Israel	McGovern	Schakowsky
Jackson Lee	McNerney	Schiff
Jeffries	Meeks	Schrader
Johnson (GA)	Meng	Scott (VA)
Jones	Moore	Scott, David
Kaptur	Moulton	Serrano
Keating	Murphy (FL)	Sewell (AL)
Kelly (IL)	Nadler	Sherman
Kennedy	Napolitano	Sinema
Kildee	Neal	Sires
Kilmer	Nolan	Slaughter
Kirkpatrick	Norcross	Smith (WA)
Kuster	O'Rourke	Speier
Langevin	Pallone	Swalwell (CA)
Larsen (WA)	Pascrell	Takai
Larson (CT)	Payne	Takano
Lawrence	Pelosi	Thompson (CA)
Lee	Perlmutter	Thompson (MS)
Levin	Peters	Titus
Lewis	Peterson	Tonko
Lieu, Ted	Pingree	Torres
Lipinski	Pocan	Tsongas
Loebsack	Polis	Van Hollen
Lofgren	Price (NC)	Vargas
Lowenthal	Quigley	Veasey
Lowey	Rangel	Vela
Lujan Grisham (NM)	Rice (NY)	Velázquez
Luján, Ben Ray (NM)	Richmond	Visclosky
Lynch	Roybal-Allard	Walz
Maloney, Carolyn	Ruiz	Wasserman Schultz
Maloney, Sean	Ruppersberger	Waters, Maxine
Matsui	Rush	Watson Coleman
McCollum	Ryan (OH)	Welch
McDermott	Sánchez, Linda T.	Wilson (FL)
	Sanchez, Loretta	Yarmuth
	Sarbanes	

NOT VOTING—8

Byrne	Gohmert	Jolly
Clyburn	Gosar	Kelly (MS)
Davis, Rodney	Hurt (VA)	

□ 1108

Mrs. ROBY and Mr. BRADY of Texas changed their vote from ''nay'' to ''yea.''

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. HURT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I was not present for rollcall vote No. 373 on H. Res. 321. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the question on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal, which the Chair will put de novo.

The question is on the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

□ 1115

DEFENDING PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT ACT

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 321, I call up the bill (H.R. 2146) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow Federal law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers to make penalty-free withdrawals from governmental plans after age 50, and for other purposes, with the Senate amendment thereto, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WOMACK). The Clerk will designate the Senate amendment.

Senate amendment:

On page 3, strike lines 9 through 11 and insert the following:

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to distributions after December 31, 2015.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RYAN OF WISCONSIN

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the motion.

The text of the motion is as follows:

Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin moves that the House concur in the Senate amendment to H.R. 2146 with the amendment printed in House Report 114–167.

The text of the House amendment to the Senate amendment to the text is as follows:

At the end of the Senate amendment, add the following:

TITLE I—TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ''Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

SEC. 102. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

(a) OVERALL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States for agreements subject to the provisions of section 103 are—

(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;

(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and distortions that are directly related to trade and investment and that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade;

(3) to further strengthen the system of international trade and investment disciplines and procedures, including dispute settlement;

(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, enhance the competitiveness of the United States, promote full employment in the United States, and enhance the global economy;

(5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources;

(6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards of the ILO (as set out in section 111(7)) and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights;

(7) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those agreements ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade;

(8) to ensure that trade agreements afford small businesses equal access to international markets, equitable trade benefits, and expanded export market opportunities, and provide for the reduction or elimination of trade and investment barriers that disproportionately impact small businesses;

(9) to promote universal ratification and full compliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor;

(10) to ensure that trade agreements reflect and facilitate the increasingly interrelated, multi-sectoral nature of trade and investment activity;

(11) to recognize the growing significance of the Internet as a trading platform in international commerce;

(12) to take into account other legitimate United States domestic objectives, including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations related thereto; and

(13) to take into account conditions relating to religious freedom of any party to negotiations for a trade agreement with the United States.

(b) PRINCIPAL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—

(1) TRADE IN GOODS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in goods are—

(A) to expand competitive market opportunities for exports of goods from the United States and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, including through the utilization of global value chains, by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade; and

(B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier elimination agreements, including with respect to those tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(2) TRADE IN SERVICES.—(A) The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding trade in services is to expand competitive market opportunities for United States services and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, including through utilization of global value chains, by reducing or eliminating barriers to international trade in services, such as regulatory and other barriers that deny national treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the establishment or operations of service suppliers.

(B) Recognizing that expansion of trade in services generates benefits for all sectors of the economy and facilitates trade, the objective described in subparagraph (A) should be pursued through all means, including through a plurilateral agreement with those countries willing and able to undertake high standard services commitments for both existing and new services.

(3) TRADE IN AGRICULTURE.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk, specialty crop, and value added commodities by—

(A) securing more open and equitable market access through robust rules on sanitary and phytosanitary measures that—

(i) encourage the adoption of international standards and require a science-based justification be provided for a sanitary or phytosanitary measure if the measure is more restrictive than the applicable international standard;

(ii) improve regulatory coherence, promote the use of systems-based approaches, and appropriately recognize the equivalence of health and safety protection systems of exporting countries;

(iii) require that measures are transparently developed and implemented, are based on risk assessments that take into account relevant international guidelines and scientific data, and are not more restrictive

on trade than necessary to meet the intended purpose; and

(iv) improve import check processes, including testing methodologies and procedures, and certification requirements,

while recognizing that countries may put in place measures to protect human, animal, or plant life or health in a manner consistent with their international obligations, including the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (referred to in section 101(d)(3) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(3)));

(B) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or other charges that decrease market opportunities for United States exports—

(i) giving priority to those products that are subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major producing countries; and

(ii) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United States import sensitive products, in close consultation with Congress on such products before initiating tariff reduction negotiations;

(C) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or lower than those in the United States;

(D) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United States;

(E) allowing the preservation of programs that support family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade;

(F) developing disciplines for domestic support programs, so that production that is in excess of domestic food security needs is sold at world prices;

(G) eliminating government policies that create price depressing surpluses;

(H) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever possible;

(I) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules to eliminate practices that unfairly decrease United States market access opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the detriment of the United States, and ensuring that such rules are subject to efficient, timely, and effective dispute settlement, including—

(i) unfair or trade distorting activities of state trading enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of state trading enterprises and such other mechanisms in order to end cross subsidization, price discrimination, and price undercutting;

(ii) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial requirements, such as labeling, that affect new technologies, including biotechnology;

(iii) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including restrictions not based on scientific principles in contravention of obligations in the Uruguay Round Agreements or bilateral or regional trade agreements;

(iv) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and

(v) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate quotas;

(J) eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in perishable or cyclical products, while improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of perishable and cyclical agriculture;

(K) ensuring that import relief mechanisms for perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible and timely to growers in the United States as those mechanisms that are used by other countries;

(L) taking into account whether a party to the negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented obligations under those agreements;

(M) taking into account whether a product is subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of a major producing country to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or by the circumvention by that country of its obligations under those agreements;

(N) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the World Trade Organization have made meaningful market liberalization commitments in agriculture;

(O) taking into account the impact that agreements covering agriculture to which the United States is a party have on the United States agricultural industry;

(P) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs, market development programs, and export credit programs;

(Q) seeking to secure the broadest market access possible in multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, recognizing the effect that simultaneous sets of negotiations may have on United States import sensitive commodities (including those subject to tariff rate quotas);

(R) seeking to develop an international consensus on the treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and in any other relevant area;

(S) seeking to establish the common base year for calculating the Aggregated Measurement of Support (as defined in the Agreement on Agriculture) as the end of each country's Uruguay Round implementation period, as reported in each country's Uruguay Round market access schedule;

(T) ensuring transparency in the administration of tariff rate quotas through multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral negotiations; and

(U) eliminating and preventing the undermining of market access for United States products through improper use of a country's system for protecting or recognizing geographical indications, including failing to ensure transparency and procedural fairness and protecting generic terms.

(4) FOREIGN INVESTMENT.—Recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a high level of protection for investment, consistent with or greater than the level required by international law, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice, by—

(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment;

(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;

(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments;

(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice;

(E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment, consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due process;

(F) providing meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes;

(G) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and a government through—

(i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims and to deter the filing of frivolous claims;

(ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims;

(iii) procedures to enhance opportunities for public input into the formulation of government positions; and

(iv) providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements; and

(H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism, to the extent consistent with the need to protect information that is classified or business confidential, by—

(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public;

(ii) ensuring that—

(I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made public; and

(II) all hearings are open to the public; and

(iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations.

(5) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are—

(A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through—

(i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that agreement; and

(II) ensuring that the provisions of any trade agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law;

(ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing products embodying intellectual property, including in a manner that facilitates legitimate digital trade;

(iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property rights;

(iv) ensuring that standards of protection and enforcement keep pace with technological developments, and in particular ensuring that rightholders have the legal and technological means to control the use of their works through the Internet and other global communication media, and to prevent the unauthorized use of their works;

(v) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement mechanisms; and

(vi) preventing or eliminating government involvement in the violation of intellectual property rights, including cyber theft and piracy;

(B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection; and

(C) to respect the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by the World Trade Organization at the Fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar on November 14, 2001, and to ensure

that trade agreements foster innovation and promote access to medicines.

(6) DIGITAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES AND CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to digital trade in goods and services, as well as cross-border data flows, are—

(A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines, and commitments under the World Trade Organization and bilateral and regional trade agreements apply to digital trade in goods and services and to cross-border data flows;

(B) to ensure that—

(i) electronically delivered goods and services receive no less favorable treatment under trade rules and commitments than like products delivered in physical form; and

(ii) the classification of such goods and services ensures the most liberal trade treatment possible, fully encompassing both existing and new trade;

(C) to ensure that governments refrain from implementing trade-related measures that impede digital trade in goods and services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or processing of data;

(D) with respect to subparagraphs (A) through (C), where legitimate policy objectives require domestic regulations that affect digital trade in goods and services or cross-border data flows, to obtain commitments that any such regulations are the least restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and promote an open market environment; and

(E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.

(7) REGULATORY PRACTICES.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding the use of government regulation or other practices to reduce market access for United States goods, services, and investments are—

(A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for the participation of affected parties in the development of regulations;

(B) to require that proposed regulations be based on sound science, cost benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other objective evidence;

(C) to establish consultative mechanisms and seek other commitments, as appropriate, to improve regulatory practices and promote increased regulatory coherence, including through—

(i) transparency in developing guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for government procurement and other regulatory regimes;

(ii) the elimination of redundancies in testing and certification;

(iii) early consultations on significant regulations;

(iv) the use of impact assessments;

(v) the periodic review of existing regulatory measures; and

(vi) the application of good regulatory practices;

(D) to seek greater openness, transparency, and convergence of standards development processes, and enhance cooperation on standards issues globally;

(E) to promote regulatory compatibility through harmonization, equivalence, or mutual recognition of different regulations and standards and to encourage the use of international and interoperable standards, as appropriate;

(F) to achieve the elimination of government measures such as price controls and reference pricing which deny full market access for United States products;

(G) to ensure that government regulatory reimbursement regimes are transparent, provide procedural fairness, are nondiscriminatory, and provide full market access for United States products; and

(H) to ensure that foreign governments—

(i) demonstrate that the collection of undisclosed proprietary information is limited to that necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory interest; and

(ii) protect such information against disclosure, except in exceptional circumstances to protect the public, or where such information is effectively protected against unfair competition.

(8) STATE-OWNED AND STATE-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding competition by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises is to seek commitments that—

(A) eliminate or prevent trade distortions and unfair competition favoring state-owned and state-controlled enterprises to the extent of their engagement in commercial activity, and

(B) ensure that such engagement is based solely on commercial considerations,

in particular through disciplines that eliminate or prevent discrimination and market-distorting subsidies and that promote transparency.

(9) LOCALIZATION BARRIERS TO TRADE.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to localization barriers is to eliminate and prevent measures that require United States producers and service providers to locate facilities, intellectual property, or other assets in a country as a market access or investment condition, including indigenous innovation measures.

