

third largest exporter of grain, despite all of the hardship that the corrupt government of that country has placed on their farmers, who simply want to earn a living from the soil and share their great gifts with the world. They have faced so many roadblocks.

Thank you for appreciating the artistry and magnificent beauty of that country and for your steadfast support of liberty both here and abroad. You have just been a magnificent member. We thank you so much for coming down here this evening.

As she was speaking about New Yorkers who are going to gather in Four Freedoms Park in New York City, a home to people from throughout the world, I wanted to say that there are more Ukrainians living outside Ukraine than inside its borders because of the tragedies that have occurred there over the last century and more, particularly because of the Stalin and Soviet period.

Ukrainians live in Canada, Portugal, Italy, Argentina, and Australia. The pieces of humanity are strewn across the globe, and as I mentioned in earlier remarks this evening, millions of her own people were either starved to death or murdered. They were killed by their own government, the government of the Soviet Union, which tried to eliminate Ukrainian culture, Polish culture, the Jewish religion.

Now we are worried about the Tatars in Crimea because they don't share the majority religion. They are a minority. The history of tyrannical leaders in that part of the world has, unfortunately, been to kill those who don't agree with them rather than to create a civil society in which all views can be expressed, even though we might not agree with them.

So we worry about the people there. We are trying to be a voice for them here in our own country—a voice for freedom, not for brutality or repression. A voice for encouragement, not force alone.

I want to thank Congresswoman MALONEY and Congressman KING for joining us this evening.

May God bless America, and may God bless the people and the legitimate government of Ukraine as she seeks to build a freedom of liberty and justice for all her people.

I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 2030

HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2013, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. KING) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to be recognized by you and to address you here on the floor of the House of Representatives.

I would first like to say I appreciate the gentleladies—and that is plural—

presentation and the breadth of their attention to the part of the world that has been the center of our discussion here tonight and that should be the center of our American discussion, and will be, for some time to come.

As I watch this unfold, and think of the time in 2008 when I found myself in the Nation of Georgia within a little more than a week after the Russians invaded two provinces or states of Georgia, one of them South Ossetia, and having arrived there and met with the leadership in Georgia, including President Saakashvili and his cabinet that were young people, and a minister of defense that was still awaiting his 30th birthday, I heard the narrative from inside Tbilisi on what the Russians had planned and what the Russians had done.

Now, history is little bit undecided, Mr. Speaker, about who fired the first shot in Georgia. It may have been the Russians baited the Georgians into it. It may have been that the Russians actually fired on the Georgians and the Georgians fired back.

In any case, the narrative that I received there that was part of a briefing that was synced with our State Department and with the representatives of the Nation State of Georgia brought together information that there was a single underpass, there was a two-lane underpass; that within a 24-hour period of time, some 2,200 Russian vehicles, tanks, armor and other equipment went under that underpass.

They had to have staged that invasion of Georgia. It could not have been a spontaneous response on the part of the Georgians firing on the Russians or the Russians who may well have fired the first shots at Georgia.

In any case, when the Russians went in and occupied those parts of Georgia, that began a movement, a strong movement of hegemony, and I think that it was passed off that the Georgian circumstances were somehow an anomaly, that somehow it was regional tensions that were brought up, and that the eye to the sea wasn't necessarily what Putin was thinking about.

Well, Mr. Speaker, I believe that he was. I believe it was the first piece on the giant geopolitical chessboard, the chessboard that our President doesn't seem to think actually is in play any longer, that Cold War chessboard.

But when I look at the map of that part of the world and look at the flow of energy that goes back and forth, Ukraine and Georgia have similarities. One is, they have ports.

The second one is that they are a nexus for energy, transmitting energy through their countries with pipelines and, in the case of Georgia, rail lines. It is important that if you can control Georgia you can control a lot of the energy that comes through from the east, and if you can control Yugoslavia, you can control a lot of the energy that comes through from the east.

Those two things, plus the historical involvement of the Russians in the Cri-

mea. I take us back to the gentlelady from Ohio who laid out the case of the 1994 treaty that the Russians signed and the interested parties signed that all would respect the territorial and sovereign borders of the Ukraine, and of course the Russians violated that.

I don't expect much of anything else to happen. I don't think they are bound by their honor in any way. I think they are only bound by the limitations of the static tension that comes from power, and that power can be economic, it can be political. It is probably not very much cultural, but it also is, in the highest degree it is military.

When there is no military deterrent in place, then Putin is going to be determined to move forward and reconstitute the old Soviet Union. He lamented years ago that the worst thing that happened in the 20th century was the implosion of the Soviet Union, or the disintegration of the Soviet union.

I would also point out that the world is not going to tolerate a lone superpower, which the United States of America is, the unchallenged greatest nation in the world, the strongest superpower there has been, with global reach everywhere.

