

economic development of states in the region", was unanimously adopted on February 29, 2012. Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate—

(1) condemns acts of armed robbery at sea, piracy, and other maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea;

(2) endorses and supports the efforts made by United States Government agencies to assist affected West and Central African countries to build capacity to combat armed robbery at sea, piracy, and other maritime threats, and encourages the President to continue such assistance, as appropriate, within resource constraints; and

(3) commends the African Union, sub-regional entities such as the ECOWAS and ECCAS, and the various international agencies that have worked to develop policy and program frameworks for enhancing maritime security in West and Central Africa, and encourages these entities and their member states to continue to build upon these and other efforts to achieve that end.

#### AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 2012. Mr. REID (for Mr. PORTMAN (for himself, Ms. AYOTTE, Mr. HELLER, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. MCCAIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

SA 2013. Mr. REID (for Mr. TOOMEY (for himself, Mr. FLAKE, and Mr. MCCAIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2014. Mr. REID proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2015. Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2014 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2016. Mr. REID proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2017. Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2016 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2018. Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2017 proposed by Mr. REID to the amendment SA 2016 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2019. Mr. VITTER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 2020. Ms. COLLINS (for Mr. REID) proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2013 proposed by Mr. REID (for Mr. TOOMEY (for himself, Mr. FLAKE, and Mr. MCCAIN)) to the bill S. 815, *supra*.

SA 2021. Mr. BLUMENTHAL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 2022. Mr. FLAKE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 2023. Ms. HIRONO (for Mr. SANDERS) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 287, to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve assistance to homeless veterans, and for other purposes.

#### TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

**SA 2012.** Mr. REID (for Mr. PORTMAN (for himself, Ms. AYOTTE, Mr. HELLER, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. MCCAIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

Strike sections 2 through 6 and insert the following:

#### SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers;

(2) to provide an explicit, comprehensive Federal prohibition against employment discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity, including meaningful and effective remedies for any such discrimination;

(3) to invoke congressional powers, including the powers to enforce the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, and to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to section 8 of article I of the Constitution, in order to prohibit employment discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity; and

(4) to reinforce the Nation's commitment to fairness and equal opportunity in the workplace consistent with the fundamental right of religious freedom.

#### SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—In this Act:

(1) COMMISSION.—The term "Commission" means the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

(2) COVERED ENTITY.—The term "covered entity" means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.

(3) DEMONSTRATES.—The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.

(4) EMPLOYEE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term "employee" means—

(i) an employee as defined in section 701(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(f));

(ii) a State employee to which section 302(a)(1) of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16b(a)(1)) applies;

(iii) a covered employee, as defined in section 101 of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1301) or section 411(c) of title 3, United States Code; or

(iv) an employee or applicant to which section 717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)) applies.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The provisions of this Act that apply to an employee or individual shall not apply to a volunteer who receives no compensation.

(5) EMPLOYER.—The term "employer" means—

(A) a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce (as defined in section 701(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(h)) who has 15 or more employees (as defined in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B) of paragraph (4)) for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but does not include a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;

(B) an employing authority to which section 302(a)(1) of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 applies;

(C) an employing office, as defined in section 101 of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 or section 411(c) of title 3, United States Code; or

(D) an entity to which section 717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies.

(6) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY.—The term "employment agency" has the meaning given the term in section 701(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(c)).

(7) GENDER IDENTITY.—The term "gender identity" means the gender-related identity,

appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex at birth.

(8) LABOR ORGANIZATION.—The term "labor organization" has the meaning given the term in section 701(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(d)).

(9) PERSON.—The term "person" has the meaning given the term in section 701(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(a)).

(10) SEXUAL ORIENTATION.—The term "sexual orientation" means homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.

(11) STATE.—The term "State" has the meaning given the term in section 701(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(i)).

(b) APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, a reference in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—

(1) to an employee or an employer shall be considered to refer to an employee (as defined in subsection (a)(4)) or an employer (as defined in subsection (a)(5)), respectively, except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection; and

(2) to an employer in subsection (f) of that section shall be considered to refer to an employer (as defined in subsection (a)(5)(A)).

