

today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (S. 3454) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

S. 3454

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.

Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DIS- ABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable details.

Sec. 304. Automated insider threat detection program.

Sec. 305. Software licensing.

Sec. 306. Strategy for security clearance reciprocity.

Sec. 307. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 compliance.

Sec. 308. Subcontractor notification process.

Sec. 309. Modification of reporting schedule.

Sec. 310. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Working capital fund amendments.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Homeland Security Intelligence Program.

Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.

Sec. 503. Protecting the information technology supply chain of the United States.

Sec. 504. Notification regarding the authorized public disclosure of national intelligence.

Sec. 505. Technical amendments related to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 506. Technical amendment for definition of intelligence agency.

Sec. 507. Budgetary effects.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

TITLE I—BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Department of Defense.

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The National Security Agency.

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.

(8) The Department of State.

(9) The Department of the Treasury.

(10) The Department of Energy.

(11) The Department of Justice.

(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S. 3454 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY TO COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c);

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of positions for fiscal year 2013 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.

(b) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2013 the sum of \$540,721,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 835 positions as of September 30, 2013. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement

and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2013 the sum of \$514,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAILS.

Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended—

(1) by striking “two years.” and inserting “three years.”; and

(2) by adding at the end “A non-reimbursable detail made under this section shall not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the receiving element of the intelligence community.”.

SEC. 304. AUTOMATED INSIDER THREAT DETECTION PROGRAM.

Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 112-18; 50 U.S.C. 403-1 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “October 1, 2012,” and inserting “October 1, 2013.”; and

(2) in subsection (b), by striking “October 1, 2013,” and inserting “October 1, 2014.”.

SEC. 305. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each chief information officer for an element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall—

(1) conduct an inventory of software licenses held by such element, including utilized and unutilized licenses; and

(2) report the results of such inventory to the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

(b) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall—

(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, provide to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each report received by the Chief Information Officer under subsection (a)(2), along with any comments the Chief Information Officer wishes to provide; and

(2) transmit any portion of a report submitted under paragraph (1) involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over such department simultaneously with submission of such report to the congressional intelligence committees.

SEC. 306. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

(a) STRATEGY.—The President shall develop a strategy and a schedule for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and schedule shall include—

(1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required under such section for a security clearance issued by a department or agency of the Federal Government, including reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal Government; and

(2) a description of the specific circumstances under which a department or agency of the Federal Government may not recognize a security clearance issued by another department or agency of the Federal Government.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall inform Congress of the strategy and schedule developed under subsection (a).

SEC. 307. IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2010 COMPLIANCE.

(a) PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each develop a corrective action plan, with major milestones, that delineates how the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and each such Agency will achieve compliance, not later than September 30, 2013, with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the amendments made by that Act.

(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) each Director referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the corrective action plan required by such paragraph; and

(B) the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the corrective action plan required by paragraph (1) with respect to the applicable Agency.

(b) REVIEW BY INSPECTORS GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the Inspector General of each Agency required to develop such a plan, and in the case of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of such plan that includes—

(A) the assessment of the Inspector General of whether such Agency or Office is or is not likely to reach compliance with the requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the amendments made by that Act, by September 30, 2013; and

(B) the basis of the Inspector General for such assessment.

(2) ADDITIONAL SUBMISSION OF REVIEWS OF CERTAIN INSPECTORS GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the assessment of the applicable plan provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1).

SEC. 308. SUBCONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION PROCESS.

Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the method by which contrac-

tors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community are granted security clearances and notified of classified contracting opportunities within the Federal Government and recommendations for the improvement of such method. Such report shall include—

(1) an assessment of the current method by which contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community are notified of classified contracting opportunities;

(2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier under such a contract;

(3) an assessment of the role the existing security clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of contracting opportunities;

(4) an assessment of the role the current security clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability of contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community to execute classified contracts;

(5) a description of the method used by the Director of National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the notification process of the intelligence community to produce a talented pool of subcontractors;

(6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of such notification process; and

(7) recommendations for improving such notification process.

SEC. 309. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING SCHEDULE.