When the United States pulls back—first, Mr. Speaker, we project power. We project power in the ways that I said, economically, culturally, militarily and strategically, and when the United States pulls back from that, when we decide that we are not going to exert influence in parts of the world, then the lust for power that comes in the embodiment of someone like Putin fills that vacuum. In fact, it is pushing constantly. It doesn't need a vacuum to push in.

Russian pushed into Georgia in 2008. They gave us a preview of what was to come.

Now, here we are, these few years later, these six or so years later, and we are watching now, as Putin finished up with his Olympics, his 50-plus billion dollar endeavor, I think a lot of it had to do with raising the spirits of the Russian people and their sense of support for him so that he could get away with this cold tactic of a military invasion and conquest of the Crimea.

I don't have any doubt that he has got his eyes on the balance of the Ukraine, that he has got his eyes on the balance of the Soviet Union in whatever order that he can pull this off.

If we show weakness, if we don't stand strong, if we don't stare him down, if we don't put the kind of equipment and resources in place to block his move, then Putin is going to march through these countries, one after another.

It is a fairly long hiatus between Georgia and the component of the Ukraine that has now been invaded and occupied that we call now the Crimea, but I think it is interesting and I think it is ironic, Mr. Speaker, that it is the Crimea that has been grabbed as part

of the Ukraine, and now they are seeking, the Russians have already annexed it, Mr. Speaker, and now they are about forcing a referendum this Sunday.

When they talk about how the Duma has to operate and what the legal structure is in Russia, it is all a matter of what does Putin command. Whatever the sequential order of the Duma is, and whatever we might think they have to jump through for hoops, I think it is just this: if Putin commands, then they will jump through the hoops at his command.

We should think about this. Georgia, and now the Crimea and the eyes of the Russians and Putin, in particular, looking into the Ukraine, and think about what happened the last time we had a dictator who had such a desire for conquest and occupation.

I would take us back to this piece of history where, as I saw this happen, when the Russians went into the Crimea, Mr. Speaker, immediately, I began to rethink the sequence of history, when Adolf Hitler demanded that they receive the Sudetenland, a component and the western perimeter of at the time Czechoslovakia. The pretense that he used was identical to the pretense that Putin has used to go into the Crimea.

It was Hitler that said there are German-speaking people and they deserve German representation, and someone has got to protect them and represent them, and I need to do that, as the leader, the Fuhrer of Germany. They are German-speaking people, they are German people, they need to be under German rule. That was the pretense that he used that forced the negotiations that took place in Munich in 1938.

Before we go to that spot, there was a peaceful march into and invasion of the Nation of Austria, and pulling us back in that history, Mr. Speaker, there was significant pressure that was put on the Austrians that began back prior to 1938, and Hitler made the arguments too.

Austria, still, to this day, is a German-speaking country. They identify very closely with the German people. They flow back and forth. The difference between an Austrian and a German isn't a particularly distinct one, although they are separate nation states today.

But Hitler put pressure on the Chancellor of Austria, and as he brought them to an agreement and got the Chancellor of Austria to make some appointments of Austrian Nazi officers, he weakened the resistance of the leadership by doing so.

On March 12 of 1938, essentially the day—March 11, the Chancellor of Austria resigned. March 12 Nazi troops flowed into Austria. By the 13th of March they had declared Austria to be a protectorate, a separate protectorate of the German empire that had begun.

Now, this is a recovery of a nation that was defeated in World War I. They had gone through tremendous eco-

nomics crisis and chaos, as had Austria, and they were vulnerable, and Austria was powerless to stand in the way of the Nazi military machine, and the Wehrmacht. So March 12 was essentially the date that the flow of the Nazis marched into, went into Austria and Vienna, March 12 of 1938, Mr. Speaker.

Now, think of this. In the spring of 1938, Nazi troops flow into Austria, essentially annex the country without firing a shot. Pretty similar to the Russians going into the Crimea.

Now, they did fire some shots in Georgia, a lot of shots in Georgia, and people were killed, and a number of Russian planes were shot down by the Georgian military, but we are back in 1938. Spring of 1938, Austria taken over by the Nazis. In September of 1938, Hitler has been spending the whole summer agitating that the Sudetenland needs to also come into the German sphere of influence in a similar fashion that Austria had been brought into the German sphere of influence.

Neville Chamberlain, the now infamous failed peacekeeper, peacemaker then flew to Munich to meet with Hitler and made an agreement called the Munich Agreement with Hitler and signed off on it and got a letter that Adolf Hitler signed which said, we are going to have peace now in Europe if you just give me the Sudetenland, the German-speaking area which was the western perimeter of Czechoslovakia.

