

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. SHELBY. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. President, if I might, for the record, I will talk briefly about the legislation I referred to. This is a bipartisan bill. I filed it—

Mr. INHOFE. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection has already been heard.

Mr. INHOFE. Well, there are two motions. I am objecting to the discussion of the amendment at this time, until we find out how long it will be.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Colorado have 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. President, the reason I have offered this consent agreement today is that this would help literally hundreds of small businesses to create hundreds of thousands of jobs at no cost to the American taxpayer.

I did want to, in the spirit of bipartisanship, mention the cosponsors of the bill: Majority Leader REID from Nevada, and Senators SNOWE, COLLINS, SCHUMER, BOXER, BROWN, GILLIBRAND, INOUE, LIEBERMAN, NELSON of Florida, BENNET of Colorado, SANDERS, and WYDEN.

The bill addresses a problem that everybody in the Chamber agrees needs to be addressed, and that is the trouble small businesses are having accessing capital so they can grow and create jobs.

We saw that our unemployment rate inched up to 9.8 percent in November. That is indicative of the fact that our economy is having trouble gaining traction. We all know that if small businesses expand and grow, our economy will be getting back on track.

If I might, let me tell you how this bill would help small businesses. Under current law, credit unions are doing what they can to help business interests and meet the demands of particularly family businesses. But they are constrained by an arbitrary cap on the size and amount of the loans they can issue. In every State, there are credit unions that would like to lend more, responsibly. But the Federal Government gets in the way.

This legislation would get the Federal Government out of the way and allow credit unions help jumpstart the economy. Under current statute, credit unions are constrained to dedicating no more than 12.25 percent of their total assets to small business lending. Many credit unions have run up against that cap. What this legislation would do is take the most experienced and well-run credit unions and allow them to meet the rising demand for small business loans.

The National Credit Union Administration, the Federal regulator, would

have the authority to allow the small business lending cap to slowly increase from the current 12.25 percent limit to a maximum of 27.5 percent of total assets.

Lest you think this has been pulled out of thin air, the proposal has the backing of the Banking Committee, the Treasury Department, and National Credit Union Association. It also has the support of the National Small Business Association, the National Association of Realtors, and even the Conservative Americans for Tax Reform thinks this is a good idea.

The Credit Union National Association projects that these reforms are sensible reforms and would increase small business lending by \$10 billion within the first year, with an increase of nearly \$200 million in my State, and I am sure it would be similar in all States. It is expected to also increase 100,000 jobs nationwide.

This is disappointing. It is a shame we can't move this legislation forward. We should be helping our economy, but we are embroiled in other things here. I will continue to fight for this, and I hope other Senators here today will join me in helping unleash the power of credit unions and get Americans back to work.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will yield for a moment for an announcement from the Senator from Montana.

(The remarks of Mr. TESTER are printed in today's RECORD under "Morning Business.")

EXECUTIVE SESSION

TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS—Continued

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we go to executive session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KERRY. We will now consider the START treaty. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from South Dakota, Senator THUNE.

AMENDMENT NO. 4841

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask that the pending Inhofe amendment be set aside in order to call up my amendment No. 4841.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. THUNE] proposes an amendment numbered 4841.

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the

amendment be dispensed with, and that we resume consideration of the Inhofe amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To modify the deployed delivery vehicle limits of the Treaty)

In section 1(a) of Article II of the Treaty, strike "700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers" and insert "720, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers".

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will yield at this moment to the Senator from Wyoming—

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am trying to get a procedure in place. I ask my colleague from Oklahoma if it is possible, with my colleague from South Dakota, to enter into a time agreement. Obviously, we won't ask colleagues to come and vote tonight. Can we get a time agreement and set it aside for a vote at such time that the leadership decides is appropriate?

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I respond by saying that I will object to a time agreement at this time. Several people, including the Senator from Arizona, want to speak on this amendment. That might create a problem because of his activity on this amendment. Let's keep it moving, and I can assure you that I want to get out of here quicker than you do.

Mr. KERRY. If that is true, let's go.

Mr. INHOFE. At this time, I yield to the Senator from Wyoming on a subject of far greater significance than anything we have been talking about. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming to discuss something.

Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma. It is a great pleasure for me to be able to make an announcement from the floor of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent to share my joy as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. ENZI and Mr. INHOFE are printed in today's RECORD under "Morning Business.")

