

The comprehensive draft cyber security legislation under development in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence attempts to create such a cooperative relationship by: \*\*\*

Mr. BOND. In addition, because, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, believe no legislation in this area should impede the intelligence community's ability to protect our nation from terrorist attacks and other threats, we asked the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for an informal assessment of our bill. They told us that, unlike other bills that have been introduced, this bill protects intelligence community equities, especially with respect to protecting classified intelligence sources and methods.

The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 2010 provides broad lanes in the road, without micromanaging, to give all partners in cyber security, whether government or private, the flexibility to defend against threats from our enemies. The private sector already has a tremendous incentive to protect their own networks; all the Federal Government needs to do is support them with technology and information and get out of the way.

Cyber attackers have been stealing intellectual property, threatening to take down our critical infrastructure, and gaining insight into our national security networks. The longer Congress waits to act, the more our vulnerability to these attacks increases. The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act will put the Government, our critical infrastructure companies, and the private sector on the right path to securing our networks. I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this important legislation.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise to express my support as a cosponsor of the National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act. At long last, our Nation is finally recognizing the increasing danger posed by cyber threats and the devastating disruption that they can cause because of the interdependent nature of information systems that support our Nation's critical infrastructure.

As a Nation, we must develop a strategy that provides a strategic framework to prevent cyber attacks against America's critical infrastructures. As a government, we must reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks and minimize the damage and recovery time from cyber attacks should they occur. I believe that the legislation that my colleague from Missouri and I are introducing today will provide a sure foundation to put our Nation on a path to begin to address cyber vulnerabilities.

The challenge to protect cyberspace is vast and complex and ultimately requires the efforts of the entire government. As a Nation, we must recognize that cyber threats are multi-faceted and global in nature. These threats operate in an environment that rapidly changes. The sharing of information

between government and the private sector is crucial to our overall national and economic viability.

Last January, McAfee issued a report that concluded that the use of cyber attacks as a strategic weapon by governments and political organizations is on the rise. The U.S. is the most targeted nation in the world—and our military, government, and private sector systems are often attacked with impunity. Our Nation has experienced large-scale malicious cyber intrusions from individuals, groups and nations. These attacks have dramatically increased in number and complexity.

Just last year, Google and over 30 other companies linked to our energy, finance, defense, technology and media sectors fell prey to costly cyber attacks. Too many nations either directly sanction this activity or give it tacit approval by failing to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators. Many of the major incidents are presently coming out of Russia and China.

The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act would establish a National Cyber Center, housed within the Department of Defense. The mission of the National Cyber Center would be to serve as the primary organization for coordinating Federal Government defensive operations, cyber intelligence collection and analysis, and activities to protect and defend Federal Government information networks. Critical in achieving this mission would be the sharing of information between the private sector and federal agencies regarding cyber threats. This center would be led by a Senate-confirmed director modeled after the Director of National Intelligence position. The director reports directly to the President and would coordinate cyber activities to protect and defend Federal Government information networks. The director would serve as the President's principal adviser on such matters and developing policies for securing Federal Government information networks.

In our Nation today, over 3/4 of our Nation's critical infrastructure is under the control of the private sector. One such example is smart grid technology for power grids. The Smart Grid will use automated meters, two-way communications and advanced sensors to improve electricity efficiency and reliability. The nation's utilities have embraced the concept and are installing millions of automated meters on homes across the country. However, cyber security experts have determined that some types of meters can be hacked. As we rely on technology developed by private industry, we must ensure that we harden this technology against threats that could leave our citizens vulnerable.

The opening salvos of future conflicts will be launched in cyberspace. In 2008, we saw this occur when Russian forces launched a cyber attack on Georgian defense and information networks. The Russians essentially blinded the Georgian military during the South

Ostessia conflict. Our reliance on technology and integrated networks certainly makes our military and critical infrastructure more efficient. However, that efficiency can have its price in the form of cyber vulnerability.