(a) INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—Section 103H(k)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h(k)(1)(A)) is amended—

(1) by striking “January 31 and July 31” and inserting “October 31 and April 30”; and

(2) by striking “December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,” and inserting “September 30 and March 31.”.

(b) INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 17(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is amended—

(A) by striking “January 31 and July 31” and inserting “October 31 and April 30”; and

(B) by striking “December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,” and inserting “September 30 and March 31.”; and

(C) by striking “Not later than the dates each year provided for the transmittal of such reports in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,” and inserting “Not later than 30 days after the date of the receipt of such reports.”.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 507(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking paragraph (1); and

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively.

SEC. 310. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.—Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed.

(2) SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MILITARY FORCES.—Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended—

(A) by striking subsections (a) and (d); and

(B) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively.

(3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEMS BUDGET INFORMATION.—Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-6) is amended by striking subsection (e).

(4) MEASURES TO PROTECT THE IDENTITIES OF COVERT AGENTS.—Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) is amended—

(A) by striking section 603; and
(B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections 603, 604, and 605, respectively.

(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) REPORT SUBMISSION DATES.—Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)—
(i) in paragraph (1)—
(I) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), and (D);

(II) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and

(III) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking “section 114(c.)” and inserting “section 114(a).”; and

(ii) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

“(2) The date for the submittal to the congressional intelligence committees of the annual report on the threat of attack on the United States from weapons of mass destruction required by section 114(b) shall be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B).”;

(B) in subsection (c)(1)(B), by striking “each” and inserting “the”; and

(C) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking “an” and inserting “the”.

(2) TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the items relating to sections 603, 604, 605, and 606 and inserting the following new items:

“Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.

“Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress.

“Sec. 605. Definitions.”.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. WORKING CAPITAL FUND AMENDMENTS.

Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a) is amended as follows:

(1) In subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking “and” at the end;

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking “program.” and inserting “program; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:
“(D) authorize such providers to make known their services to the entities specified in section (a) through Government communication channels.”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:
“(3) The authority in paragraph (1)(D) does not include the authority to distribute gifts or promotional items.”; and

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking “from the sale or exchange of equipment or property of a central service provider” and inserting “from the sale or exchange of equipment, recyclable materials, or property of a central service provider.”; and

(B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking “subsection (f)(2)” and inserting “subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)”.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 501. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

There is established within the Department of Homeland Security a Homeland Se-

curity Intelligence Program. The Homeland Security Intelligence Program constitutes the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department that serve predominantly departmental missions.

SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking “Not later than one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,” and inserting “Not later than March 31, 2013.”.

SEC. 503. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that—

(1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology (including equipment, software, and services) that are linked directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including—

(A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government;

(B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign government; or

(C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a foreign government; and

(2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity, including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications networks of the United States due to the presence of technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph (1).

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “telecommunications networks of the United States” includes—

(1) telephone systems;

(2) Internet systems;

(3) fiber optic lines, including cable landings;

(4) computer networks; and

(5) smart grid technology under development by the Department of Energy.

SEC. 504. NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE AUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) NOTIFICATION.—In the event of an authorized disclosure of national intelligence or intelligence related to national security to the persons or entities described in subsection (b), the government official responsible for authorizing the disclosure shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees on a timely basis a notification of the disclosure if—

(1) at the time of the disclosure—

(A) such intelligence is classified; or

(B) is declassified for the purpose of the disclosure; and

(2) the disclosure will be made by an officer, employee, or contractor of the Executive branch.

(b) PERSONS OR ENTITIES DESCRIBED.—The persons or entities described in this subsection are as follows:

(1) Media personnel.

(2) Any person or entity, if the disclosure described in subsection (a) is made with the intent or knowledge that such information will be made publicly available.

(c) CONTENT.—Each notification required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide the specific title and authority of the individual authorizing the disclosure;

(2) if applicable, provide the specific title and authority of the individual who authorized the declassification of the intelligence disclosed; and

(3) describe the intelligence disclosed, including the classification of the intelligence prior to its disclosure or declassification and the rationale for making the disclosure.