AMENDMENT NO. 4833

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, we have another amendment that is up that I think is very significant. It is one having to do with verification.

I think if we look at all of the problems we are trying to address with amendments—we have been talking about missile defense, which is the one I have been most passionate about; we have been talking about other areas, too—in the case of verification, it is very significant to understand that this New START treaty has remarkably less verification than the START I treaty did. There are only 180 inspections over 10 years under New START versus 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. That is a drop of 40 inspections per year to 18 inspections per year.

In a minute, I will tell you why I think it is more precipitous than that because of the significance of the inspections as the arsenals are dropping

down in terms of the percentage of inspections versus the arsenals.

The New START treaty inspections to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems have been fundamentally changed from those in START I, replaced with a lesser provision of twice a year permitting the other party to view the debris from half of the eliminated first stages.

In a minute I will break these down, but what I am talking about is that we have a treaty now that addresses two things. Type one is the ICBM bases, the submarine bases and the air bases. These are delivery systems. I think this has to be talked about as well as the actual warheads. The type two refers to the formerly declared facilities to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty.

Now, when I say that, we were talking about trying to verify those things that are in existence today but also those that have been eliminated. In the first START I treaty, we were able to actually witness the destruction of these various warheads and of the systems that are under the consideration of this treaty. As it is now under the New START treaty, we cannot witness it. All we can do is look at the debris that remains after something is destroyed.

Now, my concern is this: If you keep the debris around from something you have destroyed, you could use the same debris, as evidenced under the New START treaty, to show you have destroyed something that was destroyed in the past and not addressing those that are still there today. So in that area, I think this is very difficult.

Finally, under the New START treaty, 24 hours of advance notice is required before an inspection, dramatically increased from the 9 hours of advance notice required under old START. Why is this important? This is important because as we get down to fewer and fewer inspections that would be made because we are limiting the arms under the treaty, then you should actually have a longer period of time of advance notice of the inspections.

So I have an amendment that will correct these inadequacies. The amendment triples the number of inspections under New START for the two types of inspections referred to under START I as the type one and type two inspections. I mentioned the type one and type two, and this would actually triple the number of inspections. Type one would increase from 10 to 30 inspections a year; type two inspections would increase from 8 to 24—the total being 54 inspections.

On July 20, 2010, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, that is James N. Miller, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee—and I was there—that the Russian cheating or breakout under the treaty would have little effect because of the United States second-strike strategy nuclear capabilities.

I wholeheartedly disagree. The whole idea that we would say the current Under Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration—what he is doing is admitting the Russians cheat, but he is saying it does not matter.

I would say this: The smaller the size of the nuclear arsenal—that is what we have today as in New START—the larger impact cheating has on a strategic nuclear balance. In other words, if you are cheating with a smaller nuclear arsenal, that is much more significant than if it were a large one. It is a percentage of a smaller figure. So if it is 50 percent of a smaller figure, it would have been 10 percent of the larger figure, of the nuclear arsenals that were there under the original START treaty.

Increasing the number of type one and two inspections is critical to New START verification because the total number of inspections has been dramatically reduced in New START from the old START. So as the weapons decreased, inspections should actually increase or be enhanced.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained this when he said why this is the case in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the original START treaty, and that was in October of 1991. He said:

Verification will become even more important as the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of the total force as this occurs.

That was way back in 1991. Since then you had former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton who stated this year, on May 3:

While [verification is] important in any arms control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels.

They agree, and we are talking about going all the way back to 1997. In 1997, Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kantor said, in a joint statement:

Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits concerns about “hidden” missiles and the actions of nuclear third parties.

That was 1996. You have 1991, 1997, then present, and, of course, in May of this year in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to Congress that the New START verification program “does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous or diverse treaty obligations under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.”

They all are consistent, agreeing No. 1: Russians cheat and, No. 2, verification be-

comes more important as the arsenals decreased in size.

I think we can say Russia has essentially violated every arms control treaty we have had with them in the past. The State Department this year submitted a report on foreign country compliance with their arms control measures. This is a report that came out this year, in 2010. They refer to the last report which was 2005. START:

There is a number of long-standing compliance issues—such as an obstruction to U.S. right to inspect warheads—raised in the START Treaty’s Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission that remained unresolved when the treaty expired in December.