#### SEC. 4. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.

(a) EMPLOYER PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for employment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the individual as an employee, because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.

(b) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individual or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individual.

(c) LABOR ORGANIZATION PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization—

(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individual;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment, or would limit such employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the individual as an employee or as an applicant for employment because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; or

(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.

(d) TRAINING PROGRAMS.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-

management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual because of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individual in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.

(e) **ASSOCIATION.**—An unlawful employment practice described in any of subsections (a) through (d) shall be considered to include an action described in that subsection, taken against an individual based on the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of a person with whom the individual associates or has associated.

(f) **NO PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OR QUOTAS.**—Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted to require or permit—

(1) any covered entity to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity employed by any employer, referred to or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area; or

(2) the adoption or implementation by a covered entity of a quota on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.

(g) **NO DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS.**—Only disparate treatment claims may be brought under this Act.

(h) **STANDARDS OF PROOF.**—Except as otherwise provided, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that sexual orientation or gender identity was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.

#### **SEC. 5. RETALIATION PROHIBITED.**

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a covered entity to discriminate against an individual because such individual—

(1) opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this Act; or

(2) made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act.

#### **SEC. 6. EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—This Act shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational institution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) pursuant to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) (referred to in this section as a “religious employer”).

(b) **PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS.**—A religious employer’s exemption under this section shall not result in any action by a Federal agency, or any State or local agency that receives Federal funding or financial assistance, to penalize or withhold licenses, permits, certifications, accreditation, contracts, grants, guarantees, tax-exempt status, or any benefits or exemptions from that employer, or to prohibit the em-

ployer’s participation in programs or activities sponsored by that Federal, State, or local agency. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to invalidate any other Federal, State, or local law (including a regulation) that otherwise applies to a religious employer exempt under this section.

**SA 2013.** Mr. REID (for Mr. TOOMEY (for himself, Mr. FLAKE, and Mr. MCCAIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

In section 6, insert before “This Act” the following: “(a) **IN GENERAL.**—”.

In section 6, insert at the end the following:

(b) **IN ADDITION.**—In addition, an employer, regardless of whether the employer or an employee in the employment position at issue engages in secular activities as well as religious activities, shall not be subject to this Act if—

(1) the employer is in whole or in substantial part owned, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society;

(2) the employer is officially affiliated with a particular religion or with a particular religious corporation, association, or society; or

(3) the curriculum of such employer is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.

**SA 2014.** Mr. REID proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

This Act shall become effective 3 days after enactment.

**SA 2015.** Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2014 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

In the amendment, strike “3 days” and insert “4 days”.

**SA 2016.** Mr. REID proposed an amendment to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

This Act shall become effective 5 days after enactment.

**SA 2017.** Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2016 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

In the amendment, strike “5 days” and insert “6 days”.

**SA 2018.** Mr. REID proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2017 proposed by Mr. REID to the amendment SA 2016 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

In the amendment, strike “6 days” and insert “7 days”.

**SA 2019.** Mr. VITTER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

#### **SECTION \_\_\_\_\_. PRENATAL NONDISCRIMINATION ACT.**

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the “Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013”.

(b) **FINDINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.**—

(1) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress makes the following findings:

(A) Women are a vital part of American society and culture and possess the same fundamental human rights and civil rights as men.

(B) United States law prohibits the dissimilar treatment of males and females who are similarly situated and prohibits sex discrimination in various contexts, including the provision of employment, education, housing, health insurance coverage, and athletics.

(C) Sex is an immutable characteristic ascertainable at the earliest stages of human development through existing medical technology and procedures commonly in use, including maternal-fetal bloodstream DNA sampling, amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling or “CVS”, and obstetric ultrasound. In addition to medically assisted sex determination, a growing sex determination niche industry has developed and is marketing low-cost commercial products, widely advertised and available, that aid in the sex determination of an unborn child without the aid of medical professionals. Experts have demonstrated that the sex-selection industry is on the rise and predict that it will continue to be a growing trend in the United States. Sex determination is always a necessary step to the procurement of a sex-selection abortion.