(d) EXCEPTION.—The notification requirement in this section does not apply to a disclosure made—

(1) pursuant to any statutory requirement, including to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Freedom of Information Act”);

(2) in connection with a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding;

(3) as a result of a declassification review process under Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) or any successor order; or

(4) to any officer, employee, or contractor of the Federal government or member of an advisory committee to an element of the intelligence community who possesses an active security clearance and a need to know the specific national intelligence or intelligence related to national security, as defined in section 3(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)).

(e) SUNSET.—The notification requirements of this section shall cease to be effective for any disclosure described in subsection (a) that occurs on or after the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) PERSONNEL PRACTICES.—Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:

“(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and

“(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made prior to a personnel action; or”.

(b) SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE.—Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting “the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” after “the Central Intelligence Agency.”.

SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT FOR DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Section 606(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426) is amended to read as follows:

“(5) The term ‘intelligence agency’ means the elements of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in section 3(4).”.

SEC. 507. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERS-BERGER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill before us today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here on New Year's Eve.

I first wish to make an announcement with respect to the availability of the classified annex to the bill under consideration for the Members of the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement I made to Members last evening.

Madam Speaker, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in room HVC-304 of the Capitol Visitor Center. The committee office will be open during regular business hours for the convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to its consideration by the House.

I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these classified documents.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased that the House is considering this intelligence authorization bill today, the last day of the year. If passed and enacted, this will be our third intelligence authorization bill since I assumed the chairmanship and my friend the gentleman from Maryland became the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee.

In May, the House overwhelmingly passed, by a vote of 386-28, an intelligence authorization bill which is the same product as the bill that is before us today. I appreciate the ranking member's hard work on this year's bill and that of our colleagues in the Senate to achieve a bipartisan result between the two Chambers.

□ 1030

This is indeed a rare occurrence in this town these days, but this is truly a bipartisan, bicameral product that moves forward when it comes to protecting the United States and putting us in the best national security posture we could imagine.

The intelligence authorization bill is vital to ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work. The intelligence community

plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from the many threats that we face.

The annual authorization bill, which funds U.S. intelligence activities spanning 17 agencies, is also a vital tool for congressional oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities. Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring the continued success of our intelligence community, and therefore the safety of all citizens of the United States. The current challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come with an intelligence authorization bill.

The FY 2013 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and provides for the development of future capabilities, all while achieving significant savings and ensuring intelligence agencies are being good stewards of our taxpayers' money.

This year, the bill is significantly below last year's enacted budget but up modestly from the President's roughly \$72 billion budget request for fiscal year 2013. It is also in line with the House budget resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities above the President's budget.

The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous operations designed to keep Americans safe.

It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence activities, including the global counterwar on terrorism and efforts by the National Security Agency to defend us from advanced foreign state-sponsored cyberthreats. And I can't tell you enough, Madam Speaker, how in this Chamber we have acted to stand up in the face of a growing cyberthreat not only to government networks but to private networks as well. We have, in a bipartisan way, given the first step on how we stand up our defenses here in the United States to protect us from nation-states like China and Russia—and now Iran—who seek to do us harm using the Internet. We will again aggressively pursue next year, with the help of my ranking member, actions needed, I believe, to protect the United States against what is the largest threat we face that we are not prepared to handle, and that is the growing threat of cyberattack and cyberespionage.

Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a critical, important mission of our intelligence community, and we made sure the resources were available to that end, as well as for global monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weap-

ons systems and tests, and for research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies' technological edge.

And like the House-passed bill, this bill promotes operating efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the procurement and operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. The bill holds personnel levels, one of the first and biggest cost drivers, generally at last year's levels. Even so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel positions for select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance officers to keep watch on terrorists, and personnel for certain other programs that will increase cooperation and training with our foreign partners in the critically important role for our intelligence agencies as we move to protect ourselves from threats all around the world.

The bill authorizes increased funding for intelligence collection programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign spies. It also increases funding for our intelligence community's comparative advantage—cutting-edge research and development. This is an incredibly important investment for the United States. If we are going to continue to lead in the ability to detect before they can do harm to the United States, we have to make the investment in research and development of high-end technological advancement.