This commission endured the time all the way up to December 2009, in different areas. In the biological weapons convention—there are a lot of different kinds of weapons of mass destruction. They are not all nuclear—biological, chemical, conventional. In the biological weapons convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that “Russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and its nature and status have not changed.”

Then, in 2010, the State Department report said: Russian confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was terminated.

What they are saying is even back in 2005 they say it was inadequate because they are still continuing, they are violating the accord. This is back in 2005, on biological weapons. Then that was renewed in 2010, saying they are still not doing it today. That was biological weapons.

On chemical weapons we find the same thing. In 2005 the State Department assessed that “Russia was in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities.”

In 2010 the State Department again stated that there was an “absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.”

With biological weapons, they have not complied there; in the chemical weapons, they have not complied there; with conventional weapons in Europe, the United States notes in the 2010 report that “Russia’s actions have resulted in noncompliance with its treaty obligations.”

The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to U.S. officials, the United States believes Russia has moved short-range tactical nuclear warheads to facilities near NATO allies as recently as this spring.

I think the Senator from Idaho covered this to some degree. We are concerned about those tactical problems. I guess what we can say is, we know one

thing and nobody seems to disagree with this: Russia cheats. But there are five things to be considered. One is there are fewer inspections than there were under the old one. Second, instead of actually seeing the destruction of these warheads, we depend on the debris that remains after the destruction has taken place.

I think everyone understands if we are depending on debris, we can be looking at debris from one destruction effort and they can declare that they have done it three or four times since then, using the same debris.

Third is, advance notice is three times longer now. It should be shorter now because of more significance. As we get the smaller stockpile, we should have a greater compliance requirement.

The fourth is weapons decrease—we should be paying more attention to them.

No. 5, Russia does cheat.

I believe of all the amendments, the amendments on the missile defense are significant. It concerns me that we have something, as I said on the floor yesterday, and I quoted, several Russians from the very beginning were saying: We don't want the United States—and it is the intent of this treaty—to be able to enhance their missile defense treaties.

Right now, I look at this and, as I said several times: This is fine, the treaty, except it is with the wrong people. This treaty is with Russia, not with where the threat is—not with North Korea, not with Iran. That is where the problem is.

I have had very strong feelings. I disagreed with taking down the termination of the ground-based system that was to be in Poland because our intelligence tells us—it is not even classified—that Iran will have the capability of sending a nuclear warhead and having a delivery system reaching as far as the eastern part of the United States by 2015. We, with a ground-based interceptor site in Poland, would have had that opportunity. But now that that site is down, we would be dependent, as I showed on a chart yesterday, on a 2-B system that we don't even know—they say maybe it will be done by 2020. We have no assurance it will.

Look at that: We the United States will be naked in this effort for a period of time between 2015 and at least 2020. Maybe even longer than that.

All these things are important. But this one is equally important because it does not do any good to have a verification system that is as flawed as this system.

We will have an opportunity to talk about this in more detail. For that reason it is my understanding, and I assure the Senator from Massachusetts that my being unwilling to agree to a time agreement is not—this is not going to shorten it at all. It is my intention to move on with this as soon as we can get to it. I understand it is pretty well locked in for tomorrow.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma. I know he is not trying to prolong it. I was just trying to see if we can get a time certain now, but I am confident we will.

I do not know if the Senator from South Dakota—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. I apologize. I don't know if the Senator from South Dakota is planning to be here? I ask if anybody knows whether he is.

Let me speak to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma for a few minutes. I thank him for this amendment on verification. It is an amendment that will help us to flesh out this question of verification, which is important to anybody in the Senate. I guess three words that have become famous beyond what people might have thought when they were first uttered is the pronouncement of President Reagan, "trust, but verify," which at the time was accompanied by his articulation of the Russian words for that.

Obviously, any agreement we would enter into with the Russians, or with anybody, can never rely completely on somebody's word—either word—because neither side is going to be satisfied with somebody's word with whom they have the necessity of actually having to reach this kind of an agreement to reduce weapons that are pointed at each other for lots of different reasons over a long period of time.

I assure the Senator from Oklahoma that every Senator on our side—and most importantly the unbelievably experienced negotiators who put this treaty together, who made a lifetime of trying to understand these kinds of relationships and the ways in which to adequately verify—they would not be standing in front of the country and the world and the Congress saying to us this treaty provides better verification in many ways than we had previously.

