

middle class, our working families. Let's get it done for middle class America. Without a strong middle class, there is not a strong America.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you very much, Mr. TONKO, for bringing that up.

I'm going to ask Ms. KAPTUR of Ohio to take the podium here and to tell us about Wall Street and some of the reforms that she is advocating.

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and rise this evening on the subject of MF Global and the clear need for oversight by the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, Congress isn't doing its job to investigate the fraud that has infected our entire financial system, fraud perpetrated by Wall Street, and it has hurt the global financial system as well. I think the reason is that too many people have forgotten that gambling with other people's money often entices very addictive personalities who are incapable of self-policing. They need rules, they need limits, and they need oversight. Otherwise they just keep getting into the same trouble again and again, harming innocent people in the process by looting their assets.

The American people know that corruption on Wall Street is pervasive, and millions upon millions of our fellow citizens have been harmed by it. The Republican leadership in this House have failed in their responsibility to aggressively investigate crime in the financial services sector.

Earlier this month, I spoke about Bloomberg's report on how President Bush's Secretary of the Treasury, Hank Paulson, in 2000, inappropriately and behind closed doors in a private meeting tipped off his former colleagues at Goldman Sachs and a handful of Wall Street insiders about how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might collapse and what steps the government intended to take. All of this occurred on the very same day that Secretary Paulson led The New York Times to believe that those two companies would give a signal of confidence to the markets.

You can imagine what those financial insiders did with their investments before the rest of America was even aware.

I also reminded my colleagues that the Securities and Exchange Commission was finally rebutted recently in a New York court for settling fraud cases with major Wall Street banks like Citigroup in a way that allowed the biggest banks to walk away by simply paying a few fines without so much as admitting any wrongdoing.

I ask, where is this Congress' oversight of these most crucial financial machinations that have so harmed our Nation and world since the market crashed in 2008?

Finally, after months and months of press coverage, Congress is taking a tad of action. Last week, the House's Agriculture Committee held one of the first hearings we have seen all year.

That hearing, called by Chairman FRANK LUCAS of Oklahoma and Ranking Member COLLIN PETERSON of Minnesota, began to shed some light on what is the eighth-largest bankruptcy in U.S. history at MF Global Holdings. Its misdeeds had been widely reported, but they deserve much closer scrutiny. We need to subpoena their full records and transactions that led to the collapse.

Even before last week's hearings, we knew that MF Global Holdings filed for Chapter 11 on October 30. Citizens in my district have been impacted and harmed as over \$1 billion disappeared from customer accounts. The Washington Post and other press reported weeks ago that the firm's CEO, former Governor Jon Corzine, had essentially placed a \$6.3 billion bet on the sovereign debt of several European Governments. After its most recent quarterly return showed almost \$200 million in losses, MF Global stock lost 67 percent of its value.

But this is not just a case of an investment firm being lured by the higher returns of riskier bonds. As investigators continue to piece together what happened at MF Global, there is increasing evidence of criminal activity. This case has all the trappings of a massive case of fraud.

Now, CME Group Incorporated, which audited MF Global's accounts, reported weeks ago that Mr. Corzine's company violated key Federal requirements to keep its accounts separate from their customer accounts. At last week's Agriculture Committee hearing, the public was once again told that as much as \$1.2 billion may still be missing from segregated customer accounts.

This isn't just a case of misplaced money. The financial press has been reporting a staggering amount of malfeasance in the days before MF Global filed for bankruptcy. In an apparent effort to buy themselves time, MF Global sent checks instead of wiring money. Many of those checks, we all know now, bounced. There are stories of requests to transfer funds being denied and even inaccurate account statements being issued. Even more egregious are accounts of people receiving bounced checks going back and finding their accounts were also altered inappropriately. May I ask, if this doesn't sound like fraud, what is it?

□ 2120

The American people must demand more congressional oversight. Congress needs to produce more information.

I attended last week's hearing in the House Agriculture Committee. While some important questions were asked of Mr. Corzine, Congress' responsibility has been far from met. Anyone who carefully followed the hearing watched as Mr. Corzine dodged questions and provided hollow responses.

The Wall Street Journal provided us with an interesting assessment of Mr. Corzine's testimony that is worth entering in the RECORD. According to the

Journal, Governor Corzine ducked or deflected questions 15 times. On five occasions, he used a well known strategy for avoiding accountability by using some variant of the phrase, "I did not intend to break any rules." He apologized or expressed regret six times for the damage his choices wrought on countless families and businesses. But the operative fact is \$1.2 billion; that is the amount that is missing from MF Global's segregated client funds for which Mr. Corzine could provide no explanation. In fact, astoundingly, this seasoned trader pleaded ignorance of what was happening at his own company.

Let me mention that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Jill Sommers, a representative who testified at the hearing, was very invaluable to public understanding.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRIFFITH of Virginia). The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I believe that I have a Special Order and time remaining, my own Special Order for 30 minutes.

MF GLOBAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. There being no majority Member to be recognized at this time, under the Speaker's announced policy of January 5, 2011, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank the Speaker.

Let me rephrase this. At the hearing, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Jill Sommers' testimony was invaluable to the public. Her testimony places the MF Global collapse in proper perspective, and I'm quoting directly. She said:

"Lehman Brothers and Refco are the two most recent futures commission merchant bankruptcies. While the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy was monumental in scale and the Refco bankruptcy involved serious fraud at the parent company, commodity customers did not lose their money at either firm. In both instances, commodity customer accounts were wholly intact; that is they contained all open positions and all associated segregated collateral. That being the case, customer accounts were promptly transferred to healthy FCMs"—or futures commission merchants—"with the commodity customers having no further involvement in the bankruptcy proceeding. Unfortunately, that is not what happened at MF Global because customer accounts were not intact."

The fact that "customer accounts were not intact," as Commissioner Sommers described it, means that someone took other people's money. I believe most of us would call that theft. Even if some of the money is recovered by the bankruptcy process, that does not alter the fact that the process by which customer accounts were violated broke the law.

It is an understatement to say that many American families and businesses lost important investments. The mismanagement of this one firm has put hundreds of people's investments in jeopardy. They deserve answers. Congress has lead responsibility to ask hard questions, and here are some questions that demand reply.

On transfers of funds from customer accounts, Congress must ask examiners from Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group, who said that transfers at MF Global were made "in a manner that may have been designed to avoid detection," so let us ask: Should the person or persons who attempted to avoid this detection be held accountable, and how should that occur? It seems unlikely Mr. Corzine is not responsible. So which person, or persons, at MF Global made the decision to invade customer accounts? Congress must assure full tracing of those transactions.

A second group of questions should revolve around who are the responsible parties. If Mr. Corzine simply cannot recall or does not know what happened at MF Global, as he seemed to claim, who should Congress and investigators speak with at MF Global to ascertain his exact role and those of other top executives? Who's going to probe? That's the role of a congressional investigatory committee.

Who, besides Mr. Corzine, was directly responsible for segregating customer account funds from MF Global funds? Over \$1 billion did not walk off on its own. Some set of persons at MF Global moved those funds, and it's highly implausible that no one authorized that action. So what set of persons authorized those actions exactly?

Another set of questions should revolve around who approved MF Global's risk standards? We know that Michael Roseman, MF Global's former chief risk officer who resigned in March 2011, reportedly assessed that the strategy that MF Global was undertaking was too risky. Any assertion that the strategy was prudent at the time, as Mr. Corzine is arguing, is against the facts of history because MF Global went bankrupt. Congress needs to take whatever steps are necessary to find out exactly who pressured Mr. Roseman to resign for blowing the whistle on the behavior inside that company.

Another set of questions can be asked about what other financial partners participated in MF Global's trades. There are allegations that the transfer of \$200 million to J.P. Morgan in the final days of MF Global was suspected by J.P. Morgan bankers of utilizing MF client funds. To what extent are these allegations true? At what point can we determine whether wire fraud was committed and, if so, by whom and to what extent? All of this begs the ultimate question of whether or not sufficient protections were exercised for customers to stop wire fraud.

Another set of questions can revolve around were any inside players aiding

and abetting MF Global's behavior. We know that current Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Mr. Gensler has recused himself from the case. Mr. Gensler actually worked for Mr. Corzine at Goldman Sachs, and they apparently carried on later in the same social and academic circles. The public has a right to know at what point Mr. Gensler had any knowledge or reason to believe that the customer accounts at MF Global might not have been intact; and then, how did he and his agency and his staff respond—day by day, hour by hour, email by email?

Finally, according to Reuters, companies like Koch Industries removed billions from MF Global just before it filed bankruptcy. How did that powerful company know when to take their money out and why did my constituents not know when to take their money out? Could, in fact, Koch Industries have gotten the same tip-off that Goldman's CEO Hank Paulson had given Freddie Mac investors and Fannie Mae investors just a few years before? How much of MF Global's money not wired rightfully belongs to the holders of segregated accounts that were inappropriately tapped by MF Global? How do my constituents get full restitution?

Yes, there are far too many questions—lots of questions—and far too few complete answers.

Yes, this Congress needs to take white collar crime more seriously. Who would accept an explanation, as we heard the other day, that "I did not intend to steal." It could be \$100 from the corner gas station, right? How can that be an acceptable answer for taking hundreds of millions and over \$1 billion?

Rigorous investigation matters. Congress needs more robust hearings. We need more thorough investigations.

□ 2130

What should concern all of us is that the financial industry's fraud and imprudence, yes, addictive behavior, is not limited to a case here or there. In the financial services sector, fraud has become systemic. It is endemic. It has harmed our Nation's economy to its vitals and has hurt millions of people across our country and the financial systems of other countries.

In 2009, the FBI testified before the House Judiciary Committee that the current financial crisis, and I'm quoting directly, "has produced one unexpected consequence: it has exposed prevalent fraud schemes that have been thriving in the global financial system. These fraud schemes are not new, but they are hitting the economy hard and the public is hurting as a result of market deterioration."

What a true statement. Regretfully, this isn't the first time that our country has seen a crime wave in the financial services industry. Indeed, the crimes and addictive behavior seem to be getting bigger, not smaller.

In the 1980s, it was the savings and loan crisis. Then the FBI responded

with a staff of 1,000 agents and forensic experts based in 27 cities.

Do you know how many they had over there when this started? Forty-five. You could count them on your own hands.

Perpetrators went to jail back then but, rather, the Congresses at that time ignored the warnings of what had happened, and they gave an even bigger green light during the 1990s to more abuse by removing the rules of the road for banking during the 1990s.

Example, the upending of the Glass-Steagall Act in the late 1990s that blew the lid off prudent banking and allowed bankers and speculators to be in the same company. And look what has happened. We need to restore the Glass-Steagall Act, and I have a bill to do that, and there are dozens and dozens of cosponsors on that bill.

In 2000, the surreptitious undermining of derivative regulation by this Congress led to Wall Street's bullish plunder that we are now experiencing again, the result of addictive behavior of the 2000s.

You know, when you go back to the savings and loan crisis, that was much smaller than what we are enduring today. That is why I have a straightforward bill, H.R. 1350, the Financial Crisis Criminal Investigation Act. It authorizes an additional 1,000 agents and forensic experts for the white collar crime division of the FBI to investigate and prosecute these financial crimes. I encourage all of my colleagues to join me as a cosponsor. The Bureau does not have anywhere near the resources it needs to take on crimes of this magnitude and dimension.

Congress has long debated what level of regulation is needed to restrain financial addicts. There should be no debate about the need to uphold the law, to recover innocent people's money, to prosecute the addicted gamblers, to set a strict standard of behavior in the financial sector so it simply never happens again, so that we can restore confidence and regular order, not insider abuse, to America's financial markets.

I think this Congress has an awesome responsibility to do its job, and it should not fear anyone. The committees of this House should be working overtime to probe the truth, to find the truth, to get at the truth of those who have harmed America, that have put so many millions of people out of work, where so many homes have been foreclosed that the property values of this country can't even find their footing at this point.

It's affecting capital formation; it's affecting the ability of local banks to make loans because they're not sure what's going to happen to valuation on their books. What could be more serious than the committees of this Congress doing their job?

I want to commend Congressman LUCAS of Oklahoma. I want to commend Congressman PETERSON of Minnesota. Wouldn't it be wonderful if

they could continue their important work, but that the other committees of this Congress that have responsibility for oversight, Government Oversight and Reform, the Judiciary Committee, the Financial Services Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, were actually to do the work that needs to be done to put this country's banking and financial system back in a decent position with prudent rules and to finally quash the addictive behavior that has brought our country to this very dangerous point?

[From The New York Times, Dec. 11, 2011]

A ROMANCE WITH RISK THAT BROUGHT ON A PANIC

(By Azam Ahmeo, Ben Protess and Susanne Craig)

Soon after taking the reins of MF Global in 2010, Jon S. Corzine visited the Wall Street firm's Chicago offices for the first time, greeting the brokers, analysts and sales staff there.

One broker, Cy Monley, caught Mr. Corzine's eye. Unknown to MF Global's top management in New York, the employee, whose job was to match buyers and sellers in energy derivatives, was also trading a small account on the side, using the firm's capital.

"How are you making money on side bets? What else are you guys doing to make money here?" Mr. Corzine asked enthusiastically, his eyes widening, the broker recalled. The new chief executive grabbed a seat and spent an hour questioning Mr. Monley as other top executives from New York hovered impatiently nearby.

Although Mr. Corzine had been a United States senator, governor of New Jersey, co-head of Goldman Sachs and a confidant of leaders in Washington and Wall Street, he was at heart a trader, willing to gamble for a rich payoff.

Dozens of interviews reveal that Mr. Corzine played a much larger, hands-on role in the firm's high-stakes risk-taking than has previously been known.

An examination of company documents and interviews with regulators, former employees and others close to MF Global portray a chief executive convinced that he could quickly turn the money-losing firm into a miniature Goldman Sachs.

In the final days before filing for bankruptcy, MF Global moved an estimated \$1.2 billion of customer funds to other institutions.

He pushed through a \$6.3 billion bet on European debt—a wager big enough to wipe out the firm five times over if it went bad—despite concerns from other executives and board members. And it is now clear that he personally lobbied regulators and auditors about the strategy.

His obsession with trading was apparent to MF Global insiders over his 19-month tenure. Mr. Corzine compulsively traded for the firm on his BlackBerry during meetings, sometimes dashing out to check on the markets. And unusually for a chief executive, he became a core member of the group that traded using the firm's money. His profits and losses appeared on a separate line in documents with his initials: JSC.

After joining MF Global, Jon S. Corzine invested heavily in the debt of troubled European countries.

Yet few appeared willing to check Mr. Corzine's trading ambitions.

The review of his tenure also sheds new light on the lack of controls at the firm and the failure of its watchdogs to curb outside risk-taking. The board, according to former employees, signed off on the European bet

multiple times. And for the first time it is now clear that ratings agencies knew the risks for months but, as they did with subprime mortgages, looked the other way until it was too late, underscoring how three years after the financial crisis, little has changed on Wall Street.

MF Global filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 31. As the firm spun out of control, it improperly transferred some customer money on Oct. 21—days sooner than previous thought, *-F.-s-gd* people briefed on the matter. And investigators are now examining whether MF Global was getting away with such illicit transfers as early as August, one person said, a revelation that would point to wrongdoing even before the firm was struggling to survive.

The consequences of the firm's collapse have been severe: Some \$1 billion in customer money remains missing and thousands of clients, including small farmers in Kansas or hedge funds in Connecticut, still do not have nearly a third of their funds.

Some of that money may never be recovered if, as some regulators now fear, MF Global used it to cover trading losses and replenish overdrawn bank accounts.

The bet on European sovereign debt is not thought to be directly connected to the missing money. But the fears about the firm's exposure to Europe tipped an anxious market, causing a run on MF Global that regulators suspect led the firm to fight for its life using customer money.

Mr. Corzine has not been accused of any wrongdoing. Through a spokesman, he declined to comment for this article.

While Mr. Corzine apologized for the firm's collapse when he appeared before the House Agriculture Committee on Thursday, he has continued to defend the European trade, calling it "prudent" at the time.

The European trade was initiated by Mr. Corzine late in the summer of 2010. The new chief executive explained the bet to a small group of top traders, arguing that Europe would not let its brethren default. In just a few months, the trade swelled to \$6.3 billion, from \$1.5 billion.

Europe's debt crisis, meanwhile, continued to flare, raising questions about whether some of the Continent's bigger economies, Spain and Italy, might be ensnared in the maelstrom.

In August, some directors questioned the chief executive, asking him to reduce the size of the position. Mr. Corzine calmly assured them they had little to fear.

"If you want a smaller or different position, maybe you don't have the right guy here," he told them, according to a person familiar with the matter. He also told one senior board member that he would "be willing to step down" if they "had lost confidence in me," Mr. Corzine told Congress on Thursday, although he said he had not intended to make a threat.

The board relented.

A CURIOUS CAREER MOVE

Few would have guessed that Mr. Corzine, having led Goldman Sachs before serving in the Senate and as a governor of New Jersey, would wind up the chief executive of a little-known brokerage house.

At Goldman, which he joined in 1975, the young bond trader quickly gained a reputation as someone able to take big risks and generate big profits. Even after ascending to the top of the firm, he kept his own trading account to make bets with the firm's capital. In 1999, Mr. Corzine was ousted from Goldman amid a power struggle.

By 2010, having suffered a stinging defeat in his bid for re-election as the Democratic governor of New Jersey, Mr. Corzine hoped to resume his career on Wall Street.

A friend, J. Christopher Flowers, one of MF Global's largest investors, helped him get there. Mr. Corzine and Mr. Flowers worked at Goldman decades ago, and at one point, Mr. Flowers helped manage Mr. Corzine's vast wealth while he was a senator, according to Congressional records.

Mr. Corzine's arrival was a coup. MF Global had hired an executive search firm, Westwood Partners, to hunt for a new leader. But some members of the board, including David I. Schamis, who worked for Mr. Flowers, were recruiting Mr. Corzine.

He was a popular manager, former employees say. An avuncular presence with a beard and sweater vest, he had a knack for remembering names. Even in the firm's final hours, they recall that Mr. Corzine never lost his temper. His work ethic also impressed colleagues. He often started his day with a five-mile run, landing in the office by 6 a.m. and was regularly the last person to leave the office.

His intense routine was on par with his ambitions for the firm. With 15 top executives in the firm's boardroom on his first day, March 23, 2010, he said, "I think this firm has tremendous potential and I can't wait to get started," one person who attended said.

Mr. Corzine faced a steep challenge.

For years, MF Global aligned buyers and sellers of futures contracts for commodities like wheat or metals, and took a small commission along the way. But over the last decade, that business had become endangered. By the time Mr. Corzine arrived, near zero-percent interest rates and paper-thin commissions had led to five consecutive quarters of losses.

Soon after taking the helm, Mr. Corzine oversaw a wave of job cuts and overhauled compensation, moving from steady commissions to salary and discretionary bonuses like the rest of Wall Street.

At the same time, Mr. Corzine filled the ranks with employees from Goldman Sachs and hedge funds like the Soros Fund Management. He recruited Bradley Abelow, a fellow Goldman alumnus and a top aide when he was governor, to be chief operating officer.

Mr. Corzine arrived just as Washington was pressing the big banks to curb their lucrative yet risky businesses. Spotting an opening, he fashioned new trading desks, including one just for mortgage securities and a separate unit to trade using the firm's own capital, a business known as proprietary trading.

Not to be outdone, Mr. Corzine was the most profitable trader in that team, known as the Principal Strategies Group, according to a person briefed on the matter. Mr. Corzine traded oil, Treasury securities and currencies and earned in excess of \$10 million for the firm in 2011, the person said.

Some inside MF Global worried that the expansion of the profitable trading business in New York came at the expense of its futures clearing operation, which was centered in Chicago. To drum up sales, Chicago brokers were pushed to introduce longtime clients to their counterparts in New York, a move that raised tensions.

At times, Mr. Corzine seemed unfamiliar with some aspects of the futures division. In June, speaking at the Sandler O'Neill Financial Services Conference at the St. Regis Hotel in Manhattan, Mr. Corzine stumbled. "Right now, if you thought about MF Global's retail business, you probably could only think of—" he said, then paused to recall the name of the division at MF Global that catered to individual investors.

He leaned over to an aide, who told him it was Lind-Waldock.

"Chief Risk Officer"

"I consider one of my most important jobs to be chief risk officer of our firm," Mr. Corzine told that conference.

Yet soon after joining MF Global, Mr. Corzine torpedoed an effort to build a new risk system, a much-needed overhaul, according to former employees. (A person familiar with Mr. Corzine's thinking said that he saw the need to upgrade, but that the system being proposed was "unduly expensive" and was focused in part on things the firm didn't trade.)

While risk at the firm had been sharply increased with the bet on European sovereign debt, there was a compelling argument for Mr. Corzine's strategy.

MF Global had obtained loans to buy debt of Italy, Ireland and other troubled European nations, while simultaneously pledging the bonds as collateral to support the loans. The loans would come due when the bonds matured, which would happen no later than the end of 2012. MF Global, Mr. Corzine reckoned, would profit on the spread between the interest paid on the loans and the coupons earned from the bonds.

But the size of the European position was making the firm's top risk officers, Michael Roseman and Talha Chaudhry, increasingly uncomfortable by late 2010, according to people familiar with the situation. They pushed Mr. Corzine to seek approval from the board if he wanted to expand it.

Mr. Roseman then gave a PowerPoint presentation for board members, explaining the sovereign debt trade as Mr. Corzine sat a few feet away. The presentation made clear the risks, which hinged on the nations not defaulting or the bonds losing so much value they caused a cash squeeze. The directors approved the increase. Mr. Roseman eventually left the firm.

Within MF Global, Mr. Corzine welcomed discussion about his bet and his reasons for it, though some senior managers said they feared confronting such a prominent figure. Those who did challenge him recall making little progress. One senior trader said that each time he addressed his concerns, the chief executive would nod with understanding but do nothing.

These concerns were only internal at first because, while MF Global had disclosed the existence of the transactions in at least one filing in 2010, it never mentioned the extent to which they were used to finance the purchase of European debt.

The firm bought its European sovereign bonds making use of an arcane transaction known as repurchase-to-maturity. Repo-to-maturity allowed the company to classify the purchase of the bonds as a sale, rather than a risky bet subject to the whims of the market. That called to mind an earlier era of trading when firms used repo-to-maturity to finance the purchase of risk-free assets like United States Treasury securities. Mr. Corzine's specialty at Goldman many years earlier.

"It's like a bond trader from 15 years ago went to sleep and suddenly awoke to make these trades," one regulator who later reviewed the transactions remarked to a colleague.

Eventually, MF Global's auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, asked Mr. Corzine to report the European debt exposure to his investors. He personally met with the accounting firm in December 2010, two people said, and it was agreed that the transactions would be mentioned in a footnote in the firm's annual report, which was filed on May 20, 2011.

Mr. Speaker, I thank you very much for the time this evening, I thank my colleagues and those who are listening, and I yield back my remaining time.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 2339

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. DOLD) at 11 o'clock and 39 minutes p.m.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. DIAZ-BALART (at the request of Mr. CANTOR) for today through December 16 on account of a family medical issue.

ADJOURNMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the House stands adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow for morning-hour debate.

There was no objection.

Accordingly (at 11 o'clock and 40 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, December 15, 2011, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

4297. A letter from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Associate Director of National Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, transmitting a report of a violation of the Antideficiency Act, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency case number 10-04; to the Committee on Appropriations.

4298. A letter from the Chairman and President, Export-Import Bank, transmitting a report on transactions involving U.S. exports to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuant to Section 2(b)(3) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended; to the Committee on Financial Services.

4299. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report concerning methods employed by the Government of Cuba to comply with the United States-Cuba September 1994 "Joint Communiqué" and the treatment by the Government of Cuba of persons returned to Cuba in accordance with the United States-Cuba May 1995 "Joint Statement", together known as the Migration Accords; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

4300. A letter from the Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, transmitting the semiannual report on the activities of the Office of Inspector General for the period from April 1, 2011 to September 30, 2011, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. app. (Insp. Gen. Act), section 5(b); to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4301. A letter from the Acting Staff Director, Commission on Civil Rights, transmit-

ting the Commission's Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal year 2011; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4302. A letter from the Chief Human Capital Officer, Corporation for National and Community Service, transmitting a report pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4303. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the Department's Agency Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2011; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4304. A letter from the Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, transmitting a report pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4305. A letter from the Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, transmitting 2 reports pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4306. A letter from the Delegated the Authority of the Staff Director, Commission on Civil Rights, transmitting notification that the Commission recently appointed members to the Arizona Advisory Committee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows:

By Mr. BLUMENAUER (for himself, Mr. POE of Texas, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. CARNAHAN, Mr. SRES, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. CONYERS, Ms. BASS of California, Ms. LEE of California, and Mr. SMITH of Washington):

H.R. 3658. A bill to strengthen implementation of the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. PAULSEN (for himself, Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky, Mr. BOUSTANY, Mr. SCHOCK, and Mrs. BLACK):

H.R. 3659. A bill to reauthorize the program of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families through fiscal year 2012, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CARNAHAN (for himself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. CONNOLLY of Virginia, Mrs. ELLMERS, Mr. JONES, and Mr. WELCH):

H.R. 3660. A bill to establish the United States Office for Contingency Operations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. TIBERI (for himself, Mr. NEAL, Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. GERLACH, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. TERRY, Mr. PASCRELL, and Mr. CLEAVER):

H.R. 3661. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent and expand the temporary minimum credit rate for the low-income housing tax credit program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McKEON (for himself, Mr. RUNYAN, Mr. AKIN, Mr. THORNBERRY, Mrs.