vote for H. Res. 411 and demand that the President show us the secret side deals.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BECERRA), the chairman of the House Democratic Caucus.

Mr. BECERRA. I thank the ranking member, Mr. SCHIFF, for yielding the time.

Mr. Speaker, the goal of America and the international community in our negotiations with Iran is and has been to prevent Iran from producing and possessing nuclear weapons. By all accounts, Iran had already reached a point where it was perhaps just months away from crossing that nuclear threshold—I repeat, months away; not years, not decades—months away.

So few votes can be taken more seriously than one intended to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why

this Congress and the American people should support the agreement negotiated to prevent Iran from producing and possessing nuclear weapons, and we should vote here in this Congress against any of these congressional measures attempting to thwart its implementation.

The negotiated agreement provides for inspection and verification, a regime which Iran had to consent to and it must now submit to. That regime for inspection and verification is not just credible, it is enforceable, and those who have conducted nuclear inspections will tell you that. Ask those who deal with nuclear materials, and they will tell you that. And ask those who have butted heads with and had to negotiate with Iran, and they will tell you that.

Our ability to respond as well, should Iran decide to regress from its obligations, is real and it is robust. Nothing in this negotiated agreement is based on trust. The inspections, the penalties, they all are mandatory and unambiguous in their terms.

No deal is perfect. We can all think of ways of making a deal better. But thinking is not doing, and speculation won't stop Iran from reaching a nuclear weapons capability.

It should escape no one's notice that every measure, every economic sanction in place today against Iran has failed to stop Iran's lurch towards a nuclear weapon—remember, perhaps only months away from that nuclear threshold.

It was time for America and our international partners to take this to another level before the only alternative available to all of us was the use of military force. This is why the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and China joined together to force and drive Iran to the negotiated agreement.

How often, these days, can we utter the names of those six countries together working for the same cause?

This agreement constitutes a meaningful and enforceable check on Iran's nuclear ambitions and any intentions it might have to cheat.

Back in July when this agreement was reached, I stated that it "must constitute measurable progress in halting nuclear proliferation, driving the region and the world further away from nuclear Armageddon."

The negotiated agreement meets that test, and with the support of Great Britain, Germany, France, yes, even Russia, and, yes, even China, we will hold Iran to that test. And that is why we should support the negotiated agreement.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. MIMI WALTERS).

Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. This deal represents a direct threat to the United States, Israel, and the world.

Recently, I visited Israel and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Prime

Minister Netanyahu was firm in his warning—this is a very bad deal, and it could result in grave consequences for the world.

First, this deal allows Iran to continue to enrich uranium that can be used to develop a nuclear weapon.

Second, this deal abandons the President's promise of anytime, anywhere inspections to a process that allows Iran to delay up to 24 days.

Third, this agreement would result in the comprehensive lifting of the economic sanctions that have stifled Iran's quest for a nuclear weapon.

Bottom line, this deal presents far too many risks for the U.S. and far too many rewards for Iran. When the Ayatollah chants "death to America," he means it, and that should cause serious concern in every American citizen.

It is time for America to wake up and understand the danger and threat this deal presents to our national security.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

First, I want to address briefly the very strained interpretation I think my friends are giving the Corker legislation. To accept the arguments of the opposition to the deal, you would have to accept the proposition that the Corker legislation requires the administration to provide an agreement between the IAEA and Iran to which the United States is not a party, to which the United States has no obligation, and of which the IAEA is precluded from providing to the administration. That seems to me a very farfetched interpretation of the Corker legislation.

What's more, if you accept the argument that we can't have a vote on the agreement until we have this document between the IAEA and Iran, then why has the majority scheduled a vote on the agreement for tomorrow? So it is inconsistent with what their own majority has scheduled.

But finally, I don't think anyone is fooled by the nature of this procedural motion or bill. No one expects, in the least, that anyone who has voiced their opposition to the agreement is somehow going to change their opinion if they have access to this private document between the IAEA and Iran. What's more, as we know, the IAEA enters into these agreements with individual nations around the world, so this is not at all unique to the situation with Iran.

One final point I would like to make: We are now well into the debate on the agreement, and for all the arguments that have been advanced as to why we should have concerns about provisions in the agreement or concerns about Iranian behavior, many of which I share, there is one thing we have heard precious little about from the opposition to the deal, and that is, what is the credible alternative?

So, I ask the question: What is the credible alternative?

And the answer, from what I am able to divine from the scarce attention that the opposition pays to this—

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LOUDERMILK). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself an additional minute.

The answer, as far as I can discern from the opposition to the deal, is this: This is how the alternative would work.

Congress rejects the deal. Congress, the administration, then, somehow goes out and persuades the rest of the world to maintain sanctions, even when we rejected an agreement adopted by the other major powers, and even when those other powers tell us explicitly that there will be no new negotiations. But somehow we maintain the sanctions regime under this theoretical alternative.

And what? Iran gives up all enrichment and comes back to the table prepared to capitulate everything?

That seems so fanciful, so far removed from the reality of the situation, that it is no surprise that the opposition devotes very little, if any, time to discussing a credible alternative, because, indeed, there is no credible alternative.

So, again, this is why I think it is so important for us to focus on how we can strengthen the constraints in the agreement, mitigate the risks that we will face, and that is a much more constructive path forward than rejection of this, seeing Iran going back to spinning up its centrifuges, picking up where they left off at 20 percent enrichment and going beyond, picking up where they left off with 19,000 more centrifuges and thousands of kilos of uranium.

Is that really the path we want to go down? I think not.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1515

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

There was a credible alternative. There was a credible alternative that this body passed by a vote of 400–20, bipartisan legislation which the administration blocked in the Senate, legislation which would have put that additional pressure on the regime in Iran.

Knowing that the United States is the 800-pound gorilla, knowing that countries do not have the option and companies around the world do not have the option of making a choice when they have to make that choice between doing business with the United States or doing business with Iran, they have to do business with the United States.

We have put that bill into the Senate. The administration blocked it. That legislation would have ensured the type of pressure on Iran that would have forced the Ayatollah to make a choice between real compromise—real compromise—on his plan to construct a weapon or economic collapse for that regime.

We would have had that leverage in this negotiation. That leverage was

given up by this administration by blocking that bill in the Senate in the last Congress. And, frankly, that option is still available to us.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT).

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, tomorrow is September 11, a solemn day in our history when thousands of Americans lost their lives in the worst terror attack in our history.

It is disturbing that we happen to be debating whether a state sponsor of terror should have a glide path to nuclear weapons at this time. But we are.

I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a long time, almost 20 years now. I chaired the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.

I can tell you without any reservation that this deal with Iran is a disaster. It will weaken the security of our allies in the region, and it will make Americans less safe here at home.

If this deal goes through, Iran will receive up to \$150 billion. That is 25 times what Iran currently spends on its entire military. Does that seem like a good idea?

We are talking about the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism here. This money will fund more and more terror across the globe and here.

My district is the greater Cincinnati area. GE aircraft engines is headquartered there. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is just up the road. They have been top potential targets for ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, since the cold war.

This deal allows Iran to get more sophisticated ICBM technology from Russia, which will allow them to target not only Tel Aviv, but Washington and New York and Cincinnati. This is just nuts.

What happened to the "anytime, anywhere" inspections? Gone. It will take months to get the inspectors in. And, by that time, they will have moved the incriminating evidence elsewhere.

The bottom line is the Obama administration wanted a deal, any deal, more than the Iranian mullahs did. This administration was willing to sell out Israel and our allies in the region and make us less safe here at home.

This is a lousy, lousy deal, and it ought to be rejected.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume just to take a brief moment to respond to my colleague from California.

I wish it were so simple that a credible alternative was the passage of a bill in Congress that had not passed before that we could pass now and, through the mere act of our legislation, compel the rest of the world to join us in a new negotiation and a stronger round of sanctions. We simply don't have that power to coerce the rest of the world with a bill we pass here in Congress.

What is more, to imagine that a new sanctions bill will somehow force Iran to come back to the table ready to concede its entire enrichment program is simply not credible. If that is what we are left with, we are really left with no really good alternative.

Again, I think that is precisely why we need to move forward with the agreement that has been reached between the world powers and Iran.

At this point, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. MCCOLLUM).

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, the Iran nuclear agreement is fundamental to the national security of the United States.

I applaud the tremendous efforts of Secretary Kerry and Secretary Moniz, who worked in concert with the world's most powerful military and economic nations to reach a verifiable agreement that will deny the ability of Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.

In a past era, when politics was civil and foreign policy was bipartisan, this diplomatic agreement would have been championed by Republicans and Democrats as a nonproliferation triumph, as it is today in Great Britain, our greatest ally. This agreement will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

As an Israeli intelligence analyst has said, "This is not about trust and goodwill between sides. It is the strict inspection and verification regimes that will ensure the success of the agreement."

And if Iran violates the agreement, sanctions will "snap back" and the international community together will take action.

I strongly support this agreement, and I am grateful for President Obama's unwavering leadership in the face of hostile and unprecedented attacks from Republicans and Israel's Prime Minister.

The New York Times calls the Republican efforts a "vicious battle against Mr. Obama" and an "unseemly spectacle of lawmakers siding with a foreign leader against their own Commander in Chief."

I want to be crystal clear: I support our Commander in Chief.

The Republicans and Israeli opponents of this agreement are the same neocons who sold the war in Iraq to America based on lies, distortions, and misinformation.

And now what do the Republicans offer as an alternative? Nothing. They have no plan, no plan other than to kill this agreement, which means that Iran will either obtain a nuclear weapon or the U.S. goes to war to stop them. Well, let me tell you: I am not interested in another Republican war in the Middle East.

Now is the time to put the national security of the American people first. Let's reject this Republican game playing and support a tough diplomatic agreement that will stop Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Penn-

sylvania (Mr. SHUSTER), the chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice strong opposition to this fatally flawed Iran deal.

By signing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the President agreed to allow all documents, secret annexes, and side deals to be reviewed by the U.S. Congress.

But, once again, President Obama has not complied with the law of the land and, therefore, does not have the authority to waive sanctions on Iran.

By lifting sanctions on the Iranian regime, a nation that finances the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups will receive over \$100 billion in assets and no doubt will continue to fund terrorist organizations at probably greater levels than they are able to do today, those terrorist organizations with the motto "death to America."