Tomorrow, in the classified session, we will have an opportunity to dig into a little bit of what exactly those ingredients are that fill that out—better. I am not going to go into them all now.

But let me talk specifically about the amendment the Senator has proposed. He proposes an amendment to the treaty itself, which we all understand now after two votes, both of which have been to reject a change to the treaty itself because of the implications of changing it. Those do not change here with this particular amendment. But let me go beyond that so we, hopefully, could enlist the opposition to this amendment of some people who will see why it is unnecessary and, in fact, conceivably even counterproductive.

The Senator wants to increase the number of type one inspections. I might add this concept of a type one inspection and a type two inspection is new to the New START treaty. It is

new to the process. What the Senator would like to do is triple the number of inspections currently set forth in the treaty.

The second reason, after the question of why you do not want, for this reason particularly, to amend the treaty, there might be a circumstance where a treaty were so egregious or it presented us with such a challenge that the Senate might decide to advise and consent, and we would all say we ought to send this back. But this does not rise to that level, in my judgment, and I think colleagues will share that opinion.

Let me say why.

We can achieve effective verification with the number of inspections that are set forth in the treaty. Admiral Mullen has said we can, the Strategic Command says we can, the national intelligence community says we can—the people responsible for verification. This treaty would never have been sent to the Senate if this treaty did not have adequate verification measures in it that would allow the intelligence community to sign off and say to Senators: Please vote for this treaty.

But let's go underneath that and examine it a little bit. That is the judgment of our military, the State Department, our intelligence community. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, told us we should approve this treaty the earlier, the sooner, the better. I think we need to heed his judgment and the judgment of our military.

The Senator expresses the concern that there are fewer inspections here than the original START treaty had. In sort of on-its-face terms, that is a truth. That is a true statement if you simply compared the total number that existed in START I and you compare the number that are set forth in the New START. But that is not what we are comparing.

The reason for that is, in 1992, when we approved START I, there were four countries that we were approving inspections for—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia—because they all had nuclear facilities. There were about 70 sites that we inspected back then in 1992.

But as we all know, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of cold warriors for years and years from the end of World War II until this historic moment of 1992, the fact is, we were inspecting those 70 sites with a very different relationship and a very different world.

Today, the New START agreement only seeks 35 Russian sites to inspect because Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine no longer have any nuclear weapons. Those weapons were consolidated in Russia, and the sites in Russia were reduced. So you do not want an apples and oranges comparison here. The comparison of how many fixed number of inspections there were back in 1992 is simply not applicable to what you need in 2010, given the change of locations, the change of relationship,

and the numbers of sites where there are nuclear weapons.

The comparison is also problematic beyond that because, in fact, under the New START, the inspections we do have, because of the way they have been set up in the type one, type two and the way they have been laid out, they are actually about two inspections equivalent to one inspection under START I.

Let me explain that. Under the original START treaty, an inspection of a missile to see whether it had too many warheads, that inspection of a missile was counted as a separate inspection from so-called update inspections of the base. In other words, there was an inspection of the base, which might take place because we had been told or learned that there was some change in delivery vehicles or other aspects of the base. So we could go to the base and have an update inspection, and that was counted as a separate inspection from the inspection of a missile that might have been located there.

But under the new START, we are allowed to conduct up to ten type one inspections a year, and each inspection includes both the counting of the warheads mounted on one missile bomber and the conducting of the equivalent of the START I treaty separate update inspection. So you get two for one—two inspections for one.

So you cannot compare these inspections in the way the Senator from Oklahoma has. Ten type one and eight type two inspections per year, under the New START agreement, is at least comparable to the 15 data update inspections and 10 reentry vehicle inspections we had under the old START. The 10 reentry vehicle inspections per year under New START are the same as under the old START. So the truth is, the inspection numbers under New START are comparable to those under the original START treaty.

That is precisely why our military and intelligence officials told us this number would be sufficient to comply, to provide verification compliance with this treaty. As I said, we can discuss more of this in the closed session tomorrow. I wish to remind my colleagues, tripling the number of inspections per year, as the Senator's amendment would require, is not a freebie. It is not something we can just say to the Russians: we are going to triple your inspections. Guess what. They are going to demand the same number of inspections of us.