The date was September 29, 1938, when Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler in Munich. He flew back to England and landed, had a press conference on the airstrip on September 30 of 1938 and waved the letter in his hand that said, peace for our time.

We remember it as peace in our time, but he actually said peace for our time and waved the letter, did the press conference, and let all of England and the free world know that Hitler didn't have any further designs on any kind of real estate; he didn't intend to take over any other part of Europe, that he was going to be happy with what he had achieved, which was Austria and the Sudetenland, the western perimeter of Czechoslovakia. Peace for our time.

So after that press conference, I am sure that Neville Chamberlain went to bed thinking that he had accomplished something, and the very following day the Nazis then flowed into Sudetenland, and they stayed there and occupied throughout the winter.

That takes us through the winter of 1938 and the spring of 1939. By March 16, the Nazi troops had flowed throughout the balance of Czechoslovakia, occupied it.

Now, you would think that we were going to have peace for our time at that time because, after all, Hitler didn't announce his planned operations to go in and invade and occupy any other part of Europe. He had been announcing that he was peaceful. He signed the letter. He just didn't keep his word.

Sound a little curious, doesn't it, Mr. Speaker. The Russians signed the agreement with the Ukrainians in 1994 that they would respect the territorial boundaries of the Ukraine. They kept that deal as long as it was suitable to the Russians.

The Russian signature, of course, means nothing to Putin if they have territorial aspirations, if they have territorial greed. So Putin, in a very similar fashion to Adolf Hitler, went into the Crimea and took the Crimea over.

He had it planned. He had it strategized. He should have been able to see it coming. I would like to think that our intel predicted this as a strategic move, rather than just a response to a military move. I don't know that and probably will never know that, if that was ever the dialogue of the people who were watching very closely in that part of the world.

When Hitler went in and occupied the balance of Czechoslovakia, and we had the summer then of 1939 wondering, but not very intensively, we have got peace in Europe again. Land for peace. Worked out pretty well, Neville Chamberlain thought.

Yet, September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland. He had already cut a deal with the Russians that they were going to carve Poland up. It took the Russians another 12 days to get mobilized to go in and start carving up their part of Poland, but the Nazi divisions were prepared to go, and they launched a blitzkrieg invasion of Poland and invaded and occupied and penetrated to the predetermined line that he and Stalin had agreed to, and Poland was carved up.

□ 2045

Now that crossed the line for the rest of Western Europe. That did launch World War II in a formal fashion. So as the Western World began to mobilize for a war that they hoped to never see fought and were not very well prepared for, the following spring, in April of 1940, the Nazis invaded Norway. April 13, they invaded Greece and Yugoslavia.

Think how fast this took place. They had been planning for a long time. They had mobilized for a long time. They had the strategy put in place, and by April 13 of 1940, in a short 2-year period of time, they had gone through Austria, the Sudetenland, the balance of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia by April 13, 1940.

Mr. Speaker, this was a dramatic takeover of real estate and property. At some point, Hitler no longer needed to put up the pretense because the war was declared then, and it was declared on September 1 of 1939, shortly after September 1 of 1939, Mr. Speaker.

These are dramatic changes that took place across Europe. They were ideological clashes, economic clashes, geographic clashes, and cultural clashes that came to a head in that part of the world. We think it can't happen

again or it won't happen again. We fought the cold war for 45 years, and, finally, the Berlin Wall went down, and MARCY KAPTUR went over and chiseled a piece out with her own hand. I learned that tonight on the floor. I am impressed, and I am proud of her for having the conviction to go and do that, knowing and understanding what that meant then and what it means today.

Mr. Speaker, we are watching a Russia push back on this. We have seen the character and the culture under Stalin; we have seen it under Brezhnev; we have seen it under Khrushchev; and we have seen it under Lenin, the territorial hegemony attitude of the Russians and a Putin who would like to reconstruct the old Soviet Union and do so by military conquest. That is what we have in the Crimea. I don't have any doubt he is looking again at Ukraine.

Now I will go through some of the rest of these countries that fell at the beginning of World War I. I have taken you through Austria, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland carved up by Russia and the Nazis. They made a deal, a cold and cruel agreement to carve Poland up, and they executed a lot of Jews, and they executed a lot of Poles just for being Jews and Poles.

History marks that kind of brutality on both sides of that line that came into Poland. I recall meeting in Cologne, Germany, a few years ago with some leaders in that part of the world. The gentleman who was sitting next to me at a dinner table and I got into a conversation—about the same age—what did our parents do during the Second World War? Mr. Speaker, I listened as he told me that his father fought at Auschwitz. I said: Did he fight to liberate Auschwitz? He said that he fought in the Russian invasion of Auschwitz in September of 1939 when the Russians went in and invaded Poland from the east and invaded and occupied, and Auschwitz was part of that territory that the Russians carved out.

