

his nose at the United States and the international order. Yet none of that has kept President Obama from calling this relationship with Putin and Russia a success.

If we consider the three biggest U.S. diplomatic victories often attributed to this reset the President likes to talk about—greater Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, the New START arms control treaty, and the Russian support for U.S. sanctions in Iran—only the first one looks like a genuine, durable achievement from the vantage point of March 2014.

The New START treaty was a dangerous giveaway. In addition to jeopardizing U.S. missile defense plans, it reduced the number of American nuclear launchers and warheads while allowing Russia to increase the size of its own arsenal.

As for the Iran sanctions endorsed by the U.N. Security Council members in June of 2010, these were less significant than the unilateral U.S. sanctions that Congress forced upon President Obama despite his objections in December 2011. For that matter, the administration has now unilaterally decided to loosen U.S. sanctions—and thereby relinquish some of the best leverage we have on Tehran—to keep them from crossing that red line and acquiring a nuclear weapon. What did we get for that? We got minor concessions and more hollow promises.

As with other U.S. adversaries, the Iranians are watching Ukraine to see how President Obama responds. In the modern era, cross-border military invasions of sovereign States have been a blessedly rare occurrence. Yet Vladimir Putin has now launched two of them in less than 6 years. The Secretary General of NATO has called Russia's armed seizure of Crimea "the gravest threat to European security and stability since the end of the Cold War." Europe remembers the primary location for two world wars during the last century. They remember, and they remember what happened in 1938 which, unfortunately, bears an eerie resemblance to some of the initial steps being taken by Vladimir Putin and Russia today, and they remember what happened after that, casting the world into a terrible war in which millions of people lost their lives in World War II.

President Obama's initial response was to sanction 11 Russians and Ukrainians, leaving Putin's inner circle and his favorite oligarchs untouched, and they drew mocking rebukes from the Kremlin. Last Thursday, the President decided to ramp up the sanctions by issuing new sanctions that did go a little further, targeting four oligarchs and 16 government officials, including Putin's Chief of Staff, along with a prominent Putin-linked financial institution.

In addition, President Obama declared he had now signed a new Executive order. Remember, the President said he has a phone and a pen. Well, he has been using them—not necessarily

working with Congress but he has been using them. He has issued a new Executive order that gives us the authority to impose sanctions not just on individuals but on key sectors of the Russian economy. The problem with that is that sanctions imposed on Russia's economy are going to hurt Europe and invariably end up inflicting damage even on the U.S. economy. But I hope the President uses this authority to send Putin a message and finds a way to thread the needle to exact the costs he said he would exact on Putin for this lawless act.

In my view, the sanctions should also target Rosoboronexport. This is a State-owned Russian arms dealer that has been supplying the Assad regime and Syria with weapons, and it has become the Grand Central Station of corruption. The U.S. Pentagon has inexplicably been buying Mi-17 helicopters from Rosoboronexport to supply the Afghan military, despite numerous alternatives. I am happy to report the senior Senator from Indiana Mr. COATS has introduced an amendment that would terminate these contracts and prohibit all business dealings with companies that cooperate with Rosoboronexport, and I am a proud cosponsor of that amendment. I hope the majority leader, as Senator MCCONNELL, the Republican leader, implored this morning, will allow an open amendment process so reasonable amendments designed to improve this bill will be allowed to be voted on.

As America responds to Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, sanctions will remain a critically important tool, but sanctions alone are not enough. They should be accompanied by at least three other U.S. policy moves.

First, the United States needs to assess the military needs of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries and then swiftly dispatch—or facilitate the purchase of—whatever resources may be required. Offering military ration kits rather than serious military assistance is a joke. It is a bad joke, and it is an insult to our friends in Kiev and freedom-loving people within the orbit of Russia.

Second, we should enhance and expand our European missile defense system with upgrades such as a new X-Band radar and more capable interceptors. We should also increase our overall missile defense budget. This is something Putin hates but which is a legitimate expenditure of self-defense monies to help keep the world safer, particularly from the threat of an Iranian missile.