While I cannot get into the specifics of a lot of these programs, it's important to mention them as we are going through the process each year in conducting oversight of intelligence activities and making funding recommendations that will help the community meet its mission in the most effective, fiscally responsible way.

The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 intelligence authorization bill we are considering today preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of this country's intelligence work requires that the congressional Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people and even our colleagues here in the House. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, without the advancement of these bills.

I want to thank all of the members of the committee for their bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security for the United States. I want to thank both of the staffs for working together to produce this bill. This truly is a collaborative effort both from staff and Members in this Chamber and in the Senate, proving that you can work in a bipartisan way to accomplish the best interests of the United States and, in this case, particularly when it comes to national security.

One final note: I want to congratulate Mrs. MYRICK on her years of great service to the Intelligence Committee. She will be leaving us this year. This will be her last authorization bill that she will participate in. I am pleased to see that a provision she championed in May concerning the protection of the United States information technology supply chain is included in this bill. She has done great work in her time with the committee, and she certainly will be missed. She has been a true champion of the national security interests of this country. She is a great friend of mine, and I wish her well in her new endeavors.

I thank all who participated. I also want to take this opportunity to thank my chief counsel for celebrating his birthday today on the House floor with us on New Year's Eve day. I appreciate that very much.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Before us today is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013. It's a good, bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence professionals the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to keep us safe. And I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman ROGERS. His bipartisan leadership has helped us make the Intelligence Committee a committee that provides oversight to our intelligence agencies and gives them the resources that they need to protect our country. I also want to acknowledge the staff on both sides of the aisle who worked very closely to put this bill together.

When Chairman ROGERS and I took over leadership of the Intelligence Committee, we made a commitment to bipartisanship. We believe politics has no place in national security. The stakes are just too high. We also made a commitment to passing intelligence budgets that provide oversight to the intelligence community and give it important financial direction. Chairman ROGERS and I also work closely with Chairwoman DIANNE FEINSTEIN and vice chair SAXBY CHAMBLISS of the Senate Intelligence Committee, our counterparts in the Senate, so we can get things done.

If this bill becomes law, it will be the third budget bill in a row passed since we took over leadership in January, 2011—a big change from the previous 6 years when we only passed one budget bill. This was an open, bipartisan process where we reached agreement on issues that will make this country safer and intelligence processes more efficient.

We know we are facing tough economic times. This budget is slightly below the enacted levels of FY 2012. We made cuts where appropriate, eliminated redundancies, and pushed programs to come in on time and on budget.

People ask me what keeps me up at night. Besides spicy food, I say weap-

ons of mass destruction and a catastrophic cyberattack that shuts down our banking system, water supply, power grids or worse.

This bill continues a substantial investment in cybersecurity that must be made to keep up with the cyberthreats of today and tomorrow. We also believe we must protect privacy and civil liberties when it comes to cybersecurity.

Another priority is space. The bill promotes the commercial space industry by enhancing the government use of commercial imagery and commercial communications services. It requires the government to use commercial imagery to the maximum extent practicable.

I believe competition is important to ensure we get high quality products while keeping costs down. It drives innovation and provides a much-needed insurance policy in case there are problems with other programs. And it does create jobs.

The bill expanded our counterterrorism efforts to continue the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. The bill also makes counterintelligence the priority it is. It makes strategic additions across the intelligence community. This will pay for surveillance, better supply chain security, and the counterintelligence analysts we need.

The bill added resources to the intelligence community's global coverage initiatives to ensure the United States is capable and ready to address threats from any location around the world, especially in areas of strategic interest.

□ 1040

It authorizes the Department of Defense's new defense clandestine service to reorganize its human intelligence collection. It will be a part of the CIA's national clandestine service. The bill directed the Director of national intelligence to develop a centralized cloud for the entire intelligence community; advancing collaboration and further promoting efficiency; and it required the President to develop a strategy for security clearance, reciprocity, and a report on how to better protect our information technology across the global supply chain.