It is quite a thing to listen to that kind of a narrative. Clear over on the east side of the line that we didn't think about enough throughout that course of history, there were people that were invading armies that were launched in September of 1939 to go and take the free country of Poland and carve it up in a cold-blooded and greedy way to latch on to the property of Poland.

So the pattern is there. And they are on this together, and they are staring each other down across this line. But it takes us through 1939 and into 1940, when Norway and Greece, in the spring, were occupied along with Yugoslavia. And then on the 10th of May, the Nazi panzer divisions rolled through Belgium and into France. Belgium lasted about 18 days and ended about May 28, 1940, when they fully surrendered. And France lasted until about the 22nd of June. Paris capitulated and surrendered June 14,

and the balance of France was handed over under Nazi control with Vichy cooperation as late as June 22 of 1940.

Then the Battle of Britain began—and that was fought over the English Channel, much of it, and over the land area of Great Britain. That essentially ended. You don't know when it ends, but looking back on the calendar, it ended in the late fall of 1940. And we are still not in this war, Mr. Speaker. This country is still sitting here watching the lot of the rest of the world engage in the conflict—not that I wanted to be in that conflict any earlier than that—but we were neutral, although we were trying to help out our Allies and help out the British. And I am thinking, what are the Russians looking at at the time? They are wondering, their ally, Hitler, was not very reliable, but they went through 1940 and through all of the spring of 1941 believing that they had made an agreement to carve up Poland, and somehow they were going to have the static border between Germany and the Russians. They probably believed that Hitler didn't have any further land aspirations either.

Now, I bring this up because we should not believe that Putin doesn't have further aspirations. Hitler did have. On June 22, 1941, he launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded Russia itself, from a treaty to carve up Poland to an all-out assault and offensive on Russia, to invade and occupy Russia, and nearly got it done.

That, Mr. Speaker, is a very long and complex history that can be read in a book entitled "Absolute War," written by Chris Bellamy. It is about 750 pages. It goes through the details, in great detail, of that Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of Russia. It was, of course, turned back at Stalingrad.

While that went on, it was easy to see that Hitler was planning the invasion of Russia for a long, long time. He was retrofitting his railcars to be able to go on the different gauge rails as they were sending men and equipment into Russia. He had an agreement with the Russians that they were going to send him the things he needed, raw materials and feed grains and the raw materials that they could use and that they needed badly in Germany in exchange for German engineers going to Russia. He had his German engineers that were helping the Russians develop and build military equipment and munitions, except the German engineers were ordered to slow-walk the Russians and do very little to help move them along in their progression of developing their military capability, all the while raw materials—food and supplies that Hitler needed from Russia—were pouring into Germany and becoming part of the resources for the war effort that was about to come.

That launched June 22. It would have been earlier by about 6 weeks if it hadn't been for an uprising revolution in Yugoslavia that took five German divisions to go down there to put the

uprising down, the revolution down in Yugoslavia. That delayed the planned invasion of Russia for Hitler from May 12 up until June 22. It likely was the difference in whether the Nazi troops would have been successful in Stalingrad and in Moscow.

But if one, today, Mr. Speaker, travels to Moscow and you land at the airport and take ground travel from the airport, that long high traffic area on into Moscow, you will see just outside of Moscow a large tank barrier that is sitting there which marks the furthest most easterly advance of a German tank that was part of the invasion attempts in Moscow.

We don't think about how close that came. It came within perhaps weeks of being successful, that difference between the delay of that invasion which would have been scheduled for May 12 that turned out to be June 22, 1941. We don't study this in our history very much, Mr. Speaker, because we turn our focus to Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, and then the need and the necessity for us to launch a two-front war almost immediately.

That conflict set the borders for today, a conflict of the Second World War. I take you through this piece of history, and I will be naming some of the countries that may well be targets of Putin. But I take you through this history to get, Mr. Speaker, people that are paying attention to this discussion, to get you to Yalta on February 11, 1945. I briefly mentioned it while the gentlelady from Ohio had the floor.

I think about that meeting between Franklin Delano Roosevelt, between Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill, the three leaders that were the central players in the Second World War European theater—not the Japanese or Pacific theater, but the European theater. They met at Yalta. It is ironic to me that Yalta is in the Crimea. Putin has annexed, not only annexed the Crimea, he annexed Yalta itself, the very place where those three leaders took a map of the world, of Asia and Europe, and drew a line on that map.

West of the line—after the war was over, they planned that they would defeat this Nazi Germany that has marched through all these countries that I have described. They planned that they were going to defeat Nazi Germany, that they were going to invade and occupy all of the countries from the east on the Russian side and from the west the Allied side. By that time, it was just post the Battle of the Bulge, which ended near the end of January in 1945.