(D) A “sex-selection abortion” is an abortion undertaken for purposes of eliminating an unborn child based on the sex or gender of the child. Sex-selection abortion is barbaric, and described by scholars and civil rights advocates as an act of sex-based or gender-based violence, predicated on sex discrimination. Sex-selection abortions are typically late-term abortions performed in the 2nd or 3rd trimester of pregnancy, after the unborn child has developed sufficiently to feel pain. Substantial medical evidence proves that an unborn child can experience pain at 20 weeks after conception, and perhaps substantially earlier. By definition, sex-selection abortions do not implicate the health of the mother of the unborn, but instead are elective procedures motivated by sex or gender bias.

(E) The targeted victims of sex-selection abortions performed in the United States and worldwide are overwhelmingly female. The selective abortion of females is female infanticide, the intentional killing of unborn females, due to the preference for male offspring or “son preference”. Son preference is reinforced by the low value associated, by some segments of the world community, with female offspring. Those segments tend to regard female offspring as financial burdens to a family over their lifetime due to their perceived inability to earn or provide financially for the family unit as can a male. In addition, due to social and legal convention, female offspring are less likely to carry on the family name. “Son preference” is one of the most evident manifestations of sex or

gender discrimination in any society, undermining female equality, and fueling the elimination of females' right to exist in instances of sex-selection abortion.

(F) Sex-selection abortions are not expressly prohibited by United States law or the laws of 47 States. Sex-selection abortions are performed in the United States. In a March 2008 report published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Columbia University economists Douglas Almond and Lena Edlund examined the sex ratio of United States-born children and found "evidence of sex selection, most likely at the prenatal stage". The data revealed obvious "son preference" in the form of unnatural sex-ratio imbalances within certain segments of the United States population, primarily those segments tracing their ethnic or cultural origins to countries where sex-selection abortion is prevalent. The evidence strongly suggests that some Americans are exercising sex-selection abortion practices within the United States consistent with discriminatory practices common to their country of origin, or the country to which they trace their ancestry. While sex-selection abortions are more common outside the United States, the evidence reveals that female feticide is also occurring in the United States.

(G) The American public supports a prohibition of sex-selection abortion. In a March 2006 Zogby International poll, 86 percent of Americans agreed that sex-selection abortion should be illegal, yet only 3 States proscribe sex-selection abortion.

(H) Despite the failure of the United States to proscribe sex-selection abortion, the United States Congress has expressed repeatedly, through Congressional resolution, strong condemnation of policies promoting sex-selection abortion in the "Communist Government of China". Likewise, at the 2007 United Nations Annual Meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women, 51st Session, the United States delegation spearheaded a resolution calling on countries to condemn sex-selective abortion, a policy directly contradictory to the permissiveness of current United States law, which places no restriction on the practice of sex-selection abortion. The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women has urged governments of all nations "to take necessary measures to prevent . . . prenatal sex selection".

(I) A 1990 report by Harvard University economist Amartya Sen, estimated that more than 100 million women were "demographically missing" from the world as early as 1990 due to sexist practices, including sex-selection abortion. Many experts believe sex-selection abortion is the primary cause. Current estimates of women missing from the world range in the hundreds of millions.

(J) Countries with longstanding experience with sex-selection abortion—such as the Republic of India, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China—have enacted restrictions on sex-selection, and have steadily continued to strengthen prohibitions and penalties. The United States, by contrast, has no law in place to restrict sex-selection abortion, establishing the United States as affording less protection from sex-based feticide than the Republic of India or the People's Republic of China, whose recent practices of sex-selection abortion were vehemently and repeatedly condemned by United States congressional resolutions and by the United States Ambassador to the Commission on the Status of Women. Public statements from within the medical community reveal that citizens of other countries come to the United States for sex-selection procedures that would be criminal in their country of origin. Because the United States permits abortion on the basis of sex, the United

States may effectively function as a "safe haven" for those who seek to have American physicians do what would otherwise be criminal in their home countries—a sex-selection abortion, most likely late-term.