Our military bases would have to be prepared to host three times as many inspections per year as they are currently preparing for. Frankly, that could certainly disrupt day-to-day operations of strategic forces. Anytime the Russians select one of our bases for inspections, we would have to lock down the movements of any treaty items at that base for 24 hours before and throughout the inspection, which is at least another day. That means dropping everything, stopping any

movements of our delivery vehicles, halting any work on these systems, and you have to get ready to protect any unrelated classified information that you do not want the Russians to see.

So I think it is one thing to ask our strategic nuclear forces to do that 10 times a year or less than once a month. It is another thing for them to be waiting for 30 inspections a year. We have two submarine bases, three bomber bases, and three ICBM bases that are going to be subject to type one inspections. If we follow through with those amendments, frankly, I think our base commanders, not to mention the Pentagon, would be less than satisfied. Right now, they are comfortable with what we have in this treaty. But far more important, they are comfortable we can verify, which is the key to the ratification of any treaty.

Let me also remind my colleagues that the verification provisions in this treaty were developed with the concerns and the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense totally in that mix. They helped guide what came out here. ADM Mike Mullen agreed. Let me quote him: "The verification regimes that exist in the New START treaty is in ways better than the one that has existed in the past."

Why would we want to challenge that? Why would we want to open now a whole new can of worms of renegotiation when we think what we have is better than what we had previously?

Admiral Mullen also stated he is convinced the verification regime is as stringent as it is transparent and borne of more than 15 years of lessons learned under the original START treaty.

General Chilton has said:

Without New START, we would rapidly lose some of our insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly.

Let me also quote a letter Secretary Gates sent me this summer about whether Russia could cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be militarily significant. He said:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs Commander, the U.S. Strategic Command, and I, assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START due to both the New START verification regime, and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure. Our analysis of the NIE and the potential for Russian cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification regime is effective, and that our national security is stronger with this treaty than without it.

I mentioned before that Ronald Reagan was one great advocate for this kind of verification. So I wish to quote what Condoleezza Rice wrote the other week:

The New START treaty helpfully reinstates on-site verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the expiration of the original START treaty last year. Meaningful verification was a significant achievement of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, and its reinstatement is crucial.

Finally, I would like to point out that we addressed the importance of this verification question in condition 2 of the resolution of ratification. That condition requires that before New START can enter into force, and every year thereafter, the President has to certify to the Senate that our national technical means, in conjunction with the verification activities provided for in the New START treaty, are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian compliance with provisions of the New START treaty and timely warning of any Russian preparation to breakout of the limits. So we are going to remain seized of this issue for every year the treaty is in force.

So not only could we lose the treaty if this amendment were to pass, not only could we impose unwanted and unneeded requirements on our military bases and our military, not only would we not effectively increase the verification because of the advantages that were built into the New START treaty by our negotiators, which have been attested to by the very people who need to enforce it, not only that, but we could be without any verification at all for maybe 1 year, 2 years, longer, who knows whether we get any agreement or not.

Clearly, that exposes our country in ways I do not think we want to, and it certainly is no guarantee of an increase in the inspections themselves.

I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

MR. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me make a couple of comments and observations. I know the Senator from Massachusetts started out by saying we have to take someone's word for it. My concern is, and I agree with his statement in reference to quotes that were made by Ronald Reagan, the "trust, but verify."

He also said, and when I look at this, I think this is—I think it is flawed in all the ways we talked about this before. But I remember the statement actually, I was here, when Reagan came back from Iceland. He said what Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of the 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union had already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

I think we are—most of us who have questions that were unanswered and we want amendments—are those who do not believe this is a good treaty.

When the Senator talks about the number of inspections, let's keep in mind when we did the first treaty, we were only inspecting new facilities, existing facilities, facilities that could be used, warheads that could be used, looking at the MIRV situation.

But now, on this one, we also want to inspect to make sure those things they had agreed to destroy they actually

have destroyed. That is why I talked about the debris—rather than seeing something destroyed, they look at the debris that is left over.

On the argument, on the fact that you talked about the one time in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. When you look at the vastness of Russia, I remember—and one thing the Senator from Massachusetts and I have in common is we both are aviators. I had occasion—I will share with my friend from Massachusetts—a few years to fly an airplane around the world, replicating the flight of Wiley Post, a very famous Oklahoman.

In doing this, I went all the way from Moscow to Provideniya, all the way across Siberia. I can remember going from time zone after time zone and not seeing anything except vast wilderness and perhaps a few bears now and then.