As Americans, we must be prepared to fight back should we be attacked. We must also harden our networks against the tools that criminals use to steal a person's identity and a company's trade secrets. These are the same tools that today can and will be used by terrorists in the future to attack and erode our infrastructure and defense systems. The stakes are too high and the risks are too grave to delay. If we don't move now to protect our national cyber infrastructure, the consequences to our economy, security and citizens could be dire. This is a fight we must win. The only way to win is to be prepared.

#### SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

##### SENATE RESOLUTION 565—SUPPORTING AND RECOGNIZING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES PROGRAMS OPERATING UNDER TITLE X OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mr. FRANKEN, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. BEGICH, Mr. KERRY, Mr. WYDEN, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Ms. CANTWELL, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mrs. BOXER, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mrs. MURRAY, and Mrs. GILLIBRAND) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions:

##### S. RES. 565

Whereas 2010 marks the 40th anniversary of the family planning services programs operating under title X of the Public Health Service Act which has for 40 years provided low-income people in the United States access to contraceptive services, supplies, and information regardless of their ability to pay for these services;

Whereas a 2009 report from the Institute of Medicine echoed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's finding that, "family planning is one of the most significant public health achievements of the twentieth century";

Whereas the family planning services programs operating under title X are the only dedicated source of Federal funding for family planning services in the United States;

Whereas in 2008, 17,400,000 people were in need of publicly funded services and supplies;

Whereas in 2008, title X-funded family planning providers worked tirelessly to serve over 5,000,000 low-income men and women;

Whereas publicly supported family planning services, such as those provided by title X, help to prevent 1,500,000 unintended pregnancies each year;

Whereas the contribution of family planning services in assisting women in the planning and spacing of their pregnancies is linked to a reduction in infant mortality;

Whereas every dollar spent to provide services in the nationwide network of publicly funded family planning clinics saves \$3.74 in Medicaid-related costs;

Whereas title X funds allow health centers to provide an array of confidential preventive health services, including contraceptive services, pelvic exams, pregnancy testing, screening for cervical and breast cancer, screening for high blood pressure, anemia, and diabetes, screening for STDs, including HIV, basic infertility services, health education, and referrals for other health and social services;

Whereas in 2008, title X centers provided over 2,200,000 Pap tests and over 2,300,000 clinical breast exams; and

Whereas women who have access to family planning services have better health outcomes; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) acknowledges the family planning services programs operating under title X of the Public Health Service Act as a critical component of the United States public health care system, providing high-quality family planning services and other preventive health care to low-income or uninsured individuals who may otherwise lack access to health care;

(2) recognizes family planning providers at Title X health centers who work tirelessly to provide quality care to millions of low-income women and men in the United States; and

(3) supports the mission of the family planning services programs operating under title X which provide men and women the opportunity to maintain their reproductive health which contributes to the health, social, and economic well-being of families in the United States.

#### AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 4394. Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself, Mr. BENNET, Mr. BROWN of Massachusetts, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. CORKER, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. KAUFMAN, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEMIEUX, Mrs. McCASKILL, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SPECTER, and Mr. WARNER) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 4386 proposed by Mr. REID (for Mr. BAUCUS) to the bill H.R. 4213, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 4395. Mr. HARKIN (for himself and Mr. KOHL) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 4386 proposed by Mr. REID (for Mr. BAUCUS) to the bill H.R. 4213, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 4396. Mr. CORNYN (for Mr. KERRY) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 548, to express the sense of the Senate that Israel has an undeniable right to self-defense, and to condemn the recent destabilizing actions by extremists aboard the ship *Mavi Marmara*.

SA 4397. Mr. CORNYN (for Mr. KERRY) proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 548, *supra*.

#### TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

**SA 4394.** Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself, Mr. BENNET, Mr. BROWN of Massachusetts, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. CORKER, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. KAUFMAN, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEMIEUX, Mrs. McCASKILL, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SPECTER, and Mr.

WARNER) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 4386 proposed by Mr. REID (for Mr. BAUCUS) to the bill H.R. 4213, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 407, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

#### TITLE X—REGISTRATION OF AGENTS OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS

##### SEC. 1001. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Each year, many people in the United States are injured by defective products manufactured or produced by foreign entities and imported into the United States.