(10) LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the environment are—

(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States—

(i) adopts and maintains measures implementing internationally recognized core labor standards (as defined in section 111(17)) and its obligations under common multilateral environmental agreements (as defined in section 111(6)),

(ii) does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from—

(I) its statutes or regulations implementing internationally recognized core labor standards (as defined in section 111(17)), in a manner affecting trade or investment between the United States and that party, where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with one or more such standards, or

(II) its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws and in a manner affecting trade or investment between the United States and that party, except as provided in its law and provided not inconsistent with its obligations under common multilateral environmental agreements (as defined in section 111(6)) or other provisions of the trade agreement specifically agreed upon, and

(iii) does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,

in a manner affecting trade or investment between the United States and that party after entry into force of a trade agreement between those countries;

(B) to recognize that—

(i) with respect to environment, parties to a trade agreement retain the right to exercise prosecutorial discretion and to make decisions regarding the allocation of enforcement resources with respect to other environmental laws determined to have higher priorities, and a party is effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable, bona fide exercise of such discretion, or results from a reasonable, bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources; and

(ii) with respect to labor, decisions regarding the distribution of enforcement resources are not a reason for not complying with a party's labor obligations; a party to a trade agreement retains the right to reasonable exercise of discretion and to make bona fide decisions regarding the allocation of resources between labor enforcement activities among core labor standards, provided the exercise of such discretion and such decisions are not inconsistent with its obligations;

(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as defined in section 111(7));

(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to protect the environment through the promotion of sustainable development;

(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies that unduly threaten sustainable development;

(F) to seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States environmental technologies, goods, and services;

(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade;

(H) to ensure that enforceable labor and environment obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement and remedies as other enforceable obligations under the agreement; and

(I) to ensure that a trade agreement is not construed to empower a party's authorities to undertake labor or environmental law enforcement activities in the territory of the United States.

(11) CURRENCY.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to currency practices is that parties to a trade agreement with the United States avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other parties to the agreement, such as through cooperative mechanisms, enforceable rules, reporting, monitoring, transparency, or other means, as appropriate.

(12) FOREIGN CURRENCY MANIPULATION.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to unfair currency practices is to seek to establish accountability through enforceable rules, transparency, reporting, monitoring, cooperative mechanisms, or other means to address exchange rate manipulation involving protracted large scale intervention in one direction in the exchange markets and a persistently undervalued foreign exchange rate to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade over other parties to a trade agreement, consistent with existing obligations of the United States as a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.

(13) WTO AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.—Recognizing that the World Trade Organization is the foundation of the global trading system, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding the World Trade Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements are—

(A) to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage of the World Trade Organization and multilateral and plurilateral agreements to products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately covered;

(B) to expand country participation in and enhancement of the Information Technology

Agreement, the Government Procurement Agreement, and other plurilateral trade agreements of the World Trade Organization;

(C) to expand competitive market opportunities for United States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, including through utilization of global value chains, through the negotiation of new WTO multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, such as an agreement on trade facilitation;

(D) to ensure that regional trade agreements to which the United States is not a party fully achieve the high standards of, and comply with, WTO disciplines, including Article XXIV of GATT 1994, Article V and V bis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Enabling Clause, including through meaningful WTO review of such regional trade agreements;

(E) to enhance compliance by WTO members with their obligations as WTO members through active participation in the bodies of the World Trade Organization by the United States and all other WTO members, including in the trade policy review mechanism and the committee system of the World Trade Organization, and by working to increase the effectiveness of such bodies; and

(F) to encourage greater cooperation between the World Trade Organization and other international organizations.

(14) TRADE INSTITUTION TRANSPARENCY.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain wider and broader application of the principle of transparency in the World Trade Organization, entities established under bilateral and regional trade agreements, and other international trade fora through seeking—

(A) timely public access to information regarding trade issues and the activities of such institutions;

(B) openness by ensuring public access to appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submissions, including with regard to trade and investment dispute settlement; and

(C) public access to all notifications and supporting documentation submitted by WTO members.

(15) ANTI-CORRUPTION.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to the use of money or other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper advantage in a manner affecting trade are—

(A) to obtain high standards and effective domestic enforcement mechanisms applicable to persons from all countries participating in the applicable trade agreement that prohibit such attempts to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure any such improper advantage;

(B) to ensure that such standards level the playing field for United States persons in international trade and investment; and

(C) to seek commitments to work jointly to encourage and support anti-corruption and anti-bribery initiatives in international trade fora, including through the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, done at Paris December 17, 1997 (commonly known as the ''OECD Anti-Bribery Convention'').

(16) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are—

(A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing for resolution of disputes between governments under those trade agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable, and reasoned manner, requiring determinations based on facts and the principles of the agreements, with the goal of increasing compliance with the agreements;

(B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization to review compliance with commitments;

(C) to seek adherence by panels convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding and by the Appellate Body to—

(i) the mandate of those panels and the Appellate Body to apply the WTO Agreement as written, without adding to or diminishing rights and obligations under the Agreement; and

(ii) the standard of review applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreement involved in the dispute, including greater deference, where appropriate, to the fact finding and technical expertise of national investigating authorities;

(D) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification and settlement of disputes through consultation;

(E) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations under the agreement;

(F) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to a dispute under the agreement that—

(i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the agreement;

(ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation; and

(iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and

(G) to seek provisions that treat United States principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to—

(i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable agreement;

(ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement procedures; and

(iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.

(17) TRADE REMEDY LAWS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws are—

(A) to preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international safeguard provisions, in order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions; and

(B) to address and remedy market distortions that lead to dumping and subsidization, including overcapacity, cartelization, and market access barriers.

(18) BORDER TAXES.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding border taxes is to obtain a revision of the rules of the World Trade Organization with respect to the treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvantage to countries relying primarily on direct taxes for revenue rather than indirect taxes.

(19) TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade in textiles and apparel articles are to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports of textiles and apparel in foreign markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in textiles and apparel.

(20) COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—With respect to an agreement that is proposed to be entered into with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries and to which section 103(b) will apply, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding commercial partnerships are the following:

(i) To discourage actions by potential trading partners that directly or indirectly prejudice or otherwise discourage commercial activity solely between the United States and Israel.

(ii) To discourage politically motivated actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel and to seek the elimination of politically motivated nontariff barriers on Israeli goods, services, or other commerce imposed on the State of Israel.

(iii) To seek the elimination of state-sponsored unsanctioned foreign boycotts against Israel or compliance with the Arab League Boycott of Israel by prospective trading partners.

(B) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the term ''actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel'' means actions by states, non-member states of the United Nations, international organizations, or affiliated agencies of international organizations that are politically motivated and are intended to penalize or otherwise limit commercial relations specifically with Israel or persons doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories.

(21) GOOD GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF LEGAL REGIMES, AND THE RULE OF LAW OF TRADING PARTNERS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to ensuring implementation of trade commitments and obligations by strengthening good governance, transparency, the effective operation of legal regimes and the rule of law of trading partners of the United States is through capacity building and other appropriate means, which are important parts of the broader effort to create more open democratic societies and to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights.

(c) CAPACITY BUILDING AND OTHER PRIORITIES.—In order to address and maintain United States competitiveness in the global economy, the President shall—

(1) direct the heads of relevant Federal agencies—

(A) to work to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to carry out obligations under trade agreements by consulting with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that country's laws relating to customs and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights, labor, and the environment; and

(B) to provide technical assistance to that country if needed;

(2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to develop and implement standards for the protection of the environment and human health based on sound science;

(3) promote consideration of multilateral environmental agreements and consult with parties to such agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement that includes trade measures with existing environmental exceptions under Article XX of GATT 1994; and

(4) submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate an

annual report on capacity-building activities undertaken in connection with trade agreements negotiated or being negotiated pursuant to this title.

SEC. 103. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

(a) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF BARRIERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Whenever the President determines that one or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President—

(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries before—

(i) July 1, 2018; or

(ii) July 1, 2021, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c); and

(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim—

(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,

(ii) such continuance of existing duty free or excise treatment, or

(iii) such additional duties,

as the President determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.

Substantial modifications to, or substantial additional provisions of, a trade agreement entered into after July 1, 2018, or July 1, 2021, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c), shall not be eligible for approval under this title.

(2) NOTIFICATION.—The President shall notify Congress of the President's intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.

(3) LIMITATIONS.—No proclamation may be made under paragraph (1) that—

(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date of enactment;

(B) reduces the rate of duty below that applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreements or a successor agreement, on any import sensitive agricultural product; or

(C) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4) AGGREGATE REDUCTION; EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—

(A) AGGREGATE REDUCTION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in effect on such day if—

(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 1/10 of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement with respect to such article; and

(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the effective date of such first reduction.

(B) EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—No staging is required under subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that is not produced in the United States. The United States International Trade Commission shall advise the President of the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging under this subparagraph.

(5) ROUNDING.—If the President determines that such action will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph (4), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount equal to the lesser of—

(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or

(B) ½ of 1 percent ad valorem.

(6) OTHER LIMITATIONS.—A rate of duty reduction that may not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (3) may take effect only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included within an implementing bill provided for under section 106 and that bill is enacted into law.

(7) OTHER TARIFF MODIFICATIONS.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1)(B), (3)(A), (3)(C), and (4) through (6), and subject to the consultation and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3524), the President may proclaim the modification of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(5)), if the United States agrees to such modification or staged rate reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.

(8) AUTHORITY UNDER URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT NOT AFFECTED.—Nothing in this subsection shall limit the authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(b) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF AND NONTARIFF BARRIERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—(A) Whenever the President determines that—

(i) 1 or more existing duties or any other import restriction of any foreign country or the United States or any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the United States economy, or

(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the period described in subparagraph (C).

(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for—

(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A); or

(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition of, such barrier or other distortion.

(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under this paragraph before—

(i) July 1, 2018; or

(ii) July 1, 2021, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c).

Substantial modifications to, or substantial additional provisions of, a trade agreement entered into after July 1, 2018, or July 1, 2021, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c), shall not be eligible for approval under this title.

(2) CONDITIONS.—A trade agreement may be entered into under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 102 and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in sections 104 and 105.

(3) BILLS QUALIFYING FOR TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—(A) The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this title referred to as ''trade authorities procedures'') apply to a bill of either House of Congress which contains provisions described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall hereafter in this title be referred to as an ''implementing bill''.

(B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are—

(i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into under this subsection and approving the statement of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such trade agreement; and

(ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority are required to implement such trade agreement or agreements, only such provisions as are strictly necessary or appropriate to implement such trade agreement or agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority.

(c) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL PROCESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in section 106(b)—

(A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) before July 1, 2018; and

(B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) after June 30, 2018, and before July 1, 2021, if (and only if)—

(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph (2); and

(ii) neither House of Congress adopts an extension disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before July 1, 2018.

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT.—If the President is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures should be extended to implementing bills described in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to Congress, not later than April 1, 2018, a written report that contains a request for such extension, together with—

(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule for submitting such agreements to Congress for approval;

(B) a description of the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title, and a statement that such progress justifies the continuation of negotiations; and

(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed to complete the negotiations.

(3) OTHER REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—

(A) REPORT BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—The President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the decision of the President to submit a report to Congress under paragraph (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to Congress as soon as practicable, but not later than June 1, 2018, a written report that contains—

(i) its views regarding the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title; and

(ii) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) should be approved or disapproved.

(B) REPORT BY INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.—The President shall promptly inform the United States International Trade Commission of the decision of the President to submit a report to Congress under paragraph (2). The International Trade Commission shall submit to Congress as soon as practicable, but not later than June 1, 2018,

a written report that contains a review and analysis of the economic impact on the United States of all trade agreements implemented between the date of the enactment of this Act and the date on which the President decides to seek an extension requested under paragraph (2).

(4) STATUS OF REPORTS.—The reports submitted to Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, may be classified to the extent the President determines appropriate.

(5) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS.—(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ''extension disapproval resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ''That the _____ disapproves the request of the President for the extension, under section 103(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, of the trade authorities procedures under that Act to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) of that Act after June 30, 2018.'', with the blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House of Congress.

(B) Extension disapproval resolutions—

(i) may be introduced in either House of Congress by any member of such House; and

(ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules.

(C) The provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.

