

bring new transparency and accountability to the shadowy market in derivatives. It will protect taxpayers from the need to engage in the kind of multibillion-dollar bailouts required in the current crisis by allowing for an orderly resolution of failing financial firms. It empowers regulators to establish tough new capital requirements that make it harder for firms to become so big they endanger the stability of the system. It requires hedge funds to register with the SEC and provide information about their once-hidden operations. It also strengthens the process for shareholders to select corporate directors and to limit excessive executive pay.

We have seen all too clearly the consequences of lax regulation and tepid oversight, the consequences of assuming that Wall Street can police itself. That attitude has put millions of Americans in unemployment lines, has plastered foreclosure signs on millions of American homes, and has pumped billions of dollars of taxpayer money into Wall Street firms that happily profited from their risky bets and then leaned on the rest of us to bail them out when the bill came due.

I say to those colleagues who are considering voting against this bill: Knowing what our investigation and others have discovered, how can you oppose this effort to erect a wall between Wall Street's never-ending appetite for reckless risk and the rest of the American economy?

It is time to put the cop back on the beat on Wall Street. It is time to end Wall Street's "heads we win, tails you lose" game. It is time to prevent as best we can the next manmade disaster threatening our jobs, our homes, and our businesses. It is time to pass this major financial reform legislation, and I hope we will see a strong vote for it in the day ahead.

#### PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TRIP

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about a trip Senator JACK REED and I recently took to Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, we met with the Prime Minister, the Governor of the critical northern province that includes the Swat Valley, the Pakistani general who is commander of their Army's 11th Corps. In Afghanistan, we met in Kabul with General Petraeus, with Ambassador Eikenberry, with President Karzai, with many of his ministers.

Then, in Afghanistan, we traveled to Kandahar Province, where we met with General Carter, who is the commander of the ISAF forces, the Kandahar Governor and the city mayor of Kandahar. Then we met with the commander of the Afghan Army's 205th Corps, Major General Zazai.

One of the key things we saw, and something which is critically important to the success of this mission in Afghanistan, is that the Afghan Army

be strengthened, take responsibility, primarily, for the security of the country, and lead operations which are joint operations between the Afghan Army and the coalition forces, including American forces.

That will be dramatized, that movement towards the shift of responsibility to the Afghans, where it belongs. A dramatic moment is going to take place later in July or early in August when, in a major operation in the area around Kandahar city, right in the heart of Taliban country, there is going to be a large number of forces that are Afghan forces, a large number of American forces, and from other countries, and it will be the Afghans who will be in the lead in that operation.

This is the Taliban's worst nightmare: facing an Afghan-led force that is going to clear them from control of the area. The Afghan people detest the Taliban, and they respect their own army. And our major goal and mission should be to build up that army, strengthen it sizewise and with equipment and training so it can take major security responsibility for that country. This is the path to success in Afghanistan.

Again, because of this planned operation, which is now announced, and because of a number of other steps which have been taken—a very significant number of positive steps in the last 6 months—I have some confidence we are on the way to a successful outcome in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has made progress in a number of ways since my visit there in January.

The progress I refer to is toward the key goal of preventing Afghanistan from being dominated by a Taliban organization that would once again provide a haven for the international terrorist movement, al-Qaida.

To achieve that goal, Afghanistan must be able to take principal responsibility for its own security. We and other outsiders cannot secure Afghanistan, but we can help the Afghan security forces do so.

The building blocks to achieve that goal are present. The Afghan National Army, ANA, is respected by the people and the Taliban is despised and feared because of the terror they spread and threaten.

A capable, strong, large Afghan Army is the Taliban's worst nightmare because it means that the Taliban's propaganda that foreigners seek to dominate Afghanistan rings hollow. This is particularly true when Afghan troops are in the lead in joint operations with the troops of ISAF.