Have we learned nothing from our past mistakes? The same person that negotiated the deal with North Korea also led the discussions with Iran.

We must ask ourselves, Is the world a safer place when unstable nations like North Korea are testing nuclear weapons?

The number one responsibility of the United States Congress charged to us in the Constitution is national security.

This agreement jeopardizes our security because I believe, as the Prime Minister of Israel believes, that this will ensure that Iran will get a nuclear weapon.

For the security of America and our friends and allies around the world, we must oppose this agreement.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), the distinguished minority leader.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I commend him for his extraordinary leadership as the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, which has served us so well.

His leadership has served us so well in this debate today and in our deliberations leading up to this debate. It has served us well in the ongoing as we use intelligence to protect the American people. So I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

I did not go to the well as usual for the leader, but I wanted to be here because I have some materials that I want to share with you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I think today and tomorrow, the next 24 hours, is a very, very special time in the Congress of the United States. Members will be called upon to make a decision that affects our oath of office, to protect and support the Constitution and, of course, the American people.

This is a moment that we are prepared for. That is what I have this

binder here for, to say I commend my colleagues because they have spent thousands of hours reviewing the agreement, reviewing the annexes and the classified materials, speaking with experts, gaining information, acquiring validation from outside sources other than the administration and the agreement itself, conversations with each other, conversations with their constituents, all to have, again, a sense of humility that we all don't know everything about this subject.

And we have to get our assurances from those whose judgment we respect, as well as to support this agreement on the merits. It is a very fine agreement.

I will take a moment just to talk about my own credentials because I see that people are doing that in their statements. I read with interest Senator MENENDEZ' statement where he talks about his service in the Senate, and I will talk about mine in the House.

For over 20 years, I have served as a member of the Intelligence Committee both as a member of the committee, as the top Democrat on the committee, and as the Speaker and leader ex officio over the years, longer than anyone in the history of the Congress.

I went to the Intelligence Committee because I had a major concern which sprang from my district, which was a very big interest there in stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Plowshares, an organization dedicated to that purpose, was founded there. They saluted President Reagan and the actions that he took when he was President. And they are very actively supporting this agreement now.

But I mentioned my credentials because I brought that experience to make a judgment on the agreement after it was negotiated.

Of course we were briefed, as members of the committee and members of the leadership, on the ongoing as to the progress that was being made in negotiations.

Again, having been briefed all along the way, I still was pleasantly pleased to see what the final product was. What the President negotiated was remarkable. It was remarkable in several respects.

One was that the P5, the permanent members of the Security Council, plus one—that would be Germany—the P5 nations negotiated this agreement with Iran: China, Russia, France, the U.K., the United States.

This is quite remarkable, that all of those countries could come to agreement. And an important part of that leadership was the leadership of President Obama to have that engagement sustained over a couple-year period.

Now, President Bush took us a bit down this path, and that is referenced in an op-ed that was put forth by Brent Scowcroft.

When he supported this legislation, he says that "The deal ensures that this will be the case for at least 15 years and likely longer."

But he talks about the fact that this has been a goal, as what Ronald Reagan did with the Soviet Union arms control and what President Nixon did with China. It was a negotiation.

And he talked about the fact that this particular agreement was one that was worked on under the presidency of President Bush. Actually, he places it in time.

So let me read his comment:

"Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) will show the world whether the United States has the will and sense of responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or whether it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible spread of nuclear weapons. Strong words perhaps, but clear language is helpful in the cacophony of today's media.

"In my view, the JCPOA"—as it is known—"meets the key objective, shared by recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with unprecedented verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security Council."

He goes on for a couple of pages.

Mr. Speaker, I will submit for the RECORD Brent Scowcroft's statement.

[From the Washington Post, August 23, 2015]

THE IRAN DEAL: AN EPOCHAL MOMENT THAT CONGRESS SHOULDN'T SQUANDER

(By Brent Scowcroft)

Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) will show the world whether the United States has the will and sense of responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or whether it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible spread of nuclear weapons. (Strong words perhaps, but clear language is helpful in the cacophony of today's media)

In my view, the JCPOA meets the key objective, shared by recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with unprecedented verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security Council. Iran has committed to never developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon; the deal ensures that this will be the case for at least 15 years and likely longer, unless Iran repudiates the inspection regime and its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol.

There is no more credible expert on nuclear weapons than Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who led the technical negotiating team. When he asserts that the JCPOA blocks each of Iran's pathways to the fissile material necessary to make a nuclear weapon, responsible people listen. Twenty-nine eminent U.S. nuclear scientists have endorsed Moniz's assertions.

If the United States could have handed Iran a "take it or leave it" agreement, the terms doubtless would have been more onerous on Iran. But negotiated agreements, the

only ones that get signed in times of peace, are compromises by definition. It is what President Reagan did with the Soviet Union on arms control; it is what President Nixon did with China.

And as was the case with specific agreements with the Soviet Union and China, we will continue to have significant differences with Iran on important issues, including human rights, support for terrorist groups and meddling in the internal affairs of neighbors. We must never tire of working to persuade Iran to change its behavior on these issues, and countering it where necessary. And while I believe the JCPOA, if implemented scrupulously by Iran, will help engage Tehran constructively on regional issues, we must always remember that its sole purpose is to halt the country's nuclear weapons activities.

Israel's security, an abiding U.S. concern, will be enhanced by the full implementation of the nuclear deal. Iran is fully implementing the interim agreement that has placed strict limits on its nuclear program since January 2014 while the final agreement was being negotiated. If Iran demonstrates the same resolve under the JCPOA, the world will be a much safer place. And if it does not, we will know in time to react appropriately.

Let us not forget that Israel is the only country in the Middle East with overwhelming retaliatory capability. I have no doubt that Iran's leaders are well aware of Israel's military capabilities. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have impressive conventional militaries, and the United States is committed to enhancing their capabilities.

Congress rightfully is conducting a full review and hearing from proponents and opponents of the nuclear deal. However, the seeming effort to make the JCPOA the ultimate test of Congress's commitment to Israel is probably unprecedented in the annals of relations between two vibrant democracies. Let us be clear: There is no credible alternative were Congress to prevent U.S. participation in the nuclear deal. If we walk away, we walk away alone. The world's leading powers worked together effectively because of U.S. leadership. To turn our back on this accomplishment would be an abdication of the United States' unique role and responsibility, incurring justified dismay among our allies and friends. We would lose all leverage over Iran's nuclear activities. The international sanctions regime would dissolve. And no member of Congress should be under the illusion that another U.S. invasion of the Middle East would be helpful.

So I urge strongly that Congress support this agreement. But there is more that Congress should do. Implementation and verification will be the key to success, and Congress has an important role. It should ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant bodies and U.S. intelligence agencies have all the resources necessary to facilitate inspection and monitor compliance. Congress should ensure that military assistance, ballistic missile defense and training commitments that the United States made to GCC leaders at Camp David in May are fully funded and implemented without delay. And it should ensure that the United States works closely with the GCC and other allies to moderate Iranian behavior in the region, countering it where necessary.

My generation is on the sidelines of policymaking now; this is a natural development. But decades of experience strongly suggest that there are epochal moments that should not be squandered. President Nixon realized it with China. Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush realized it with the Soviet Union. And I believe we face it with Iran today.

□ 1530

Ms. PELOSI. I also want to quote another Republican—Brent Scowcroft served in the administration of President George Herbert Walker Bush—Senator John Warner joined Senator Carl Levin. These are two chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee—one a Democrat, but before him, a Republican, John Warner. They talk about they support this. They say:

The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts, and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of a coalition that participates in and could support the use of a military option. The failure of the United States to join the agreement would have that effect.

Mr. Speaker, I submit Carl Levin and John Warner's statement for the RECORD.

WHY HAWKS SHOULD ALSO BACK THE IRAN DEAL

(By Carl Levin and John Warner)

We both were elected to the Senate in 1978 and privileged to have served together on the Senate Armed Services Committee for 30 years, during which we each held committee leadership positions of chairman or ranking minority member. We support the Iran Agreement negotiated by the United States and other leading world powers for many reasons, including its limitations on Iran's nuclear activities, its strong inspections regime, and the ability to quickly re-impose sanctions should Iran violate its provisions.

But we also see a compelling reason to support the agreement that has gotten little attention: Rejecting it would weaken the deterrent value of America's military option.

As former chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we have always believed that the U.S. should keep a strong military option on the table. If Iran pursues a nuclear weapon, some believe that military action is inevitable if we're to prevent it from reaching its goal. We don't subscribe to that notion, but we are skeptical that, should Iran attempt to consider moving to a nuclear weapon, we could deter them from pursuing it through economic sanctions alone.

How does rejecting the agreement give America a weaker military hand to play? Let's imagine a world in which the United States rejects the nuclear accord that all other parties have embraced. The sanctions now in place would likely not be maintained and enforced by all the parties to the agreement, so those would lose their strong deterrent value. Iran would effectively argue to the world that it had been willing to negotiate an agreement, only to have that agreement rejected by a recalcitrant America.

In that world, should we find credible evidence that Iran is starting to move toward a nuclear weapon, the United States would almost certainly consider use of the military option to stop that program. But it's highly unlikely that our traditional European allies, let alone China and Russia, would support the use of the military option since we had undermined the diplomatic path. Iran surely would know this, and so from the start, would have less fear of a military option than if it faced a unified coalition.

While the United States would certainly provide the greatest combat power in any military action, allies and other partners make valuable contributions—not just in direct participation, but also in access rights,

logistics, intelligence, and other critical support. If we reject the agreement, we risk isolating ourselves and damaging our ability to assemble the strongest possible coalition to stop Iran.

In short, then, rejecting the Iran deal would erode the current deterrent value of the military option, making it more likely Iran might choose to pursue a nuclear weapon, and would then make it more costly for the U.S. to mount any subsequent military operation. It would tie the hands of any future president trying to build international participation and support for military force against Iran should that be necessary.

Those who think the use of force against Iran is almost inevitable should want the military option to be as credible and effective as possible, both as a deterrent to Iran's nuclear ambitions and in destroying Iran's nuclear weapons program should that become necessary. For that to be the case, the United States needs to be a party to the agreement rather than being the cause of its collapse.

In our many years on the Armed Services Committee, we saw time and again how America is stronger when we fight alongside allies. Iran must constantly be kept aware that a collective framework of deterrence stands resolute, and that if credible evidence evolves that Iran is taking steps towards a nuclear arsenal, it would face the real possibility of military action by a unified coalition of nations to stop their efforts.

The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts, and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of a coalition that participates in and could support the use of a military option. The failure of the United States to join the agreement would have that effect.

Ms. PELOSI. Again, I refer to the statements of my colleagues. They are thoughtful; they are serious, and they are courageous in support of the agreement.

I would like to thank President Obama and the entire administration for being available as Members sought clarification to respond to their concerns. I want to thank the President, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz, Secretary Lew, and so many others for their leadership and availability to us in a bipartisan way in our Democratic Caucus.

For years, Iran's rapidly accelerating enrichment capability and burgeoning nuclear stockpile has represented one of the greatest threats to peace and security anywhere in the world. We all stipulate to that. That is why we need an agreement.

That is why I am so pleased that we have so many statements of validation from people. The experts say:

This agreement is one of the greatest diplomatic achievements of the 21st century.

It is no wonder that such a diverse and extraordinary constellation of experts have made their voices heard in support of this—again, I use the word—“extraordinary” accord.

On the steps of the Capitol the other day with our veterans and with our Gold Star moms who have lost their sons, we heard the words of diplomats and soldiers, generals and admirals and diplomats by the score—Democrats, Republicans, and nonpartisan.

We heard from our most distinguished nuclear physicists; we heard from those scientists, and we heard from people of faith. I would like to quote some of them. More than 100 Democratic and Republican former diplomats and ambassadors wrote:

In our judgment, the JCPOA deserves congressional support and the opportunity to show that it can work. We firmly believe that the most effective way to protect U.S. national security and that of our allies and friends is to ensure that tough-minded diplomacy has a chance to succeed before considering other more risky alternatives.

That is the diplomats.

The generals and admirals wrote:

There is no better option to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. If the Iranians cheat, our advanced technology, intelligence, and the inspections will reveal it, and U.S. military options remain on the table. And if the deal is rejected by America, the Iranians could have a nuclear weapon within a year. The choice is that stark.

Twenty-nine of our Nation's most prominent nuclear scientists and engineers wrote:

We consider that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation agreements.

I quote “and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation agreements.”

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated nonproliferation framework.

They went on to say more.

Mr. Speaker, 440 rabbis urged Congress to endorse the statement, writing:

The Obama administration has successfully brought together the major international powers to confront Iran over its nuclear ambitions. The broad international sanctions move Iran to enter this historic agreement.

They urge support.

Mr. Speaker, 4,100 Catholic nuns wrote to Congress stating:

As women of faith, followers of the one who said, “Blessed are the peacemakers,” we urge that you risk on the side of peace and vote to approve the Iran nuclear deal.

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew warned of the hazards of rejecting the agreement, reminding us that foreign governments will not continue to make costly sacrifices at our demand. I say this in response to something that my distinguished colleague from California said:

Indeed, they would be more likely to blame us for walking away from a credible solution to one of the world's greatest security threats and would continue to reengage with Iran.

He went on to say:

Instead of toughening the sanctions, the decision by Congress to unilaterally reject the deal will end a decade of isolation of Iran and put the United States at odds with the rest of the world.

We certainly don't want to do that.

Today, something very interesting happened, Mr. Speaker. It was a statement put forth by U.K. Prime Minister

David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. They wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post and said:

This is an important moment. It is a crucial opportunity at a time of heightened global uncertainty to show what diplomacy can achieve.

This is not an agreement based on trust or any assumption about how Iran may look in 10 or 15 years. It is based on detailed, tightly written controls that are verifiable and long-lasting.

They went on to say:

We condemn in no uncertain terms that Iran does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel and the unacceptable language that Iran's leaders use about Israel. Israel's security matters are and will remain our key interests, too. We would not have reached the nuclear deal with Iran if we did not think that it removed a threat to the region and the nonproliferation regime as a whole.

We are confident that the agreement provides the foundation for resolving a conflict on Iran's nuclear program permanently. This is why we now want to embark on the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, once all national procedures are complete.

Our own President wrote to Congressman JERRY NADLER:

I believe that JCPOA, which cuts off every pathway Iran could have to a nuclear weapon and creates the most robust verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program, is a very good deal for the United States, for the State of Israel, and for the region as a whole.

Many of us share the views that had been expressed by those in a position to make a difference on this agreement.

Tuesday night, again after the votes here in this House, dozens of Members supporting the nuclear agreement stood on the steps of the Capitol. We were honored to be joined by military veterans and Gold Star families, men and women whose sacrifices remind us of the significance of putting diplomacy before war. They remind us of the significance of this historic transformatonal achievement.

Congratulations. These nuclear physicists, they congratulated the President on this agreement. I congratulate him, too.

Our men and women in uniform and our veterans and our Gold Star moms remind us of our first duty, to protect and defend the American people. I am pleased to say we achieve that with this agreement.

I urge my colleagues to support the agreement and to vote "no" on the other items that are being put before us today.

I think we all have to, as we evaluate our decision, ask ourselves: If we were the one deciding vote as to whether this agreement would go forward or that we would fall behind, how would we vote? None of us has the luxury to walk away from that responsibility.

I am proud of the statements that our colleagues have made, the agreement the President has reached; and I

know that tomorrow we will sustain whatever veto the President may have to make.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. MCHENRY), the deputy chief whip and a member of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on this important matter of national security.

Today, I rise in opposition to this bad nuclear deal the President has negotiated. I don't oppose it because the President negotiated it. I don't oppose it because it was brought forth by this administration.

I oppose it because it is bad for the security of America. It is bad for the security of the world. It is bad for the security of our most sacred ally, Israel. It is bad for the nonproliferation strategies the world has had to mean that we have fewer nuclear weapons on this planet.

Now, you have to ask yourself a few basic questions: Has Iran warranted the trust of the international community to enter into this agreement? The answer is no. It is very clear by their actions over the last 20 and 30 years that they should not be trusted.

Number two, we hear the Supreme Leader of Iran saying, time and again, "death to America and Israel." He has declared his nation is committed to the destruction of Israel. He has called America the Great Satan.

Now, how can we believe a country is fully committed to our destruction yet, at the same time, uphold their end of the bargain? We can't. We must oppose this agreement based off of what is best for international security and what is best for our Nation's security.

We also have to oppose this because it will mean, during my lifetime or during my children's lifetime, we will have more nuclear weapons, not fewer.

This is a bad agreement, and we should reject it.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield the balance of my time and the ability to control the time to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CUMMINGS).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, since 1998, I have had the privilege of sending a group of high school students each year to Israel where they are paired with Israeli teens to learn about what life is really like in Israel.

When these students return, they have learned life lessons that stay with them forever, but just as important, they have made friendships that will also last a lifetime.

I am a proud and strong friend and ally of Israel, and I have been for a very long time. This is why I believe we must support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and why I am here

to oppose the resolution. The world cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, and I will not stand by as Iran continues to gain ground towards that objective.

This agreement puts real, concrete steps in place to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, steps that have already begun to degrade Iran's ability to produce nuclear material.

According to the independent experts, this deal "effectively blocks the plutonium pathway for more than 15 years." These experts also assess that, without the deal, Iran may shrink its breakout time to a few weeks or even days.

The steps outlined in the agreement complement existing prohibitions on the development of a nuclear weapon by Iran.

□ 1545

Under this agreement, the international community will have unprecedented access to ensure that Iran never gets one.

This agreement will not be monitored merely according to the goodwill of Iran. Its enforcement mechanisms are verifiable and transparent.

Under this agreement, there will be more inspectors than ever in Iran. These inspectors will have daily access to Iran's declared nuclear sites and will be able to have access to undeclared sites that they suspect may be involved in nuclear activity. Inspections will be regular, and they will be invasive. They will not be oriented around Iranian convenience but, rather, around compliance, ensuring that the international community remains safe and, indeed, informed.

If at any time Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement, the full brunt of international sanctions will snap back, once again hobbling the Iranian economy.

It is important to note that many sanctions will still be in place. Relief will come only from those sanctions related to nuclear activities. Bans on technology exports, restrictions against the transfer of conventional weaponry and WMD technology, sanctions based on terrorism activities, and bans on foreign assistance will all continue.

Without this deal, experts estimate that Iran will have enough nuclear material for weapons in 2 or 3 months. During negotiations, Iran stopped installing centrifuges, but they will resume if this agreement falls apart, potentially accelerating that timeline.

The opponents of this agreement propose rejecting this deal and pursuing a stronger one, but that plan could have grave consequences. If the United States rejects this deal, Iran will continue developing more sophisticated enrichment technologies. By the time any new negotiations begin, Iran would likely already be a nuclear state. There is also no guarantee that Iran would return to the negotiating table after having wasted 2 years on this agreement.

Is this worth the risk? I do not believe that it is. We should support this agreement.

This agreement accomplishes a critical goal: establishing a set of verifiable provisions to prevent Iran from developing enough nuclear material to build a bomb.

This deal does not change, in any way, our solemn commitment to protecting Israel, nor does this prevent us from using any other measures if Iran should violate this agreement, including using the full force of the strongest military in the world.

But the United States must lead not only with our military might; we have worked diligently to achieve a peaceful resolution to this issue, and it is time for us to show our integrity and values for which we stand.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM JOHNSON), a true American hero who served this country with distinction in Korea and in Vietnam and as a prisoner of war for nearly 7 years.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, at this grave hour, I come to express my opposition to President Obama's deal with Iran.

To this day, Iran chants "death to America." In fact, Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. Its regime has the blood of America's servicemembers on its hands.

Iran is our enemy.

The President asks us to trust Iran; but what has Iran done to earn our trust? Nothing. This is a deal of surrender, and, with it, Iran will go nuclear.

The alternative isn't war. The alternative is to strike a better deal. I say this as one of the few Members of Congress who has seen combat, who has fought two wars, and who has spent nearly 7 years as a POW.

So I say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle: Do the right thing. Put country above party. Listen to the American people. Uphold your most sacred duty—safeguard our Republic from those who seek to destroy it. Vote this deal down.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from the District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON).

