

person on Wall Street, every talking head you see on television says it is unsustainable. But we have not seen any action to get us off this path. How much longer can we go before we do something? The bullet, as one person said a number of years ago about a bank that went bankrupt—they found out the Atlanta housing market collapsed, and he said: It was too late. The bullet was in the heart. When will the bullet be in our heart? When will it be too late to fight back?

On Wednesday of this week, the Democratic majority—after having brought up their bill that I have referred to; and the Senate rejected this excessive debt and spending by a vote of 45 to 52—a number of Democrats said: No, we are not going for that, Mr. Leader. A vast majority of the Democrats supported the bill, but a significant number said: No, we are not going to keep doing this. So they have now proposed yet another version of the extenders bill, on Thursday, yesterday. This version would add \$55 billion to the deficit instead of \$78 billion. But the number is a distortion, and it is done as a result of double counting certain funds and simply shortening the time some of the provisions would take effect—not fixing it in a significant way.

To pay for some of this spending, the Democratic majority proposes to increase the oil excise tax that funds the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to 49 cents from its current 8 cents a barrel. So the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund was created to have a fund to pay costs that might relate in the future to oil—

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator asked to be notified when 7 minutes had elapsed, and we are at about 7 minutes 15 seconds.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Acting President pro tempore and will wrap up.

There is so much to be said about this. But I just wish to point out how the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is a complete shell game. It is an absolute double counting of money, and it adds to the debt, and the debt of the bill in the way it has been scored hides the real impact.

The legislation would increase the tax on oil but does not set aside the increased revenue and save it in a fund to clean up the oil spill in the gulf or other such disasters as it is supposed to. Instead, it takes the money and creates a paper trust fund but sends the money directly over to the Treasury in order to pay some of the spending in this package and is used to reduce the amount of debt they say the bill will create.

Do you follow me? They claim they are creating a trust fund but at the same time using the money to fund the spending in this bill and claiming this money as income to justify that. Well, what is going to happen when the fund needs money to clean up a spill, which is what it was created for? Well, it is not going to be there because it is

going to already have been spent. There is no dispute about this. This is absolute fact, and it is just another example of the recklessness and irresponsibility of the spending that is going on here. It is time for the American people to rise up and say to Congress: We need to have honest spending and restraint in spending.

I thank the Acting President pro tempore and yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be recognized for 20 minutes, to be followed by the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. DODD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me say it was my intention to come down and talk about the same subject my friend from Alabama has addressed, and I will do that if there is time at the conclusion of my first subject, which has to be said and addressed today, and if not, I may have to come back after my friend from Connecticut to address this subject. It has to do with the liability limits—something we need to think through. There is a gross misunderstanding and a lot of pandering going on of people demagoging that issue, and I want to address that.

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, something has happened that we haven't even talked about on the floor, and it is very timely and very significant. We all remember what has happened in the past about treaties that have come up and the administration, whether it is Democratic or Republican, if they want a treaty, they are going to try to rush it through. This same thing happened with the Law of the Sea Treaty under President Bush, and when that happened, it was somewhat of a crisis because many of us were opposed to our own President. We are going to find this to be true about the treaty I wish to address, and that is the New START treaty. I think we all remember the START treaty, the START II treaty, and now they are calling this the New START treaty.

Yesterday, on June 17, in the committee on which I am the second ranking member, the Senate Armed Services Committee, we held the first hearing on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or the New START treaty. During the hearing, we had Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Dr. CHU, and Admiral Mullen all emphasizing the importance of verifying the treaty. But wait a minute. They are all speaking in behalf of the President, which means we haven't had a hearing yet. This is something we are going to be talking about doing before we get any closer to ratifying this treaty.

I think the bottom-line question for all Americans and the Senate is, Does

this treaty improve the national security of the United States? I don't think so. To put it bluntly, this treaty will have a profound negative impact and implications on the U.S. national security.

Let's start with the need for the treaty because we are being told it is either this treaty or it is nothing at all, and that is just not an accurate statement. The United States and Russia are still committed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons to a range of about 1,700 to 2,200—a decrease from 6,000 under START. Additionally, the United States and Russia had the option of extending START for 5 years and keeping in place the same detailed verification and inspection protocols under START. So it is not a matter that we have to do something or we won't have anything at all because we will continue under the existing treaties that are there. It was the decision of the Obama administration to abandon START I protocols and rush forward to another START treaty. Both countries are still bound under the Moscow Treaty.