(D) It is not in order for—

(i) the House of Representatives to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules;

(ii) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance; or

(iii) either House of Congress to consider an extension disapproval resolution after June 30, 2018.

(d) COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS.—In order to contribute to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or service sector, and expand existing sectoral agreements to countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases where the President determines that such negotiations are feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such sectors include agriculture, commercial services, intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods, government procurement, information technology products, environmental technology and services, medical equipment and services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products. In so doing, the President shall take into account all of the negotiating objectives set forth in section 102.

SEC. 104. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, CONSULTATIONS, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION.

(a) CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—

(1) CONSULTATIONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS.—In the course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(A) meet upon request with any Member of Congress regarding negotiating objectives, the status of negotiations in progress, and the nature of any changes in the laws of the United States or the administration of those laws that may be recommended to Congress to carry out any trade agreement or any requirement of, amendment to, or recommendation under, that agreement;

(B) upon request of any Member of Congress, provide access to pertinent documents relating to the negotiations, including classified materials;

(C) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(D) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the House Advisory Group on Negotiations and the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations convened under subsection (c) and all committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over laws that could be affected by a trade agreement resulting from the negotiations; and

(E) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate.

(2) CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE.—Prior to exchanging notes providing for the entry into force of a trade agreement, the United States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a timely basis with Members of Congress and committees as specified in paragraph (1), and keep them fully apprised of the measures a trading partner has taken to comply with those provisions of the agreement that are to take effect on the date that the agreement enters into force.

(3) ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH CONGRESS.—

(A) WRITTEN GUIDELINES.—The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and the ranking members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, respectively—

(i) shall, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop written guidelines on enhanced coordination with Congress, including coordination with designated congressional advisers under subsection (b), regarding negotiations conducted under this title; and

(ii) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be necessary from time to time.

(B) CONTENT OF GUIDELINES.—The guidelines developed under subparagraph (A) shall enhance coordination with Congress through procedures to ensure—

(i) timely briefings upon request of any Member of Congress regarding negotiating objectives, the status of negotiations in progress conducted under this title, and the nature of any changes in the laws of the United States or the administration of those laws that may be recommended to Congress to carry out any trade agreement or any requirement of, amendment to, or recommendation under, that agreement; and

(ii) the sharing of detailed and timely information with Members of Congress, and their staff with proper security clearances as appropriate, regarding those negotiations and pertinent documents related to those negotiations (including classified information), and with committee staff with proper security clearances as would be appropriate in the light of the responsibilities of that committee over the trade agreements programs affected by those negotiations.

(C) DISSEMINATION.—The United States Trade Representative shall disseminate the guidelines developed under subparagraph (A) to all Federal agencies that could have jurisdiction over laws affected by trade negotiations.

(b) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS.—

(1) DESIGNATION.—

(A) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—In each Congress, any Member of the House of Representatives may be designated as a congressional adviser on trade policy and negotiations by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consulting with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means and the chairman and ranking member of the committee from which the Member will be selected.

(B) SENATE.—In each Congress, any Member of the Senate may be designated as a congressional adviser on trade policy and negotiations by the President pro tempore of the Senate, after consultation with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Finance and the chairman and ranking member of the committee from which the Member will be selected.

(2) CONSULTATIONS WITH DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS.—In the course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a timely basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional advisers for trade policy and negotiations designated under paragraph (1).

(3) ACCREDITATION.—Each Member of Congress designated as a congressional adviser under paragraph (1) shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President as an official adviser to the United States delegations to international conferences, meetings, and negotiating sessions relating to trade agreements.

(c) CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY GROUPS ON NEGOTIATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—By not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days after the convening of each Congress, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives shall convene the House Advisory Group on Negotiations and the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate shall convene the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations (in this subsection referred to collectively as the ''congressional advisory groups'').

(2) MEMBERS AND FUNCTIONS.—

(A) MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE ADVISORY GROUP ON NEGOTIATIONS.—In each Congress, the House Advisory Group on Negotiations shall be comprised of the following Members of the House of Representatives:

(i) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).

(ii) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of the committees of the House of Representatives that would have, under the Rules of the House of Representatives, jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade agreement negotiation conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this title would apply.

(B) MEMBERSHIP OF THE SENATE ADVISORY GROUP ON NEGOTIATIONS.—In each Congress, the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations shall be comprised of the following Members of the Senate:

(i) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).

(ii) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of the committees of the

Senate that would have, under the Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade agreement negotiation conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this title would apply.

(C) ACCREDITATION.—Each member of the congressional advisory groups described in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B)(i) shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President as an official adviser to the United States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to which this title applies. Each member of the congressional advisory groups described in subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(ii) shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President as an official adviser to the United States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the member is in one of the congressional advisory groups.

(D) CONSULTATION AND ADVICE.—The congressional advisory groups shall consult with and provide advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, the development of the applicable trade agreement, and compliance and enforcement of the negotiated commitments under the trade agreement.

(E) CHAIR.—The House Advisory Group on Negotiations shall be chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations shall be chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(F) COORDINATION WITH OTHER COMMITTEES.—Members of any committee represented on one of the congressional advisory groups may submit comments to the member of the appropriate congressional advisory group from that committee regarding any matter related to a negotiation for any trade agreement to which this title applies.

(3) GUIDELINES.—

(A) PURPOSE AND REVISION.—The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and the ranking members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, respectively—

(i) shall, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade Representative and the congressional advisory groups; and

(ii) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be necessary from time to time.

(B) CONTENT.—The guidelines developed under subparagraph (A) shall provide for, among other things—

(i) detailed briefings on a fixed timetable to be specified in the guidelines of the congressional advisory groups regarding negotiating objectives and positions and the status of the applicable negotiations, beginning as soon as practicable after the congressional advisory groups are convened, with more frequent briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;

(ii) access by members of the congressional advisory groups, and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent documents relating to the negotiations, including classified materials;

(iii) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade Representative and the congressional advisory groups at all critical periods during the negotiations, including at negotiation sites;

(iv) after the applicable trade agreement is concluded, consultation regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of negotiated commitments under the trade agreement; and

(v) the timeframe for submitting the report required under section 105(d)(3).

(4) REQUEST FOR MEETING.—Upon the request of a majority of either of the congressional advisory groups, the President shall meet with that congressional advisory group before initiating negotiations with respect to a trade agreement, or at any other time concerning the negotiations.

(d) CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC.—

(1) GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT.—The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and the ranking members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, respectively—

(A) shall, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop written guidelines on public access to information regarding negotiations conducted under this title; and

(B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be necessary from time to time.

(2) PURPOSES.—The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) facilitate transparency;

(B) encourage public participation; and

(C) promote collaboration in the negotiation process.

(3) CONTENT.—The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall include procedures that—

(A) provide for rapid disclosure of information in forms that the public can readily find and use; and

(B) provide frequent opportunities for public input through Federal Register requests for comment and other means.

(4) DISSEMINATION.—The United States Trade Representative shall disseminate the guidelines developed under paragraph (1) to all Federal agencies that could have jurisdiction over laws affected by trade negotiations.

(e) CONSULTATIONS WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEES.—

(1) GUIDELINES FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEES.—The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and the ranking members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, respectively—

(A) shall, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop written guidelines on enhanced coordination with advisory committees established pursuant to section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) regarding negotiations conducted under this title; and

(B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be necessary from time to time.

(2) CONTENT.—The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall enhance coordination with advisory committees described in that paragraph through procedures to ensure—

(A) timely briefings of advisory committees and regular opportunities for advisory committees to provide input throughout the negotiation process on matters relevant to the sectors or functional areas represented by those committees; and

(B) the sharing of detailed and timely information with each member of an advisory committee regarding negotiations and pertinent documents related to the negotiation (including classified information) on matters relevant to the sectors or functional areas the member represents, and with a designee with proper security clearances of each such member as appropriate.

(3) DISSEMINATION.—The United States Trade Representative shall disseminate the guidelines developed under paragraph (1) to all Federal agencies that could have jurisdiction over laws affected by trade negotiations.

(f) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION OF CHIEF TRANSPARENCY OFFICER IN THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE.—Section 141(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2171(b)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

''(3) There shall be in the Office one Chief Transparency Officer. The Chief Transparency Officer shall consult with Congress on transparency policy, coordinate transparency in trade negotiations, engage and assist the public, and advise the United States Trade Representative on transparency policy.''.

SEC. 105. NOTICE, CONSULTATIONS, AND REPORTS.

(a) NOTICE, CONSULTATIONS, AND REPORTS BEFORE NEGOTIATION.—

(1) NOTICE.—The President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 103(b), shall—

(A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating negotiations with a country, written notice to Congress of the President's intention to enter into the negotiations with that country and set forth in the notice the date on which the President intends to initiate those negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the negotiations with that country, and whether the President intends to seek an agreement, or changes to an existing agreement;

(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, such other committees of the House and Senate as the President deems appropriate, and the House Advisory Group on Negotiations and the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations convened under section 104(c);

(C) upon the request of a majority of the members of either the House Advisory Group on Negotiations or the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations convened under section 104(c), meet with the requesting congressional advisory group before initiating the negotiations or at any other time concerning the negotiations; and

(D) after consulting with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance, and at least 30 calendar days before initiating negotiations with a country, publish on a publicly available Internet website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and regularly update thereafter, a detailed and comprehensive summary of the specific objectives with respect to the negotiations, and a description of how the agreement, if successfully concluded, will further those objectives and benefit the United States.

(2) NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING AGRICULTURE.—

(A) ASSESSMENT AND CONSULTATIONS FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT.—Before initiating or continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related to the subject matter under section 102(b)(3)(B) with any country, the President shall—

(i) assess whether United States tariffs on agricultural products that were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country;

(ii) consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with respect to imports from the United States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity; and

(iii) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met.

(B) SPECIAL CONSULTATIONS ON IMPORT SENSITIVE PRODUCTS.—(i) Before initiating negotiations with regard to agriculture and, with respect to agreements described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 107(a), as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(I) identify those agricultural products subject to tariff rate quotas on the date of enactment of this Act, and agricultural products subject to tariff reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5 percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on December 31, 1994;

(II) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning—

(aa) whether any further tariff reductions on the products identified under subclause (I) should be appropriate, taking into account the impact of any such tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the product concerned;

(bb) whether the products so identified face unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not based on scientific principles in contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements; and

(cc) whether the countries participating in the negotiations maintain export subsidies or other programs, policies, or practices that distort world trade in such products and the impact of such programs, policies, and practices on United States producers of the products;

(III) request that the International Trade Commission prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of any such tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the product concerned and on the United States economy as a whole; and

(IV) upon complying with subclauses (I), (II), and (III), notify the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate of those products identified under subclause (I) for which the Trade Representative intends to seek tariff liberalization in the negotiations and the reasons for seeking such tariff liberalization.

(ii) If, after negotiations described in clause (i) are commenced—

(I) the United States Trade Representative identifies any additional agricultural product described in clause (i)(I) for tariff reductions which were not the subject of a notification under clause (i)(IV), or

(II) any additional agricultural product described in clause (i)(I) is the subject of a request for tariff reductions by a party to the negotiations,

the Trade Representative shall, as soon as practicable, notify the committees referred to in clause (i)(IV) of those products and the reasons for seeking such tariff reductions.

(3) NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FISHING INDUSTRY.—Before initiating, or continuing, negotiations that directly relate to fish or shellfish trade with any country, the President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and shall keep the Committees apprised of the negotiations on an ongoing and timely basis.

(4) NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING TEXTILES.—Before initiating or continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related to textiles and apparel products with any country, the President shall—

(A) assess whether United States tariffs on textile and apparel products that were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country and whether the negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity; and

(B) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met.

(5) ADHERENCE TO EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENT OBLIGATIONS.—In determining whether to enter into negotiations with a particular country, the President shall take into account the extent to which that country has implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its international trade and investment commitments to the United States, including pursuant to the WTO Agreement.

(b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS BEFORE ENTRY INTO AGREEMENT.—

(1) CONSULTATION.—Before entering into any trade agreement under section 103(b), the President shall consult with—

(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and each joint committee of Congress, which has jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters which would be affected by the trade agreement; and

(C) the House Advisory Group on Negotiations and the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations convened under section 104(c).