Ms. NORTON. I thank my good friend for yielding to me on this important subject for our country today and in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Speaker, while many Republicans have been trying to find a way, just this very day, not to have a vote on the Iran agreement, I have been searching for a way to represent my 650,000 constituents by voting on any version offered. Five nations, whose systems differ from one another in every conceivable way, and the United Nations have approved this deal, but the Republicans are torn on whether to even vote on the deal at all.

No wonder.

Left with no credible argument against the deal, itself, Republicans have changed the subject, even knowing that Iran is close to getting the bomb as I speak and risking the loss of U.S. international credibility. Instead, Republicans cite side agreements. However, they have all of the information available to any nation on all nuclear agreements, or they cite issues not under negotiation at all, like Iran's role in the Middle East.

Here is what my constituents cite, Mr. Speaker:

\$12,000 in Federal taxes per resident—the most per capita in the United States—but no vote on the Iran deal or on anything else on this House floor. With statehood, D.C. would vote "yes" and be counted just as Uncle Sam counts our taxes every single year.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PITTENGER), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.

Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for yielding this time. I thank him for his strong leadership to reject this administration's agreement with Iran.

Mr. Speaker, this deal is a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy in the Middle East and towards the Iranian Government. For years, the Iranian Government has actively opposed U.S. interests in the region and has directly financed some of the world's most oppressive terrorist groups, most notably, Hezbollah.

As a result of this agreement, over \$100 billion will be released from repatriated oil profits back to the mullahs in Iran, and 46 banks in Iran will now be approved to transmit money through the international financial system. Look at what they have done previously with their finances. We gave them \$700 million a month as a precondition just to come to the negotiations—\$12 billion over a 16-month period. You can see their footprint in Lebanon; you can see it in Iraq; you can see it in Yemen; you can see it in Syria; you can see it in South America.

Mr. Speaker, what we are doing today is going to translate into increased, enhanced terrorist activities throughout the world. May we look back on this day as one of the most consequential votes we will take tomorrow in this Chamber, as consequential as what we did in declaring war against Japan and Germany. May we recognize the reality of what is taking place.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. DESAULNIER).

Mr. DESAULNIER. I thank the gentleman from Maryland, the distinguished ranking member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I want to speak as a freshman Member of this body who has been able to learn a great deal about this difficult, difficult area of the world—a place where America has invested too many lives and too much

money—and to talk about my journey in coming to the decision to vote with the President and feeling like he deserves a congratulatory note for this accomplishment in a very difficult and complex piece of diplomacy, perhaps equal to the difficulty and the complexity of this area of the world which has had so much turmoil and history.

I have spent the last 60 days taking every opportunity to listen to constituents and experts.

I, with a small group of my freshman colleagues, have been personally briefed at the White House by President Obama. I traveled to Israel for the first time and met with high-level Israeli officials for almost 2 hours, including with Prime Minister Netanyahu. I learned about the 3,000 years of history and animosity amongst groups and also of the very close proximity in which those groups have lived for thousands of years and shared their difficult history. I met with leaders of our international coalition, and I continue to be a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Israeli relationship as, I believe, most of my colleagues on both sides are.

I held six townhalls—a certain measure of masochism, perhaps, by a freshman Member—that took hours, meeting with both pro and opponents in my district, in the San Francisco Bay Area. We received over 1,000 phone calls, emails, and constituent questions on this issue, and more than 70 percent of them were in favor of the proposal.

Ultimately, at the heart of my decision in supporting a deal is the possibility that this deal promotes the long-term investment in peace on this difficult part of our planet. In addition, it creates security and stability, ultimately, for the United States. I believe that this accord is our best option for achieving both of those goals.

As recently as yesterday, I was able to listen to advisers and leaders who represent our coalition partners. The sanctions regime, due in large part to the European Union's participation, deflated Iran's economy and forced them to the negotiating table. In 2012, Iran's economy shrank for the first time in two decades by almost 2 percent.

This is the final proposal, I believe, if the U.S. were to withdraw. Our coalition partners that helped negotiate this deal and create the ability and the leverage to negotiate will not come back to the table. Our authority and standing in the world community will be severely diminished.

There are some who say that Iran cannot be trusted, and I think we all agree on that. The future of this rollout is not black-and-white, and it has many unknowns and hypotheticals on both the supporters' and the opponents' sides. We do not know if Iran will cheat, but we do know that oversight and compliance is strong and consequential, and consequences for cheating will be enforced by the international community.

In my view, it is in the national security interests of the United States of

America to support this agreement. It is an opportunity to let diplomacy work and to put it in action.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. GUTHRIE), a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Education and the Workforce Committee.

Mr. GUTHRIE. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my disapproval of President Obama's deal with Iran.

I ask myself this question: Has Iran earned the right to be trusted?

We must ask this because we know there are secret deals that my colleagues and I were not privileged to. Therefore, a vote to support this deal is a vote to trust Iran.

The behavior of Iran's leaders over the last 30 years offers no indication that the next decade will be any different; and now, with these secret details, we cannot know if the deal is verifiable, enforceable, and accountable.

The people who know Iran best trust them the least. Iran's neighbors have already requested additional arms from the United States to protect themselves from this very deal. Any deal should include these three powerful principles: safety, security, stability. This deal falls short, and I cannot support it.

□ 1600

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. LANGEVIN).

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this has probably been one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make during my time in Congress. For the record, I still have deep reservations about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

However, while it is not without flaws or risks, I believe the plan presents our best chance to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions and protect the security of the United States and our allies, particularly the State of Israel.

The preamble to the agreement is both critically important and crystal clear when it states that "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons." And we will hold Iran to it in perpetuity, as they have committed.

Mr. Speaker, I do not trust Iran. But this agreement is built on verification, not trust, and I believe that it includes the needed monitoring and enforcement tools.

If Iran violates the deal in any way, increased international monitoring will allow us to know quickly and act decisively. Conversely, if we were to abandon this agreement despite the international community's support, Iran's nuclear ambitions could go unchecked, and that is not a risk I am willing to take.

Mr. Speaker, like many of my constituents, I still have significant con-

cerns with the agreement and with Iran's pattern of behavior, particularly its support of terrorism.

That is why I am committed to exercising rigorous oversight of this plan's implementation, leaving no doubt that cheating will result in severe repercussions.

As the President has said publicly and he has reiterated to me personally, all of our options remain on the table when it comes to responding to failed Iranian commitments, including military options and the reimposition of sanctions, either in whole or in part, either unilaterally or multilaterally.

Additionally, all the terrorism-related sanctions are outside the scope of this agreement and remain in force, and I am committed to providing any further tools necessary to constrain Iran's destructive nonnuclear activities.

Mr. Speaker, Congress should also establish an oversight commission or Select Committee to ensure Iranian adherence to the deal and recommend courses of action in response to any breach of Iranian commitments.

This would be in addition to the Oversight Committee related to Intelligence or the Foreign Affairs Committee or other committees, including the Armed Services Committee that might also have jurisdiction.

The more eyes on Iran in this agreement in making sure that they are living up to the commitments, the better.

Mr. Speaker, we need to show our resolve and ability to execute the fundamental objectives of the JCPOA, preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon.

While I have deep concerns about aspects of the deal, rejecting it now would potentially lead us down an even darker path without the support of the international community and with severe and unpredictable consequences.

I will vote to support this deal and what I believe is now our best chance to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threat, our best chance for an international community united in support of our interests, and our best option for peace. We must give diplomacy a chance to work.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. DONOVAN), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the House of Representatives will stand on the right side of history in rejecting this dangerous deal. I have asked myself, as many people in this Chamber have asked, "Why is this a good deal for the United States?"

Iran is holding four Americans illegally hostage in their country. That was not part of the negotiations. Iran continues to support worldwide terrorism. There is no restrictions on that in this deal.

Fifty billion dollars will be immediately released to the regime with no restrictions on its use. That was not part of the deal. They continue to develop ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic

missiles, that could reach the American mainland. There were no restrictions on that during this deal.

We are told by the administration that, if we reject this deal, the rest of the P5+1 will not join us. Well, last week Iran's top cleric said America remains Iran's number one enemy.

Days after the deal was announced, Iran's Supreme Leader called for "death of America," not the death of France, not the death of Great Britain, not the death of Russia, not the death of China. It was the death of America.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HULTGREN). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield another 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, since when is America afraid to stand alone?

I was one of the fortunate freshman that got to go to Israel recently and I sat with the Prime Minister, who told us this deal guarantees that, in 15 years, Iran will have a nuclear arsenal. Just yesterday the Supreme Leader tweeted that Israel won't exist in 25 years.

I also visited the Holocaust Museum and, like many people who weren't alive during that historic tragedy, I asked myself, "Why didn't anyone stop this?" Well, my fear is that some day in the near future people are going to ask, "Why didn't America stop Iran?"

The bottom line is that this is a bad deal for America. It is a bad deal for Israel, and it is a bad deal for the world.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time each side has?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 14 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California has 27 minutes remaining.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. YARMUTH).

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this historic agreement with Iran. It is good for America, absolutely critical for Israel, and is a historic step toward a more stable Middle East.

We entered into P5+1 negotiations with one prevailing goal, to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what this agreement does.

Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. I want to repeat that because there has been a lot of false reports and fearmongering about Iran being able to build a bomb in 10 years or 15 years. Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.

This is the third provision of the deal: "Iran affirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons."

Iran has agreed to never have a nuclear weapon. With this agreement in place, we will have an unprecedented inspection regimen to guarantee it.

IAEA inspectors will have more access in Iran than in any other country

in the world. No nuclear site is off limits. They will have access wherever they need it, whenever they need it, and at every single stage of the process.

This agreement is built on verification and full cooperation. If Iran fails to meet either of those standards, if at any point inspectors believe that Iran is stonewalling or being uncooperative, the deal is violated and strict sanctions return.

Mr. Speaker, this is a good deal, and there is no possibility of a so-called better deal. Our partner nations have made it clear that, if we walk away from this agreement, they will not support the tough sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place.

That is the reality. As a result, a vote against this agreement is a vote to weaken international sanctions against Iran. It is a vote to allow them a clear path to a nuclear weapon, and it is a vote to make Israel less safe and the Middle East more dangerous.

