

act now. Talk is long past. We have exhausted the time for just talk and discussion. We have to act and pass a jobs bill. A central part of a jobs bill has to be a job creation tax credit to efficiently and effectively and in a very focused way create jobs in the near term.

I ask my colleagues to review and co-sponsor the job creation tax credit legislation I have for small businesses.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 403—EX-PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB SHOULD BE TRIED BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL RATHER THAN BY A CIVILIAN COURT

Mr. VITTER (for himself, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. CHAMBLISS, Mr. ENSIGN, and Mr. WICKER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. RES. 403

Whereas Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, attempted to blow up a transcontinental airliner, Northwest Airlines Flight 253, over Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day 2009;

Whereas Abdulmutallab boarded Flight 253 in Amsterdam using an unrevoked United States visa after having traveled from Yemen, purchasing his ticket with cash, and checking no luggage;

Whereas prior to the attack on Flight 253, Abdulmutallab's father, a prominent Nigerian banker, warned officials at the United States Embassy in Nigeria that his son was being influenced by Islamic extremists in Yemen;

Whereas United States intelligence officials learned, based on intercepted al Qaeda communications from Yemen in November 2009, that a man named "Umar Farouk" had volunteered for an upcoming terrorist attack and had been in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, the same Yemen-based radical cleric who sent more than a dozen e-mail messages to the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Malik Hasan;

Whereas in November 2009, the National Security Agency also intercepted a phone conversation involving al Qaeda operatives in Yemen discussing an unnamed Nigerian man;

Whereas in December 2009, intelligence officials learned that al Qaeda operatives in Yemen were looking for "ways to move people to the West" and specifically mentioning the Christmas Day date;

Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had issued finished intelligence regarding Abdulmutallab by Christmas Day 2009, which both the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) had access to, but did not disseminate more broadly within the intelligence community due to the absence of a photograph of Abdulmutallab, despite the fact that other counterterrorism groups already possessed such a photograph;

Whereas the intelligence agencies for the United Kingdom revoked Abdulmutallab's British visa because of a fraudulent visa application;

Whereas after Abdulmutallab was apprehended by United States Customs agents and local police following his failed attack on Flight 253, he spoke freely about receiving

training from members of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and stated that other jihadists would follow him;

Whereas local agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interrogated Abdulmutallab for 50 minutes, during which time Abdulmutallab disclosed information concerning his training in Yemen and the operation of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula;

Whereas after 50 minutes, the FBI stopped its interrogation of Abdulmutallab, agreeing to continue the interrogation after he received medical attention for the burns on his legs and groin caused by the failed bomb he had sewn in his underwear;

Whereas before the FBI agents resumed the interrogation, Attorney General Eric Holder made the decision to extend the rights required under *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) to Abdulmutallab and to treat him as a common criminal rather than an unprivileged enemy belligerent who would be subject to military law;

Whereas the FBI agents, following the decision of Attorney General Holder, read Abdulmutallab his *Miranda* rights, including his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent, at which point Abdulmutallab stopped divulging information and remained silent;

Whereas information concerning Yemeni terror networks, terrorist training operations, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are of the utmost value to the United States in its ongoing war against international terrorism;

Whereas Attorney General Holder made the decision to extend *Miranda* rights to Abdulmutallab without consulting the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, the NCTC Director, Michael Leiter, the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, or the FBI Director, Robert Mueller;

Whereas Attorney General Holder did not consult the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), which, according to Director Blair, "was created exactly for th[e] purpose" of making "a decision on whether . . . a certain person who's detained should be treated as . . . a case for federal prosecution";

Whereas despite the fact that President Barack Obama created the HIG for the specific purpose of interrogating high-value detainees in order to obtain intelligence, the HIG was not yet operational by Christmas Day 2009;

Whereas given the evidence against Abdulmutallab and the numerous witnesses onboard Flight 253 who saw him attempt to detonate an explosive device, it was not necessary to secure testimony admissible in civilian court by providing *Miranda* rights to Abdulmutallab;

Whereas even if testimony that would be admissible in a civilian court was believed to be necessary, Abdulmutallab qualified for an exception to the requirements under *Miranda* that permits law enforcement officers to interrogate individuals with possible knowledge of an impending terrorist attack;