(K) The American medical community opposes sex-selection. The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, commonly known as "ACOG", stated in its 2007 Ethics Committee Opinion, Number 360, that sex-selection is inappropriate because it "ultimately supports sexist practices". The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (commonly known as "ASRM") 2004 Ethics Committee Opinion on sex-selection notes that central to the controversy of sex-selection is the potential for "inherent gender discrimination", . . . the "risk of psychological harm to sex-selected offspring (i.e., by placing on them expectations that are too high)", . . . and "reinforcement of gender bias in society as a whole". Embryo sex-selection, ASRM notes, remains "vulnerable to the judgment that no matter what its basis, [the method] identifies gender as a reason to value one person over another, and it supports socially constructed stereotypes of what gender means". In doing so, it not only "reinforces possibilities of unfair discrimination, but may trivialize human reproduction by making it depend on the selection of non-essential features of offspring". The ASRM ethics opinion continues, "ongoing problems with the status of women in the United States make it necessary to take account of concerns for the impact of sex-selection on goals of gender equality". The American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, an organization with hundreds of members—many of whom are former abortionists—makes the following declaration: "Sex selection abortions are more graphic examples of the damage that abortion inflicts on women. In addition to increasing premature labor in subsequent pregnancies, increasing suicide and major depression, and increasing the risk of breast cancer in teens who abort their first pregnancy and delay childbearing, sex selection abortions are often targeted at fetuses simply because the fetus is female. As physicians who care for both the mother and her unborn child, the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists vigorously opposes aborting fetuses because of their gender." The President's Council on Bioethics published a Working Paper stating the council's belief that society's respect for reproductive freedom does not prohibit the regulation or prohibition of "sex control", defined as the use of various medical technologies to choose the sex of one's child. The publication expresses concern that "sex control might lead to . . . dehumanization and a new eugenics".

(L) Sex-selection abortion results in an unnatural sex-ratio imbalance. An unnatural sex-ratio imbalance is undesirable, due to the inability of the numerically predominant sex to find mates. Experts worldwide document that a significant sex-ratio imbalance in which males numerically predominate can be a cause of increased violence and militancy within a society. Likewise, an unnatural sex-ratio imbalance gives rise to the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and a consequent increase in kidnapping and other violent crime.

(M) Sex-selection abortions have the effect of diminishing the representation of women in the American population, and therefore, the American electorate.

(N) Sex-selection abortion reinforces sex discrimination and has no place in a civilized society.

(O) The history of the United States includes examples of sex discrimination. The

people of the United States ultimately responded in the strongest possible legal terms by enacting a constitutional amendment correcting elements of such discrimination. Women, once subjected to sex discrimination that denied them the right to vote, now have suffrage guaranteed by the 19th amendment. The elimination of discriminatory practices has been and is among the highest priorities and greatest achievements of American history.

(P) Implicitly approving the discriminatory practice of sex-selection abortion by choosing not to prohibit them will reinforce these inherently discriminatory practices, and evidence a failure to protect a segment of certain unborn Americans because those unborn are of a sex that is disfavored. Sex-selection abortions trivialize the value of the unborn on the basis of sex, reinforcing sex discrimination, and coarsening society to the humanity of all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life. Thus, Congress has a compelling interest in acting—indeed it must act—to prohibit sex-selection abortion.

(2) CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.—In accordance with the above findings, Congress enacts the following pursuant to Congress' power under—

(A) the Commerce Clause;

(B) section 5 of the 14th amendment, including the power to enforce the prohibition on Government action denying equal protection of the laws; and

(C) section 8 of article I to make all laws necessary and proper for the carrying into execution of powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.

(c) DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNBORN ON THE BASIS OF SEX.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 13 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

**"§ 250. Discrimination against the unborn on the basis of sex**

**"(a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever knowingly—**

**"(1) performs an abortion knowing that such abortion is sought based on the sex or gender of the child;**

**"(2) uses force or the threat of force to intentionally injure or intimidate any person for the purpose of coercing a sex-selection abortion;**

**"(3) solicits or accepts funds for the performance of a sex-selection abortion; or**

**"(4) transports a woman into the United States or across a State line for the purpose of obtaining a sex-selection abortion; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.**