I urge my colleagues to recognize that reality, to support this agreement and allow our President and our Nation to take these historic steps toward a more peaceful world.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA).

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to President Obama's disastrous Iran nuclear deal. This deal not only threatens the safety and security of the United States, one of our closest allies, Israel, it threatens the safety and security of the entire world.

It fails to prevent Iran from eventually having a nuclear weapon, the exact opposite of what it is intended to do. Iran now simply just has to wait a decade before becoming a nuclear power.

In the meantime, because Iran gets everything they need and want in return for so-called reductions in their nuclear capabilities, they can dramatically expand their dominance in the region, build up their ballistic missile and weapons capabilities, grow their economy and military, and have even greater ability to fund and promote terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, can we really expect to trust a government like Iran's whose leaders chant "Death to America"?

I strongly advise my colleagues to oppose this horrible deal. Our Nation and our allies deserve better.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Ms. ESTY).

Ms. ESTY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action not as a perfect agreement, but as the only viable path forward to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. I do not come to this decision lightly or easily.

Iran is a deadly state sponsor of terrorism, and the Iranian regime has repeatedly threatened America and our close ally, Israel.

Despite decades of sanctions by the United States, Iran has come within months of succeeding in its effort to acquire sufficient material for a nuclear bomb.

Mr. Speaker, the question before us today is not, Is this a perfect agreement that addresses all of Iran's dangerous behavior? The truth is there are no perfect options in dealing with this regime.

Instead, we must ask: "Will this agreement verifiably prevent a nuclear armed Iran? Will this agreement advance American national security interests in the region? Will this agreement advance the national security of our ally, Israel?"

Through a very long and deliberate process, I have reached the conclusion that the answer to these three questions is yes.

I believe that it is better to have this imperfect international agreement that we can aggressively enforce than to have no agreement at all.

During August I spent a week in Israel meeting with political and military leaders and hearing from ordinary citizens who are deeply concerned about Iran's intentions.

As I stood on the Golan Heights, I could see the smoke rising from shelling in Syria. That smoke is a visible sign of the chaos and danger in the region for both the United States and for the entire Middle East.

I am keenly aware of the very real threats Iran poses to Israel's security and to our national security. I share the deep concerns of many of my constituents, of many Jewish leaders, who distrust Iran.

That is why, Mr. Speaker, I believe that, after this week's vote, we have another critical choice to make. It is an important choice to make for our children, our grandchildren, and our men and women in uniform.

Our choice is this: Will we come together as Americans to enforce the Iranian nuclear agreement in the years to come?

As the Iran nuclear agreement goes into effect, we must work together—no matter our vote this week—to enforce Iran's commitments and to stand prepared to act decisively when Iran tests our resolve. We cannot afford to cast a vote and walk away.

Mr. Speaker, we have the greatest opportunity to achieve stability in the region when we lead our allies and work with other international partners, as we did when we created the international sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table.

The Iranian nuclear agreement is the beginning of a long-term, multinational commitment. We must stand strong with our allies. We must commit to ensuring that the inspectors have the access and resources to carry out the agreement.

We must stand ready to act, to lead the world to respond to signs of cheating or other Iranian efforts to undermine its obligations.

□ 1615

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LANCE).

Mr. LANCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge rejection of the underlying Iranian agreement. The President did not submit to Congress two inspection side agreements secretly negotiated between the IAEA and Iran.

Congress and the American people have no information on what these secret side agreements entail, although news reports have suggested that Iran will be able to inspect at least some of its own military facilities.

Under the underlying agreement, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism—an antagonist of the United States, of Israel, and of several Arab nations, a 35-year-old regime known for horrible human rights abuses—will receive at least \$100 billion immediately, some of which will undoubtedly be used for terrorism.

A better underlying agreement can be negotiated, making sure Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons or ICBMs whose only purpose can be militaristic. It is important to note that a clear majority of the American people and a clear majority of both houses of Congress—Republicans and some Democrats, together the representatives of the American people—oppose this deal.

This is the most consequential vote I shall cast as a Member of Congress on foreign policy since I have been privileged to be here.

I urge rejection of the Iranian agreement, which is not in the best interests of the national security of the United States.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to just clear up some things. The IAEA's separate arrangements with Iran are not part of the agreement within the definition of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. The separate arrangements were negotiated between the IAEA and Iran to resolve outstanding issues. The arrangements between Iran and the IAEA are considered safeguard confidenceals, meaning that the IAEA does not share the information with member states.

The U.S. also has safeguard confidenceals, arrangements with the IAEA, and we would not want any member state to be able to request access to information about our nuclear infrastructure.

Beyond that, Mr. Speaker, IAEA Director General Amano has declared that the arrangements between the IAEA and Iran are technically sound and consistent with the Agency's long-established practice. They do not compromise the IAEA safeguard standards in any way.

Let's be clear. There is no self-inspection of Iranian facilities, and the IAEA has in no way given responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran, not now and certainly not in the future. That is not how the IAEA does business.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 6½ minutes remaining.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART), a member of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak against a deal which I believe will become one of the most dangerous mistakes in U.S. history. This deal does not stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear program. It recognizes and legitimizes their nuclear program in short order.

It allows Iran to develop ballistic missiles and brings an end to the arms embargo against that regime. It frees up hundreds of billions of dollars to fund and export terrorism. I am convinced that this deal will also lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This deal, Mr. Speaker, is one of the biggest mistakes that we, our children, and our grandchildren will pay a very dear price for.

Mr. Speaker, history will record this deal as the moment that the United States and the world granted the largest, most dangerous sponsor of terrorism that which it covets the most, nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

I hope I am wrong, Mr. Speaker, but I fear that I am not.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to be clear that this agreement isn't based on trust. It is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in history. The international inspectors will have 24/7 access to surveillance of enrichment facilities and reactors and regular non-restricted access to all other declared sites.

Beyond declared facilities, the inspection provisions give the international inspectors the access they need, when they need it, to carry out the most intrusive inspection system ever peacefully negotiated.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SHIMKUS).

(Mr. SHIMKUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, this Chamber has a lot of heroes. SAM JOHNSON is one of those. I am proud to have followed him, and I salute him.

I have been fortunate to do many things. I was an Army officer in West Germany, a high school teacher, and a local elected official. Now, as a Member of Congress, I am honored to cast votes for the people that I represent.

My constituents want the President to follow the law, as is his responsibility under article II of the Constitution. The President did not submit all the necessary documents as required

under the law. I and my constituents want to know what is in these side agreements.

To my colleague from Maryland, those assurances are not good enough when we are going down this path of peace and war to trust the IAEA with no documents, not being able to see that.

Our primary responsibility here is to protect our citizens against all enemies, foreign and domestic. This deal gives Iran more money. They will remain the number one state sponsor of terror. They will continue to chant "death to America" and "death to Israel." They will not free our citizens.

Now, we assure that Iran will get nuclear weapons; the region will go into a nuclear arms race, and the world and the U.S. will be less safe. This is a terrible deal, an embarrassing deal, and one we will regret in the future.

Vote to fully disclose this deal; vote against the deal, and vote to keep the sanctions on.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. PERRY), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, no one wants Iran to have a nuclear weapon; I certainly don't think the President wants them to, but I think it is clear that they are going to. The question is when. Clearly, the President tried to make a good deal. I don't think he thinks that Iran can be trusted, but I do think he thinks that they won't cheat.

Mr. Speaker, the road to hell was paved with good intentions, and I am sure that the administration had and has good intentions, but the facts remain. Iran has been cheating, literally, for thousands of years—or at least that region has—and certainly, we know the facts.

The facts are, for the last 36 years, Iran has cheated on every single agreement they have signed. They are cheating at this very moment. An agreement that is based on that, that they wouldn't cheat, is an agreement that is fatally flawed.

Mr. Speaker, this is the same country that won't cheat, this is the same country that leaders recognize and recommend the stoning of women, the hanging of homosexuals, the sponsor of mass terrorism. This is the nation that we have signed an accord with.

Mr. Speaker, the other side will tell you that this is a great agreement with robust controls and an inspection paradigm. With all due respect, none of us know what that is; yet the pillar of this agreement is based upon solely that, an inspection paradigm that is so robust that Iran can't cheat, and no one knows what it is. We are literally voting for something and on something that we don't know what it is, and we are being urged to vote for it.

Mr. Speaker, Iran cannot be trusted. The blood will not be on my hands from these rockets that Hamas launches into Israel and these American soldiers that come home in body bags in the future.

I just want to let everybody know that the blood will not be on my hands and the hands of those who vote against this agreement.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. FARR).

Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I have been listening to this debate all day, and I really have to be, I guess, angered by the amount of misstatement of fact here and about this House being so negative about this country and about our President.

You can't get away with criticizing Presidents or leaders of other countries being negative about us when you are standing around being negative about our own country and our own President.

This agreement is about trust, and it isn't about trust with Iran. It is about trust with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nobody has spoken about what that Agency does, other than the chairman, about how important it is.

It has been around since 1957. We helped create it. It has 2,400 employees. We probably trained most of them. They know about inspections. They are an international organization. They don't belong to anybody. No country owns them.

You can't go and trash all day that they have a secret agreement with Iran when they have a secret agreement with the United States and with Russia and with China and with all the other signatories. That is their business. They go in and verify.

We don't allow them to go into our top classified areas without some agreement of how you are going to handle that classified information. They are not going to release that information to other countries. They wouldn't have any credibility.

When you are asking that the President release that information, he doesn't have it. He doesn't own it. It is the IAEA and Iran. What if Iran was saying, We don't want to enter into this agreement because we don't know what the IAEA has entered into with the United States?

Stop trashing the process. Trust this organization. We have been proud of it for 58 years. It is the top cop on nuclear inspections, all the 1,100 facilities around the world, nuclear power plants, military bases with nuclear equipment, weapons. They are the inspectors. They are the ones that trust and verify. Give them a chance.

Everybody in the world thinks this is the toughest agreement ever negotiated. Why would we not be celebrating it? This is diplomatic history. We have done great things here, and you want to trash it, and you want to trash the administration. That is not America. Give peace a chance.

Vote “no” on this awful bill.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, some of us have seen this before. Some of us were around for the North Korean nuclear agreement, and President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal looks increasingly like the dangerous deal that we struck with that regime in North Korea.

In 1994, the U.S. Government signed a deal with North Korea that, according to then-President Clinton, would make the United States, the Korean peninsula, and the world safer, in his words.

The agreement, we were told, did not rely on trust, but would instead involve a verification program which would stop the North Koreans from ever acquiring a nuclear bomb. That sounds familiar today.

Unfortunately, the North Korean deal had holes that you could fire a ballistic missile through. The deal did not dismantle North Korea’s program. It committed the United States to rewarding North Korea with large quantities of fuel oil without requiring the regime to implement the terms.

Worst of all, the deal relied on inspection provisions that were naive and ultimately were worthless. The predictable result was that, on October 4, 2002, North Korea revealed it had been lying all along and that it had continued to secretly develop nuclear weapons.

Four years later, North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Il, ordered an underground nuclear test, and today, North Korea is a global menace, and it supports and sponsors terrorism, and it is the most unstable nuclear power on Earth. There is a reason why some of us raise these issues.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. ROUZER).

Mr. ROUZER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this so-called Iran deal because it paves the way for Iran to obtain nuclear capabilities that will not only threaten Israel and create an arms race in the Middle East, but will also be a direct threat to America.

□ 1630

Time and time again, the Government of Iran has demonstrated its unwillingness to be transparent and open regarding their nuclear arms development and fraudulent behavior. Let’s not forget that we just recently discovered two of their secret nuclear facilities, and who knows how many more they have.

The sanctions relief included as part of this deal guarantees that Iran, the world’s number one sponsor of terrorism, will have billions more to fund their evil acts. And if there is any confusion, Iran’s stated intentions of wiping Israel off the face of the Earth and its public chants of “death to America” make their intentions very clear.

Mr. Speaker, America has always stood for what is right—the greatest

force for good mankind has ever known. Let’s keep it that way and defend this agreement.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOHO).

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in opposition to this deal. This is a terrible deal for America, for the Middle East, and for the world.

This is a deal that can’t be verified. The IAEA, as so eloquently talked about by my colleague across the aisle, is the same IAEA that had their inspector buying nuclear material for North Korea.

This is a deal that will embolden Iran. It will make them stronger. They are the number one sponsor of terrorism in the world, shouting, “Death to America.” When they stop having the rhetoric from their Ayatollah and from their President saying “death to America” and they start denouncing terrorism and release our hostages, then we can go forward with this. But this will do nothing but embolden Iran, make them stronger, and make the Middle East more unstable.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ZELDIN), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.

The Congress is not on the clock, because we haven’t received the entire agreement. And for anyone out there who wants to be supportive of this deal, let’s think what the President was telling the American public and all of us.

The House has a deal that wasn’t based on trust; it is built on verification. How do you support a deal based on verification without knowing what the verification is?

I would be happy to yield if anyone wanted to stand up and explain how you support a deal without knowing what the verification is. You can’t. That is why we are asking for it.

And for those who say that opposing this deal is somehow negative towards America, I took an oath to be an officer of the United States military, willing to fight and die in protection of our freedoms and liberties. I love this country. I took an oath to serve here the members of my district because I love America.

So don’t tell me that somehow opposing this deal is negative toward America. I oppose this deal because I love my country.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ROSKAM).

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, did you notice something? Did you notice that, for the past 2 years, the President of the United States has said that if we were going to have a deal, it was going to be based on full disclosure?

Mr. Speaker, the President said that we were going to know all of the infor-

mation. And the State Department submitted to the Congress a document that said: Here is all the information.

But after that, Mr. Speaker, you know what we found out? There are two secret deals. There are two secret side deals, side arrangements, that we have not seen.

Now, think about it. There are two alternatives: either this is sacrosanct between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Iranian Government and no one is allowed to see it under the law—no one absolutely; it is totally confidential—or it is not.

Now, how can it be, Mr. Speaker, that some elements of the administration have been briefed on those documents but they have not been disclosed to Congress and they have not been disclosed to the American public? How can that be?

I will tell you how it can be. Because this is absurd. The administration has not disclosed material information.

And so why are we here today? Why is Chairman ROYCE managing this time? Why are we contemplating this resolution that is brought forth by Congressman POMPEO and Congressman ZELDIN? It is to say this: Administration, you have not complied. Therefore, Corker-Cardin has not been invoked. Therefore, the House is not going to vote on this nefarious deal.

This is an awful deal, Mr. Speaker, and it should be wholeheartedly rejected with all urgency. I urge the passage of this resolution to make it very clear that we are not going to be complicit. We are not going to be complicit, Mr. Speaker. We are not going to be midwives and bring into the world this awful thing. We won’t be complicit.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

A few speakers ago, there was a statement made about folks loving America. Well, guess what. We all love America. The fact that we may have disagreements with regard to this proposal does not take away from our love of this great country. We may differ, but the fact still remains that we love our country. And I just want to make that clear, because it is sickening to hear those kinds of comments.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. EMMER).

Mr. EMMER of Minnesota. The American people have spoken and overwhelmingly oppose this agreement. Our allies in the region, who know Iran best, oppose this deal. The President, enabled by Senate Democrats, continues to live in a fantasyland.

The President’s track record in the region is appalling: Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Benghazi, the reset with Russia, red lines in Syria, his failed ISIL strategy, and his catastrophic withdrawal from Iraq, just to name a few, now handing billions, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a legal pathway to a nuclear weapon to Iran.

The American people deserve the truth rather than lies and half-truths about snapback sanctions; secret side deals; anytime, anywhere inspections; Iran's right to enrich uranium or plutonium; and, as we stand here today, Congress' role in this bad deal.

Members of Congress must ask themselves two questions: Does this deal make us more secure? Does this deal make us more safe? The answer to both questions is a resounding, no, it doesn't.

Secretary of State Kerry said "no deal is better than a bad deal." I couldn't agree more.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LOUDERMILK).

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Speaker, let's be clear: Iran is an enemy to the United States of America, not by our declaration but by a proclamation of the most senior military leaders of that nation that have stated their destiny is to destroy the United States of America. Now, I was recently told by the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, that when someone says they want to destroy you, believe them.

So what are we to trust? Are we to trust Iran, when they say that their destination, their goal, is to destroy the people of the United States of America? Or do we trust them when they say that they will commit to not develop a nuclear weapon? Or do we trust an international organization who has details about verification that they won't even share with the representatives of the people of this Nation who would be drastically affected by that?

Oh, yes, but I have been told it is not about trust; it is about verification. But the details of the most critical part of that verification are being kept secret from the Members of this Congress who are expected to approve this deal that would have drastic effects upon the people of the United States.

I would submit to you that those who chant "death to America," the leaders in Iran, know the details of it.

We must stop this now.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Tennessee (Mrs. BLACKBURN).

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the chairman for the work that he has done on this issue and the awareness that he has helped to raise not only with Members of this body, but with the American people.

The American people are speaking out. They do not want this Iran deal to be on the books. And there are good reasons why.

As I was home and talking to my constituents, many are like me. They are a mom, they are a grandmother, and they fear for what this will do to our country. They fear for what it will

do to the safety of our children and future generations. They are asking the right questions:

Does Iran deserve the right to be trusted? Absolutely not.

When their neighbors don't trust them, should we trust them? The answer is of course not.

Is this a transparent agreement? Of course not. The secret side deals that have been made, why would we do that? Why would we incentivize, create a pathway, for Iran to have a nuclear weapon?

I think what we should do is require the President to come forward with every component to expose this so we know what kind of future this creates for our children and our grandchildren.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Returning to an argument I was making earlier about this body's experience with North Korea, it does look to me like many are willing to concede to Iran the same loopholes that we gave North Korea.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah has declared that his country would never agree to anywhere, anytime inspections. That is what is a little confusing about this. Especially, he says, in Iranian military sites. What we are informed of is that Iran is going to do its own inspection at Parchin. Without a full picture of Iran's nuclear program, without full ability to inspect these sites, we will be verifying in the dark, just as we were with North Korea.

The Ayatollah is also demanding sanctions be lifted before Iran dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. In short, the Supreme Leader, again, is not going to let international inspectors into the places he builds his secret weapons, and yet he wants billions of sanctions in relief that he could funnel into terrorist groups that he funds, including Hezbollah and Hamas.

Just like North Korea, Iran wants its rewards upfront. Again, like North Korea, what is Iran demanding? The best prize of all: the stamp of international legitimacy for its nuclear program.

The truly stunning thing about this nuclear deal is that even if Iran fulfills all of its commitments in a few short years, the mullahs will be free from restraints, have international blessing for Iran's nuclear program, and will have billions of dollars that they will use, in my opinion, for destabilizing the region. Because the IRGC controls most of these business contracts, their military controls the contracts.

It is not too late to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but to do so, we need to learn from our mistakes; and if we don't, the Ayatollah, just like Kim Jong-il before him, will have, in my view, an easy path to the bomb.

Mr. CUMMINGS. May I inquire as to how much time we have remaining, Mr. Speaker?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 3 minutes

remaining. The gentleman from California has 8½ minutes remaining.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear that this agreement is not based on trust; it is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in history.

There has been a lot of talk about \$100 billion—others have floated other figures—in sanctions relief, but we know that it is more like around \$50 billion, and it is conjecture as to how Iran will spend this money. Our terrorism sanctions will remain firmly in place to combat the money that Iran passes to any terrorist groups.

□ 1645

This is a good deal, not because the President says so, not because I say so, not because anyone else in this Chamber says so. It is a good deal because the experts say so.

Nuclear physicists, disarmament experts, antinuclear proliferation experts, members of the intelligence community—including the former head of Mossad—and our allies all agree that the right thing to do to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is to support this deal.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WEBER).

Mr. WEBER of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, Neville Chamberlain landed at Heston Aerodrome on September 30, 1938, and spoke to the crowds. He said: "The settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem has been achieved."

He said, "This morning I had another talk with German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper that bears his name on it, as well as mine."

He went on to say, "We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again."

Later that day, he stood outside of 10 Downing Street and read again. He said: "My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour."

He said, "I believe it is a peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep."

Mr. Speaker, we all know how that turned out.

My friends, if this deal passes—and make no mistake, it is quite a deal for Iran—Americans will not get a quiet night's sleep.

As long as Barack Hussein Obama is in office aiding and abetting the Iranian terroristic regime, we will not be safe and Americans will not sleep well.