Whereas despite the fact that the United States is at war with al Qaeda and deeply concerned about the operation of Islamic terrorist networks in the Arabian Peninsula and in Yemen, a country that continues to harbor the terrorists who attacked the U.S.S. Cole, Attorney General Holder, under the guidance of President Obama, subsequently ordered that Abdulmutallab be prosecuted on criminal charges in a United States civilian court rather than in a military tribunal;

Whereas under the international law of armed conflict, the United States has the authority to detain enemies who have engaged in combatant actions until the end of hostilities;

Whereas on September 18, 2001, the Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of military force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), stating that "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons";

Whereas following extensive debate and numerous hearings on the topic, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which became law on October 28, 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111-84); and

Whereas pursuant to the President's authority under the United States Constitution as the Nation's Commander-in-Chief, as well as the Congressional authorization for the use of military force under Public Law 107-40, the President has both the authority and the responsibility to detain Abdulmutallab and other foreign terrorists and prosecute them through a military tribunal for their terrorist actions on behalf of al Qaeda: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) foreign terrorists who are enemies of the United States should not be afforded the same rights under the Constitution as United States citizens;

(2) the most important duty of the Attorney General is to protect the United States from its terrorist enemies;

(3) the decision by Attorney General Holder to truncate Abdulmutallab's interrogation after only 50 minutes cost the United States Government untold intelligence and has made America less safe;

(4) Attorney General Holder should not provide Abdulmutallab with a civilian trial, nor should he have ordered that Abdulmutallab be advised of his right to remain silent;

(5) to the extent possible, foreign terrorist enemy combatants should be tried in military tribunals rather than in civilian courts;

(6) to the extent that foreign terrorists are prosecuted in civilian courts, they should be thoroughly interrogated for information necessary to protect the United States before they are provided with a lawyer and informed of their right to remain silent; and

(7) at a minimum, the Attorney General should consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Defense, congressional leaders, or the President before unilaterally deciding to terminate the interrogation of a key intelligence source and provide a terrorist enemy with the same rights as those that are guaranteed under the Constitution for United States citizens.

SENATE RESOLUTION 404—SUPPORTING FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT AND OTHER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN SUDAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. WICKER, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mrs. BOXER, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. BYRD, Mr. ISKASON, Mr.

MERKLEY, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, Mr. BAYH, Mr. CARDIN, AND MR. CASEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 404

Whereas violent civil conflict between North and South in Sudan raged for 21 years, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 2,000,000 people and displacement of another 4,000,000 people;

Whereas the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on January 9, 2005, brought a formal end to that civil war;

Whereas the United States Government, particularly through the efforts of the President's Special Envoy for Sudan Jack Danforth, worked closely with the parties, the mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the United Kingdom and Norway to bring about the CPA;

Whereas the CPA established a 6-year interim period during which the Government of Sudan would undertake significant democratic reforms and hold national elections, and at the end of which the South would hold a referendum on self-determination, with the option to forge an independent state;

Whereas, while the parties have made progress on several parts of the CPA, limited national government reforms have been made and several key issues remain outstanding, notably border demarcation, resolution of the census dispute, and certain preparations for the 2011 referenda for southern Sudan and Abyei;

Whereas the NCP's delay and refusal to follow through on some of its commitments under the CPA has fueled mistrust and suspicion, increasing tensions between northern and southern Sudan;

Whereas research by the Small Arms Survey, published as recently as December 2009, shows that both sides are building up their security forces and covertly stockpiling weapons in anticipation of a possible return to civil war;

Whereas the Government of Southern Sudan continues to face a range of challenges and continues to struggle with problems of financial management, insufficient capacity, and a limited ability to provide security in parts of its territory, especially in the face of increasing inter-ethnic and communal violence;

Whereas humanitarian organizations and the United Nations report that more than 2,500 people were killed and an additional 350,000 displaced by inter-ethnic and communal violence within southern Sudan throughout 2009;

Whereas the Lord's Resistance Army, a brutal rebel group formed in northern Uganda, has reportedly resumed and increased attacks against civilians in southern Sudan, creating another security challenge in the region;