That is why I believed we should have focused on training and equipping the ANA, why we should have sent in trainers and mentors instead of sending in more combat troops. That is why when President Obama decided to send in 30,000 more U.S. troops, I strongly supported the decision to begin to reduce those troops in July of 2011. That

date is the action-driving mechanism to demonstrate to the Afghans the urgency of acting to get their army up to the size and capability where they can succeed in the mission so vital to them and to us—securing their country against the Taliban.

A number of steps have been taken in the last 6 months toward achieving that goal.

First, recruitment for the ANA is up, partly because, according to General Caldwell, who leads the ISAF training mission, the announcement of the July 2011 date last December incentivized the Afghan leaders to act to stimulate recruitment.

Second, the Afghan army has grown very quickly, exceeding the goals. Last December the army had 100,000 men; by May the number was 125,000; and Minister of Defense Wardak said he expects to announce that the end of September 2010 goal of 134,000 will be met by the time of the Kabul conference in late July.

Third, the ratio of ISAF forces to Afghan forces is improving in terms of Afghans becoming numerically dominant. When I was with our marines in Helmand Province in January, there were two or three marines for each Afghan soldier. In Kandahar Province, where Senator REED and I visited last week, the ratio is about one to one and by September it will be predominantly Afghan.

Fourth, the partnering in the field between the ANA and ISAF is real. Every Afghan unit from battalion down to company level is now planning and operating together with ISAF units. This has the twin benefits of training Afghan troops and having the Afghan people see that it is their respected army that they want to provide the security which is doing that, rather than foreign troops which have less understanding of their culture and will someday leave.

Fifth, and central to the success of the mission of Afghans being principal providers of security, is the fact that Afghan troops are more and more in the lead in joint operations. A highly significant event will take place at the end of July and early August. A major joint ANA-ISAF operation will move into the Taliban heartland of the Arghandab Valley, just west of Kandahar city. Approximately 10,000 troops—the Afghan 205th Corps with 5,160 soldiers and ISAF with 4,430 soldiers—will clear the area of insurgents.

The planning is complete and the orders signed. It is a major, incredibly important effort and, of great significance, the Afghans will be in the lead.

The significance of this will not be lost on the Afghan people, nor on the Taliban.

Kandahar Province is where the Taliban movement was born. Months of effort have been extended to "shape" the upcoming effort. The city of Kandahar and its environs are being secured at the cost of many lives—both Afghan and coalition forces—so as to

prevent additional insurgents from re-informing the Arghandab region.

This will not be just a clearing operation.

It will be a clear and hold operation, with Afghan National Police, ANP, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police, ANCOP, doing the holding with the Afghan National Army and coalition military police.

As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, said:

To have American Marines standing on a corner in a key village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan policeman or Afghan soldier.

The key to success of a counterinsurgency effort, which is aimed at protecting the people, is winning the support of those people. A significant sign of progress in this respect is that the tips needed about the whereabouts of the Taliban, so essential to defeating them, are coming into the coalition in vastly increasing numbers. An ISAF Strategic Assessment report indicates that there has been increased reporting by local Afghans on the locations of IEDs and weapons caches, resulting in a higher ratio of finds/turn-ins to explosions.

Sixth, the equipping of the Afghan Army is beginning to happen. We authorized the transfer of equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan for the ANA instead of bringing all that equipment back to the United States. We learned that 800 of 1,600 up-armored humvees have arrived in Afghanistan and the rest will soon arrive.

There are other reasons for optimism. We met with the Governor of Kandahar Province and the mayor of the city of Kandahar. Their outspoken opposition to the Taliban and the warlords who have been in power and who recently assassinated the District Governor of Arghandab remains strong and resolute.

Those are some of the signs of progress, but it has come at great cost. We have lost almost 1,200 of our brave troops in Afghanistan, and many times that number wounded. The cost to our treasure has been high. The months ahead will see more casualties, almost all inflicted by IEDs. The strain on our extraordinary troops and their families and on the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan is great. Despite the stress, their morale is high, and regardless of whether one agrees with the mission in Afghanistan, those men and women deserve a tribute from all Americans. We stand in awe of them.