Let's keep in mind that this treaty addresses two things: It addresses nuclear capability, warheads and the reduction of the warheads down to about 1,550, as well as delivery systems. This is the something we keep hearing about. People don't really have an understanding. If you have a nuclear warhead, you still have to deliver. There are three basic categories of deliverance. One is to do it with ICBMs. We all know what that is. The other is SLBMs; that is, submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The third would be through the air. We have two vehicles that can do this; that is, the old B-52 and the B-2.

So I think we need to talk about four things: modernization, force structure, missile defense, and verification, and then the overall ability to deter our enemies.

Keep in mind that this is a treaty between two countries, Russia and the United States. That is not really what the problem is. I think we all understand the problem is Syria, North Korea, and now Iran, which our intelligence tells us is going to have the capability of delivering an ICBM to the eastern part of the United States as early as 2015. That is very serious.

First of all, modernization. The well-respected Perry-Schlesinger Commission, a bipartisan congressional commission on strategic posture, has been working for a long period of time, and they have come up with the conclusion that our nuclear arsenal is a victim of disrepair and neglect. We haven't been doing anything with these. Even Secretary Gates—keep in mind, he was here yesterday at this hearing—he said:

There is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the numbers of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.

We haven't done that for any period of time at all. Nonetheless, Secretary Gates, the same one who was testifying yesterday, said as recently as last October that we have to modernize and we have to test.

General Chilton, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified that modernization was not only important but essential. The last B-52—we are talking about the equipment we have—the last B-52 we cranked out was in 1964. These are ancient vehicles.

Under President Obama's first budget, he has done away with the next generation of bombers, so we can kind of forget about that as long as he is President and has a majority in this Congress. The only major nuclear power not modernizing its weapons is us. Everybody else is. Every other major power in the world is modernizing, and we all agree we shouldn't be the only one who is not doing this. Some lack modern safety features such as insensitive high-explosive and unique signal generators, and some rely on vacuum tubes.

A lot of people who are the age of my kids and grandkids don't remember how old vacuum tubes are. They look at the radios on their cars and they wonder why mine in my 1965 Ford pickup takes so long to warm up. It is because they don't remember that is the way things were. That is the way our nuclear equipment is operating now. No weapons have been fully tested since 1992 when the United States voluntarily suspended its underground nuclear testing program, and that was in anticipation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Meanwhile, other nuclear countries, including Russia, continue to modernize and replace their nuclear weapons.

Press reports indicate the administration will invest \$100 billion over the next decade in nuclear delivery systems. Now, this comes out of the press. I haven't heard this from the Obama administration. About \$30 billion of this total will go, as it should, to the development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine. That will leave about \$70 billion over that 10-year period. According to estimates by the Strategic Command, the cost of maintaining the current dedicated nuclear forces is about \$5.6 billion a year or \$56 billion over the decade. So that leaves \$14 billion, which is totally inadequate to do what we need to do, and certainly it is not sufficient enough to get to a higher degree of sophistication and modernization of our aging 1964 B-52 bomber.

I am concerned that the appropriators are not going to be able to fully fund the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request of \$624 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration. I commend them for this. This is an amount we should invest. I am not convinced we are going to be able to do that.

Here is something people haven't talked about; that is, in the fiscal year

2010 NDAA—that is the National Defense Authorization Act which I am active in—we required that the submission of a new START agreement to the Senate be accompanied by a plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent. That is under law. That is section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 NDAA. So that is something we have to comply with. Yet what we are talking about now is ratifying a treaty before we have that modernization. We are not going to let that happen. It puts off decisions on a follow-on bomber and ICBM until 2013 or 2015.

A letter was written to President Obama—and I was the one who wrote it—on December 15, 2009, signed by 41 Senators, and it stated that further reductions are not in national security interest of the United States without a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent.

So, therefore, the first issue of this is the ratification of the New START treaty by the Senate has to be linked to some kind of commitment for modernization, which is not in place now.

The second thing is force structure. According to the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission—and I will quote two sentences out of that. Keep in mind, the triad is ICBM, SLBM, and the air delivery system.

The triad of strategic delivery systems continues to have value. Each leg of the nuclear triad provides unique contributions to stability. As the overall forces shrink, their unique values become more prominent.

This is this Commission. We all know about the Perry-Schlesinger Commission. No one questions that they are the final authority, and something has to be done. We need to listen to them.

We get this also: We need to understand what the Russian force structure will look like and do a net assessment to determine whether we can maintain a viable nuclear deterrent in this new agreement. And we need to take into full consideration the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review which concluded—and I am quoting now—this is the third posture review:

Large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term relationship.