Third, we should dramatically accelerate the approval process for U.S. companies seeking to export liquefied natural gas. Congress can take the lead here by amending the 1938 Natural Gas Act, an antiquated, Depression-era law that has become an obstacle to economic growth and U.S. foreign policy interests. Even in the short term, most of our LNG exports would go to Asia, it is true, rather than Europe, but it

would increase overall the supply, and expediting and expanding those exports would increase that global supply, help push down prices, and signal to Vladimir Putin that Washington is determined to squeeze his gas revenues and break his energy stranglehold on Eastern Europe. That is why members of both political parties have called for boosting and accelerating LNG exports as quickly as possible. Those can begin to flow from the United States as early as 2015, thus increasing supply, alleviating dependency on other sources, and send a very important message to Mr. Putin.

All of the actions I have described would send a powerful message to Moscow and help maximize our diplomatic leverage in the current crisis. The March 20 sanctions were a good start. The legislation that is crafted by my friend from Tennessee, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, along with Senator MENENDEZ, the chairman, are a good start, but there is more that can be done and should be done. I hope the majority leader will allow a reasonable and rational process to allow other Members in the body to participate by adding their constructive ideas to this legislation, which will pass by the end of the week, but I think there are a multitude of good ideas that could be added to it to make it even stronger and send an even more effective message to Vladimir Putin and, hopefully, discourage him from acting further in his naked aggression in Ukraine.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCHATZ). The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to ask about my time, but before the Senator from Texas leaves, I wish to thank him for his comments and his involvement in this issue. I appreciate his coming to the floor. I think this is an important issue for us to be debating and I firmly support the open amendment process that has been alluded to.

If I could, I wish to inquire as to how much time is remaining at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 4 minutes remaining on the Republican side.

Mr. CORKER. I was afraid that might be the case. I wonder if I could ask unanimous consent to speak for 8 minutes or so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UKRAINE

Mr. CORKER. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the pending business before the Senate, which is the aid package and sanctions package and the IMF package relative to Ukraine. I wish to thank Senator MENENDEZ for the way he conducted our hearings and markup relative to this bill.

I think most people in this body understand this is a bill that came out of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a 14-3 vote. We had one Member who was absent, dealing with some business in Florida. It is my understanding had that Member been there, this actually would have come out of committee on a 15-3 vote. So I emphasize, first of all, this bill has been through the committee process. On the other hand, events on the ground have changed since the bill came out of committee. Things have evolved since it came out of committee. I hope there is an open amendment process to make adjustments to the bill to take into account some of the things that have occurred on the ground since that time.

Look, I know all of us want to strongly support Ukraine. I know all of us strongly condemn what Russia and Putin have done recently in Crimea, and I think all of us understand that what we want to do is to stop that aggression from moving on into the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine. So we are trying to respond in a way that sends a signal to Russia, sends a signal to those who have been involved in these illicit activities, that they should at least stop on the Crimean border and, hopefully, over time they will recede from Crimea. What we are trying to do is prevent further aggression in this area.

I think everyone understands it has been our policy for 70 years as the United States to promote a democratic whole and free Europe. So what is happening with Russia and Crimea—and hopefully not in Ukraine, although there is no doubt they have fomented many of the problems that have occurred there—what we are attempting to do is to ensure that Europe remains free, democratic, and whole.

I know everybody here remembers the fact that Ukraine was a place of numbers of nuclear weapons from Russia. When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, there was a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and warheads in Ukraine. We signed an agreement called the Budapest Memorandum with the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine relative to Ukraine's sovereignty if they were willing to give up these nuclear weapons. So it is very much in our national interests that we prevent Russia from breaking up and dealing nefariously with the sovereignty of Ukraine.