**"(b) CIVIL REMEDIES.—**

**"(1) CIVIL ACTION BY WOMAN ON WHOM ABORTION IS PERFORMED.—A woman upon whom an abortion has been performed pursuant to a violation of subsection (a)(2) may in a civil action against any person who engaged in a violation of subsection (a) obtain appropriate relief.**

**"(2) CIVIL ACTION BY RELATIVES.—The father of an unborn child who is the subject of an abortion performed or attempted in violation of subsection (a), or a maternal grandparent of the unborn child if the pregnant woman is an unemancipated minor, may in a civil action against any person who engaged in the violation, obtain appropriate relief, unless the pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the plaintiff consented to the abortion.**

**"(3) APPROPRIATE RELIEF.—Appropriate relief in a civil action under this subsection includes—**

**"(A) objectively verifiable money damages for all injuries, psychological and physical, including loss of companionship and support,**

occasioned by the violation of this section; and

“(B) punitive damages.

“(4) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—A qualified plaintiff may in a civil action obtain injunctive relief to prevent an abortion provider from performing or attempting further abortions in violation of this section.

“(B) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph the term ‘qualified plaintiff’ means—

“(i) a woman upon whom an abortion is performed or attempted in violation of this section;

“(ii) any person who is the spouse or parent of a woman upon whom an abortion is performed in violation of this section; or

“(iii) the Attorney General.

“(5) ATTORNEYS FEES FOR PLAINTIFF.—The court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil action under this subsection.

“(C) LOSS OF FEDERAL FUNDING.—A violation of subsection (a) shall be deemed for the purposes of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be discrimination prohibited by section 601 of that Act.

“(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—A physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, counselor, or other medical or mental health professional shall report known or suspected violations of any of this section to appropriate law enforcement authorities. Whoever violates this requirement shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.

“(e) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.—It shall be the duty of the United States district courts, United States courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under this section.

“(f) EXCEPTION.—A woman upon whom a sex-selection abortion is performed may not be prosecuted or held civilly liable for any violation of this section, or for a conspiracy to violate this section.

“(g) PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN COURT PROCEEDINGS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent the Constitution or other similarly compelling reason requires, in every civil or criminal action under this section, the court shall make such orders as are necessary to protect the anonymity of any woman upon whom an abortion has been performed or attempted if she does not give her written consent to such disclosure. Such orders may be made upon motion, but shall be made sua sponte if not otherwise sought by a party.

“(2) ORDERS TO PARTIES, WITNESSES, AND COUNSEL.—The court shall issue appropriate orders under paragraph (1) to the parties, witnesses, and counsel and shall direct the sealing of the record and exclusion of individuals from courtrooms or hearing rooms to the extent necessary to safeguard her identity from public disclosure. Each such order shall be accompanied by specific written findings explaining why the anonymity of the woman must be preserved from public disclosure, why the order is essential to that end, how the order is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and why no reasonable less restrictive alternative exists.

“(3) PSEUDONYM REQUIRED.—In the absence of written consent of the woman upon whom an abortion has been performed or attempted, any party, other than a public official, who brings an action under this section shall do so under a pseudonym.

“(4) LIMITATION.—This subsection shall not be construed to conceal the identity of the plaintiff or of witnesses from the defendant or from attorneys for the defendant.

“(h) DEFINITIONS.—

“(1) The term ‘abortion’ means the act of using or prescribing any instrument, medi-

cine, drug, or any other substance, device, or means with the intent to terminate the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of a woman, with knowledge that the termination by those means will with reasonable likelihood cause the death of the unborn child, unless the act is done with the intent to—

“(A) save the life or preserve the health of the unborn child;

“(B) remove a dead unborn child caused by spontaneous abortion; or

“(C) remove an ectopic pregnancy.

“(2) The term ‘sex-selection abortion’ is an abortion undertaken for purposes of eliminating an unborn child based on the sex or gender of the child.”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to section 249 the following new item:

“250. Discrimination against the unborn on the basis of sex.”.

(d) SEVERABILITY.—If any portion of this section or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the portions or applications of this section which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that a healthcare provider has an affirmative duty to inquire as to the motivation for the abortion, absent the healthcare provider having knowledge or information that the abortion is being sought based on the sex or gender of the child.