So right now, we are talking about the nuclear force structure suggested in section 1251 of the NDAA. We have 420 of the 450 currently deployed single-warhead ICBMs; we have 60 of the nuclear capability B-52s and B-2s, and we have 240 total of the warheads or the SLBMs. Add that up, and that is 720. This treaty calls for 700. When we asked the question of the panel yesterday: Where are you going to come up with the 20 reduction, they didn't have it, but that is still under consideration. So we don't even know at this time in terms of force structure and the problems we have.

Additionally, this treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons even

though tactical nuclear weapons remains one of the most significant threats. A tactical nuclear weapon could be a suitcase bomb; it could be anything other than the three legs of the nuclear triad this treaty addresses. One thing we know is that the Russians have 10 times—the ratio is 10 to 1—they have 10 times the tactical nuclear weapons that we do. I agree with Henry Kissinger. Just the other day, he said:

The large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence.

Again, there is a lot more on this, but I think this gets the point across that we have to be looking at the force structure.

I wish to move to the missile defense part of this.

We have heard—and we have been talking about this since January—that the New START treaty has a provision in it, in the preamble, which says that if we expand our missile defense capabilities, the Russians could get out of this treaty. We have been told by the administration that is not true. I have heard so many different explanations of article V in the treaty that I remain concerned that it is as clear as mud. The Obama administration assures us there are no limitations. Yet, if you look at the preamble, it says:

... the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

In other words, we don't want you to be concerned with your own national defense.

There is a unilateral statement that was issued by the Russian side of missile defense released the same day as the full agreed-upon text. This was in Prague in April. This is what our President signed. It said that the treaty "can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively." There it is. That is a statement. That is undeniable. It is there.

Sergey Lavrov, who is the Russian Foreign Minister, stated to emphasize that:

We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the two presidents ... correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by Washington.

He added that:

[The] Obama administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans with Russia.

So this is the one that I think is very significant.

Since I am running out of time—I am going to be able to pursue this and get into a lot more detail. But if you look at what happened in Poland when we had the ground-based missile defense shield that was being installed in the

first budget this President had, he pulled the rug out from under both the Czech Republic and Poland and discontinued this ground-based capability. That is something that put us in a position that is pretty scary.

I do wish to mention one thing about verification. There is limited verification. We all remember that President Reagan always used to say: Trust, but verify. Trust, but verify. This is all trust and no verification.

We are looking at it right now and seeing that the verification process is not there. I am concerned that there are 18 inspections per year that are allowed—that would be 180 inspections in 10 years—given the fact that we conducted on the order of 600 inspections during the 15 years of START I. The top verification priorities need to be accurate and effective, and they are not there now. They are still waiting on the National Intelligence Estimate that will assess our ability to monitor the treaty. I think we all recognize we are going to have to be able to have that verification.

Lastly would be the deterrence. As Secretary Gates said back in October of 2008:

As long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.

I agree with that, but that is not the message we heard yesterday. The New START focuses on reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States and fails to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons of other countries. The whole idea is that we are having an agreement, this treaty between two countries, but it is between the wrong two countries. This ought to be with countries such as Iran. Russia is not a threat; Iran is a threat to us. North Korea is also a threat to us. We have to be looking at where the real problem is. We know—and it is not even classified—that Iran will have the capability of sending an ICBM to the United States as early as 2015, and we have taken down the only defense we would have against that by taking out the Poland ground-based interceptor. That is scary.

The conclusion I come to on this is the Senate must receive a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, costs, and risks, with a clear and precise listing of terms, definitions, and banned permit actions, and the Senate has to continue to receive a series of follow-on hearings. We haven't had many hearings.

I remember when we had the Law of the Sea Treaty. That was during a Republican administration. The Bush administration decided that Ronald Reagan was wrong, I guess, so they were going to have this. They weren't having hearings either. They sent people over there who were answering to President Bush. At that time, the Re-

publicans were in the majority, and I chaired the Environment and Public Works Committee. We held a hearing, and the Law of the Sea Treaty passed the Foreign Relations Committee 16 to 0, and it was ready to sail through. We realized what was in it. They had not changed it since the 1980s when, at that time, Ronald Reagan was opposed to it. With that being the case, we had to have our own hearings. We had people coming in and talking about why we should not have the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The Law of the Sea Treaty would have turned over to the United Nations authority over 70 percent of the Earth's surface. We were able to effectively kill that because we were able to show it was wrong. We haven't had those hearings on this treaty yet. We have to have hearings on the treaty before they are going to be able to get the votes. I am taking this opportunity, since nobody is talking about this right now, of alerting our Members on both sides of the aisle that this Obama administration is going to rescue this treaty and get it done before we have our hearings. That isn't going to happen. Fortunately, it takes two-thirds to ratify a treaty. That is our responsibility.

Later, I will talk in more detail, as it gets closer. I will use a little bit of time and address the problem that my friend from Alabama was talking about a few minutes ago, which is that we have received a lot of criticism for our objection to raising the limits, which are currently way too low, to \$75 billion.

First, they wanted to raise the limits of liability for economic damages to \$10 billion, and I objected to that because both the President and the Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, said we need to think it thoughtfully all the way through as to how high a liability limit we want. Then they came forth with no liability limits.

These are my words and not the words of any experts, but I have spent many years in my life in the insurance business. I remember, in 1994, I was one who introduced a bill to put a repose on aviation products. At that time, we were importing aviation products and airplanes from other countries because we weren't making them here. Why weren't we making them here? Our tort laws would not let us. We had unlimited liability. They didn't have limits out there. Consequently, Piper Aircraft had to go into bankruptcy. They had to actually move some of their operations to Canada because their tort laws were different at that time. We introduced and passed a bill that was intended to be a 12-year repose bill.

That meant if a company manufactured an airplane or an airplane part and it worked fine for 12 years, and there was an accident, you could not go back against the manufacturer. We could not get it through. Instead, we had an 18-year repose bill. That was one that I thought was too long. That

meant if something had been running well for 18 years, then you could not go back and sue.

I called Lloyd's of London, and they said: You are right. We don't care if it is 18 years or 12 or 20 years; you have to have an end to underwrite against. In other words, we cannot insure it unless we know there is an end in the future.

Consequently, that is what we need to do in this because companies have to be able to have insurance in order to drill. We didn't think that was so necessary prior to the tragedy we are addressing now in the gulf. Now we realize we should be and what we need to do. If we leave it open ended, that will mean if we ever have any drilling or exploring in the gulf, it is going to have, in my opinion, to be done not even by the big 5, including BP, it would have to be done by the international oil companies—those in Venezuela and in China. So, in my opinion, if we adopt something with an open-ended, unlimited liability that means we are all through drilling in the gulf.

Quite frankly, that is exactly what the Obama administration wants. All this hype and their talk about oil and gas—earlier this week, we had the Sanders amendment, which would have put anyone out of business who was in the business of drilling, including our marginal producers in Oklahoma. A marginal well is only 15 barrels a day. That is what we do in Oklahoma. Yet the average marginal well produces only two barrels a day but accounts for 28 percent of the domestically produced oil. That is significant. They would have been out of business if we had adopted the Sanders amendment, which we handily defeated earlier this week.

I believe the statement made yesterday by Senator ROCKEFELLER pretty much says it right. I hope I have it so I can refer to it. He was criticizing all these efforts to try to have some kind of cap and trade, and I think the meeting that took place yesterday verifies that cap and trade is in fact dead. The votes simply aren't there. I don't have that—yes I do. This is what took place yesterday. It is in this morning's Politico:

The Senate Democrats may have emerged from a much-hyped caucus meeting without a clear plan for this summer's energy bill, but they appear to agree on one point; that is, cap and trade is dead.

I have been saying that for about 3 months. I think we are hearing that now from a lot of the Democrats. Senator MCCASKILL said:

I don't see 60 votes for a price on carbon right now.

There is the same quote by several others. This is a quote I like. Listen, this is profound, and I don't think I have ever quoted Senator ROCKEFELLER and said it was something with which I totally agree. But this is something he said:

The Senate should be focusing on the immediate issues before us: to suspend EPA action on greenhouse gas emissions, push clean

coal technologies, and tackle the gulf oil spill. We need to set aside controversial and more far-reaching climate proposals and work right now on energy legislation that protects our economy, protects West Virginia, and improves our environment.

I agree wholeheartedly. We on the Republican side have said we have an energy policy, and that it is all of the above.

I will yield at any time to my friend from Connecticut, since he had time reserved. Apparently, he doesn't want it.

It may be that the caucus that met yesterday was united in the idea that cap and trade is dead. But I don't think that is necessarily true with the Obama administration.

I am glad to yield to my friend. My understanding is that they only have 4 more minutes, and a unanimous consent request will be made here. I am almost out of time anyway.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am told we have time. Floor staff will let me know. We have a little more time available.