This is a bad deal. You don't argue, you don't make deals with the devil, deals with the enemy. Do we not learn from history?

Did we not learn anything from World War II?

This is a bad deal. I urge my colleagues to vote this deal down. It is time to put America first.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from engaging in personalities toward the President.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GOHMERT).

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, we have heard some try to demean the importance of what the chairman and others here on the Republican side are trying to do right now.

The fact is that, when we talk about the information that has not been provided about the outside agreements with the IAEA, it is not only material, relevant, but it is also critical.

I am reading directly from the Iran deal. Eight years after the adoption date or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier—it goes on to talk about sanctions that will be lifted.

Another place, same thing, or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, then another protocol is lifted.

If we don't know what the agreement is with the IAEA, then these years mean nothing. The IAEA, I have already heard say, as far as it knows, nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. That would mean that these years are worthless.

We have got to have the secret agreements.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time we have remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 1½ minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 6 minutes remaining.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

With regard to what the gentleman just stated, I would refer him to Senator BOB CORKER, who drafted the process that gave Congress the right to review the agreement. In talking about this situation that we are addressing today, he says that the motion is not worth considering. Apparently, he feels satisfied that the arrangement with regard to the IAEA has been satisfied.

Let's also focus with the matter at hand, and the matter at hand is preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, instead of working on pointless partisan measures like this one and others we will be considering tomorrow.

This entire piece of legislation that we have been debating is about accusations that the President did not comply with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Even, as I said a moment ago, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee does not believe that.

Let's get back to the business of the people and stop wasting their money and wasting their time.

I urge a "no" vote on this resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I guess the point that I would begin by making is that Iran won't have to cheat like North Korea did to get close to a bomb, and that is because the essential restrictions on Iran's key bomb-making technology expire or, in the words of the agreement, sunset in 10 to 15 years.

After these restrictions expire, Iran will be left with an internationally recognized industrial scale nuclear program. Iran could even legitimately enrich to levels near weapons-grade under the pretext of powering a nuclear navy. All these activities are permissible under the nonproliferation treaty, and all would be endorsed by this agreement.

Indeed, to quote the President, President Obama said, of this agreement, in year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.

A former State Department official testified to the Foreign Affairs Committee that this sunset clause is a disaster. It is a disaster as it will enable the leading state sponsor of terrorism to produce enough material for dozens of nuclear weapons, all under the terms of the agreement.

As another expert witness pointed out, the bet that the administration is taking is that, in 10 to 15 years, we will have a kinder, gentler Iran. The agreement does not dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Iran doesn't have to dismantle any centrifuges or give up any of its nuclear facilities. Even Iran's once-secret facility at Fordo, buried under a mountain top, does stay open.

Instead, the deal temporarily restricts elements of the program. It does do that. It restricts elements of the program, but it does it in exchange for something else that is permanent.

What is permanent in this, as opposed to temporary? What is permanent is the sanctions relief. Key restrictions begin to expire after only 8 years.

If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions regime, which Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition from several administrations.

I will remind the Members again, this was a hard-fought case over several administrations; and, in point of fact, in the prior Congress, myself and ELIOT ENGEL had legislation which would have put additional pressure on Iran that passed here by a vote of 400-20.

It was the administration and it was Secretary of State Kerry who made certain that that bill was bottled up in the Senate and could not see the light of day.

Now, the billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get up front will support

its terrorist activity, but those billions are just a downpayment, as this agreement reconnects Iran to the global economy.

One of the things that bothers me most about this is that Iran is not a normal country with normal businessmen running those companies. When those companies were nationalized, they were turned over to the IRGC. They were turned over, basically, to the leaders in the military, and they were turned over to the clerics.

As future contracts go forward with Iran, it is that entity that is going to be rewarded. It is going to have the political power.

For those of us that hoped to see change in Iran, now the best connected people in Iran are going to be the IRGC leaders. If we think for a minute what that will mean for those that would like to see real change, I think we lost a historic opportunity here to put the kind of pressure that would have forced change, but we did not do that.

In a major, last-minute concession—and this is the final point I would make—the President agreed to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Iran, and in 5 years, Iran will be able to buy conventional weapons and, in 8 years, ballistic missiles.

Russia and China want to sell these dangerous weapons to Iran, and that is why they pushed. That is why it was Russia pushing, at the eleventh hour, after we thought this agreement was done.

The reason we were waiting those extra days is because Russia was running interference for Iran, saying: Oh, no, wait. We also want the arms embargo lifted, including the ICBM embargo lifted.

As the Secretary of Defense of our country testified, the reason that we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the "I" in ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability of flying from Iran to the United States.

Ask yourself why Iran wants to build ICBMs, why it is that the Ayatollah says it is the duty of every military man to figure out how to help mass-produce ICBMs.

Someone once asked President Kennedy the difference between our space program and the ICBM program that Russia was building at that time, and he quipped "attitude." Kennedy's answer was "attitude."

The answer here is that attitude counts for a lot, and the attitude in the regime, when they say they are not even going to be bound by this and are now going to transfer rockets and missiles to Hezbollah and Hamas, tells us a lot about their attitude.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, for years, the Congress, the President, our European partners, and the international community have imposed a series of tough economic sanctions on Iran with the goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Those

sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and I commend President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and the entire team, along with our P5+1 partners, for their efforts to negotiate an agreement to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon.

The question for Members of Congress, who will vote on this agreement, is whether it achieves its stated goals. Given the importance of this question, I believe every Member of Congress has an obligation to thoroughly review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), consider the testimony presented at the Congressional hearings, and listen to competing views before reaching a final judgment.

Since the JCPOA was submitted to Congress on July 19, 2015, I have carefully reviewed all of its terms, attended the classified briefings and numerous presentations, and reviewed the transcripts of all the hearings that have been held in both the House and the Senate. I have also met with opponents and supporters of the agreement. While I respect the opinions of those on both sides of this issue, I have concluded that this agreement advances the national security interests of the United States and all of our allies, including our partner Israel. This agreement is the best path to achieve our goal—that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon. Indeed, I firmly believe that, should Congress block this agreement, we would undermine that goal, inadvertently weaken and isolate America, and strengthen Iran.

The benefit of any agreement must be measured against the real-world consequences of no agreement. Many forget that when these negotiations began in earnest two years ago, Iran was a threshold nuclear weapons state and remains so until and unless this agreement is implemented. As Prime Minister Netanyahu warned at the United Nations in 2012, Iran was a few months away from having enough highly enriched uranium to produce its first bomb. Today, prior to the implementation of this agreement, it has a nuclear stockpile that, if further enriched, could produce up to 10 bombs. It currently has installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges that could convert that fuel into weapons material. Indeed, many analysts believe that the combination of Iran's nuclear stockpile and its centrifuges would allow it to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material for a bomb in two months.

In addition, Iran has been enriching some of its nuclear material at its deep underground reactor at Fordow, a very difficult target to hit militarily. Moreover, Iran was in the process of building a heavy-water reactor at Arak, which could generate plutonium to be used for a nuclear weapon. Finally, Iran has been operating for years under an inadequate verification regime that increases the risks of a covert program going undetected.

This agreement blocks all of these paths to acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material and puts in place an inspection system that assures the detection of any violation and future dash to acquire a nuclear weapon. The Interim Agreement has already neutralized Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium that Prime Minister Netanyahu highlighted in his speech. This final agreement will significantly scale back the remainder of its program. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium will be cut from 9,900 kg to 300 kg, and that remainder will be limited to low-enriched uranium that cannot be

used for a weapon. In addition, the agreement removes two-thirds of Iran's installed centrifuges. No enrichment activities may be conducted at Fordow for a period of 15 years, and the facility at Arak will be permanently converted to one that does not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Taken together, these measures will extend the breakout time from about two months to at least a year and put in place layers of verification measures over different timelines, including some that remain in place permanently. It is generally agreed that these measures would allow us to detect any effort by Iran to use its current nuclear facilities—Natanz, Fordow, or Arak—to violate the agreement. The main criticism with respect to verification is that the agreement does not sufficiently guard against an effort by Iran to develop a secret uranium supply chain and enrichment capacity at a covert place. However, the reality is that the agreement permanently puts in place an inspection mechanism that is more rigorous than any previous arms control agreement and more stringent than the current system. The agreement ultimately requires inspections of any suspected Iranian nuclear site with the vote of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Neither the Chinese nor the Russians can block such inspections in the face of a united Western front. Are we really better off without this verification regime than with it?

In exchange for rolling back its nuclear program and accepting this verification regime, Iran will obtain relief from those sanctions that are tied to its nuclear program. However, that relief will only come after Iran has verifiably reduced its nuclear program as required. Moreover, if Iran backslides on those commitments, the sanctions will snap back into place. The snapback procedure is triggered if the U.S. registers a formal complaint against Iran with the special commission created for that purpose. In addition, those U.S. sanctions that are not related to the Iranian nuclear program will remain in place, including U.S. sanctions related to Iran's human rights violations, support for terrorism, and missile program.

There are some who oppose the agreement because it does not prevent Iran from engaging in adversarial actions throughout the Gulf, the Middle East, and elsewhere. That conduct, however, was never within the scope of these negotiations nor the objective of the international sanctions regime aimed at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. President Reagan understood the distinction between changing behavior and achieving verifiable limits on weapons programs. He negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, not because he thought it would change the character of "the Evil Empire" but because limiting their nuclear arsenal was in the national security interests of the U.S. and our allies. That reality is also true today. An Iranian regime with nuclear capability would present a much greater threat to the region than an Iran without one. In fact, today, as a threshold nuclear weapons state, Iran wields more influence than it will under the constraints of this agreement. That is why our focus has appropriately been on reining in the Iranian nuclear program.

The lifting of the sanctions will certainly give Iran additional resources to support its priorities. Given the political dynamic in Iran, some of those additional resources will likely be in-

vested to improve the domestic standard of living. But even if all the resources were used to support their proxies in the region, respected regional observers agree that they are unlikely to make a significant strategic difference. Moreover, any effort by Iran to increase support for its proxies can be checked by the U.S. and our allies through countermeasures. Finally, it is clear that any alternative agreement opponents seek would also result in the lifting of the sanctions and freeing up these resources.