**SA 2020.** Ms. COLLINS (for Mr. REID) proposed an amendment to amendment SA 2013 proposed by Mr. REID (for Mr. TOOMEY (for himself, Mr. FLAKE, and Mr. MCCAIN)) to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

This Act shall become effective 1 day after enactment.

**SA 2021.** Mr. BLUMENTHAL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

After section 14, insert the following:

**SEC. 14A. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY SERVICE.**

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CIVIL RIGHTS DEFINITIONS.—The terms “complaining party”, “demonstrates”, “employee”, “employer”, “employment agency”, “labor organization”, “person”, “respondent”, and “State” have the meanings given the terms in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e).

(2) MEMBER OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES.—The term “member of the uniformed services” means an individual who—

(A) is a member of—

(i) the uniformed services (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code); or

(ii) the National Guard in State status under title 32, United States Code; or

(B) was discharged or released from service in the uniformed services (as so defined) or the National Guard in such status under conditions other than dishonorable.

(3) MILITARY SERVICE.—The term “military service” means status as a member of the uniformed services.

(b) EMPLOYER PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to the individual’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s military service; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employer’s employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the individual’s status as an employee, because of such individual’s military service.

(c) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual because of the individual’s military service, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of the individual’s military service.

(d) LABOR ORGANIZATION PRACTICES.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization—

(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of the individual’s military service;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the individual’s status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s military service; or

(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.

(e) TRAINING PROGRAMS.—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual because of the individual’s military service in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.

(f) BUSINESSES OR ENTERPRISES WITH PERSONNEL QUALIFIED ON BASIS OF MILITARY SERVICE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of the individual’s military service in those certain instances where military service is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.

(g) NATIONAL SECURITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if—

(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President; and

(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.

(h) **SENIORITY OR MERIT SYSTEM; QUANTITY OR QUALITY OF PRODUCTION; ABILITY TESTS.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of military service, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration, or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of military service.

(i) **PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT NOT TO BE GRANTED ON ACCOUNT OF EXISTING NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE IMBALANCE.**—Nothing contained in this section shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this section to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the military service of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons with military service employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons with military service in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.

(j) **BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.**—

(1) **DISPARATE IMPACT.**—

(A) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this section only if—

(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of military service and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or

(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.

(B) **DEMONSTRATION OF CAUSATION.**—

(i) **PARTICULAR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.**—With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the

decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.

(ii) **DEMONSTRATION OF NONCAUSATION.**—If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.

(C) **ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE.**—The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice".

(2) **BUSINESS NECESSITY NO DEFENSE TO INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION.**—A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this section.

(3) **RULES CONCERNING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) and included in schedule I or II of the schedules specified in that section, other than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this section only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of military service.

(k) **PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATORY USE OF TEST SCORES.**—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of military service.

(l) **IMPERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY SERVICE IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.**—Except as otherwise provided in this section, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that military service was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.

(m) **RESOLUTION OF CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IMPLEMENTING LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS.**—

(1) **PRACTICES NOT CHALLENGEABLE.**—

(A) **PRACTICES TO IMPLEMENT A LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENT OR ORDER.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).

(B) **CIRCUMSTANCES.**—A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws—

(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had—

(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and

(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or

(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact.

(2) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to—

(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened;

(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the Federal Government;

(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or

(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution.

(3) **COURT FOR ACTIONS THAT ARE CHALLENGEABLE.**—Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28, United States Code.

(n) **DISCRIMINATION FOR MAKING CHARGES, TESTIFYING, ASSISTING, OR PARTICIPATING IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS.**—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of the employer's employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because the employee, applicant, individuals, or member involved has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this section, or has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.

(o) **PRINTING OR PUBLICATION OF NOTICES OR ADVERTISEMENTS.**—It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint labor-management committee, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on military service, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on military service when military service is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.

(p) **EXEMPTIONS.**—

(1) INAPPLICABILITY OF TITLE TO CERTAIN ALIENS.—This section shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State.

(2) COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE AS VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW.—It shall not be unlawful under this section for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located.