Mr. INHOFE. I ask the Chair, how much time is remaining before—the Senator from Nebraska has reserved time; is that correct?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Evidently not.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me conclude and say I will come back and talk about this at a later time. I do believe President Obama's pollster has some ideas that became public. I will share this last point.

Joe Benenson, the President's campaign pollster, did a survey for somewhat of an extremist environmental group, and, among other things, he found that based on his interpretation of the survey result, pushing for cap and trade and tying opposition to it to big oil is a potent political weapon for Democrats against Republicans this fall.

I think that says it all. People are using the tragedy in the gulf for political purposes. This is something we want people to understand.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHANNES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

U.S. ARMY SPECIALIST BLAINE REDDING

Mr. JOHANNES. Mr. President, I rise today to remember a fallen hero, U.S. Army SPC Blaine Redding of Plattsburgh, NE.

Blaine was a proud member of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, of the 101st Airborne Division, operating in one of the most dan-

gerous areas of Afghanistan, the Kunar Province.

On June 7, only 4 weeks after arriving in that country, Specialist Redding was killed when his vehicle was struck by a remotely detonated improvised explosive device.

His death is a great loss to our Nation and to Nebraska, his home State.

Blaine was a model of persistence, determination, and patriotism. Faced with challenges during his adolescent years, he realized that military service was the best way to fulfill his longings.

Blaine overcame an early departure from high school by earning a general equivalency diploma to join the U.S. Army. He was determined to sustain a family history of service to our country in uniform, beginning with a great-grandfather and continuing through subsequent generations.

Fort Campbell became a very special place for Specialist Redding. He and his brother, PFC Logan Redding, were assigned to the elite 101st Airborne Division.

But more important, he met his future wife Victoria, or Nikki, while at Fort Campbell. They were married on March 13, 2010. With this came a renewed sense of responsibility to defend this great Nation and its principles of freedom.

Specialist Redding knew combat operations, having completed already a year-long tour in Iraq. The rugged terrain and close proximity to the Pakistan border of the area of Afghanistan where he was poses special challenges to allied forces. Losses have been heavy in this region. Specialist Redding was comforted by his brother being deployed nearby. Ultimately, Logan would aid in returning his brother's body to the United States.

Specialist Redding will be remembered in different ways. His Army buddies sometimes refer to him as "a perfect soldier," a great "mortal man."

To family and friends, he had a priceless personality. To his wife Nikki, he was a devoted husband with a very big heart.

The decorations and badges earned during a far too brief Army career speak to his dedication and to his bravery: the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, and the Purple Heart. He proudly wore the Combat Infantry Badge and Air Assault Badge.

Today, I join Nikki, family, and friends in mourning the death of their beloved husband, son, brother, and friend. Blaine made the ultimate sacrifice in defense of our great Nation, and we owe him and his family an immeasurable debt of gratitude.

May God be with the Redding family, friends, and all those who mourn his death and celebrate his life. We will remember Blaine as we remember all the Nation's fallen warriors who gave their lives so that we may live in peace. Their names are etched on the con-

science of our Nation in glory undimmed unto the end of our people.

I also offer my prayers to all those serving in uniform today, and especially those serving in peril overseas. May God bless them and their families and see them through these difficult times.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REMEMBERING DOUGLAS GRAVEL

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to recognize three individuals, two of whom are no longer with us, and one is a man who just retired from a life of dedication to his community and family. I wish to spend a few minutes talking about the three of them, if I may.

The first is a friend of mine who passed away several weeks ago, an individual who made a wonderful contribution to our country.

Doug Gravel was a wonderful friend, a great champion of American education, and a person who attracted a legion of friends, supporters, and followers throughout his life.

Although he never lived for fame or even for recognition, Doug Gravel was instrumental in shaping the way we teach our children in this country, from one end of our Nation to the other.

The Montessori method of teaching, familiar to many people, was developed a century ago by Maria Montessori in Italy. It was designed as a system to educate the whole child by empowering children to guide their own development. It encourages kids to develop their own unique personalities and fosters their curiosity in the world around them while removing environmental obstacles to their progress.

For many children, the Montessori method has proven to be an unqualified success. Many of its methods are incorporated in public education in this country as well. Its revitalization in the latter half of this century can be traced back to a very small group of individuals—parents who lived in my state in Greenwich, CT. One of those people was a fellow named Doug Gravel.

Realizing there was no clearinghouse for parents, teachers, and school administrators interested in the Montessori method, Dr. Nancy McCormick Rambusch established the American Montessori Society at the Whitby School in Greenwich, CT in 1960. It is today America's oldest Montessori School, and Doug Gravel was right there with Nancy Rambusch when the program started.