(2) SCOPE.—The consultation described in paragraph (1) shall include consultation with respect to—

(A) the nature of the agreement;

(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title; and

(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 106, including the general effect of the agreement on existing laws.

(3) REPORT REGARDING UNITED STATES TRADE REMEDY LAWS.—

(A) CHANGES IN CERTAIN TRADE LAWS.—The President, not less than 180 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into a trade agreement under section 103(b), shall report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate—

(i) the range of proposals advanced in the negotiations with respect to that agreement, that may be in the final agreement, and that could require amendments to title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.) or to chapter 1 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.); and

(ii) how these proposals relate to the objectives described in section 102(b)(16).

(B) RESOLUTIONS.—(i) At any time after the transmission of the report under subparagraph (A), if a resolution is introduced with respect to that report in either House of Congress, the procedures set forth in clauses (iii) through (vii) shall apply to that resolution if—

(I) no other resolution with respect to that report has previously been reported in that House of Congress by the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance, as the case may be, pursuant to those procedures; and

(II) no procedural disapproval resolution under section 106(b) introduced with respect to a trade agreement entered into pursuant to the negotiations to which the report under subparagraph (A) relates has previously been reported in that House of Congress by the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ''resolution'' means only a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ''That the _____ finds that the proposed changes to United States trade remedy laws contained in the report of the President transmitted to Congress on _____ under section 105(b)(3) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 with respect to _____, are inconsistent with the negotiating objectives described in section 102(b)(16) of that Act.'', with the first blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House of Congress, the second blank space being filled with the appropriate date of the report, and the third blank space being filled with the name of the country or countries involved.

(iii) Resolutions in the House of Representatives—

(I) may be introduced by any Member of the House;

(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and

(III) may not be amended by either Committee.

(iv) Resolutions in the Senate—

(I) may be introduced by any Member of the Senate;

(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Finance; and

(III) may not be amended.

(v) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to consider any resolution that is not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules.

(vi) It is not in order for the Senate to consider any resolution that is not reported by the Committee on Finance.

(vii) The provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192) (relating to floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) shall apply to resolutions.

(4) ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORTS.—The report required under section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(e)(1)) regarding any trade agreement entered into under subsection (a) or (b) of section 103 shall be provided to the President, Congress, and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 days after the date on which the President notifies Congress under section 103(a)(2) or 106(a)(1)(A) of the intention of the President to enter into the agreement.

(c) INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION ASSESSMENT.—

(1) SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION TO COMMISSION.—The President, not later than 90 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into a trade agreement under section 103(b), shall provide the International Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as the ''Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit an assessment of the

agreement as described in paragraph (2). Between the time the President makes the request under this paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment, the President shall keep the Commission current with respect to the details of the agreement.

(2) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 105 calendar days after the President enters into a trade agreement under section 103(b), the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report assessing the likely impact of the agreement on the United States economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors, including the impact the agreement will have on the gross domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and competitive position of industries likely to be significantly affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States consumers.

(3) REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE.—In preparing the assessment under paragraph (2), the Commission shall review available economic assessments regarding the agreement, including literature regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, and shall provide in its assessment a description of the analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the various analyses and conclusions, including those of the Commission regarding the agreement.

(4) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The President shall make each assessment under paragraph (2) available to the public.

(d) REPORTS SUBMITTED TO COMMITTEES WITH AGREEMENT.—

(1) ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—The President shall—

(A) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141 (64 Fed. Reg. 63169), dated November 16, 1999, and its relevant guidelines; and

(B) submit a report on those reviews and on the content and operation of consultative mechanisms established pursuant to section 102(c) to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate at the time the President submits to Congress a copy of the final legal text of an agreement pursuant to section 106(a)(1)(E).

(2) EMPLOYMENT IMPACT REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—The President shall—

(A) review the impact of future trade agreements on United States employment, including labor markets, modeled after Executive Order 13141 (64 Fed. Reg. 63169) to the extent appropriate in establishing procedures and criteria; and

(B) submit a report on such reviews to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate at the time the President submits to Congress a copy of the final legal text of an agreement pursuant to section 106(a)(1)(E).

(3) REPORT ON LABOR RIGHTS.—The President shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, on a timeframe determined in accordance with section 104(c)(3)(B)(v)—

(A) a meaningful labor rights report of the country, or countries, with respect to which the President is negotiating; and

(B) a description of any provisions that would require changes to the labor laws and labor practices of the United States.

(4) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The President shall make all reports required under this subsection available to the public.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT PLAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—At the time the President submits to Congress a copy of the final legal text of an agreement pursuant to section 106(a)(1)(E), the President shall also submit to Congress a plan for implementing and enforcing the agreement.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The implementation and enforcement plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) BORDER PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.—A description of additional personnel required at border entry points, including a list of additional customs and agricultural inspectors.

(B) AGENCY STAFFING REQUIREMENTS.—A description of additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, including personnel required by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture (including additional personnel required to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to obtain market access for United States exports), the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be necessary.

(C) CUSTOMS INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS.—A description of the additional equipment and facilities needed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

(D) IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—A description of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and local governments as a result of increases in trade.

(E) COST ANALYSIS.—An analysis of the costs associated with each of the items listed in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

(3) BUDGET SUBMISSION.—The President shall include a request for the resources necessary to support the plan required by paragraph (1) in the first budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, after the date of the submission of the plan.

(4) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The President shall make the plan required under this subsection available to the public.

(f) OTHER REPORTS.—

(1) REPORT ON PENALTIES.—Not later than one year after the imposition by the United States of a penalty or remedy permitted by a trade agreement to which this title applies, the President shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report on the effectiveness of the penalty or remedy applied under United States law in enforcing United States rights under the trade agreement, which shall address whether the penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the dispute.

(2) REPORT ON IMPACT OF TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 5 years thereafter, the United States International Trade Commission shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report on the economic impact on the United States of all trade agreements with respect to which Congress has enacted an implementing bill under trade authorities procedures since January 1, 1984.

(3) ENFORCEMENT CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.—(A) The United States Trade Representative shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate after acceptance of a petition for review or taking an enforcement action in regard to an obligation under a trade agreement, including a labor or environmental obligation. During such consultations, the United States Trade Representative shall describe the matter, including the basis for such action and the application of any relevant legal obligations.

(B) As part of the report required pursuant to section 163 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2213), the President shall report annually to Congress on enforcement actions taken pursuant to a trade agreement to which the United States is a party, as well as on any public reports issued by Federal agencies on enforcement matters relating to a trade agreement.

(g) ADDITIONAL COORDINATION WITH MEMBERS.—Any Member of the House of Representatives may submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and any Member of the Senate may submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate the views of that Member on any matter relevant to a proposed trade agreement, and the relevant Committee shall receive those views for consideration.

SEC. 106. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) NOTIFICATION AND SUBMISSION.—Any agreement entered into under section 103(b) shall enter into force with respect to the United States if (and only if)—

(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into the trade agreement, notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the President's intention to enter into the agreement, and promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the Federal Register;

(B) the President, at least 60 days before the day on which the President enters into the agreement, publishes the text of the agreement on a publicly available Internet website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative;

(C) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the President submits to Congress a description of those changes to existing laws that the President considers would be required in order to bring the United States into compliance with the agreement;

(D) the President, at least 30 days before submitting to Congress the materials under subparagraph (E), submits to Congress—

(i) a draft statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the agreement; and

(ii) a copy of the final legal text of the agreement;

(E) after entering into the agreement, the President submits to Congress, on a day on which both Houses of Congress are in session, a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, together with—

(i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 103(b)(3);

(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the trade agreement; and

(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph (2)(A);

(F) the implementing bill is enacted into law; and

(G) the President, not later than 30 days before the date on which the agreement enters into force with respect to a party to the agreement, submits written notice to Congress that the President has determined that the party has taken measures necessary to comply with those provisions of the agreement that are to take effect on the date on which the agreement enters into force.

(2) SUPPORTING INFORMATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The supporting information required under paragraph (1)(E)(iii) consists of—

(i) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law; and

(ii) a statement—

(I) asserting that the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title; and

(II) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding—

(aa) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives referred to in subclause (I);

(bb) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an agreement previously negotiated;

(cc) how the agreement serves the interests of United States commerce; and

(dd) how the implementing bill meets the standards set forth in section 103(b)(3).

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The President shall make the supporting information described in subparagraph (A) available to the public.

(3) RECIPROCAL BENEFITS.—In order to ensure that a foreign country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) does not receive benefits under the agreement unless the country is also subject to the obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only to the parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement.

(4) DISCLOSURE OF COMMITMENTS.—Any agreement or other understanding with a foreign government or governments (whether oral or in writing) that—

(A) relates to a trade agreement with respect to which Congress enacts an implementing bill under trade authorities procedures; and

(B) is not disclosed to Congress before an implementing bill with respect to that agreement is introduced in either House of Congress,

shall not be considered to be part of the agreement approved by Congress and shall have no force and effect under United States law or in any dispute settlement body.

(b) LIMITATIONS ON TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(1) FOR LACK OF NOTICE OR CONSULTATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or trade agreements entered into under section 103(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the date that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for lack of notice or consultations with respect to such trade agreement or agreements, the other House separately agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution with respect to such trade agreement or agreements.

(B) PROCEDURAL DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—(i) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ''procedural disapproval resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ''That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 on negotiations with respect to _____ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to such trade agreement or agreements.'', with the blank space being filled with a description of the trade agreement or agreements with respect to which the President is considered to have failed or refused to notify or consult.

(ii) For purposes of clause (i) and paragraphs (3)(C) and (4)(C), the President has ''failed or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015'' on negotiations with respect to a trade agreement or trade agreements if—

(I) the President has failed or refused to consult (as the case may be) in accordance with sections 104 and 105 and this section with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements;

(II) guidelines under section 104 have not been developed or met with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements;

(III) the President has not met with the House Advisory Group on Negotiations or the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations pursuant to a request made under section 104(c)(4) with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements; or

(IV) the agreement or agreements fail to make progress in achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title.

(2) PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS.—(A) Procedural disapproval resolutions—

(i) in the House of Representatives—

(I) may be introduced by any Member of the House;

(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and

(III) may not be amended by either Committee; and

(ii) in the Senate—

(I) may be introduced by any Member of the Senate;

(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Finance; and

(III) may not be amended.

(B) The provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to a procedural disapproval resolution introduced with respect to a trade agreement if no other procedural disapproval resolution with respect to that trade agreement has previously been reported in that House of Congress by the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance, as the case may be, and if no resolution described in clause (ii) of section 105(b)(3)(B) with respect to that trade agreement has been reported in that House of Congress by the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance, as the case may be, pursuant to the procedures set forth in clauses (iii) through (vii) of such section.

(C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules.

(D) It is not in order for the Senate to consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance.

(3) CONSIDERATION IN SENATE OF CONSULTATION AND COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION TO REMOVE TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(A) REPORTING OF RESOLUTION.—If, when the Committee on Finance of the Senate meets on whether to report an implementing bill with respect to a trade agreement or agreements entered into under section 103(b), the committee fails to favorably report the bill, the committee shall report a resolution described in subparagraph (C).

(B) APPLICABILITY OF TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply in the Senate to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or agreements described in subparagraph (A) if the Committee on Finance reports a resolution described in subparagraph (C) and such resolution is agreed to by the Senate.

(C) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—A resolution described in this subparagraph is a resolution of the Senate originating from the Committee on Finance the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ''That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 on negotiations with respect to _____ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act shall not apply in the Senate to any implementing bill submitted with respect to such trade agreement or agreements.'', with the blank space being filled with a description of the trade agreement or agreements described in subparagraph (A).

(D) PROCEDURES.—If the Senate does not agree to a motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to a resolution described in subparagraph (C), the resolution shall be committed to the Committee on Finance.

