

official development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.

So Ethiopia has made progress towards reaching most of the Millennium Development Goals.

Together with government action and the largest social protection scheme in the region, Ethiopia has seen remarkable progress towards its development targets. Apart from the overall decline in poverty—reduced by 33 percent since 2000—positive gains have been made in terms of education, health, and reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and fistula.

USAID development funds and programs are having a massive impact in Ethiopia in everything from nutrition, sustainability, food stability, health, and education. U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs also have a strong role to play in Ethiopia.

Organizations like the U.S.-Africa Diaspora Business Council focus on tapping into the large entrepreneurial Ethiopian and African diaspora populations in the U.S.

They help provide information, build capacity, and developmental infrastructure to assist American companies to build business footprints in Ethiopia and develop trade between the U.S. and Africa.

I would like to particularly highlight the budding benefit corporations that are producing a positive impact on society and the environment as well as making a profit.

Ethiopian diaspora-owned company Blessed Coffee, the nation's second benefit corporation, is established as a socially responsible business, focusing on trade in coffee growing regions as well as in communities in the U.S. where coffee is sold.

A symbiotic relationship will be one that not only benefits the American consumer but, also, the farmers in Ethiopia and the development of the region.

On a side note, I am not sure that it is well known, but according to DNA analysis, all coffee came from Ethiopia. So we can thank them for that.

I was proud to help reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act last month, which paves the way for continued investment in Ethiopia and Africa through preferential duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of certain products.

This important bill incentivizes American companies to invest in industry and development programs in Africa and Ethiopia that provide products to the United States and jobs to the region.

As the Representative from Silicon Valley, I take special note of the large opportunities in high technology and Internet fields.

With just over 2 percent Internet penetration and 27 percent cellular phone subscriptions, Ethiopia has one of the lowest rates of Internet and mobile phone penetration in the world.

Persistent State interventions, including nationwide Internet filtering,

public sector monopoly over the telecom sector, and a relatively closed economy, have suppressed the growth of economic freedom over the past 5 years.

All of this points to an opportunity for the U.S. Government and companies to help Ethiopia modernize and open its markets to American tech companies.

In closing, let me just say that Ethiopia is a nation of growing importance and opportunity for the United States, a reality that is highlighted by President Obama's visit next week.

As one of the poorest countries, yet with one of the fastest growing economies and largest population in Africa, Ethiopia still represents enormous untapped potential for economic growth.

Ethiopia is a country where American companies can invest and bring jobs and development. It is critical that the U.S. Government seizes this opportunity for investment and mobilizes private sector capital to address the development challenges Ethiopia faces.

Additionally, the U.S. has an opportunity to help Ethiopia address the numerous humanitarian challenges it faces. The administration's Feed the Future initiative supports Ethiopia's food security strategy to reduce hunger, improve nutrition, and promote broad-based economic growth.

Ethiopia still has many serious unmet development needs in sectors like small-business lending, private education, health care, and access to electricity.

Healthy bilateral aid programs through USAID and development programs like Power Africa can help make significant improvements into the health and food security of millions of people in Ethiopia.

Notwithstanding Ethiopia's enormous development needs, we must secure ties within the country to reinforce its constructive collaboration with the U.S. on regional security issues in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia's ongoing strategic partnership with the United States in combating al-Shabaab and defeating extremism in the Horn of Africa is an opportunity for the United States to change the narrative in the region away from focusing solely on military solutions and, instead, focusing on a comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying social, economic, and political causes that fuel extremist groups.

Stability, security, and economic development are sustainable only with the development of democratic values.

Ethiopia is a young democracy where human rights and freedom of speech are not respected by the ruling government. The United States must take a strong position of standing with democratic institutions, such as free speech and open, fair, transparent elections.

The U.S. must build on Obama's historic visit and work harder to encourage positive change. As a partner, we can have frank conversations with

their government and champion human rights and democratic principles.

Ethiopia is a young country in terms of democracy, and over time we can help shape their maturing political system in a way that provides real choices for the people.

The Ethiopian diaspora here in the United States are the natural bridges and ambassadors and human resources to build and strengthen the economic, strategic, and humanitarian connections between our nations.

The future looks extremely bright for Ethiopia, and the United States has an opportunity to be a strong partner as it moves towards a wealthier, more secure, and more democratic future.

I am proud to be the co-chair of the Ethiopian American Caucus, where I can help give a legislative voice to the specific concerns of the Ethiopian American community and help the U.S. Government and diaspora build these important, necessary bridges to a brighter future.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the strong relationship between the United States and Ethiopia. As a member of the Ethiopian American Caucus, I am proud to see our bilateral relationship grow.

As the United States continues to provide economic, humanitarian, and developmental assistance, Ethiopia continues to struggle with human rights issues and food insecurity. Next week, I will visit Ethiopia with President Barack Obama to highlight America's commitment to investing in Africa. I hope that with this visit, we can reinforce our commitment to improving public health, food security, and human rights in Ethiopia.

It is my hope that in Congress, we can follow the lead of the late former Congressman Mickey Leland, whose work to end hunger and poverty was world-changing. Congressman Leland helped to form the House Select Committee on World Hunger in 1984 which generated awareness within Congress regarding national and international hunger and prompted a bipartisan effort to find solutions to end hunger in the U.S. and around the world, particularly in Ethiopia and Sudan. Congressman Leland was killed in a plane crash in Ethiopia during a mission.

Since the African Growth and Opportunities Act was reauthorized earlier this summer, Ethiopia is eligible for preferential trade benefits. I hope to see our trade relationship grow as we work with Ethiopia to improve humanitarian conditions. I am proud to be a member of the Ethiopian American Caucus and I ask my colleagues to support the relationship between the U.S. and Ethiopia.

□ 2100

#### THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 2015, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) for 30 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, just a few days ago, the White House

formally transmitted to Congress the Iranian nuclear agreement. I am holding it here in my hand. And now there will be much discussion in Congress over the role of this legislative body regarding nuclear agreements, but I would like to remind my colleagues that a process is already in place for civil nuclear agreements. This Iran deal that we have in front of us includes sections about a civil nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Under current law, section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act specifies the conditions by which the United States should enter into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with other countries. Parts of the terms determined by the 123 agreement is the cessation from enrichment or reprocessing, a term that is coined, Mr. Speaker, as the gold standard. But the Obama administration has taken the liberty to enter into 123 agreements without abiding by the gold standard.

Why should we hold different countries accountable for different terms when it comes to proliferation? We should be holding each country to the very strictest of standards to ensure maximum safeguards are in place.

This is why, Mr. Speaker, in the last Congress I reintroduced, alongside with my congressional colleague BRAD SHERMAN, a bill which reforms the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to provide greater congressional oversight of nuclear agreements with foreign countries and to protect against the threat of nuclear proliferation. So when the President says that it is either this deal or we go to war, there is actually another option.

Let's not forget about the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement, which was previously withdrawn by the Bush administration in 2008 because the President could not certify under the Iran, North Korea, Syria Non-proliferation Act that Russia was not providing nuclear, missile, and advanced conventional weapons to Iran. Yet, through this new deal with Iran, Iran can buy nuclear, missile, and advanced conventional weapons from the Russians.

Next on the list was the 123 agreement with Vietnam. I strongly opposed this agreement because it allowed Vietnam to enrich.

Next up, the pending U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement. Again, I opposed that agreement because it allows China to enrich.

So what kind of message are we sending to our allies, Mr. Speaker? Jordan and the UAE, some of our closest partners in the region, are not allowed to enrich based on their commitments to our 123 agreement, but bad actors such as Russia, China, and Vietnam, oh, they can enrich. It does not make much sense, Mr. Speaker.

Page 5, section 13—and I hope that our constituents read it—of the general provisions of the Iran nuclear agreement states that the P5+1 nations will “cooperate, as appropriate, in the field

of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex 3.”

So when we go to Annex 3, the situation becomes really scary. According to Annex 3, the P5+1 nations and Iran can cooperate on civil nuclear and scientific projects.

What does that mean? Oh, it spells it out, and it includes—listen to this—facilitation of Iran's acquisition of light water research and power reactors, for research, development, and testing; construction of new light water power reactors, including small- and medium-sized nuclear reactors; construction of state-of-the-art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors; supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the research and power reactors.

Oh, but the list keeps going.

Supply of nuclear simulation and software solutions with regard to these research and power reactors; on-the-job training on fuel management scenarios for these research and power nuclear reactors; and, last but not least, joint technical review of Iran's current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current equipment and systems.

So, essentially, we will be helping Iran to modernize and upgrade their reactors. This is absolutely absurd—and dangerously absurd, Mr. Speaker. How could we ever expect any country to agree to the gold standard when they can point to the JCPOA and say they want the Iran standard? They don't want the gold standard. We want the Iran standard because that is what is going to be one of the lasting legacies of this weak and dangerous deal: we have obliterated any of our moral or legal standing to insist that other countries forgo their own enrichment programs.

No country's leaders in their right minds would ever agree to anything less than what we have allowed Iran to do; and now if we don't block this deal's implementation, Mr. Speaker, we are putting into motion a nuclear arms race that we will not be able to stop.

Mr. Speaker, one of the most egregious mistakes of this nuclear deal—which is saying something. It is a long list of bad things. This deal is chock-full egregious mistakes, but one of the worst is the lifting of U.S. sanctions on conventional weapons and ballistic missiles as well as the lifting of sanctions on Iran's central figures of its nuclear weapons program by the E.U. and the U.N.

Just last night, Mr. Speaker, The Wall Street Journal reported on the sanctions that are to be lifted on the Iranians and the institutions behind Iran's decades-long, covert, and illegal nuclear program. This doesn't even begin to touch on the issues of sanctions being lifted against Iran's Quds Force leaders and the IRGC, the very same people who are responsible for

carrying out and planning Iran's most deadly attacks and for supporting terror attacks across the world, the very same individuals, Mr. Speaker, who have American servicemembers' blood on their hands.

That is right. The administration and the P5+1 have agreed right there in Annex 1 and Annex 2 to remove these individuals and these entities from the U.N. and European sanctions list. How the administration can even begin to try to justify removing these people from these sanctions lists and these designations is beyond comprehension. In fact, it is a direct affront to every man or woman who has served in the U.S. Armed Forces and their friends, families, and loved ones.

The administration needs to explain—and I would like viewers to look at this poster—how Soleimani, the gentleman here in the middle, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, the commander of the Quds Force, not only gets to get rid of these sanctions, but soon will get a boon to his coffers to increase his attacks against the U.S. and our interests.

But look at this rogues gallery. We are not done yet. How about General Vahidi? General Vahidi, this fine gentleman here, former Quds Force commander, Iranian defense minister, has been wanted by Interpol since 2007 for his role in the 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He will come off some of these sanctions lists, this gentleman responsible for the murder of innocent men, women, and children.

But as The Wall Street Journal article notes, we are actually going to be lifting the sanctions on the scientists and the individuals responsible for developing Iran's covert nuclear weapons program. Mr. Speaker, this will leave these individuals free to continue to work on the regime's nuclear program. But not only that, it will leave them free to proliferate their expertise and knowledge.

What we have here, Mr. Speaker, is that we essentially have agreed to lift the sanctions and designations on most of the key individuals on Iran's covert nuclear weapons program while, at the same time, allowing all of Iran's key components of its nuclear program to remain intact. How does that benefit our national security?