There are also significant threats to the Afghan mission.

The first threat emanates from Pakistan. While Pakistan has taken steps relatively recently to take on some terrorist groups, and has done so at a real cost to the Pakistan Army, they have not taken on a number of groups that use Pakistan as a safe haven, crossing the border into Afghanistan to attack Afghan and ISAF forces, or supplying and supporting those attacks and then returning to the Pakistan safe haven.

Two of those groups are the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan area of the federally administered tribal area, FATA, across the border from eastern Afghanistan, and the home of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, just across the border from Kandahar.

The State Department maintains a list of foreign terrorist groups. The State Department has said it is currently considering adding the Pakistani Taliban to that list. In my view, the Haqqani network has also long belonged on that list. We would not tolerate such groups attacking us from a neighboring country. Pakistan's failure to attack them, knowing full well, as they do, the location of their headquarters in Miranshah and Quetta, is also intolerable.

A second threat to the success of our Afghan mission is the failure of the Afghan Government to provide noncorrupt, effective government to their people. This has been the subject of much concern. President Karzai's administration and international action on the civilian government side are beginning to stir into long overdue action.

The number of U.S. Government civilians in Afghanistan has tripled since 2009, with a greater percentage in the field outside Kabul.

A third threat to the success of the Afghan mission is the undiminished power of warlords and power brokers and the so-called private security contractors, paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars, who are engaged in bribes and perverse, blatant racketeering and rip-offs.

General Rodriguez, commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and deputy commander, United States Forces—Afghanistan, is determined to protect our convoys from the warlords and their thugs who extort fees for safe passage and often collaborate with the Taliban to create the very threat of insecurity they presumably are hired to guard against.

The Afghan people hate and live in fear of the power brokers and warlords.

They corrupt the local police and are one reason why there is little public confidence in the local police.

Training of more and better local police and the expansion of the Afghan Civil Order Police, ANCOP, are hopeful signs. But the combination of warlords and power brokers operating in effective league with private security contractors, the Taliban, and an often corrupted local police, remain a significant threat to the Afghan mission's success.

The role of Afghan private security contractors, who often have devastating connections to our enemies and who rip off American tax payers, and who are facilitated by the failures of U.S. contractors to adequately vet and oversee their activities, will be the subject of a forthcoming report of a Senate Armed Services investigation.

Fourth, because success of the Afghan mission depends, probably more

than anything else, on the rapid growth and capability of the one nationally respected institution, the ANA, the continuing failure of NATO allies to fill the shortfall of perhaps 2,000 trainers for partnering in the field with Afghan Army and police, so-called operational mentoring and liaison teams, OMLTs, and police operational mentoring and liaison teams, POMLTs, is inexcusable.

Many of our allies, notably the Brits, Canadians, Australians, Poles, Danes, and Georgians have been most admirable in their efforts. But too many NATO allies have failed to make commitments or carry out commitments so important to the success of the first NATO out-of-area combat mission. Continuing pressure on the laggard allies shouldn't be needed—but it is.

The success of the Afghan mission ultimately depends on a political settlement. An approach to the reintegration of those lower level insurgents who can be reintegrated, and the reconciliation with those groups that are not irreconcilable, is underway. The Afghan Government is leading that effort also, as, of course, it must. While our views and experiences in this regard are surely relevant, a brilliant British general leading the ISAF effort in Kandahar reminded us of what T.E. Lawrence said to the British over 100 years ago in a similar situation in a place that is not too far distant from Afghanistan:

Do not try to do much with your own hands. Better (they) do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions (there), your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, July 15, following any leader time, the Senate then resume consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 4173, with the time until 11 a.m. equally divided and controlled between Senators DODD and SHELBY or their designees; with the 20 minutes prior to 11 a.m. divided as follows: 5 minutes each in the following order: Senators SHELBY, DODD, MCCONNELL, and REID; that at 11 a.m. the Senate proceed to vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate