

about delays in the disability evaluation process. I spent a few hours talking with separate groups of WTU soldiers, cadre, and clinicians in very frank discussions about their experiences and concerns. I heard positive stories too—of men and women facing life-changing injuries who said they couldn't have gotten back to active duty without the help of the WTU.

Our young men and women have a heavy burden—they are fighting two wars, often serving multiple tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. We owe them the best care possible when they are injured, and I know the Army—from General Casey to the youngest privates who are watching out for their team mates—are working hard to provide this care.

This will be especially important now at Fort Carson as the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID begins to come home. A few hundred of the brigade's 3800 soldiers have returned so far, with another few hundred due home today and more due home in the coming weeks. These soldiers have been in Afghanistan for the last year, assisting the Afghan National Army with security, governance and peacekeeping operations in Kunar province, on the Pakistani border.

The need to provide resiliency training and specialized care for our soldiers continues before, during, and after deployments. Fort Carson's Mobile Behavioral Health Teams have already identified about 920 soldiers of the 4th BCT—approximately one-quarter of the brigade—as having risk factors for depression or anxiety, exacerbated by their sustained combat, who will receive additional evaluations after returning home. About 100 of the Brigade's soldiers are expected to join Fort Carson's Warrior Transition Unit upon their return. Major General Perkins and his team at Fort Carson have worked hard to get in front of behavioral health issues, initiating this program to put behavioral health teams in with the units and work with them even before they return home so that we can identify soldiers who need help.

As the 4th BCT comes home, I want to take a moment to remember the heroes that we lost in Afghanistan. Fifty brave soldiers from this unit and supporting units have died in the past year. Those who have fallen, their families, and their fellow soldiers will not be forgotten. Here are their names:

Steven Thomas Drees
Gregory James Missman
Jason John Fabrizi
Randy L.J. Neff, Jr.
Joshua James Rimer
Patrick Scott Fitzgibbon
Richard Kelvin Jones
Jonathan Michael Walls
Matthew Lee Ingram
Matthew Everett Wildes
Youvert Loney
Randy Michael Haney
Tyler Edward Parten
David Alan Davis
William L. Meredith
Justin Timothy Gallegos
Christopher Todd Griffin

Joshua Mitchell Hardt
Joshua John Kirk
Stephan Lee Mace
Vernon William Martin
Michael Patrick Scusa
Kevin Christopher Thomson
Kevin Olsen Hill
Jesus Olar Flores, Jr.
Daniel Courtney Lawson
Glen Hale Stivison, Jr.
Brandon Michael Styer
Kimble Andrus Han
Eric Nathaniel Lembke
Devin Jay Michel
Eduviges Guadalupe Wolf
Jason Adam McLeod
Kenneth Ray Nichols Jr.
Elijah John Miles Rao
Brian Robert Bowman
John Phillip Dion
Joshua Allen Lengstorf
Robert John Donevski
Thaddeus Scott Montgomery, II
Bobby Justin Pagan
John Allen Reiners
Jeremiah Thomas Wittman
Michael David P Cardenaz
J.R. Salvacion
Sean Michael Durkin
Michael Keith Ingram, Jr.
Grant Arthur Wichmann
Nathan Patrick Kennedy
Eric M. Finniginam

Each of these soldiers served with honor, valor, and pride in the mission. While we mourn those who fell, we will forever honor their memories, and we take great pride in the courage, determination, and heroism of the entire 4th Brigade Combat Team and its supporting units. Under the exemplary leadership of Colonel Randy George and Command Sergeant Major Sasser, the 4th BCT has achieved remarkable success in some of the most hostile terrain on earth. Their efforts clearly illustrate why Fort Carson is known as "The Home of America's Best." On behalf of all Coloradans, I say "welcome home, heroes, and thank you."

CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW START TREATY

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise today to address some very important concerns that arise in my mind in the evaluation of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, that was submitted yesterday to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. I do not believe that the Senate must ratify this treaty, as some of my colleagues suggest. But, rather, I begin with the proposition that a new treaty with Russia is not essential for our national security; may well be a distraction from addressing the real threats of nuclear proliferation by other nations and nuclear terrorism; and to the extent the President puts forth this treaty as a step toward his idea of a world without nuclear weapons, it is a naïve and potentially risky strategic approach.

Basically, the purpose of arms control is to reduce the risk of war by enhancing strategic stability and security and, if possible, lessen the costs of preparing for war. It is clear that the strategic balance between the United

States and Russia is, for the most part, stable, while U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are already on a downward slope.

Both sides had made a commitment, under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to reduce deployed nuclear weapons to a range between 2,200 and 1,700 warheads, which was a significant reduction from the START I level of 6,000 warheads. Furthermore, the United States has no plans to increase the size of its nuclear force, and it appears to most informed observers that Russia, for economic reasons, was headed to even lower levels. Quite simply, there is no responsible prospect of an expanding nuclear weapons competition between our two nations. The United States and Russian nuclear arsenals are not the real problem today. Regrettably, the one category of nuclear weapons in which there is a true imbalance—tactical nuclear weapons—is not addressed by the new treaty.

I would agree with my colleagues, such as Senator DICK LUGAR, that the verification provisions under START I should not have been allowed to expire with the treaty on December 5, but this could have been dealt with through a simple 5-year extension as permitted by the START I treaty. Instead, the administration was committed to a more ambitious approach which it has found to be more challenging than expected, which in turn has led to more U.S. concessions.

The President wanted to take a significant, tangible step toward his vision of a more peaceful world without nuclear weapons—a vision I find naïve at best and, if achieved, likely to make the world less safe. As nuclear strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling has recently observed, a world without nuclear weapons would be one in which countries would make plans to rearm in order to preempt other countries from going nuclear first. Schelling writes: "Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world."

So far, at least, nuclear weapons have imposed restraint on world powers—what will happen to that restraint in the absence of nuclear weapons? What conclusions will the Russians and our allies draw from this vision of nuclear disarmament? Will our allies and partners, who have come to depend on U.S. nuclear security guarantees, pursue their own nuclear arms? Will Russia, which is increasing its dependence on nuclear weapons, interpret this as a sign of weakness and perhaps pursue a more muscular foreign policy directed against the west?

Additionally, if we draw our weapon numbers too low, the perverse result may be that smaller nations, or rogue states may believe they could become peer competitors.

In addition to the dream of nuclear disarmament, the administration's case for the new treaty rests on three

principal arguments: No. 1, that it will improve U.S. and international security by reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces; No. 2, that it will transform or “reset” relations with Russia, such that Russia will now become a partner with the United States in addressing the true nuclear dangers of proliferation and terrorism; and No. 3, that it will provide the United States the moral credibility and leadership needed to pursue its nonproliferation objectives with the rest of the world.

First, the current declining stockpile of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons is not a factor contributing to international instability, and reducing our current nuclear arsenal to the new START limit of 1,550 warheads will not have any impact on the nuclear or nonproliferation policies of the rest of the world. If reducing U.S. deployed nuclear forces from Cold War highs of over 10,000 nuclear warheads to the current level of some 2,000 has had no impact, why should the reduction of another 500 warheads make a difference?

States decide whether to acquire nuclear capabilities not because the United States and Russia have large nuclear arsenals but because those states believe nuclear weapons will enhance their national security, preserve their regimes, enhance their prestige, or further their ambitions. Likewise, states will determine whether to support U.S. nonproliferation efforts on the basis of their national interests, not on how low Russian and American nuclear stockpiles go.

As to the claim that a new START treaty with the Russians will improve relations or secure Russia's assistance in addressing other threats to international stability, there is little evidence to suggest this is the case. To the contrary, these negotiations have provided the Russians leverage over missile defense, prompt global strike, and verification issues that have marred the final agreement.

Finally, I don't see any significant cooperation from Russia in securing meaningful sanctions against Iran. To be sure, if we had any expectation that the new START treaty would secure Russian assistance in dealing with Iran, we should have drawn a more explicit linkage between the two. In other words: no new START treaty without concrete Russian assistance in obtaining a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing real, crippling sanctions on Iran. This may have been a missed opportunity.

Thus far, my remarks suggest I don't see decisive reasons to vote for the new START treaty—but are there reasons to vote against the treaty? The ratification process can help us examine several concerns.

As I evaluate the treaty, I will take a broad view that examines not only the implications for U.S. strategic nuclear forces but how this treaty impacts our relationship with allies and other military capabilities important to our national security. I will want to

know whether this treaty disadvantages the United States in any way or makes us less safe or constrains our ability to extend nuclear security guarantees to our allies.

Finally, my decision whether to support this treaty will depend on the administration's firm commitment to a serious nuclear modernization effort for our weapons, nuclear laboratories, and delivery systems—for as we go to lower numbers of nuclear weapons, it becomes increasingly important that those remaining weapons be safe, secure, and reliable.

The central consideration in evaluating this treaty is the impact the proposed numerical limitations will have on U.S. nuclear forces and in particular our ability to extend the nuclear umbrella to our allies and partners.

The administration will have to provide additional details regarding the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers the United States will field under the 700 strategic delivery system limitation—and how it plans to modernize those forces.

Last year, we were told by Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright that reductions below 800 delivery systems may be cause for some concern, while former Secretary James Schlesinger, in testifying on the new START treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently noted that the “numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.”

We need to understand, therefore, the implications of this limitation, which requires a reduction of about 180 in the number of currently deployed U.S. delivery systems. In fact, the reduction in nuclear capability will be larger for the United States since the treaty requires that conventionally armed—nonnuclear—ballistic missiles, in the case of prompt global strike, be counted against the 700 total.

Likewise, we need to understand how the Russians might configure their nuclear forces under the treaty and then conduct a net assessment to appreciate the true implications of the new START treaty for U.S. national security.

Perhaps the greatest deficiency of the new START agreement is that it does not address the 10-to-1 disparity between Russia and the United States in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. As Secretary Schlesinger recently testified, “the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.”

Russia simply refused to allow these into the negotiations. So the administration has left this for the “next agreement,” though I am not sure what leverage the United States will have over a Russia that has become more, not less, dependent on its tactical nuclear weapons.

An irony of this is that Russian tactical nuclear weapons, because they are more widely dispersed and greater in number, pose a greater risk of contributing to nuclear proliferation and ter-

rorism which, according to the administration, this treaty is supposed to help us avert.

The Strategic Posture Commission estimates Russia may have approximately 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads and that the combination of new warhead designs and precision delivery systems “open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.”

Likewise, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy has observed that the Russians are “actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.”

What if you are one of the 31 countries dependent on the United States for nuclear security guarantees? How would you interpret the fact that the United States is going down to 1,550 strategic warheads while the Russians maintain at least twice that number of shorter range nuclear warheads that in most cases are able to reach your country? What impact will this have on the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees and upon the incentives other countries may have to acquire their own nuclear capabilities?

One final point on this issue: It disturbs me that Russian tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed in this treaty, yet the United States conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt global strike capabilities by counting conventional ICBMs under the limits for delivery systems.

It is striking, moreover, that the preamble would be “mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability,” yet be silent on the impact of tactical nuclear weapons on this very same strategic stability. What is more destabilizing: conventionally armed ICBMs or thousands of tactical nuclear weapons?

Despite being told consistently from the very beginning of negotiations that missile defense will be addressed only in the preamble of the treaty, we now discover that article V contains a direct restriction on U.S. missile defense activities (i.e., cannot convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense interceptors). Will this establish a dangerous precedent with respect to including missile defense limitations in future offensive arms control agreements? Why did the U.S. side feel it necessary to concede this point?

What raises concern, with respect to article V, are other efforts by the Russians to create a linkage between U.S. missile defense activities and Russian adherence to the new START treaty. When viewed together, the treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials provide the potential for Russia to threaten or blackmail the United States against increasing its missile defense capabilities by threatening to withdraw from the treaty:

When the preamble states that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties,” does this not suggest that moving beyond “current” systems could provide grounds for withdrawal?

When the Russian’s note in their unilateral statement that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively, and then links American missile defense capabilities to the treaty’s withdrawal clause, should we not read this as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses?

Finally, what are we to make of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s warning on March 28 that “the treaty and all the obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems”? Does this mean the Russians will pull out of START if we deploy additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska or if we deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile in Europe?

Despite the administration’s assurances that none of this is legally binding, and that the U.S. unilateral statement counters this by expressing our intent to continue to deploy missile defenses, I can not help but worry that these provisions will have a negative impact on U.S. decisionmaking with respect to missile defense. After all, the administration did abandon plans to deploy ground-based interceptors in Europe—an action most believe was an irritant in United States-Russian relations.

There is something fundamentally disturbing about entering into a treaty with the Russians when we have such a divergence in view over a substantial issue like missile defense. To be sure, the Russian side has already expressed displeasure with U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe and to enhance the capability of the SM-3 missile to intercept long-range missiles launched from the Middle East.

Adding to my apprehension is recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee by a senior Department of Defense official, who stated that the United States has not yet even approached the Russians to determine whether the SM-3 IIB is, will cause them to withdraw from the treaty. They can withdraw for any reason.