(4) CONSIDERATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF A CONSULTATION AND COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION.—

(A) QUALIFICATIONS FOR REPORTING RESOLUTION.—If—

(i) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives reports an implementing bill with respect to a trade agreement or agreements entered into under section 103(b) with other than a favorable recommendation; and

(ii) a Member of the House of Representatives has introduced a consultation and compliance resolution on the legislative day following the filing of a report to accompany the implementing bill with other than a favorable recommendation,

then the Committee on Ways and Means shall consider a consultation and compliance resolution pursuant to subparagraph (B).

(B) COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF A QUALIFYING RESOLUTION.—(i) Not later than the fourth legislative day after the date of introduction of the resolution, the Committee on Ways and Means shall meet to consider a resolution meeting the qualifications set forth in subparagraph (A).

(ii) After consideration of one such resolution by the Committee on Ways and Means, this subparagraph shall not apply to any other such resolution.

(iii) If the Committee on Ways and Means has not reported the resolution by the sixth legislative day after the date of its introduction, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the resolution.

(C) CONSULTATION AND COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—A consultation and compliance resolution—

(i) is a resolution of the House of Representatives, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ''That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 on negotiations with respect to _____ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act shall not apply in the House of Representatives to any implementing bill submitted with respect to such trade agreement or agreements.'', with the blank space being filled with a description of the trade agreement or agreements described in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.

(D) APPLICABILITY OF TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply in the House of Representatives to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or agreements which are the object of a consultation and compliance resolution if such resolution is adopted by the House.

(5) FOR FAILURE TO MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Not later than December 15, 2015, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the United States Trade Representative, shall transmit to Congress a report setting forth the strategy of the executive branch to address concerns of Congress regarding whether dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization have added to obligations, or diminished rights, of the United States, as described in section 102(b)(15)(C). Trade authorities procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill with respect to an agreement negotiated under the auspices of the World Trade Organization unless the Secretary of Commerce has issued such report by the deadline specified in this paragraph.

(6) LIMITATIONS ON PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or trade agreements entered into under section 103(b) with a country to which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking are applicable and the government of which does not fully comply with such standards and is not making significant efforts to bring the country into compliance (commonly referred to as a ''tier 3'' country), as determined in the most recent annual report on trafficking in persons submitted under section 110(b)(1) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)).

(B) MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAFFICKING DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ''minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking'' means the standards set forth in section 108 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106).

(c) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—Subsection (b) of this section, section 103(c), and section 105(b)(3) are enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such other rules; and

(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House.

SEC. 107. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

(a) CERTAIN AGREEMENTS.—Notwithstanding the prenegotiation notification and consultation requirement described in section 105(a), if an agreement to which section 103(b) applies—

(1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization,

(2) is entered into with the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries with respect to which notifications have been made in a manner consistent with section 105(a)(1)(A) as of the date of the enactment of this Act,

(3) is entered into with the European Union,

(4) is an agreement with respect to international trade in services entered into with WTO members with respect to which a notification has been made in a manner consistent with section 105(a)(1)(A) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or

(5) is an agreement with respect to environmental goods entered into with WTO members with respect to which a notification has been made in a manner consistent with section 105(a)(1)(A) as of the date of the enactment of this Act,

and results from negotiations that were commenced before the date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall apply.

(b) TREATMENT OF AGREEMENTS.—In the case of any agreement to which subsection (a) applies, the applicability of the trade authorities procedures to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to the requirements of section 105(a) (relating only to notice prior to initiating negotiations), and any resolution under paragraph (1)(B), (3)(C), or (4)(C) of section 106(b) shall not be in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with the provisions of section 105(a), if (and only if) the President, as soon as feasible after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(1) notifies Congress of the negotiations described in subsection (a), the specific United States objectives in the negotiations, and whether the President is seeking a new agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and

(2) before and after submission of the notice, consults regarding the negotiations with the committees referred to in section 105(a)(1)(B) and the House and Senate Advisory Groups on Negotiations convened under section 104(c).

SEC. 108. SOVEREIGNTY.

(a) UNITED STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN EVENT OF CONFLICT.—No provision of any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b), nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States, any State of the United States, or any locality of the United States shall have effect.

(b) AMENDMENTS OR MODIFICATIONS OF UNITED STATES LAW.—No provision of any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) shall prevent the United States, any State of the United States, or any locality of the United States from amending or modifying any law of the United States, that State, or that locality (as the case may be).

(c) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS.—Reports, including findings and recommendations, issued by dispute settlement panels convened pursuant to any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) shall have no binding effect on the law of the United States, the Government of the United States, or the law or government of any State or locality of the United States.

SEC. 109. INTERESTS OF SMALL BUSINESSES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Trade Representative should facilitate participation by small businesses in the trade negotiation process; and

(2) the functions of the Office of the United States Trade Representative relating to small businesses should continue to be reflected in the title of the Assistant United States Trade Representative assigned the responsibility for small businesses.

(b) CONSIDERATION OF SMALL BUSINESS INTERESTS.—The Assistant United States Trade Representative for Small Business, Market Access, and Industrial Competitiveness shall be responsible for ensuring that the interests of small businesses are considered in all trade negotiations in accordance with the objective described in section 102(a)(8).

SEC. 110. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS; APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS.

(a) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) ADVICE FROM UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.—Section 131 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ''section 2103(a) or (b) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''subsection (a) or (b) of section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ''section 2103(b) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103(b) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015'';

(B) in subsection (b), by striking ''section 2103(a)(3)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103(a)(4)(A) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(C) in subsection (c), by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103(a) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(2) HEARINGS.—Section 132 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2152) is amended by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(3) PUBLIC HEARINGS.—Section 133(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2153(a)) is amended by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(4) PREREQUISITES FOR OFFERS.—Section 134 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2154) is amended by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' each place it appears and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(5) INFORMATION AND ADVICE FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS.—Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(B) in subsection (e)—

(i) in paragraph (1)—

(I) by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' each place it appears and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(II) by striking ''not later than the date on which the President notifies the Congress under section 2105(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''not later than the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President notifies Congress under section 106(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ''section 2102 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 102 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(6) PROCEDURES RELATING TO IMPLEMENTING BILLS.—Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2191) is amended—

(A) in subsection (b)(1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ''section 2105(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 106(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''; and

(B) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ''section 2105(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 106(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(7) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 162(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ''section 2103 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002'' and inserting ''section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015''.

(b) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS.—For purposes of applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136, and 2137)—

(1) any trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 or 2112), as appropriate; and

(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2112).

SEC. 111. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE.—The term ''Agreement on Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section 101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(2)).

(2) AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS.—The term ''Agreement on Safeguards'' means the agreement referred to in section 101(d)(13) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(13)).

(3) AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES.—The term ''Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures'' means the agreement referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).

(4) ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT.—The term ''Antidumping Agreement'' means the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 referred to in section 101(d)(7) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(7)).

(5) APPELLATE BODY.—The term ''Appellate Body'' means the Appellate Body established under Article 17.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

(6) COMMON MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ''common multilateral environmental agreement'' means any agreement specified in subparagraph (B) or included under subparagraph (C) to which both the United States and one or more other parties to the negotiations are full parties, including any current or future mutually agreed upon protocols, amendments, annexes, or adjustments to such an agreement.

(B) AGREEMENTS SPECIFIED.—The agreements specified in this subparagraph are the following:

(i) The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington March 3, 1973 (27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249).

(ii) The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987.

(iii) The Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, done at London February 17, 1978.

(iv) The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar February 2, 1971 (TIAS 11084).

(v) The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done at Canberra May 20, 1980 (33 UST 3476).

(vi) The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at Washington December 2, 1946 (62 Stat. 1716).

(vii) The Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, done at Washington May 31, 1949 (1 UST 230).

(C) ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS.—Both the United States and one or more other parties to the negotiations may agree to include any other multilateral environmental or conservation agreement to which they are full parties as a common multilateral environmental agreement under this paragraph.

(7) CORE LABOR STANDARDS.—The term ''core labor standards'' means—

(A) freedom of association;

(B) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;

(C) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;

(D) the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and

(E) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

(8) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING.—The term ''Dispute Settlement Understanding'' means the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes referred to in section 101(d)(16) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(16)).

(9) ENABLING CLAUSE.—The term ''Enabling Clause'' means the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), adopted November 28, 1979, under GATT 1947 (as defined in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501)).

(10) ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.—The term ''environmental laws'', with respect to the laws of the United States, means environmental statutes and regulations enforceable by action of the Federal Government.

(11) GATT 1994.—The term ''GATT 1994'' has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).

(12) GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES.—The term ''General Agreement on Trade in Services'' means the General Agreement on Trade in Services (referred to in section 101(d)(14) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(14))).

(13) GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT.—The term ''Government Procurement Agreement'' means the Agreement on Government Procurement referred to in section 101(d)(17) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(17)).

(14) ILO.—The term ''ILO'' means the International Labor Organization.

(15) IMPORT SENSITIVE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT.—The term ''import sensitive agricultural product'' means an agricultural product—

(A) with respect to which, as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the rate of duty was the subject of tariff reductions by the United States and, pursuant to such Agreements, was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate that was not less than 97.5 percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on December 31, 1994; or

(B) which was subject to a tariff rate quota on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(16) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT.—The term ''Information Technology Agreement'' means the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products of the World Trade Organization, agreed to at Singapore December 13, 1996.

(17) INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CORE LABOR STANDARDS.—The term ''internationally recognized core labor standards'' means the core labor standards only as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998).

(18) LABOR LAWS.—The term ''labor laws'' means the statutes and regulations, or provisions thereof, of a party to the negotiations that are directly related to core labor standards as well as other labor protections for children and minors and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health, and for the United States, includes Federal statutes and regulations addressing those standards, protections, or conditions, but does not include State or local labor laws.

(19) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ''United States person'' means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that is organized under the laws of the United States; and

(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or United States citizens, or both.

(20) URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.—The term ''Uruguay Round Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).

(21) WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION; WTO.—The terms ''World Trade Organization'' and ''WTO'' mean the organization established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.

(22) WTO AGREEMENT.—The term ''WTO Agreement'' means the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered into on April 15, 1994.

(23) WTO MEMBER.—The term ''WTO member'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(10) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(10)).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 321, the motion shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means.

The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. RYAN) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2146, Defending Public Safety Employees' Retirement Act, currently under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Welcome back, everybody. I have to admit, I am a little disappointed that we are back here today. Last week, a bipartisan majority stepped up to pass trade promotion authority. That vote showed that Republicans and Democrats can still come together to do what is right for this country. It was a vote that I am very proud of.

Unfortunately, many of our friends on the other side of the aisle would not stand with their President and voted to sacrifice a program that they support—a program that they asked for—in order to block our path. It was disappointing, but we are not going to be discouraged. That is why we are back here today.

Enacting trade promotion authority is critical for our economy and our national security, and so we are going to get it done here today. Why do we need TPA? Well, Mr. Speaker, it is pretty easy, an easy question to answer—because we need more trade. Ninety-five percent of the world's consumers don't live in America. They live in other countries. If we want to make more things here and sell them there, then we need to tear down those trade barriers that make American goods and services more expensive.

We know that trade is good for our economy. One in five jobs in America is already tied to trade, and they pay on average 18 percent more. We also need more trade to bolster our foreign policy and our national security. Stronger economic ties lead to stronger security ties. More market share means more influence. That is why so many national security voices, former military leaders, former Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of State have all called on Congress to pass TPA. They understand what is at stake here, Mr. Speaker.

What is at stake here is no less than America's credibility because the rules of the global economy are being written right now. The question is: Who is going to write those rules? Will it be the United States and our allies or will it be other nations that don't share our values or don't share our commitment to free enterprise and the rule of law?

Our friends in Asia and Europe are getting ready to place their bets. They want to sign up for American-style free enterprise, but they need to know that the United States is going to stand strong as a reliable ally, as a reliable trading partner before they do that. That is what TPA is all about.

So how does it work? We have heard all kinds of crazy misinformation spread by the opponents of trade. I mean, crazy stuff, really. Let me, one more time, explain what TPA is and what TPA is not. TPA is a process; it is not an agreement. It is a process that gives us the best shot at getting a good trade agreement. It is a process, dating back decades, that Congress has used to insert itself into trade negotiations in order to provide more accountability and more transparency to the administration, to the President.