So they decided they were going to carve up Europe. If the war ended in victory for them, then the Russians were going to take a half of Germany. We know where that line was. It became the Iron Curtain wall, and in Berlin it became the Berlin Wall. And they were going to take the Eastern Bloc countries that we know of, and that was Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,

and Bulgaria, the list goes on, Yugoslavia, those countries, parts of them.

So that agreement was made at Yalta. The agreement was agreed to by Churchill, by Roosevelt, and by Stalin. And then they collapsed in on Germany and carved that part of the world up according to the plan at Yalta.

Now, can you imagine, Mr. Speaker, sitting at Yalta in the Crimea with a map of the world and drawing on that map, this is the line east of which people will live under the Soviet influence—which hadn't technically formed yet—west of this line people will live under Western influence and, by the way, even carved up Berlin itself so that we had a U.S. sector, we had a French sector, a British sector, and a Russian sector of Berlin itself.

That set the destiny for a lot of history that was to come after that. What we saw happen over the course of, then, 45 years of cold war, Mr. Speaker, was that these countries that had been taken over by Russia, and some of them were closely within the sphere, but I will say the countries that are Eastern Bloc satellites of the Soviet Union, occupied and influenced by them, Hungary, Georgia, I mentioned the Crimea, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and now the Slovak Republic, Croatia, Austria, Belarus, to name some, to leave some out, but to get most of them, these are countries that are now on Putin's list. He puts Crimea in his little pocket and says, I have got that, I am going to hold it, and not many people in this country can devise a plan to get it back. He has got parts of Georgia in his hand.

If we don't step up our resources so that there is a deterrent in place, this man, Putin, will march on down the line. I believe he will march into eastern Ukraine. I believe that some of those operations could be going on now. I think he will be looking very closely at Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, members of NATO, member countries that we are pledged to defend. But I think that Putin looks in the eyes of our Commander in Chief and wonders how much resolve is actually there, and I think he concluded that the resolve wasn't there. That is one of the contributing factors that Putin went into the Crimea.

I don't suggest that he would not have done it if we had had a different President; although, I suspect that if this had been a stronger President, I will just say, Mr. Speaker, it is less likely if we had had a stronger President.

Now, the countries that are along that perimeter, that see Russia on their border and they see what has happened with troops marching into the Crimea and they see the threats that the balance of Ukraine is under, they see what has happened in Georgia—and, by the way, the amount of Georgia that remains as sovereign is a fairly large share of their original real estate.

They are the furthest, most easterly outpost of Western civilization in the nation of Georgia.

They have a strong spirit. They love freedom, they love free enterprise, and they love Americans. That is the case for a lot of countries up and down through that part of the world. We need a stronger presence in each one of them. We need to have a stronger force lined up. I would say one of the first moves that we need to make, and I recall the Poles and the Czechs, but under the Bush administration, we had negotiated the placement of missiles and radar in Poland and Czechoslovakia, respectively, and shortly after our President was elected, Mr. Speaker, he canceled the agreement to place the missiles and the radar in those two countries.

□ 2100

The headlines in the Warsaw paper—and they found out about this in the news. It wasn't the President calling them up saying, I'm not going to follow through on this; they found out about it in the news. The headlines in the Warsaw paper read: "Betrayed." The United States agreement with Poles and the Czechs was a betrayal of our word, and it was because Putin influenced Barack Obama into canceling the agreement that established the missiles and the radar in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The headlines said "Betrayed" in Poland. They were betrayed.

I have had some conversations with Poles since the invasion of Crimea, and I am convinced that they would accept the missiles again even though we haven't been very reliable in our partnership. They are taking a lot of heat. They are right there. Russia is next door, and the Poles have stood in the middle of invasions going two directions in the memory of many of the Poles yet today. They have enjoyed a long period of peace, fairly long considering their history, but the Poles, I believe, would accept the missiles today, and we ought to place them there. The Czechs, I don't have as good a measure on, but I would be hopeful we could place a radar there and start to build up the missile defense shield.

We did operations on the ground in Poland last August. We need to ramp them up again and do more ground operations, more joint military exercises. We need to expand those exercises along that part of the world, working in conjunction with the NATO troops and the troops of the sovereign countries along that border that is now on the west side of the new Iron Curtain that Putin has essentially announced by his invasion into the Crimea. We need to put whatever kind of advisory support the Ukrainians need right into Ukraine so that their people are trained and their people are ready to step up and defend themselves. If Putin decides to move into the balance of Ukraine, how could they do anything but defend themselves. I think they

must. I would like to see that they are ready.