This likely sets the stage for misunderstanding and confrontation as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe.

Clarifying this ambiguity, coupled with affirmation by the administration that it intends to improve the defense of our homeland and go forward with all phases of its planned missile defense deployments in Europe, is a prerequisite for ratification of the new START treaty.

Our ability to verify Russian compliance with the new agreement is also

important. One could even argue that as we go to lower levels of nuclear weapons, verification becomes more important, as the consequences of cheating become more profound. But the standard should not be whether we can verify Russian compliance with the terms of the treaty per se—though this is important—but whether we maintain sufficient confidence in our national ability to monitor developments in Russian strategic forces that, if gone undetected, could alter the strategic balance.

So when the administration argues that “verification procedures in this Treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty,” I am inclined to ask why verification procedures have become less stringent and whether such procedures make it harder for the United States to fully account for Russian strategic forces. Specifically:

Will we be able to determine whether the Russians are developing new, more powerful missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads?

Are the Russians capable of secretly producing and storing missiles and warheads that could afford them a military advantage?

While we may have confidence in the number of missiles deployed by Russia today, can we maintain this confidence over the life of the treaty?

Ultimately, it falls upon our intelligence community to monitor Russian strategic force developments. Thus it is important for the Senate, as part of its advice and consent responsibilities, to review carefully the National Intelligence Estimate on our ability to effectively verify the treaty that normally accompanies arms control agreements. I don’t believe we have seen that document yet.

I have identified just a few important issues the Senate will consider as we move forward, and it is likely there will be others as we continue to examine the treaty text, protocol, and annexes. Particularly troubling at this time is the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons which are not addressed in this treaty, and the constraints on missile defense and conventional prompt global strike in a treaty intended only to limit offensive nuclear weapons. At the very least this is a bad precedent, and I have no doubt Russia is attempting to revive the ABM Treaty regime and forestall U.S. prompt global strike capabilities.

This was a treaty that Russia needed more than the United States. Not only were Russian strategic nuclear forces headed to lower numbers for economic reasons, Russia wants an arms control agreement with the United States. Such a binational agreement validates its superpower status. The United States therefore had an opportunity to leverage Russian desire for an agreement to obtain Russian cooperation on a host of issues, starting with Iran. But the administration missed this opportunity because it was so anxious to ad-

vance its vision of a world without nuclear weapons that it failed to see how START could help address the more immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

TRIBUTE TO GENERAL VICTOR EUGENE RENUART, JR.

• Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. President, today I pay tribute to a great American who I have had the great pleasure of knowing and working with for a number of years. General Victor Eugene Renuart, Jr., is preparing to retire from the U.S. Air Force after nearly 39 years of distinguished military service, and it is fitting that we should honor his achievements.

Through peacetime and multiple armed conflicts and operations, General Renuart has embodied the core values of the Air Force: integrity, service, and excellence. He courageously demonstrated his dedication to our Nation and served us honorably as a leader, warrior, and teacher. I want to also express our deepest thanks to his wife Jill, and their sons Ryan and Andrew, for serving as the epitome of a dedicated military family. As you know, military families like the Renuarts are America’s unsung heroes, and we owe them a tremendous debt.

Gene Renuart enlisted in the Air Force while our Nation was still engaged in the Vietnam war and received his commission from the Officer Training School in 1972. In the four decades since that day, he has amassed nearly 4,000 flying hours in seven aircraft types and piloted 69 combat missions in major operations. The call to service has led Gene and his family all over the world, and he has commanded units at every level through conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The long list of awards and decorations that General Renuart has earned during his career are a testament to his years of exemplary leadership and unrelenting focus on mission accomplishment.

As a lieutenant colonel during Operation DESERT STORM, General Renuart commanded the 76th Fighter Squadron “Vanguards,” who were trusted with a mission critical to the safety of the entire region. They hunted the Iraqi landscape in search of SCUD missile sites and protected Coalition troops from attack. General Renuart’s squadron flew hundreds of combat missions and fought at the famed “Highway of Death,” leading to the liberation of Kuwait and defeat of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

It was clear to everyone who knew him that Gene Renuart was a leader of the highest caliber, and he quickly rose through the ranks. On September 11, 2001, then-Major General Renuart was serving as the Director of Operations for United States Central Command, and his leadership and experience were instrumental as our nation rapidly