This TPA has more transparency and more accountability than any version ever before. It lays out 150 objectives and guidelines that the administration must follow while negotiating a trade deal. These are our priorities. If the President wants an agreement, then he must meet to address these priorities. He must meet these guidelines in order to get it passed through Congress.

This TPA also requires that the administration consults with Congress during the negotiations: Give us access to all of the text, provide timely briefings on demand, allow Members to attend the negotiating rounds as accredited advisers if they want to. If we are here in session, we can send our people. That is what the Zinke amendment accomplishes.

Finally, perhaps most importantly, Mr. Speaker, TPA ensures that the American people can read any trade agreement, every trade agreement long before anyone is asked to vote on it—60 days. An agreement must be made public and posted online for 60 days before it can even be sent to Congress. This turns fast track into slow track.

Mr. Speaker, it is transparency, it is effective oversight, and it is accountability because if the President doesn't meet these requirements or doesn't follow the negotiating objectives, we can turn TPA off for that agreement. We can cancel the vote, we can amend the agreement, or we can stop it entirely. So it is ultimately, we, Congress, we always have the final say. No agreement takes effect, no laws are changed unless we vote to allow it.

This process, TPA, creates a pact between Congress and the administration that allows our trading partners to know that we speak with one voice. It allows them to make their best efforts, knowing that as long as the administration follows TPA, Congress won't try to rewrite an agreement later. In other words, it gives America credibility, Mr. Speaker. And, boy, do we need credibility right now.

Make no mistake, all of my colleagues, make no mistake: the world is watching us; they are watching this vote. The foreign policy failures of the last few years, not to mention the stunt pulled here last week, have capitals all around the world wondering if America still has it. Are we still the leader? Are we still the Republic that other countries aspire to be? They want to know that we are still willing to engage, still willing to lead, that we are still a nation that is out front. Or are we in retreat and decline?

We are here today to answer that question again. America does not retreat; America leads. That is why I urge my colleagues to vote ''yes'' for TPA.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, it is said that we should write the rules, not China. But make no mistake, the ''we'' is not Congress, leaving us with only a ''yes'' or ''no'' vote at the very end. To vote for TPA now is to surrender congressional leverage. To get it right in shaping TPP, the most significant trade negotiation in decades, Congress will have settled for a bill with so-called congressional negotiating objectives so vague they are essentially meaningless.

That won't matter to those who basically approach trade with a 19th century dogma, that trade between any two nations will naturally be beneficial, simply matching the comparative economic advantages of each. But that has not worked out when, in this era, one nation manipulates its currency as it trades with the other, when nations suppress worker rights to keep their wages low, or degrade their environment to help them compete, or when nations heavily subsidize their markets or they keep their markets closed while their competitor keeps them very open in vital areas, whether industrial or agricultural.

So let us write the rules, but Congress must be sure they are right. We must make sure that the beneficiaries are the many in our Nation, not just the few.

As often stated in this debate, trade does, indeed, create winners and losers. As one who has worked hard to help put together expanded trade agreements, I know that in a globalizing world economy, failure to write the rules effectively is one of the reasons there have been too many losers. Millions of jobs lost, with middle class wages stagnant for decades, while the relative few have done so well.

Congress should not give what would be essentially a blank check to USTR on key outstanding issues in the TPP negotiations. With this TPA, you are saying ''fine'' to no meaningful currency provision. You are saying ''fine'' to giving private investors in growing numbers the ability to choose an unregulated arbitration panel instead of a well-established judicial system in order to overturn local or national health or environmental regulations. With this TPA, you cannot be confident Vietnam and Mexico will adhere to meaningful labor standards. With this TPA, you can't be confident that Japan will open its market at long last to our cars or agricultural products. With this TPA, you can't be confident that there will be access to lifesaving medicines.

Despite a bombardment of rhetoric, instead of the approach that we laid out in the substitute that we have not even been allowed to consider in the committee or in this House, the reality is that this TPA will not put Congress in the driver's seat, but the backseat, for TPP and for 6 years in important negotiations with Europe in TTIP and who knows what else. Congress has a responsibility to get trade negotiations on the right track, not the fast track. Vote ''no.''

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BRADY), a senior member of the House Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. BRADY of Texas. I thank Chairman RYAN for his leadership.

Mr. Speaker, free trade is economic freedom. It is the freedom to buy and sell and compete around the world with as little government interference as possible. It is really one of the great economic rights of every American. Given the choice between more economic freedom or less, we should always choose more. We know if America doesn't lead in free and fair trade, we will grow weaker and our foreign competitors will grow stronger, and our factories and farmers and manufacturers will be priced out and shut down.

Texas is made for trade. America is made for trade. It is time, through expanded trade, to preserve these economic principles that have helped us thrive and grow over the century. That is why Congress flexing its constitutional muscles and setting clear rules for future American trade is not just a good thing for America; it is a great thing.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BECERRA), the chairman of our caucus and a member of our committee.

Mr. BECERRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, this trade promotion authority legislation, as we have heard, is all about writing the rules, writing the rules on trade. It is about who will lead or who will retreat on assisting on free and fair trade.

This TPA legislation sets forward the instructions on how we will write the rules in any trade agreement. Okay. So who is going to lead in writing the rules? On currency manipulation, where countries, not just the companies, but the countries themselves that want to trade with us are cheating by manipulating their currency to make the value of their goods look less expensive than American products in the same area, when those countries are cheating, what are we going to say should be the rules when it comes to currency manipulation?

□ 1130

Under this TPA, we can't say anything because we are prohibited from including anything in a trade agreement that will deal with currency manipulation.

You then have to ask a second question. You are telling me that countries that are going to sign these deals are going to be allowed to cheat when it comes to how they manipulate their currency so their products will look cheaper than ours? We are supposed to depend on those same countries that are cheating to now enforce the rules in these agreements against companies in those countries that are cheating? What kind of instruction is that?

What about when it comes to letting people in America know what is in these deals? What if we want to know where the products that are going to be bought and sold in our stores come from? Shouldn't we have the right, if we want, to know the country of origin of a particular product?

I have heard about tainted milk coming from places around the world. We have heard about toys that have dangerous chemicals in them that our kids play with. Don't we want to know where these products are coming from? That is all we are saying, just to know where they are coming from, not that we are going to degrade the place where they come from; we just want to know if it is made in the USA or made somewhere else.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. BECERRA. Under this TPA, we can't ask those questions. We won't be able to find out where a product is made because someone else—a tribunal, not an American court—will decide whether we can label a product as made in the USA or not.

Right now, these international tribunals that have no American jurists or judges sitting on them get to decide for us if Americans should have the right to know where a product is coming from that they are buying from a store in their neighborhood.

How does that lead to making sure trade is free and fair if we can't even put a label on a product coming from some other country that has in the past sent us tainted products?

We can do much better. We have over two or three decades of experience in writing trade deals. We know what works; we know what doesn't. The thing we know most is that enforcement is the most difficult aspect of trade because most companies in faraway places don't follow American law and American rules and they cheat and they think they think can get away with it.

We can do much better. Let's get a better trade deal that is free and fair. This TPA doesn't give us that. It doesn't give us the right rules. Reject this TPA legislation.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. It is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KIND), another distinguished member of our committee.

Mr. KIND. I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, last week, in a bipartisan majority, this House granted this administration trade promotion authority so that it can begin to elevate standards and level the playing field for our workers, our farmers, and our businesses so we can effectively compete in one of the fastest growing regions of the global economy.

It is time for us to move forward. I feel confident that, with the assurances that we received from the Republican leadership, this body will have another opportunity to also pass Trade Adjustment Assistance so that the training programs and education for the workers who need it will be in place.

Out of consideration for some of our colleagues who are trying to get home to their communities today after last night's terrible shootings, I end by encouraging my colleagues to support this legislation. It is time for America to move on.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PASCRELL), a member of our committee.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, if at first you don't succeed, try, try again. That seems to be the approach on trade.

Despite the fact that TPA passed the House last week by only eight votes, at no point did the lightbulb go off for the leadership that perhaps they could work with the majority of the Democratic Caucus to find agreement on how to move forward. I don't know why that didn't occur to you. Instead of cooperation, they have opted to use procedural tricks to pass the TPA.

The leadership has chosen to take a bipartisan bill passed by both Chambers of Congress that would aid our law enforcement officers and public safety workers and inject the unrelated, controversial trade debate into it. I can speak firsthand because I am one of the sponsors of the bill.

This bill, the Defending Public Safety Employees' Retirement Act, I have worked on with my friend Congressman REICHERT, on behalf of the men and women who serve the public in physically demanding work each and every day.

It would ensure that they could access their full retirement benefits at the time they retire without incurring a tax penalty. It is a good bill. I am not only one of the sponsors, I vote for it.

Today, this bill to provide tax fairness for our law enforcement officers has been twisted and diminished to a convenient vehicle to ram through fast track for a deeply flawed trade bill.

This is not the same bill that we voted on Friday. Please read this bill. It is not. I urge a ''no'' vote.

In fact, Harold Schaitberger, president of the International Association of Fire Fighters, has written a letter urging Members to oppose attaching TPA to this bill.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership would establish the biggest trade agreement we have seen in years, encompassing 40 percent of the world's economy. We need to take our time and do it right. In its current form, TPP is woefully inadequate and fails to ensure a fair deal for American workers.

Issues such as prohibiting currency manipulation and ensuring food safety have been neglected in TPP. As an example, only 1 percent of imported fish into this country—seafood—is inspected. I hope the next time you go into the restaurant, you ask the proprietor: Has this fish been inspected?

He will look at you like you have three heads. Isn't that interesting?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. PASCRELL. This country got shafted with our deal with Korea on country of origin automobiles. You don't really see any more cars traveling through Korea—or certainly China—that are made in the United States of America. We are taking a backseat.

Instead of protecting the interests of American U.S. workers—not protectionism, we are not advocating that—this trade bill gives protections and sweetheart deals to multinational corporations, pure and simple. The American people look at every poll—from the left, from the right, from north, south, east, west—and do not accept this deal, and we shouldn't either.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS), another member of our committee.

Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I was thinking what a difference a week does not make. The vast majority of the people in my congressional district were opposed to fast track last week, and they are even more opposed to fast track this week.

We have seen fast track before. We have seen the jobs leave our community, our district, our State, and our Nation fast enough. They don't need our help. They don't need anybody else's help. We need to create jobs here in America, not have them flee.

I agree with my colleagues who have said vote ''no.'' I agree with the people of my congressional district, and I shall vote ''no.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CUELLAR).

Mr. CUELLAR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I support TPA to give the President the authority to negotiate this agreement. It is very simple. A lot of those countries are already able to send their goods into our country duty free. What we want to do is allow our exporting companies to be able to export to those countries duty free, also, so we can send our goods over there.

Look at what has happened in Texas. Texas exported more than $289 billion last year, up 146 percent from 2004. Let's look at the number of companies that export. They are not the big companies. Ninety-three percent of those 40,737 exporting companies were small- and medium-sized businesses.

Again, Members, I ask you to please support TPA. It is good for Texas; it is good for the United States, and it is a no-brainer to allow us to export to those countries.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. DAVID SCOTT).

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the people of this great Nation are watching us today, and they are begging and pleading with us to please vote down this bill.

Who knows better than the American people who live in the towns and the cities where they have seen their manufacturing plants close and they have seen their jobs shipped overseas? Every trade deal has done it.

Let's look at the China deal. As a result of the China deal, 2 million manufacturing jobs have been shipped from America over to China.

Look at NAFTA. Yes, it created jobs; but where did they create jobs? They are in Mexico. Where did the manufacturing plants go? They went to Mexico.

That is why the American people are ringing everybody's office and urging them: Please let us not lose any more jobs.

Those of you who are concerned about income equality, the reason we have that as a burning issue in the heart and soul, particularly of middle class America, is because we are seeing the middle class vanish.

These are the jobs. These manufacturing jobs, ladies and gentlemen, are not where the big corporate presidents make millions of dollars. Yes, they are going to make plenty of millions of dollars; but these jobs go into the middle section of our economic stream and the lower income.

Look at Akron, Ohio; look at Atlanta, Georgia; look at Chicago; look at Detroit. They were once vibrant cities. The backbone of America is manufacturing, and we are shipping it out to the world.

You know what else we are shipping out there? We are shipping these jobs—not only that, the profits of these companies. Last year, $2 trillion of profits were held in these overseas accounts, away from our taxing structure.