In my view, opponents of the agreement have failed to demonstrate how we will be in a better position if Congress were to block it. Without an agreement, the Iranians will immediately revert to their status as a threshold nuclear weapons state. In other words, they immediately pose the threat that Prime Minister Netanyahu warned about in his U.N. speech. At the same time, the international consensus we have built for sanctions, which was already starting to fray, would begin to collapse entirely. We would be immediately left with the worst of all worlds—a threshold nuclear weapons state with diminished sanctions and little leverage for the United States.

I disagree with the view that we can force the Iranians back to the negotiating table to get a better deal. All of our European partners have signed on to the current agreement. Consequently, the U.S. would be isolated in its quest to return to negotiations. And in the unlikely event that we somehow returned to negotiations, the critics have not presented a plausible scenario for achieving a better agreement in a world where fewer sanctions means less economic pressure.

The bottom line is that if Congress were to block the agreement and the Iranians were to resume nuclear enrichment activities, the only way to stop them, at least temporarily, would be by military action. That would unleash significant negative consequences that could jeopardize American troops in the region, drag us into another ground war in the Middle East, and trigger unpredictable responses elsewhere. Moreover, the United States would be totally isolated from most of the world, including our Western partners. The folly of that go-it-alone military approach would be compounded by the fact that such action would only deal a temporary setback to an Iranian nuclear program. They would likely respond by putting their nuclear enrichment activities deeper underground and would likely be more determined than ever to build a nuclear arsenal.

We don't have to take that path. This agreement will give us a long period of time to test the Iranians' compliance and assess their intentions. During that period, it will give us a treasure trove of information about the scope and capabilities of the limited Iranian nuclear program. Throughout that period and beyond, we reserve all of our options, including a military option, to respond to any Iranian attempt to break out and produce enough highly enriched material to make a bomb. But we will have two advantages over the situation as it is today—a more comprehensive verification regime to detect any violation and a much longer breakout period in which to respond.

As former Secretary Clinton has indicated, the fact that we have successfully limited the scope of Iran's nuclear program does not mean we have limited its ambitions in the region. We must continue to work with our

friends and allies to constantly contain and confront Iranian aggression in the region. The United States and Israel must always stand together to confront that threat. The fact remains that Iranian support for their terrorist proxy Hezbollah continues to destabilize Lebanon and poses a direct threat to Israel, as does its support for Hamas. We must do all we can to ensure that our ally Israel maintains its qualitative military edge in the region, including providing increased funding for Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile and Iron Dome anti-rocket systems. Consideration should also be given to previously denied weapons if a need for such enhanced capabilities arises. We must always remember that some of Iran's leaders have called for the destruction of Israel and we must never forget the awful past that teaches us not to ignore those threats.

The threats Iran poses in the region are real. But all those threats are compounded by an Iran that is a threshold nuclear weapons state. This agreement will roll back the Iranian nuclear program and provide us with greater ability to detect and more time to respond to any future Iranian attempt to build a nuclear weapon.

For all of the reasons given above, I've concluded that this is an historic agreement that should be supported by the Congress.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the previous question is ordered on the resolution and on the preamble.

The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 245, nays 186, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 492]

YEAS—245

Abraham	Comstock	Gosar
Aderholt	Conaway	Gowdy
Allen	Cook	Granger
Amash	Costello (PA)	Graves (GA)
Amodel	Cramer	Graves (LA)
Babin	Crawford	Graves (MO)
Barletta	Crenshaw	Griffith
Barr	Culberson	Grothman
Barton	Curbelo (FL)	Guinta
Benishek	Davis, Rodney	Guthrie
Bilirakis	Denham	Hanna
Bishop (MI)	Dent	Hardy
Bishop (UT)	DeSantis	Harper
Black	DesJarlais	Harris
Blackburn	Diaz-Balart	Hartzler
Blum	Dold	Heck (NV)
Bost	Donovan	Hensarling
Boustany	Duffy	Herrera Beutler
Brady (TX)	Duncan (SC)	Hice, Jody B.
Brat	Duncan (TN)	Hill
Bridenstine	Ellmers (NC)	Holding
Brooks (AL)	Emmer (MN)	Hudson
Brooks (IN)	Farenthold	Huelskamp
Buchanan	Fincher	Huizenga (MI)
Buck	Fitzpatrick	Hultgren
Bucshon	Fleischmann	Hunter
Burgess	Fleming	Hurd (TX)
Byrne	Flores	Hurt (VA)
Calvert	Forbes	Issa
Carter (GA)	Fortenberry	Jenkins (KS)
Carter (TX)	Fox	Jenkins (WV)
Chabot	Franks (AZ)	Johnson (OH)
Chaffetz	Frelinghuysen	Johnson, Sam
Clawson (FL)	Garrett	Jolly
Coffman	Gibbs	Jones
Cole	Gibson	Jordan
Collins (GA)	Gohmert	Joyce
Collins (NY)	Goodlatte	Katko

Kelly (MS)	Noem	Sessions
Kelly (PA)	Nugent	Shimkus
King (IA)	Nunes	Shuster
King (NY)	Olson	Simpson
Kinzinger (IL)	Palazzo	Smith (MO)
Kline	Palmer	Smith (NE)
Knight	Paulsen	Smith (NJ)
Labrador	Pearce	Smith (TX)
LaMalfa	Perry	Stefanik
Lamborn	Pittenger	Stewart
Lance	Pitts	Stivers
Latta	Poe (TX)	Stutzman
LoBiondo	Poliquin	Thompson (PA)
Long	Pompeo	Thornberry
Loudermilk	Posey	Tiberi
Love	Price, Tom	Tipton
Lucas	Ratcliffe	Trott
Luetkemeyer	Reed	Turner
Lummis	Reichert	Upton
MacArthur	Renacci	Valadao
Marchant	Ribble	Wagner
Marino	Rice (SC)	Walberg
Massie	Rigell	Walden
McCarthy	Roby	Walker
McCaul	Roe (TN)	Walorski
McClintock	Rogers (AL)	Walters, Mimi
McHenry	Rogers (KY)	Weber (TX)
McKinley	Rohrabacher	Webster (FL)
McMorris	Rokita	Wenstrup
Rodgers	Rooney (FL)	Westerman
McSally	Ros-Lehtinen	Westmoreland
Meadows	Roskam	Whitfield
Meehan	Ross	Williams
Messer	Rothfus	Wilson (SC)
Mica	Rouzer	Wittman
Miller (FL)	Royce	Womack
Miller (MI)	Russell	Woodall
Moolenaar	Ryan (WI)	Yoder
Mooney (WV)	Salmon	Yoho
Mullin	Sanford	Young (AK)
Mulvaney	Scalise	Young (IA)
Murphy (PA)	Schweikert	Young (IN)
Neugebauer	Scott, Austin	Zeldin
Newhouse	Sensenbrenner	Zinke

NAYS—186

Adams	Doyle, Michael	Lipinski
Aguilar	F.	Loeb
Ashford	Duckworth	Loeb
Bass	Edwards	Lofgren
Beatty	Ellison	Lowenthal
Becerra	Engel	Lowe
Bera	Eshoo	Lujan Grisham
Beyer	Esty	(NM)
Bishop (GA)	Farr	Lujan, Ben Ray
Blumenauer	Fattah	(NM)
Bonamici	Foster	Lynch
Boyle, Brendan	Frankel (FL)	Maloney, Sean
F.	Fudge	Matsui
Brady (PA)	Gabbard	McCollum
Brown (FL)	Gallagher	McDermott
Brownley (CA)	Garamendi	McGovern
Bustos	Graham	McNerney
Butterfield	Grayson	Meeks
Capps	Green, Al	Meng
Capuano	Green, Gene	Moore
Cárdenas	Grijalva	Moulton
Carney	Gutiérrez	Murphy (FL)
Carson (IN)	Hahn	Nadler
Cartwright	Hastings	Napolitano
Castor (FL)	Heck (WA)	Neal
Castro (TX)	Higgins	Nolan
Chu, Judy	Himes	Norcross
Cicilline	Hinojosa	O'Rourke
Clark (MA)	Honda	Pallone
Clarke (NY)	Hoyer	Pascarella
Clay	Huffman	Payne
Cleaver	Israel	Pelosi
Clyburn	Jackson Lee	Perlmutter
Cohen	Jeffries	Peters
Connolly	Johnson (GA)	Peterson
Conyers	Johnson, E. B.	Pingree
Cooper	Kaptur	Pocan
Costa	Keating	Polis
Courtney	Kelly (IL)	Price (NC)
Crowley	Kennedy	Quigley
Cuellar	Kildee	Rangel
Cummings	Kilmer	Rice (NY)
Davis (CA)	Kind	Richmond
Davis, Danny	Kirkpatrick	Roybal-Allard
DeFazio	Kuster	Ruiz
DeGette	Langvin	Ruppersberger
Delaney	Larsen (WA)	Rush
DeLauro	Larson (CT)	Ryan (OH)
DelBene	Lawrence	Sanchez, Linda
DeSaulnier	Lee	T.
Deutch	Levin	Sanchez, Loretta
Dingell	Lewis	Sarbanes
Doggett	Lieu, Ted	Schakowsky
		Schiff

Schrader	Swalwell (CA)	Veasey
Scott (VA)	Takai	Vela
Scott, David	Takano	Velázquez
Serrano	Thompson (CA)	Visclosky
Sewell (AL)	Thompson (MS)	Walz
Sherman	Titus	Wasserman
Sinema	Tonko	Schultz
Sires	Torres	Waters, Maxine
Slaughter	Tsongas	Watson Coleman
Smith (WA)	Van Hollen	Welch
Speier	Vargas	Yarmuth

NOT VOTING—2

Maloney,	Wilson (FL)
Carolyn	

□ 1722

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated against:

Ms. WILSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 492, had I been present, I would have voted "no."

APPROVAL OF JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 412, I call up the bill (H.R. 3461) to approve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, relating to the nuclear program of Iran, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3461

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPROVAL OF JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.

Congress does favor the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, relating to the nuclear program of Iran.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 3 hours equally divided and controlled by the chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the minority leader or their designees.

The gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) will control 90 minutes. The gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY), and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. MAXINE WATERS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous materials on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, we have held 30 hearings and briefings on Iran since these negotiations began. We have reviewed this