I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012. When this bill was before the House in May, it passed by a bipartisan margin of 386-28. It's a good bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs and protect our Nation.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I inquire if the minority side has a list of speakers.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. At this time, we have one speaker. We're waiting for more; but if they don't come, we'll move on.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Then I will continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the Congressman from Ohio, DENNIS KUCINICH.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my friend. And I want to thank both my friends, the chair and the ranking member, for the work that they do on intelligence. You make a commitment to this country, and I think the country is in good hands because of your work.

I want to raise a question—and we've had some of these conversations between ourselves. I'm very concerned about the shift that's occurred in our national security policy where the Central Intelligence Agency has increasingly played a very powerful paramilitary role with the execution of drone strikes. Numerous studies have indicated that there are many innocent civilians being killed by drone strikes. There's a lack of accountability here. There have been studies that suggest, for example in Yemen, that drone strikes are stirring up anti-American sentiment to the point where al Qaeda is actually being empowered.

We really have to ask of the CIA, but even more than that, of our entire national security infrastructure, What's the game plan here? We see there have been changes in military policy where certain functions have been ceded to the CIA. We see changes in foreign policy where the State Department has let go of some of its functions. We know that the military has made an attempt with the Defense Intelligence Agency to try to become more actively involved as a separate organization. They were seeking 1,600 new spies.

We have this architecture of national security which is so powerful, but I'm not sure that it's actually that effective. I don't question the effectiveness of our chair or our ranking member, but I do question the effectiveness of what we're doing.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. I do question the effectiveness of this drone program, its adherence to international law or lack thereof, the intel gathering on targeted killings where we've seen reports of efforts of one group to target individuals and other groups as a way of trying to settle some scores between people so they put them up as a potential terrorist and they get marked on a list and executed. And as I mentioned earlier, the concern about civilian deaths.

I think that the Central Intelligence Agency functions best in gathering intelligence, and we ought to support them in that regard. I was very concerned and expressed this on the floor about what happened in Benghazi. If we'd paid more attention to the CIA, we probably would still have some of our officials there alive. But that's gone and it's over. We have to recognize that putting the CIA more and more into a paramilitary position is not in the best interest of this country, I don't believe.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The gentleman and I have had these conversations, and I respect his position greatly and the work he does in Congress.

I have some disagreements, and I'll tell you why—and I hope that the gentleman will consider voting for this bill today. The amount of oversight that the ranking member and I have increased on programs that may have concerns on behalf of Americans, because we have the same concerns. There are tools that America engages in, including air strikes. Air strikes have been something that we have used since we could figure out how to get something off the ground and throw something at the ground. They have been used as a tool. It's not a policy of the United States; it's a tool of the United States to make America safe.

The amount of oversight that happens—and I will tell you this: if there is any air strike conducted that involves an enemy combatant of the United States outside the theater of direct combat, it gets reviewed by this committee. I am talking about every single one. That's an important thing. There are very strict reviews put on all of this material. There are very strict guidelines about how these air strikes may or may not occur, because we have that same feeling. If people lose faith in the ability of our intelligence services to do their work, then they will be ineffective, and, therefore, we will be less safe.

Our argument has been we want that oversight, we want aggressive oversight, and we want thorough review. I can tell you—and I think you'd be proud—of the very work that we do on the committee to that end. We never really did covert-action reviews, except for sporadically. Now we do regularly, quarterly, and monthly covert-action reviews on this committee to make sure that we get it right, that they get it right.

Mr. KUCINICH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would be honored to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. I have no question about the commitment of the chair and the ranking member to proper oversight, but what I do question is that the proliferation of the drone strikes puts such an extraordinary burden on our own oversight capacities. I'm wondering, looking retrospectively at the number of civilian casualties that have occurred, the oversight—there's a decoupling of the oversight capacity from the consequences of the strikes, and that's the point that I'm making here.

I would ask my friend going forward for the committee to be ever more vigilant on—if you're for these strikes and you are conducting the oversight, look at the consequences of civilian casualties to raise questions about the information that's being given you. That's the point that I'm making.

With that, I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate that, and I reclaim my time.

I think this is very important. Again, I personally review and the committee reviews the material that comes to these committees.