Can't you see America is getting weaker because of these trade policies? I urge you to vote ''no'' and stand up for the American people for a change.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for yielding and, once again, for his tremendous leadership.

I rise in strong opposition to this bill and to once again say ''no'' to fast track. This legislation cynically uses a bill that would exempt retired Federal police officers and firefighters from paying a penalty on withdrawals from their retirement accounts if they retire after the age of 50. What does that have to do with fast track? Absolutely nothing—this is just plain wrong.

What is more, we know now that the Senate is considering attaching the Trade Adjustment Assistance, or TAA, to the recently passed African Growth and Accountability Act, better known as AGOA, as a means to get this flawed trade package passed.

That is why yesterday, my colleagues Congressional Black Caucus Chair Congressman BUTTERFIELD, Congresswoman KAREN BASS, Congressman KEITH ELLISON, and myself sent a letter to the Senate leadership expressing our opposition to what they are trying to do in using AGOA as a bargaining chip.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, DC, June 17, 2015.

Hon. MITCH MCCONNELL,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. HARRY REID,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MAJORITY LEADER MCCONNELL AND MINORITY LEADER REID: We write to urge you to expeditiously pass H.R. 1295, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, without attaching unrelated amendments. If passed, the bill would go to the President and reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until the end of FY 2025.

AGOA is too important to be used as a bargaining chip to pass unrelated trade legislation. As you know, AGOA is not controversial and passed out of the House of Representatives with almost 400 votes. AGOA is a trade preference program that is usually noncontroversial, and thus voice voted. It is the centerpiece of relations between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. Though a small percentage of overall trade by the United States, AGOA has helped enhance trade, investment, job creation, and democratic institutions throughout Africa.

In its current form, AGOA expires September 30, 2015. It is imperative that the Senate move H.R. 1295 along to reauthorize the program soon. Delays will not only negatively affect global supply chains, but also adversely affect the livelihoods of individuals whose jobs come from AGOA.

The House has already passed H.R. 1295 to reauthorize AGOA. We urge the Senate to follow suit without delay and send the bill to President Obama's desk.

Sincerely,

GK BUTTERFIELD,
Member of Congress,
KAREN BASS,
Member of Congress,
BARBARA LEE,
Member of Congress,
KEITH ELLISON,
Member of Congress.

Ms. LEE. AGOA is a growth and trade act. That is a trade preference program that has helped enhance trade investment and job creation to democratic institutions throughout Africa.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the gentlewoman an additional 1 minute.

Ms. LEE. In no way should that be used as a bargaining chip on this bill. It is outrageous. Members should not have to choose between programs that they support, like TAA and AGOA, and then supporting fast track.

These procedural gimmicks are outrageous, and they are fundamentally dishonest. If Members fall for this maneuver, we not only risk imperiling the TAA, a program that many of our constituents rely on, but also AGOA.

We have got to vote ''no'' on this bill, ''no'' to attaching TAA to AGOA. Let's get back to the drawing board and come up with a real fair, free, and transparent trade bill.

□ 1145

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN), ranking member on the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, if you vote for this bill, you get fast track without Trade Adjustment Assistance. There is no assurance Trade Adjustment Assistance will come to this floor or that it will come to this floor in a form that either Republicans or Democrats will support.

The supporters of this deal can't make their case without repeating demonstrably false statistics. The fact is we won a $177 billion trade deficit in goods with the countries with which we have free trade agreements. The $75 billion surplus in services brings the net to over a $100 billion deficit.

How have so many Members been misled by charlatan lobbyists into coming to this floor and giving false statistics? They are given this slippery phrase: Go down to the floor and talk about what has happened since NAFTA.

Now, ''since NAFTA'' usually sounds like, well, since the early 1990s. What they mean is excluding NAFTA. Excluding NAFTA when we review free trade agreements is like excluding LeBron James when you evaluate the Cavaliers.

This bill is catastrophic for our national security. It hollows out our manufacturing base, and it is the greatest gift to China that we could possibly make because it enshrines the sacrosanct nature of currency manipulation. It says, in the future, countries can manipulate their currency all they want and there will be no accounting for it.

In addition, the rules of origin provisions allow goods that are admitted to be 50 or 60 percent made in China—that are actually 70 or 80 percent made in China—to get fast-tracked into the United States. So China gets 80 percent of the benefit of this agreement without having to admit a single American export.

As for Vietnam, our workers are going to have to compete against 56-cent-an-hour labor.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. SHERMAN. We are told that we will get free access to the Vietnamese markets. Vietnam doesn't have freedom. Vietnam doesn't have markets. They are not going to buy our exports any more than their Communist Party decides to do so.

The chairman points out that with trade comes influence. That is right. There will be Nike lobbyists here, financed by this bill and its effects, lobbying against going after Vietnam for its oppression of religion and its oppression of unions. So they will have influence here in Washington. They will continue not to have freedom, and we will continue to lose jobs.

THE TRADE DEFICIT WITH FTA PARTNERS
MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE WITH FTA COUNTRIES
[In thousands of dollars]

Country	U.S. Domestic Exports 2014	U.S. Imports for Consumption 2014	2014 Balance
Australia	24,460,776	10,846,176	13,614,600
Bahrain	996,619	930,049	66,570
Canada	262,930,650	345,304,263	−82,373,613
Chile	15,311,892	9,501,206	5,810,686
Colombia	18,313,501	17,162,947	1,150,554
Costa Rica	6,289,716	9,493,622	−3,203,906
Dominican Rep	7,218,421	4,462,740	2,755,681
El Salvador	3,062,786	2,390,272	672,514
Guatemala	5,653,385	4,140,518	1,512,867
Honduras	5,686,432	4,511,855	1,174,577
Israel	7,894,126	23,054,059	−15,159,933
Jordan	1,971,195	1,354,296	616,899
Korea	42,010,900	68,602,393	−26,591,493
Mexico	192,706,833	292,481,624	−99,774,791
Morocco	2,044,141	1,010,429	1,033,712
Nicaragua	905,977	3,079,467	−2,173,490
Oman	1,911,822	974,788	937,034
Panama	9,737,362	386,123	9,351,239
Peru	8,891,414	6,029,607	2,861,807
Singapore	26,468,896	16,259,527	10,209,369
Total	644,466,844	821,975,961	−177,509,117

SERVICES TRADE BALANCE WITH FTA COUNTRIES

According to the Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, we ran a surplus in services of $75 billion with FTA Countries as of 2013, the last year for which we have data on our services trade broken down for the FTA countries as a group. Assuming normal growth for 2014, our surplus in services is roughly $77 billion.

Therefore, our TOTAL TRADE BALANCE with FTA partner countries is just over $100 billion. We run a significant deficit with FTA Countries.

Explanation: There are different methods for measuring the trade balance of the United States. The table above uses the most accurate data for measuring the value of goods (merchandise) actually ''Made in the USA'' and exported from the United States to the various countries listed. The source for our goods data is the International Trade Commission (ITC) dataweb, available at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. ITC measures exports in two different ways (''Total Exports'' and ''Domestic Exports'').

We use ''Domestic Exports.'' According to the ITC, ''Domestic Exports measures goods that are grown, produced and manufactured in the United States, or goods of foreign origin that have been changed in the United States.'' FTA proponents like to use an alternative measurement, ''Total Exports,'' which ''measures the total movement of goods out of the United States to foreign countries,'' whether those goods were made or altered by U.S. workers in the United States or not—it includes goods that were simply transiting the United States without alteration. Counting these ''Re-Exports'' that are included in the ''Total Exports'' measurement will give a distorted bilateral trade balance for given countries because it drastically over-counts exports. For similar reasons and in order to give an accurate, apples to apples comparison, on the import side we use ''Imports for Consumption'' which includes only imports that are not re-exported. Using the alternative ITC measurement for imports, ''Total Imports,'' would overstate imports by counting those goods coming into the United States that are going to be re-exported. See http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/tradestatsnote.pdf for more on these terms and what the measurements represent.

Services data. Ideally our nation's trade balance figures would provide the trade balance for both goods and services. However, services are more difficult for government agencies to track, and the agencies therefore do not break the trade data down consistently for every partner country, every year. Also, the agencies cannot compile services data as quickly as merchandise data. We use a 2013 services balance figure for FTA countries in the aggregate that the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis provided to the Chamber of Commerce for a report touting FTAs. We assume growth of about $5 billion in the positive services balance for 2014. See the Chamber report for these services data at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/open__door__trade__report.pdf.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. How much time remains for both sides?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Wisconsin has 22½ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan has 10½ minutes remaining.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. We are the only two speakers left on our side. Because of deference to our Members from South Carolina who are trying to get home to this tragedy, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TIBERI), and then I am just going to hold to close just for our South Carolina Members.

Mr. TIBERI. Mr. Speaker, read the bill. I have got it right here. The only thing different is the number at the top has changed. The content is the same.

TPA is not a trade deal. It is a process that holds this President accountable. It sets in motion Congress inserting itself.

By the way, NAFTA, I mean, I just continue to get blown away by the misinformation. No wonder the American people get confused.

I take this personally. As the gentleman from New Jersey knows, my dad lost his job way before NAFTA. We have a trade surplus in manufacturing with NAFTA. We have a trade surplus in services with NAFTA. We have a trade surplus in agriculture, food, and beverages with NAFTA. In fact, we have a trade surplus with NAFTA, if you take out oil and energy products. We have a trade surplus in manufacturing with NAFTA. I do get fired up about this.

Mr. Speaker, 95 percent of the world's population is outside the United States. A multinational corporation can move anywhere it wants to, a Fortune 500 company can move anywhere it wants to, and they do.

Lake Shore, in my district, a family-owned business, they cannot. This is about breaking down barriers for Lake Shore, for Screen Machine, because they can't move a plant overseas, and they are at a competitive disadvantage. A large corporation can move. They can't.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is about jobs. This is about the American worker. This is about the fact that we have the ability today to complete anywhere in the world if those trade barriers are broken down.

We have to break them down, Mr. Speaker. One out of every five jobs is trade-related. They are good jobs.

Vote ''yes'' on TPA. Vote ''yes'' for the American worker.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. BASS).

Ms. BASS. Mr. Speaker, last week I spoke in favor of H.R. 1891, the AGOA Extension and Enhancement Act of 2015. In the middle of tremendous controversy and tension over TPA, it was encouraging to have legislation that wasn't controversial, in fact, had overwhelming support with 397 votes. The bill was sent to the Senate, and we were hopeful that H.R. 1891 would have already made it to the President's desk.

Unfortunately, the bill is a victim of its own success. So many rumors are floating around that because AGOA is popular, supported by both Democrats, Republicans, Senators, and House Members, that now Senators are considering adding more controversial bills into AGOA.

We are hearing TAA might be added. The press is even reporting consideration is being given to using AGOA as a vehicle to extend the Ex-Im Bank. We hear the thinking is, if TAA failed in the House last week, if it is added in to AGOA, we will all vote for it.

AGOA can and should and stand on its own. The Senate should pass AGOA and send it to the President.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. VELÁZQUEZ), who is the ranking member on the Committee on Small Business.

Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. Mr. Speaker, once again, we are being asked to vote for an agreement that will cost jobs, undermine environmental protections, and erode workers' rights, all in the name of so-called free trade.

This agreement is being negotiated in the dark, behind closed doors. That secretive process may benefit large, multinational companies and their lobbyists, but it does not help small manufacturers in Brooklyn. It does nothing for New Yorkers struggling to raise a family while keeping their jobs from being exported.

When there is a bad process, we end up with a bad deal for American workers, and we have seen this in the past. New York lost 374,000 manufacturing jobs since NAFTA and the World Trade Organization agreements.

This vote, Mr. Speaker, comes down to a simple question: Are you going to side with Wall Street, large corporations, and their lobbyists, or will you stand with working families in your district? I will take the latter.

Vote ''no.''

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT).

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, in Washington we never seem to lack for self-certified smart people. They are the folks who know what is best for you and your family.

While they, today, are insisting on railroading through this fast-track trade deal—and they say it is so sweet for working families—is it so unreasonable to ask: What do the workers think about this bill?