Mr. Speaker, I am known as a fiscal conservative in this House. I supported the resolution that advanced the \$1 billion in loan guarantees to the Ukrainians. I don't think that is enough. I think we should be prepared in this Congress to go down the line and match Putin dollar per dollar with loan guarantees, provided we could condition them in such a way that Putin himself doesn't get his hands on those resources. We need to demonstrate our commitment to the Ukrainians and let them know that we will be there.

We need to invite Georgia into NATO. We should have done that back in 2008. We should have brought Ukraine into NATO during that same period of time. Those kind of things could well have been a deterrent to Putin, and we didn't take advantage of the opportunity to bring them in the NATO sphere of influence.

So I would offer again to Georgia, come on into NATO. Ukraine, get stabilized a little bit so we can see what kind of government is going to emerge, but we ought to consider a stabilized government of Ukraine being an eligible candidate for NATO. We need to build our defenses up along those borders. We need to understand that, back to that static nature, that this is the renewal of the cold war launched by Putin, and we can't continue to back up thinking that he is not going to push.

I have read through and delivered the history of the Nazi regime from 1938, March of 1938 on until the invasion of Russia by the Germans, by the Nazi regime, because there is a distinct difference, on June 22, 1941, when the Second World War was launched in a large way. This is not going to happen in a way that Putin is going to put it out on the calendar and tell us that he has his eye on some of the eastern regions of the Ukraine and then maybe he thinks he is going to put a little pressure on some of the other countries, maybe back to Georgia again or Belarus, but they are so closely aligned there, it is hard to draw a distinction. Maybe it is one of the other countries along the way. Maybe it is Estonia. Maybe it is Latvia. Maybe it is Lithuania; maybe it is all of them. I have gone through this history of what happened at the beginning of World War II, and I think we understand how quickly it can happen and how little is the time to get ready and how important it is to be prepared.

Mr. Speaker, we must be a strong military Nation. We must be prepared. About the same time that Secretary Hagel announced drastic military cuts is about the same time that Putin went into the Crimea. It is possible it is a coincidence, but the military cuts information was already out. I think we should suspend those cuts now. I think we should be prepared to match Putin dollar per dollar in the Ukraine. I think we need to put the missiles up

and the radar up in Poland and Czechoslovakia. I think we need to sail a few more operational ships into the Black Sea. I think we need to have more presence in that part of the world, and we need to get our military back to ready. If they are cutting our military down to pre-World War II levels, and I look at some of the troop levels that we have for all of our arenas of operation, and I see what can be mustered by the Russians in one location, and I see how weak the military is in Western Europe, and how weak their resolve is, Mr. Speaker, I am very concerned that this second cold war has been relaunched, and you never know if it is going to turn into a shooting war, but trading land for peace has no successful precedent in history that I can think of.

Neville Chamberlain tried to trade off the Sudetenland for peace. What did it get us? That gave up the rest of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland. I recall the Gaza Strip being traded off, land for peace, and what does that get? That gets tunnels, and it gets rockets shot out of the Gaza Strip into the balance of Israel. Land for peace, Mr. Speaker: if someone can show me a successful trade of land for peace, I do not know what it is throughout the course of history.

It isn't that this is something—the Second World War that happened a long, long time ago in a different place and a different time. A lot of Americans are buried in that soil in Europe, and they gave their lives so that freedom could live.

We are going to commemorate and celebrate the successful landing at Normandy this upcoming June 6. That should be enough to bring our focus to what transpired then in that period of history, and it should bring our focus into the prevention of anything like that happening again. It should bring our focus into having peace through strength, being strong militarily, being strong economically, and being strong spiritually and strong culturally. Those are the credentials of the United States of America, to live free and be strong.

Each time we have been involved in wars that were, some would say as critics, foreign interventionism, then we have decided there was a peace dividend, chopped our military down. We don't need them so much anymore; we will have a core group of our military because, after all, we are Americans. Just being Americans is a deterrent.

Obviously, it is not. Putin thumbs his nose at us. I will take us through the cycles. We were late getting into World War I. We went over there very highly mobilized, and made a significant difference to help close out the end of World War I. It was a travesty in that part of the world, and World War I did not end it. It did not end decisively and conclusively, and it set the stage for World War II.

We instead cut our troops back down going into 1940. We were weak. The

Japanese knew it. That is why they had the audacity to attack us in Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Nazis didn't respect us or they would have been more hesitant in their part of the world they were invading and occupying.

A strong America has always been successful. Ronald Reagan came onto the scene, and recognized that we were weak. He recognized, Mr. Speaker, that there was a cold war and a geopolitical chess game taking place. As Jeane Kirkpatrick described it, chess and monopoly on the same board. The only question was, during the cold war—and this was in 1984 when she said this, and 5 years later, we found the answer. In 1984, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to the United Nations, appointed under Ronald Reagan, as she stepped down, she said chess and monopoly on the same board in this cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the question is whether we bankrupt the Soviet Union economically before they checkmate us militarily.