Whereas the Government of Southern Sudan and the United Nations Mission (UNMIS) have not taken adequate steps to address the rising insecurity and to protect civilians in southern Sudan;

Whereas, despite 5 years of peace, most of southern Sudan remains severely underdeveloped with communities lacking access to essential services such as water, health care, livelihood opportunities, and infrastructure;

Whereas Sudan is scheduled to hold national elections in April 2010, and the people of southern Sudan and Abyei are to hold

their referendum on self-determination in January 2011 under the terms of the CPA;

Whereas the holding of these elections, Sudan's first multiparty elections in 24 years, could be a historic milestone for the country and a step toward genuine democratic transformation if the elections are fair and free and all communities are able to participate;

Whereas the existence of laws that grant powers to government security services in Sudan to arrest and detain citizens without charge and recent actions taken by the security forces to restrict freedom of speech and assembly by opposition parties have raised concerns that conditions may not exist for fair and free elections in Sudan;

Whereas the conflict in Darfur is still unresolved, the security situation remains volatile, and armed parties continue to commit humanitarian and human rights violations in the region, raising concerns that conditions may not exist for Darfurians to freely and safely participate in the elections; and

Whereas the security situation in the whole of Sudan has profound implications for the stability of neighboring countries, including Chad, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda: Now, therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) acknowledges the critical importance of preventing a renewed North-South civil war in Sudan, which would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences for all of Sudan and could destabilize the wider region;

(2) supports the efforts of President Barack Obama to reinvigorate and strengthen international engagement on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA);

(3) encourages all international envoys and representatives, including those of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations, to work closely together and coordinate their efforts to bolster the peace accord;

(4) calls on the parties in Sudan—

(A) to comply fully with their commitments under the CPA;

(B) to refrain from actions that could escalate tensions in the run-up to the 2011 referendum;

(C) to work expeditiously to resolve outstanding issues of the agreement; and

(D) to begin negotiations to resolve post-referenda issues, including resource allocation and citizenship rights in the case of separation;

(5) calls on the Government of National Unity to amend or repeal laws and avoid any further actions that would unduly restrict the freedom of speech and assembly by opposition parties or the full participation of communities, including those in Darfur, in the upcoming national elections;

(6) encourages the international community and the United Nations to engage with local populations to provide assistance for elections in Sudan and popular consultations while also closely monitoring and speaking out against any actions by the Government of Sudan or its security forces to restrict or deny participation in a credible elections process;

(7) calls on the Government of Southern Sudan to work with the assistance of the international community to design and begin implementing a long-term plan for security sector reform that includes the transformation of the army and police into modern security organs and the training of all security forces in human rights and civilian protection;

(8) urges the United Nations Security Council to direct and assist the UNMIS peacekeepers to better monitor and work to

prevent violence in southern Sudan and to prioritize civilian protection in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources;

(9) supports increased efforts by the United States Government, other donors, and the United Nations to assist the Government of Southern Sudan to improve its governing capacity, strengthen its financial accountability, build critical infrastructure, and expand service delivery;

(10) urges the President to work with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, other governments, and regional organizations at the highest levels to develop a coordinated multilateral strategy to promote peaceful change and full implementation of the CPA; and

(11) encourages the President and other international leaders to strategize and develop contingency plans now for all eventualities, including in the event that the CPA process breaks down or large-scale violence breaks out in Sudan before or after the 2011 referendum, as well as for longer term development in the region following the referendum.

PRIVILEGES OF THE FLOOR

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeff Barham, a detailee in the Senate HELP Committee majority office, be granted floor privileges for the duration of the consideration of Ms. Patricia Smith's nomination to be Solicitor for the Department of Labor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONGRATULATING NORTH-
WESTERN UNIVERSITY
FEINBERG SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent that the Judiciary Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Res. 394 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 394) congratulating the Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine for its 150 years of commitment to advancing science and improving health.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and any statements related to the resolution be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 394) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

S. RES. 394

Whereas, on March 12, 1859, the origins of Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine began with Drs. Hosmer A. Johnson, Edmund Andrews, Ralph N. Isham, and