(2) Both consumers and businesses in the United States have been harmed by injuries to people in the United States caused by defective products manufactured or produced by foreign entities.

(3) People in the United States injured by defective products manufactured or produced by foreign entities often have difficulty recovering damages from the foreign manufacturers and producers responsible for such injuries.

(4) The difficulty described in paragraph (3) is caused by the obstacles in bringing a foreign manufacturer or producer into a United States court and subsequently enforcing a judgment against that manufacturer or producer.

(5) Obstacles to holding a responsible foreign manufacturer or producer liable for an injury to a person in the United States undermine the purpose of the tort laws of the United States.

(6) The difficulty of applying the tort laws of the United States to foreign manufacturers and producers puts United States manufacturers and producers at a competitive disadvantage because United States manufacturers and producers must—

(A) abide by common law and statutory safety standards; and

(B) invest substantial resources to ensure that they do so.

(7) Foreign manufacturers and producers can avoid the expenses necessary to make their products safe if they know that they will not be held liable for violations of United States product safety laws.

(8) Businesses in the United States undertake numerous commercial relationships with foreign manufacturers, exposing the businesses to additional tort liability when foreign manufacturers or producers evade United States courts.

(9) Businesses in the United States engaged in commercial relationships with foreign manufacturers or producers often cannot vindicate their contractual rights if such manufacturers or producers seek to avoid responsibility in United States courts.

(10) One of the major obstacles facing businesses and individuals in the United States who are injured and who seek compensation for economic or personal injuries caused by foreign manufacturers and producers is the challenge of serving process on such manufacturers and producers.

(11) An individual or business injured in the United States by a foreign company must rely on a foreign government to serve process when that company is located in a country that is a signatory to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters done at The Hague November 15, 1965 (20 UST 361; TIAS 6638).

(12) An injured person in the United States must rely on the cumbersome system of let-

ters rogatory to effect service in a country that did not sign the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. These countries do not have an enforceable obligation to serve process as requested.

(13) The procedures described in paragraphs (11) and (12) add time and expense to litigation in the United States, thereby discouraging or frustrating meritorious lawsuits brought by persons injured in the United States against foreign manufacturers and producers.

(14) Foreign manufacturers and producers often seek to avoid judicial consideration of their actions by asserting that United States courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.

(15) The due process clauses of the fifth amendment to and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution govern United States courts' personal jurisdiction over defendants.

(16) The due process clauses described in paragraph (15) are satisfied when a defendant consents to the jurisdiction of a court.

(17) United States markets present many opportunities for foreign manufacturers.

(18) In choosing to export products to the United States, a foreign manufacturer or producer subjects itself to the laws of the United States. Such a foreign manufacturer or producer thereby acknowledges that it is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts in at least one State.

##### SEC. 1002. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) foreign manufacturers and producers whose products are sold in the United States should not be able to avoid liability simply because of difficulties relating to serving process upon them;

(2) to avoid such lack of accountability, foreign manufacturers and producers of foreign products distributed in the United States should be required, by regulation, to register an agent in the United States who is authorized to accept service of process for such manufacturer or producer;

(3) it is unfair to United States consumers and businesses that foreign manufacturers and producers often seek to avoid judicial consideration of their actions by asserting that United States courts lack personal jurisdiction over them;

(4) those who benefit from exporting products to United States markets should expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of at least one court within the United States;

(5) exporting products to the United States should be understood as consent to the accountability that the legal system of the United States ensures for all manufacturers and producers, foreign, and domestic;

(6) exporters recognize the scope of opportunities presented to them by United States markets but also should recognize that products imported into the United States must satisfy Federal and State safety standards established by statute, regulation, and common law;

(7) foreign manufacturers should recognize that they are responsible for the contracts they enter into with United States companies;

(8) foreign manufacturers should act responsibly and recognize that they operate within the constraints of the United States legal system when they export products to the United States;

(9) United States laws and the laws of United States trading partners should not put burdens on foreign manufacturers and producers that do not apply to domestic companies;

(10) it is fair to ensure that foreign manufacturers, whose products are distributed in