We know the answer to that. We bankrupted the Soviet Union before they checkmated us militarily. They could not keep up with our investment and America's innovativeness. They couldn't keep up with our missile defense system that we were putting place, either, the Strategic Defense Initiative that was announced by President Reagan, and should I say demagogued here on the floor of the House of Representatives by Democrats calling it Star Wars. I thought it was a tactical and a messaging error on the part of President Reagan not to embrace it and say that's right, it is Star Wars. We are going to build a missile defense system, and that seemed a long reach at the time. It doesn't seem like such a long reach today, and that defense system should have deployed in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

There is a defense system that is deployed in other places around the world, and a defense system, of course, that is deployed to protect Israel today. That is a product of SDI, that is the vision of SDI; but the vision of Putin, Vladimir Putin, is hegemony. That means if you were once a Soviet state, he wants you back as a Soviet state. If he can get it militarily, he will get it militarily. If he can get it politically, he will get it politically, but we should understand that these countries that I have named off are countries that he looks at, that he would like to have back as part of the Russia Federation, to re-create the old Soviet Union. I will name these countries again: Georgia. He invaded and occupied Crimea, that is part of it. Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Croatia, Austria on the edges, and Belarus. That is some of them, not all of them. We have a big challenge in front of us.

Mr. Speaker, I would challenge and encourage the Members of this Congress to get better informed, to get up

to speed on what is taking place in foreign relations.

For about the last six months, I have been very concerned that I don't hear a foreign policy discussion or debate here on the floor of the House. I don't see much for legislation come through. I don't hear it in the dialogue among my colleagues. I hear a handful of Senators on the other side of the Rotunda that will go out and engage in foreign policy and have those kinds of discussions.

Yes, I agree, the President sets the foreign policy and he is the Commander in Chief, but he is not the sole source of knowledge and input. He needs good advisers. I think he needs to make better decisions than he has made. He needs to be strong and he needs to be bold. He needs to be able to look Putin in the eye and see the KGB that JOHN MCCAIN identified, and understand that there is an agenda there, and Putin can be deterred if the price is high, but the price has to be high enough to deter Putin.

I want to challenge and encourage the Members of the House, Members of the Senate, get engaged in foreign policy. Travel and meet the leaders of these countries and build relationships in those countries. When it is time that things must be done, it is too late to start building a relationship; then it is time to act. Build a relationship first, build an understanding first, and we need far, far more expertise on foreign policy than we have today.

We have a Presidential election that is starting to emerge, and among the Presidential candidates, I strongly encourage them, get your foreign policy credentials up. Travel now while you can. As the campaign gets closer, there is less time available to do it, and it will look more and more like you are trying to burnish your foreign policy credentials. From my standpoint, you need to go to those countries and you need to see the leaders. You need to know them face to face and eye to eye. They need to recognize you when you walk into the room.

This Congress needs to get more focused on foreign policy. This country needs more focus on foreign policy. When something like that happens, then we can have a more open discussion. I was encouraged to hear the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) talk in depth on the relationship with Ukraine, and as chair of the Ukrainian Caucus, MARCY KAPTUR has been very good on these issues. There are not enough of us engaged in a similar fashion.

Here is what I would do if I were moving the pieces around on this chess board, rather than having my voice and my vote here in the House of Representatives. I would put the missiles and the radar back up in Poland and Czechoslovakia. I would amp up our energy production here in our part of the world. I would release it so we could ship liquefied natural gas out of the United States over to Europe, to help give them, back them up in the event that Putin decides to shut their gas off.

□ 2115

Having that supply stream would be very useful. Putting more energy out on the market does go into Russia's economy and it makes it harder and harder for Putin to have the resources to be able to do the things he wants to do militarily. I think that is all delayed reaction, however, and in the short-term offer NATO membership to Georgia. Take a look at doing that as soon as the government could be established by and for the people of Ukraine by bringing them into NATO. I would encourage the EU to take a look at broadening their membership also, because I think it is easier to support a NATO membership if they are also a member of the EU, although I am only slightly thrilled about that particular proposal.

Special trainers in operations and forces to help support the Ukrainians in any place up along the border of the countries that border on Russia, and land operations up and down through that entire theater. Build then a military shield of deterrent, and start building it so that he knows that any aggressive move that he makes is going to be met by a countermove, strategic countermove. And the Ukrainians need to be prepared to fight for their land.

At this point, I haven't heard very much about what they might do if Putin decides to go forward and invade. You may not be the military that can stand up to the Russian military, but if you don't defend your own country, no one else is going to be able to step in and help. I say that, Mr. Speaker, to the Ukrainians, and encourage them: love freedom; love liberty.

Let's strengthen our relationships with the Ukrainians so that the growing economy of the West, the freedom that comes with free enterprise and liberty-loving people, strengthens the Ukrainian people and all the people up and down along that border.

Mr. Speaker, I don't want to see a replay of what happened at the beginning of World War II. I don't want to see countries on the Eastern Bloc side eventually taken over, some without firing a shot, some by a brutal invasion.

But I will just go through the march that took place from Hitler again, and it started in 1938. Austria, then the Sudetenland, then the balance of Czechoslovakia, then Poland invaded by the Nazis and by the Russians in September of '39, then Norway in the spring of 1940 by the Nazis, and then Greece and Yugoslavia by the Nazis, then on into France essentially the same day. France capitulated June 22. A year later, Hitler invaded Russia in Operation Barbarossa and nearly succeeded in his invasion of Russia.

That is the march that went through by a country that essentially was fighting a two-front war—Germany. The Russians don't have that problem. They are a one-front situation. But the hegemony of Putin needs to be recognized. He will take the old Soviet bloc

countries when he thinks he can get away with it. He will only be restrained by that. If he thinks he can't achieve, then he can be restrained. The ways that we make him do that are: respect economic power and respect the military deterrent.

We need to call upon our European allies to remember these lessons of the Second World War that I have described. I know that some of them announced that they have had a vote that declares them to be neutral in every conflict. I recall sitting in Vienna not that long ago with some of the leaders of their country and they announced they are a neutral country, and their policy is they will be neutral in any conflict and they will never fight another war and that nothing good comes from war. That was a discussion.

I happen to have been to the site that overlooks the Battle of Vienna that took place in September 11 and 12 of 1683 when the Polish King Jan Sobieski launched a cavalry charge down into the Turks that had Vienna surrounded, and they were a matter of days before they would have succeeded. The Turks would have succeeded in invading and occupying Vienna, and if they were successful, nothing likely would have stopped them in a march all the way across Europe.

I pointed out to the Austrians: it is a good thing that your ancestors didn't have such a resolution in September of 1683, because we would all have been occupied by the Ottoman Empire if it hadn't been for the courageous battle that took place right there in Vienna where we sat, and it was the West versus the East.

So history does turn on battles; it does turn on wars. They are enabled by or sometimes stifled by a successful or a failed economy. They are promoted by people who believe in themselves, and the overreach of brinksmanship brings about war.

I am opposed, of course, to war. I don't want to see our American troops go overseas. I don't want to deploy our military in a place like that. But we have got to provide support. We need to provide that support in a nonkinetic way now. If we do that, we might be able to deter what otherwise likely could come, which could very well be Putin deciding that in his lifetime he is going to reconstruct the entire Soviet Union.

That is what I fear, Mr. Speaker. That has to be our caution and our byword. If we act as if it is not a threat, as if it is not going to happen, if we turn our policy to let's make sure that—and this seems to be the policy that is emanating from the White House, Mr. Speaker. Give Putin an off-ramp. Don't close the gate on the off-ramp. Let's push a little bit, give him a little pressure, but give him room to pull back out of Crimea.

Mr. Speaker, I can tell you it is not about an off-ramp for Putin. He pulled in there, he is not pulling out. He wants Crimea. He is going to hang on

to it, and his eyes are on the balance of Ukraine right now.

The idea that we are going to coalesce our foreign policy around not pushing on Putin too hard because otherwise there isn't a way for him to get on an off-ramp, I would mark the times it was mentioned by our administration on my hand, and I have, in Sarah Palin-style, eight different marks on my hand the times that they mentioned "off-ramp."

It isn't about an off-ramp, Mr. Speaker. We can't be obsessing about an off-ramp. Putin doesn't want an off-ramp. If he wanted an off-ramp, he never would have gone up the in-ramp that he took to go into the Crimea.

This is about deterring him from going into the balance of the satellite states, in particular, in Eastern Europe. It is necessary that we put the deterrents in place. It is necessary that we go through these steps that I have described, Mr. Speaker.

I appreciate your attention and urge all those that have listened to my words to follow them.

I yield back the balance of my time.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. MCINTYRE (at the request of Ms. PELOSI) for today on account of travel difficulties.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 1917. An act to provide for additional enhancements of the sexual assault prevention and response activities of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services; in addition, to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; and to the Committee on the Judiciary for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

Karen L. Haas, Clerk of the House, reported and found truly an enrolled bill of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 2019. An act to eliminate taxpayer financing of political party conventions and reprogram savings to provide for a 10-year pediatric research initiative through the Common Fund administered by the National Institutes of Health, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 22 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, March 12, 2014, at 10 a.m. for morning-hour debate.