There are many in the world who have political agendas about civilian casualties. I can tell you to rest assured that that is a point of review for any activity—I'm talking about any activity—that our intelligence community may or may not engage in. I think that you would be shocked and stunned how wrong those public reports are about civilian casualties, and I say that with all seriousness and with the very thought that every one of these events is reviewed.

If there is an air strike used as a technique anywhere in the world to keep America safe, it is reviewed if it comes within the purview of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, on this committee. Those reports are wrong. They are not just wrong; they are wildly wrong. And I do believe people use those reports for their own political purposes outside of the country to try to put pressure on the United States.

□ 1050

Mr. KUCINICH. If I may, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to present to you and the ranking member reports that have been forwarded to me regarding these casualties. Maybe these are reports that you've seen, and maybe they aren't; but I certainly think that in the interest of acquitting our country's efforts that we make sure that every effort is made to avoid civilian casualties. So I will present those to you and the ranking member in the next few days, and I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In reclaiming my time, I just want to assure the gentleman that every one of these is reviewed, and rest assured that the public reports about civilian casualties are not just a little bit wrong; they are wildly wrong.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, I do want to acknowledge the work that has been done by DENNIS KUCINICH as a Member of Congress. DENNIS and I don't always philosophically agree, but I respect that he has a good point of view. That's the whole process here in Congress—that we have different points of view, that we come together, that we debate, and that we can make decisions.

So, DENNIS, we are going to miss you. Good luck to you and your family in the future, and I'm glad that one of the last things you're going to do is come here and talk about our bill today.

In just acknowledging what the chairman said, there is an aggressive legal process that is undertaken as far as drones are concerned that goes to the highest levels of our government before strikes are taken. In everything that I have reviewed, if there are children or innocent victims there, the strike does not take place. So there is a process. Unfortunately, there are some casualties—very minor. I would also agree with the chairman as far as this is concerned: in that what you read in the media is usually not what the facts are.

It is part of what we do. Why do we have the Intelligence Committee? We have it because there is classified information that if it got out would hurt the national security of our country. It's part of our role and our committee's role to take this classified information and work with the agencies to which we provide oversight so we will continue to work through that process.

Mr. KUCINICH, I'm glad that you did raise that as an issue, as we all should.

Madam Speaker, for the third time in 3 years, Chairman ROGERS and I have stood on the floor of the House encouraging our colleagues to support our intelligence budget bill. Today, we both rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. The bill gives our intelligence professionals the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to protect America and American interests.

We crafted a bill that addresses our core needs, including space, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. We are also keeping an eye on the bottom line. The bill is slightly below last year's budget and holds personnel at last year's levels. In a very strong bipartisan way, the Intelligence Committee came together as Democrats and Republicans to do what is right for our country and for the intelligence community.

I thank the staff again for what it has done, and I thank the chairman for his leadership in helping to provide this bill in a very fair, bipartisan way.

I would also like to acknowledge two Democratic Members who will be leaving us at the end of this session—Congressman DAN BOREN of Oklahoma and Congressman BEN CHANDLER of Kentucky. Both Members will be greatly missed, and I appreciate their service on the Intelligence Committee.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2013, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 5½ minutes remaining.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Again, I want to thank my ranking member and both staffs on the Intelligence Committee for the long hours, hard work and thorough, detailed work

on the budgets and on the classified annex of this report.

I think it should alleviate many of the good concerns of Mr. KUCINICH and others who are concerned about these activities. I think it's important to reiterate that we have the same concerns, which is why we are so thorough and why we have joined together in a bipartisan way to increase the level of congressional oversight and to increase our impact and influence on the policies of the intelligence community in order to make sure it conforms with what this body and what I think the United States of America wants and needs in its intelligence services.

We have now done, as I said before, regularly scheduled covert action, which, I think, should rest assured Americans that it is serious, thoughtful and thorough oversight. For counterintelligence activities, we now have regularly scheduled oversight. Every department is required to proffer its budget request, and we go over it line by line, dollar by dollar, policy by policy to make sure it conforms with the concerns of everyone in this body.

As I said before, these are very brave Americans who are serving in really tough neighborhoods all over the world—trying to collect information, trying to take actionable intelligence to a point that it protects us from harm here at home. They deserve our respect, our encouragement, our high-five and pat on the back when they come home. They want thorough oversight. You wouldn't believe it, but they do. They want to know that the work that they're doing would make America proud for them risking their lives and being away from their families and putting it all on the line to keep America safe.

That's why we agreed to do this in a bipartisan way and to be so thorough in its congressional oversight, because without that—without that confidence, without that faith of the American people that they're doing something on behalf of this great Nation—they will lose their ability to do what they do, and they will lose the courage and confidence that they need to do it in the right way. So that's what this bill reflects.

I understand your concerns. I look forward to our further conversations on this; and in further conversations, I'd like to have the opportunity, if we can arrange this, to give you some examples—a peek behind the curtain as to exactly what goes on in the processes of making sure that we keep the good people safe and that the bad guys are brought to justice. I think you'd be proud of that work. This bill reflects that.

Again, thanks to the ranking member and to the staffs and to the members on both sides of this committee. Thanks to Senator FEINSTEIN and to Senator SAXBY CHAMBLISS for their help in putting this bill together.

I hope we'll get a large show of support with a strong vote of bipartisan-

ship for the men and women who are serving at our intelligence posts all around the world today. Let's send this to the President so we can go about the business of keeping America safe and maybe even look at some other details that the Speaker may have interest in dealing with today.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, today, I voted against the Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act. Despite keeping funding levels flat and capping personnel levels to that of Fiscal Year 2012, this authorization is not significantly different than the earlier version I voted against in May.

It is another missed opportunity to make significant, smart reductions in our intelligence infrastructure, at a time when we're asking so many others to make significant budgetary sacrifices in the midst of austerity. This legislation continues to spend way too much money—\$72 to \$78 billion a year—with little transparency or efforts to reduce the sprawling intelligence community and protect privacy rights.

It's of paramount importance to keep our country safe, and that's exactly what our intelligence community has done, but we cannot afford to spend as much on intelligence as Russia does on its entire military budget or employ hundreds of thousands of people with secret clearance.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, S. 3454.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

NEIL A. ARMSTRONG FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER AND HUGH L. DRYDEN AERONAUTICAL TEST RANGE DESIGNATION ACT

Mr. HALL. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6612) to redesignate the Dryden Flight Research Center as the Neil A. Armstrong Flight Research Center and the Western Aeronautical Test Range as the Hugh L. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6612

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION OF DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER.

(a) REDESIGNATION.—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center in Edwards, California, is redesignated as the “NASA Neil A. Armstrong Flight Research Center”.

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the flight research center referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the “NASA Neil A. Armstrong Flight Research Center”.

SEC. 2. REDESIGNATION OF WESTERN AERONAUTICAL TEST RANGE.

(a) REDESIGNATION.—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Western Aeronautical Test Range in California is redesignated as the “NASA Hugh L. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range”.

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the test range referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the “NASA Hugh L. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. HALL) and the gentlewoman from Maryland (Ms. EDWARDS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

□ 1100

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HALL. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members shall have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 6612, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. HALL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to begin by thanking, as I should, the Members for their bipartisan support of the legislation. H.R. 6612 would redesignate the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Dryden Flight Research Center, which is co-located with the Edwards Air Force Base in the Antelope Valley of California, as the Neil A. Armstrong Flight Research Center. The bill would also rename the Western Aeronautical Test Range as the Hugh L. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range. This is very appropriate; they were very dear friends.

Neil Armstrong needs no introduction. Actually, this bill was introduced by his congressman, KEVIN MCCARTHY, the congressman where the redesignation will take place. The gentleman from California is the majority whip, but Neil Armstrong absolutely needs no introduction. He's an iconic American hero, and one of the most humble men I've ever met. He was quiet, thoughtful, and deliberate, choosing his words carefully, whether it was testifying before a congressional committee, giving a speech, or sharing a quiet movement with a friend. He did not exaggerate, and always, always gave recognition to the teams of engineers, technicians, and scientists at NASA and in industry when speaking