While the environmental provisions have been secreted away from the public, we do know that USTR does not believe in environmental law enforcement. Is it unreasonable to stop and ask: What do those who advocate for clean water and clean air and conservation of our resources think about this trade deal?

I believe they support fair trade. They recognize that it raises all boats, but unfair trade sinks too many of them. They are capsized by competing with those who pay an average minimum wage of 60 cents an hour and whose only worker organization is the Communist Party in Vietnam.

I believe our workers deserve respect. This bill asks American businesses to go out and compete with countries that mistreat their workers, that pollute their air and water and destroy their natural resources, and that deflate or adjust their currency, manipulating it in ways that are unfair.

Railroading this bill through today will deny any opportunity, which we have struggled so long for so many months to try to achieve to make this a better right-track bill. The fast-trackers have rejected every constructive improvement that we have offered to this measure. And all of us here in Congress have to concede we know less about what is in this trade bill than the Vietnamese Politburo, than the Malaysian Government that has countenanced sex trafficking.

We need an open, fair process to advance real trade opportunities for all families. Reject this fast track.

Mr. LEVIN. We had one additional speaker. I don't see her, so I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

I started off by saying it is said we should write the rules, not China. That is true. We have been striving to try to help write the rules. We did so for years.

We introduced a substitute bill that outlined where we were coming from and where we thought these negotiations should go. That wasn't even given time for discussion.

So here is what we are left with. When you vote for TPA under these circumstances, essentially what we are saying to this administration, it is essentially a blank check. They may talk. They may let us see some of the documents, but often in ways we can't discuss them publicly.

This is likely to add up to a TPP that will be even more controversial than this TPA. For that reason, I strongly urge that, as was said earlier, we slow down this process in order to try to find a route to a TPP that would have broad bipartisan support. That has always been my aim, rather than this kind of vote with a few handfuls of Democratic votes making this far, far, far from a bipartisan vote.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

For those who are coming on the floor protesting this particular process from the minority, it is the stunt pulled last week that brought about this process.

We have talked a lot about what TPA is. It is a process, not a trade agreement.

I want every Member in this body to think about what this vote represents. It is one that will speak loudly about our political system: Can it still work?

It is a vote about what kind of Congress we want to be: Will we empower ourselves in trade agreements or just let the administration do whatever it wants?

It is a vote about what kind of country we want to have: Are we still committed to leading? Are we still the symbol of freedom in free enterprise?

Mr. Speaker, this is a vote for accountability and for transparency. This is a vote for a stronger economy and higher wages. This is a vote for our system of free enterprise. This is a vote for American leadership. This is a vote to declare that America still has it. This is a vote to reestablish America's credibility.

The world is watching. Vote ''yes.''

I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. BONAMICI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2146, the Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. For the past several

years I have had many conversations about trade with the people of Northwest Oregon. I've spoken with farmers, environmentalists, semiconductor manufacturers, wine makers, workers, sports and outdoor apparel employees, and others.

The district I represent has many trade-dependent jobs and industries. We export a broad array of products—from computer chips to potato chips. Last year in Oregon, nearly 6,000 Oregon companies exported more than $20 billion in products. Expanding the overseas markets for U.S. goods will help businesses expand in this country. Trade agreements done right make it easier to sell American-made goods and they level the playing field by reducing tariffs that currently make it difficult for Oregonians to compete in many of the world's markets.

This legislation is not the trade agreement itself, but rather a bill through which Congress establishes requirements for the negotiation of trade agreements and the procedure for Congress to use when voting on whether to approve the agreement when it is final.

The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act earned my vote because it requires the President to negotiate a trade agreement that includes strong and enforceable labor and environmental standards, fosters innovation, would help expand exports, provides transparency for the American people, and guarantees a meaningful role for Congress in trade negotiations.

I strongly support the rights of workers and their ability to collectively bargain and work in a safe environment. I also oppose child labor and forced labor. The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act raises the bar in these areas and includes provisions that require trading partners to comply with internationally-accepted labor standards and face trade sanctions if they do not. For the first time it includes human rights—one of the cornerstones of our democratic values—as a negotiating objective. Oregon's First Congressional District is known for its natural treasures—from the Pacific Ocean to the Columbia River to the Clatsop State Forest—and it is imperative that they be preserved for future generations. Deciding between conserving our natural resources and growing our economy is a false choice; we can and must do both. The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act ensures that our clean air, land, and water will not be up for negotiation.

The bill also protects intellectual property to safeguard innovation and fight piracy overseas, but with provisions to ensure that those protections will not impede access to much-needed medicines for people in developing countries.

The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act requires trade agreements to contain high standards and protections, and it also requires that the agreements include strong enforcement provisions to make clear that the standards and protections will be upheld and enforced.

It is important to my constituents that any trade agreement be accessible and transparent to the public. The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act includes unprecedented access to trade agreements; the entire final agreement must be made available to the public for a minimum of 60 days before the President signs it. In addition, after the full text of the trade agreement becomes public, there will still be months before Congress votes on whether to approve it.

To earn my vote, any trade agreement must be good for Americans. The jobs we gain by expanding exports tend to pay high wages, but there is a risk that some workers may be displaced by trade and by globalization. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is an important program to help workers transition into new fields by investing in skills and worker retaining. Without a reauthorization, TAA will expire at the end of September 2015. I voted in favor of TAA last week, but unfortunately it did not pass. But let me be very clear, I voted for the TPA again today because the Speaker, the Senate Majority Leader, and the President have committed that Trade Adjustment Assistance and customs enforcement legislation will also move forward without delay.

I was deeply concerned that an early version of TAA legislation included cuts to Medicare. Seniors serve our country, contribute to our economy, raise families, and strengthen communities across the nation. I urged House leadership to eliminate this provision. The bill I voted for did not cut Medicare and I will continue to work with my colleagues to ensure seniors are not singled out to pay for this program.

This trade package, however, is far from perfect, and as we move forward I will continue to work to pass TAA and improve the trade agreement. I am very disappointed that partisan language to tie the administration's hands on climate change was inserted at the last minute into the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act, which passed the House of Representatives last week without my support. I am also very concerned that two very smart enforcement provisions offered by my colleague from Oregon, Representative EARL BLUMENAUER, were deleted. His "Green 301" and enforcement fund provisions were very important to the overall effectiveness of the customs bill, and I will encourage the conferees to insist upon their inclusion in the bill we ultimately send to the President's desk for signature.

We live in a changing and global economy. Markets, industries, and technologies evolve and American businesses and workers need to be able to react and adapt to thrive. A 21st century trade agreement broadens our country's reach and, done right, leads to more opportunity, more growth, and more job creation. It also supports the principle of trade according to fair rules, equally applied, as opposed to all parties doing whatever they want on a playing field that is far from level.

I am committed to policies that support a strong, long-term economy for hardworking Oregonians and Americans. A trade agreement done right can help achieve this goal, and passing H.R. 2146 is an important step in this process.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 321, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. RYAN).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on adoption of the motion will be followed by a 5-minute vote on the passage of H.R. 160.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 218, noes 208, not voting 8, as follows:

[Roll No. 374]

AYES—218

Abraham
Allen
Amodei
Ashford
Babin
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Benishek
Bera
Beyer
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Blumenauer
Boehner
Bonamici
Bost
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Coffman
Cole
Comstock
Conaway
Connolly
Cooper
Costa
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davis (CA)
Delaney
DelBene
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Duffy
Ellmers (NC)
Emmer (MN)
Farr
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gibbs
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guinta
Guthrie
Hanna
Hardy
Harper
Hartzler
Heck (NV)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Hill
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Hudson
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hurd (TX)
Hurt (VA)
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Kelly (PA)
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Knight
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Larsen (WA)
Latta
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Marchant
Marino
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meehan
Meeks
Messer
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moolenaar
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
O'Rourke
Olson
Palazzo
Paulsen
Peters
Pittenger
Pitts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Price, Tom
Quigley
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rokita
Rooney (FL)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rouzer
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Salmon
Sanford
Scalise
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Wasserman Schultz
Weber (TX)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (IA)
Young (IN)
Zinke

NOES—208

Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Amash
Bass
Beatty
Becerra
Bishop (GA)
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buck
Burgess
Bustos
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cárdenas
Carney

Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clawson (FL)
Clay
Cleaver
Cohen
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conyers
Cook
Courtney
Crowley
Cummings
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Donovan
Doyle, Michael F.
Duckworth
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Esty
Farenthold
Fattah
Fleming
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Garrett
Gibson
Gohmert
Graham
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutiérrez
Hahn
Harris
Hastings
Heck (WA)
Higgins
Honda
Hoyer
Huffman
Hunter
Israel
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (GA)
Jones
Jordan
Joyce
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kirkpatrick
Kuster
Labrador
Langevin
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lee
Levin
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Luján, Ben Ray (NM)
Lummis
Lynch
MacArthur
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Massie
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McKinley
McNerney
Meadows
Meng
Mooney (WV)
Moore
Moulton
Mulvaney
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
Nugent
Pallone
Palmer
Pascrell
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Perry
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Poliquin
Posey
Price (NC)
Rangel
Richmond
Rohrabacher
Rothfus
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Russell
Ryan (OH)
Sánchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sherman
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Speier
Swalwell (CA)
Takai
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velázquez
Visclosky
Walz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Webster (FL)
Welch
Westmoreland
Wilson (FL)
Wittman
Yarmuth
Zeldin

NOT VOTING—8

Byrne
Clyburn
Davis, Rodney
Gosar
Jolly
Kelly (MS)
Payne
Young (AK)

□ 1225

So the motion to concur was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated against:

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 374 I would have voted "no" on passage. Had I been present, I would have voted "no."

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 374 I intended to vote "no."

PROTECT MEDICAL INNOVATION ACT OF 2015

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the vote on the passage of the bill (H.R. 160) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the excise tax on medical devices, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 280, nays 140, not voting 13, as follows:

[Roll No. 375]

YEAS—280

Abraham
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Ashford
Babin
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Benishek
Bera
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Boustany
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Burgess
Bustos
Calvert
Cárdenas
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Clark (MA)
Clawson (FL)
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davis (CA)
DelBene
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Donovan
Duckworth
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers (NC)
Emmer (MN)
Farenthold
Fattah
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gabbard
Garrett
Gibbs
Gibson
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Graham
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grothman
Guinta
Guthrie
Hanna
Hardy
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Heck (NV)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins
Hill
Holding
Hudson
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd (TX)
Hurt (VA)
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Joyce
Katko
Keating
Kelly (PA)
Kilmer
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Knight
Kuster
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Lynch
MacArthur
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Massie
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Moulton
Mullin
Mulvaney
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Newhouse
Noem
Nolan
Norcross
Nugent
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Peters
Peterson
Pittenger
Pitts
Poliquin
Pompeo
Posey
Price, Tom
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney (FL)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce
Ruiz
Russell
Ryan (WI)
Salmon
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Speier
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Swalwell (CA)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Vargas
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Walz
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Young (IN)
Zeldin
Zinke

NAYS—140

Adams
Bass
Beatty
Becerra
Beyer
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Carney
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Crowley
Cummings
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Esty
Farr
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gallego
Garamendi
Grayson
Green, Al
Grijalva
Gutiérrez
Hahn
Hastings
Heck (WA)
Himes
Hinojosa
Honda
Hoyer
Huffman
Israel
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kind
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lee
Levin
Lewis
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Luján, Ben Ray (NM)
Maloney, Carolyn
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
O'Rourke
Pallone
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rangel
Rice (NY)
Richmond
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sánchez, Linda T.
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Takai
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Veasey
Vela
Velázquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOT VOTING—13

Byrne
Clyburn
Davis, Rodney
Delaney
Fincher
Gosar
Jolly
Kelly (MS)
King (IA)
LaMalfa
Messer
Poe (TX)
Rogers (KY)

□ 1233

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. MESSER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 375 I was unavoidably detained and missed the recorded vote. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye."

Mr. LAMALFA. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 375 I was detained with constituents including a World War II veteran and family visiting in the U.S. Capitol for the first time and missed rollcall No. 375. Had I been present, I would have voted "yes."

Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 375, had I been present, I would have voted "yes."

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to cast my vote on rollcall No. 375. Had I been present to vote on rollcall No. 375, I would have voted "aye."

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, June 18, 2015, I was absent