(3) CONTROL OF CORPORATION INCORPORATED IN FOREIGN COUNTRY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice prohibited by this section engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer.

(B) FOREIGN PERSON NOT CONTROLLED BY EMPLOYER.—This section shall not apply with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.

(C) CONTROL.—For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based on—

- (i) the interrelation of operations;
- (ii) the common management;
- (iii) the centralized control of labor relations; and
- (iv) the common ownership or financial control,

of the employer and the corporation.

(4) CLAIMS OF NO MILITARY SERVICE.—Nothing in this section shall provide the basis for a claim by an individual without military service that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual's lack of military service.

(q) POSTING NOTICES.—Every employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee covered under this section shall post notices to applicants, employees, and members describing the applicable provisions of this section, in the manner prescribed by section 711 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-10).

(r) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue regulations to carry out this section in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code.

(s) ENFORCEMENT.—The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, and 712 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-7, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, and 2000e-11) shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this section provides to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of military service in violation of any provision of this section, or regulations promulgated under subsection (r), concerning employment.

(t) APPLICATION.—Nothing in sections 2 through 14 shall be construed to apply to this section.

**SA 2022.** Mr. FLAKE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 815, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

In section 8, add at the end the following:

(c) GUIDANCE ON GENDER TRANSITION.—Not later than the effective date of this Act, the Commission shall issue guidance with respect to this Act and gender transition, including defining the term “transition” (including other forms of the word).

(d) GUIDANCE ON SHARED FACILITIES.—Not later than the effective date of this Act, the Commission shall issue guidance with respect to this Act on shared facilities. When issuing such guidance, the Commission shall take into account any undue hardship on employers in meeting the nondiscrimination requirements of this Act.

**SA 2023.** Ms. HIRONO (for Mr. SANDERS) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 287, to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve assistance to homeless veterans, and for other purposes; as follows:

On page 11, strike line 25 and insert the following: lessness pursuant to such partnerships.

“(f) SUNSET.—The authority of the Secretary to enter into partnerships under this section as described in subsection (a) shall expire on December 31, 2016.”.

On page 13, strike lines 3 through 18 and insert the following:

**SEC. 10. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM OF REFERRAL AND COUNSELING SERVICES FOR VETERANS AT RISK OF HOMELESSNESS WHO ARE TRANSITIONING FROM CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS.**

Section 2023 of title 38, United States Code, is amended—

- (1) by striking subsection (b);
- (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking “To the extent practicable, the program” and inserting “The program”;
- (3) in subsection (d), by striking “September 30, 2014” and inserting “September 30, 2017”;
- (4) in subsection (e)(2), by striking “provided under the demonstration program”; and
- (5) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively.

On page 14, strike lines 2 through 14 and insert the following:

(a) TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION FOR SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL AND HOMELESS VETERANS.—Section 2031(b) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking “December 31,

Beginning on page 14, strike line 24 and all that follows through page 15, line 7, and insert the following:

(f) TRAINING ENTITIES FOR PROVISION OF SUPPORTIVE SERVICES FOR VERY LOW-INCOME VETERAN FAMILIES IN PERMANENT HOUSING.—Section 2044(e)(3) of such title is amended by striking “2012” and inserting “2014”.

On page 15, strike lines 8 through 12.  
On page 16, line 7, strike “March 31, 2018” and insert “August 31, 2017”.

#### AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

##### COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 6, 2013, at 2:30 p.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

The Committee will hold a hearing entitled, “America COMPETES: Science and the U.S. Economy.”

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 6, 2013, at 10 a.m. in room SD-215 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct a hearing entitled “Health Insurance Exchanges: An Update from the Administration.”

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 6, 2013, at 10:30 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 6, 2013, at 10 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 6, 2013, at 10 a.m., in room SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct a hearing entitled “Oversight of the Bureau of Prisons & Cost-Effective Strategies for Reducing Recidivism.”

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on November 6, 2013, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct a hearing entitled “Judicial Nominations.”

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on November 6, 2013, at 10 a.m. in room SR-418, of the Russell Senate Office Building.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to