We have crafted a bill which does three things. No. 1, it provides economic aid. I think everyone in this body understands the tremendous economic problems Ukraine is experiencing. I think we all understand the first thing that has to happen in Ukraine is it has to be stabilized economically. Therefore, the administration has pledged \$1 billion in aid. This bill backs that up in a way that allows that to occur. Obviously, Congress has to approve spending, which is associated with loan guarantees. These loan guarantees, by the way, would not take effect until after Ukraine has signed an IMF agreement that makes sure they

are going to go through the structural processes necessary to make sure they do what actually causes them to be a more successful country.

The bill also deals with sanctions. I think everyone knows there have been numbers of people who have been involved nefariously in dealing internally in Ukraine with their sovereignty issues, but there also have been numbers of corrupt officials in Russia who have affected what is happening in Ukraine, and this bill sanctions both. We are sending a very strong message. Economic aid is important, but I also think sanctioning the bad behavior and Russia understanding there are going to be additional sanctions put in place is important.

I wish to thank the administration for the sanctions that have been put in place. I thought it was a big step to put in place sectoral sanctions, or when they said they had the ability through Executive order to do that. What I hope will happen, and what we have pressed for out of our office, is they will implement some of those sectoral sanctions to send a shock wave through the Russian economy that in the event they do anything to come into Ukraine while they are amassing troops on the border—if they do anything in that regard—this is just the beginning.

I think all of us understand Russia is in a place where their economy is weak and we know the ruble has depreciated greatly in value. We understand our best asset against them right now is sanctions that would hurt them economically and certainly affect those people who sit around Putin and affect him in big ways.

The third piece of this bill is IMF reform. I join a number of people who believe the IMF reforms that have been laid out are important. They are important to the world. I talk to my friends on this side of the aisle who I think may have more of an isolationist bent, and I say that one of the things that is most important for us as a nation is to have an entity such as the IMF—it is not perfect, it makes mistakes, but it is the entity that everything in the world is looking to right now to help usher Ukraine from where they are to a place that is prosperous and has the ability to improve the standard of living of Ukrainians, which is very important from the standpoint of their stability.

So we are all focused on the IMF. We have people on my side of the aisle who again have become more isolationist, less adventurous, if you would, relative to—which is where the country is, I understand. But what the IMF does is allow us to share the risk of stabilizing countries such as Ukraine with other countries around the world. I think all of us understand the threats to global stability are greater today than they have been in the past. So there was an agreed-to set of reforms that took place back in 2010. I strongly support—I strongly support—those reforms and,

as a matter of fact, would say Ukraine is the poster child for why we need to have an IMF that is functioning at a much higher level.

We account for a transfer from something called the NAB, if you will—it is a line of credit that we have; it is out there; it is a liability our Nation has—and we transfer \$63 billion of that \$100 billion over to something that is in a basket of currency. So we are not taking on any additional liabilities. Yet there is a pay-for aspect of this through the budgeting process that is fully accounted for in this bill.

Again, I join Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary Jim Baker in saying and knowing we should adopt these IMF reforms.

These are the three big elements of this bill. We have some democracy assistance. We have some authorized sums to help us build stronger relationships with our allies. But I strongly support this piece of legislation. I think this piece of legislation is a full package. It is a package that deals with the three aspects that need to be dealt with at this time.

Ukraine is, again, the poster child of why we want to have a fully functioning IMF. Look, I know there are going to be amendments offered. There actually have been some already. I hope we will have a full and open process, with amendments that are relevant to what we are dealing with on the floor. I think the bill can be improved.

It is my hope, as we move through this week, that we will have the opportunity for those amendments to be heard and voted on but, at the same time, by the time the week ends and we head back to our respective States we will have, in a unified way, sent a message to Russia, sent a message to the people of Ukraine as to where this body stands relative to their support economically, relative to sanctions that we believe strongly should be put in place against Russia, and how we believe the IMF should be functioning as a stabilizing force in the world.

With that, I yield the floor.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE ACT OF 2014—MOTION TO PROCEED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 2124, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Motion to proceed to Calendar No. 329, S. 2124, a bill to support sovereignty and democracy in Ukraine, and for other purposes.