We have agreed to lift sanctions on the Iranian equivalent of A.Q. Khan, this gentleman here, the head of Iran's WMD program. A.Q. Khan, if you remember, Mr. Speaker, is the Pakistani nuclear physicist responsible for the proliferation network that helped Libya, North Korea, Iran, and China develop their nuclear programs. He is the equivalent of A.Q. Khan. The Iranian A.Q. Khan helped the regime in its attempt to develop a nuclear explosive device which the regime still refuses to come clean about to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

So look at this rogues gallery. We are not done.

Now the Iranian equivalent of A.Q. Khan will be likely taken off the designation list before the terms of this agreement is up, meaning that, by the time this deal expires, this Iranian, A.Q. Khan, will have had years to perfect his explosive device without repercussions.

This deal will also lift sanctions on the nuclear scientist named Abbasi-Davani. This fine gentleman here was the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency. Not only was this man once the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, but he was sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, sanctioned by the U.N. for his work on both Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program, which, by the way, just underscores the absurdity of the notion that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Only nations that intend on having a nuclear payload develop ballistic missiles, and this man was involved in both. Yet he too will be removed from U.N. sanctions before this agreement expires, leaving him several years to continue his work without any international scrutiny.

But we have one more fine gentleman to point out, Mr. Speaker, as if that weren't enough. German engineer Gerhard Wisser, right over here, is a collaborating German scientist. He was an individual who was convicted and imprisoned in South Africa for his involvement in the A.Q. Khan network and who has facilitated the sale of nuclear equipment to North Korea, to Iran, and to Libya. He will be delisted, as well.

On top of all of this, Iran's organization involved in spearheading its nuclear weapons research will be removed from the U.S. sanctions list, despite its long record of noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

All I see in this agreement, Mr. Speaker, is a path to the Iranian bomb and not the prevention of one, as the administration claimed was the objective. Any way you slice it, Mr. Speaker, Iran will be a nuclear weapons state within a decade or so, and these individuals will be free to harm our international interests.

Even if the U.N. Security Council opts to reimpose sanctions on the regime, Iran has built into the agreement that this would be a violation of the agreement. Listen to that, Mr. Speaker. If the U.N. Security Council opts to reimpose sanctions, Iran has in this deal a stipulation that this would be a violation of the agreement, and then it can simply snap back its own nuclear program. That is the only snapback that is involved, Iran snapping back its own nuclear program. And now it will be free of all the burdens of sanctions. It will have its entire infrastructure—complete with the added benefit of U.S. assistance in modernizing its equipment, in advancing certain aspects of it—as well as the key individuals involved and responsible for advancing the program ready and able to produce a nuclear weapon without any problems whatsoever.

Mr. Speaker, if Congress approves this deal, we are guaranteeing that Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state, and we are giving away every bit of leverage that we have against this rogue regime. This deal isn't going to avert a war. It might very well precipitate one. Our only real option for peace and a nuclear-free Middle East is to insist on a better deal.

Mr. Speaker, we must back that up with tougher sanctions, not a promise to lift sanctions on some of the world's most dangerous individuals. How can we say, Mr. Speaker, that this nuclear deal is anything but a bad deal when it doesn't meet the benchmarks of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions or even the President's own benchmarks from 2013?

□ 2115

Iran was in violation of every one of those resolutions; yet, just 2 days ago, the administration and the rest of the P5+1 went to the U.N. Security Council to bind ourselves to lifting the resolutions, even though the Iranian regime never complied with a single one—six resolutions violated.

Each of those resolutions confirmed that Iran was not in compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency, had not halted enrichment, had not stopped reprocessing, had not halted developing nuclear technology, and had not stopped its ballistic missile program.

Iran has never met a U.N. Security Council resolution that it didn't violate; yet here we are, pretending that Iran has somehow complied with the international community and can be trusted this time to live up to its obligation under international law.

Let's just take a look at what each of those resolutions required from Iran and what we are no longer requiring Iran to do as a result of this disastrous deal.

Mr. Speaker, I will start with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, implemented on July 13, 2006. It demands that Iran suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, which would be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency after Iran's noncompliance with the IAEA for over 3 years.

It gave Iran 1 month to comply with the IAEA or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions. It endorsed the diplomatic solution, specifically a P5+1 proposal from 2006 for a long-term, comprehensive agreement to determine the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

It called upon states to exercise vigilance to prevent the transfer of any item, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile program. Iran did not comply.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 passed on December 23rd, 2006, it imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to halt uranium enrichment as stipulated

in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 that I just spoke about.

It reaffirms that Iran shall, without further delay, suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development to be verified by the IAEA and work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor, moderated by heavy water.

The resolution further imposed sanctions on that country, blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and freezing the financial assets of persons and entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Also, this resolution established a new committee comprised of all council members to monitor the implementation of the present text and designate further individuals or entities to which the sanctions should apply. I bet Iran was really worried about that new committee.

How about this resolution, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, adopted on March 24, 2007? It widened the scope of the previous resolution by banning Iran's arms exports, arms embargo, prohibits transfers to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual-use items, exports from Iran of arms or WMD useful technology.

It reaffirmed previous positions on Iran's nuclear program, including the suspension of all enrichment activity. It sanctioned additional individual and entities. How many more people could we put on that list?

How about another resolution? U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803, adopted on March 3, 2008, it approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend nuclear projects and activities.

It reaffirmed all previous resolutions and demanded that Iran cease all enrichment and reprocessing and ballistic missile related activity. It required countries to inspect suspected cargo to and from Iran, extended the freezing of financial assets to persons or entities supporting Iran's nuclear-related programs or activities. It called upon countries to monitor activities of Iranian banks. It imposed travel restrictions on sanctioned individuals.

How about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1835, adopted on September 27, 2008? It reaffirmed all previous resolutions. It reports that it found conclusively that Iran is continuing to develop its nuclear program.

I bet that was a surprise. It found that Iran was making progress on developing and operating its centrifuges and continued to deliberately block and stonewall. It called on Iran to comply with obligations fully and without delay.

Remember, these resolutions are gone now, Mr. Speaker.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 adopted on June 9, 2010, it reaffirmed all previous resolutions. It prohibited Iran from investing abroad

in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies, or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology.

It prohibited Iran from launching ballistic missiles, including on its own territory. It required Iran to refrain from any development of ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable.

It mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but does not bar sales of missiles that are not on the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. It called on the vigilance of international lending to Iran, providing trade credits and other financing.

It called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran air cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran shipping lines or by any ship in national or international waters, if there are indications that they are carrying cargo banned for carriage to Iran.

Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered, but it could happen. It froze the assets of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions and required that countries ban the travel of named Iranians.

That was back in the day, Mr. Speaker; yet here we are today, 2 days after the administration went around Congress to bind the United States to a U.N. Security Council resolution that will lift all of those resolutions. You see all of those resolutions; we just ripped them up, no longer needed. We did not achieve a single thing that those previous six resolutions called for.

Now, to make matters worse, Mr. Speaker, the P5+1 countries will honor their obligations on this new U.N. Security Council resolution, while the Iranian regime laughs at us all the way to the bomb.

Iran has never felt compelled to honor its international obligations; and now, we are just supposed to expect it to fully comply with this? A zebra can't change its stripes, and this Iranian regime will never feel obligated to abide by this new international agreement.

Why tie our hands like this, Mr. Speaker? This is a bad and dangerous nuclear deal. I would urge my colleagues to reject it.

There has been a lot of talk, Mr. Speaker, about these anytime, anywhere inspections. I think it is important for us to examine what this agreement actually says about anytime, anywhere.

If the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, they can request clarification from Iran. They request clarification from Iran, Oh, please explain to us. If Iran's clarification does not satisfy the IAEA, then the IAEA can request access to such locations—request.

If the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements within 14 days of the IAEA's original request—look at the timeline, Mr. Speaker—

then the joint commission would advise on how to resolve that issue within an additional 7 days; then Iran will have another 3 days to implement such a decision.

Can you keep up with me, ladies and gentlemen? Do the math. Iran actually has 24 days to stall or hide any undeclared nuclear material.

Is that the definition now of anytime, anywhere inspections, Mr. Speaker? I don't think so, and Iran's Defense Minister doesn't think so either. Why do I say that? Just 2 days ago, he said that the IAEA would not be allowed to inspect any of Iran's military sites.

They have been saying over and over again—the Supreme Leader has said the same thing multiple times—Iran will not let foreigners inspect any military center or interview its nuclear scientists.

On top of that, Iran's Foreign Minister and chief negotiator said, just yesterday, that Iran has secured the so-called right to deny the IAEA access to its nuclear sites for inspections.

Iran has also banned American nuclear inspectors from entering any nuclear site or participating on any International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team. No American can participate.

Let's just say, for argument's sake, that Iran is caught cheating, as unlikely as that might be—and I am being facetious obviously—what happens then? Well, it says it right here. It is very clear. The deal states that, if the countries believe that Iran is not meeting its commitment under this agreement, they can refer the issue to the joint commission.

The commission would have 15 days or longer to resolve the issue; then the issue can be referred to the ministers of foreign affairs if the commission could not resolve the issue. That is another 15 days for the ministers, Mr. Speaker.

Let's do the math. We are already up to 30 days at the minimum. Then the compliance participant could request that the issue be considered to the advisory board, which will have another 15 days to issue a nonbinding opinion.

If it is not resolved during this process and the U.N. Security Council gets notified, by the end, another 2 months or so would have passed and given Iran enough time to lobby Russia, China, and the rest of the P5+1 to vote with them so that sanctions are not reimposed.

Remember, Mr. Speaker, sanctions will only be reimposed in the event of a significant nonperformance by Iran. The key word there is "significant."

What does the U.S. consider significant violations? What do the Europeans consider significant violations? What does China consider it? What does Russia and Iran, itself, consider significant violations?

Iran can prevent from sanctions being reimposed, as long as they cheat only in small increments and not significantly. If they just cheat a little bit, they can get away with it.

Additionally, the JCPOA explicitly states: "Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitment under this JCPOA in whole or in part."

Iran is saying: If you put sanctions on us, we don't have to continue with this agreement.

I am not making it up. That is a quote. Even if Iran is caught cheating and we move to reimpose sanctions, as we are entitled to do under the JCPOA, Iran is actually entitled to walk away from the deal.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I feel that Iran will use this as its trump card to bully the P5+1 into not addressing violations or holding Iran accountable for its cheating. Even though the United States has the ability to veto a Security Council vote, choosing not to reimpose sanctions and hold Iran accountable, we must, again, remember that such a veto would unravel this deal, reapply sanctions, and allow Iran to claim it can walk away.

Finally, an effective sanctions regime against Iran that was established over many years cannot be easily re-applied. The idea of snapback sanctions is simply not viable.

Mr. Speaker, I could go on and on about all of the loopholes in this deal. Suffice it to say, we can do better than this. We must do better than this. We owe it to our children and our grandchildren to do better than this.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 2130

#### THE IRAN DEAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 2015, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GOHMERT) for 30 minutes.

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, I both applaud and appreciate the comments by my colleague, a person I love being a colleague with, Ms. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN. These are profound points, excellent points, she has been making about the so-called Iran deal.

What is shocking to me—and I got this copy that a friend was using, but the pages aren't numbered. By the way, Mr. Speaker, when Secretary Kerry came to the Hill today—in having been through briefings by our Secretary previously—I knew that the best use of my time would be in going and reading the deal for myself, which is what I did.

It was interesting. I know that we have been assured over and over publicly that this is such a great deal, that this is what is going to really save the world from the Iranians having a nuclear deal, but there are some very troubling things that I haven't heard anybody mention about this agreement.

Actually, there is a report that there is an outside deal that has to be arranged by the IAEA with Iran in order