When I think about the areas they have where things can be hidden, compared to any of these other countries, including our own, it is kind of a scary thing.

I do believe we need to have the opportunity to increase the inspections because there is so much more area to inspect. The idea that it is not a freebie—I know it is not. I know anything in this treaty that I would change, such as the number of inspections, would apply to us as well as them. I understand that. But in that respect, I don't mind doing it because there is one big difference between the United States and Russia: They cheat and we don't. It is fine with me if we have to subject ourselves to a greater number of inspections so long as we can do the same with them.

I will stand by the statements made and also the statements that were discovered in the 2010 Department report which I quoted from having to do with biological weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces in Europe. I am glad to repeat the quotes, but I don't think I have to. In 2010, the State Department said that Russia's confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily been documented, whether it is biological weapons or any other program, such as chemical weapons. So with the fact that they have not complied as they stated they would in the past—and we are now dealing with that—I think we have to take more precautions, more inspections, more verifications, because they have demonstrated clearly that they are not telling the truth, and they have not complied with commitments in the past.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I will not engage in a long discussion. I don't know if the Senator from Indiana wants to say something.

First of all, I am envious of that flight. I would love to have made that. Secondly, as the Senator knows—and I think I will reserve most of this for the classified session tomorrow—we have

great ability to observe construction in Siberia or any part of Russia and to notice changes of various kinds, notwithstanding the vastness. Yes, there have been occasions when there have been some misunderstandings or differences of opinion about enforcement requirements. We have had some differences on those things. We can again discuss some of those in closed session. But the treaties have worked. The process set up by which we get into dispute resolution and sort of raise these issues has worked. When we notice something they are doing that we think is, in fact, not in compliance or likewise when they have with us, we have gotten together, and, because of the treaty, we have come into a discussion, and we have worked those things through.

I think our intelligence community's conclusion is that they have never exceeded the limits, though there have been some misunderstandings about sort of the process of getting from one place to another with respect to one system or another.

Let's have that discussion in a place where we can do it without a sense of restraint, but I think it is a good one to have. I look forward to continuing that with my colleague.

I don't know if the Senator from Indiana has anything he wants to add.

Mr. President, I understand the Senator from South Dakota will not be here, so unless there is another Senator seeking recognition or looking for an amendment to be acted on at this point, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Let me make one last comment. I think the Senator from Massachusetts is right that we have covered enough of this tonight. There are some things that would be worth going into in a closed session. One thing that doesn't have to be in a closed session is the fact that there is a long record of Russians not complying with the first treaty. I would rather use another word than "cheating," but that is one that everyone understands, and that has characterized Russia's behavior in previous treaties.

The statement we are making right now, everyone is in agreement that the lower the arsenal becomes, the more significant it is for inspections for verification. I think everyone is in agreement with that. That is something that is probably the strongest point of our argument.

The last thing I will say is just to repeat something I said for which I was a little bit overwhelmed when I said it. This is the first in 51 years that we have missed our wedding anniversary. And what I was trying to say before I

got choked up is to my wife at home: I love you more today than I did 51 years ago.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEGICH). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to legislative session from executive session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CELEBRATING ALLISON'S BIRTH

Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I got an early Christmas present on the day it was expected! On Wednesday, December 15, Allison Quinn McGrady was born to my daughter Emily and husband Mike. I have been able to hold each grandchild on the day they were born. This baby, Allison, was a bit more difficult. I voted in committee and four times on the floor and made a mad dash for Dulles Airport. I flew to Denver. I rented a car and drove to Cheyenne, WY. I got to the hospital. It was late enough all the desks were shut down. I found my way to the maternity ward and got help to find the right room and once again got to hold another grandchild on the day she was born. There is no greater feeling of wonder and awe and appreciation on this planet than to hold another generation in my hands. To welcome a new life to this Earth is always breathtaking—but the thrill a grampa feels is indescribable—it is a feeling—it is incredible love and is only known to those who are also grandparents.

As I hold her and she tests this new world with eyes that recognize little, but absorb sights by the moment; as mouth and tongue explore a new atmosphere; as a tiny hand with small fingers opens and closes in a new freedom; I watch changing expressions as tiny ears hear sounds that have been muted before. I now have some instant replay memories of that little face and a moving hand and all those blankets and the tiny stocking cap to hold body heat, locked in my mind. She was 6 pounds 12.5 ounces and 19 inches long. Oh, to see such a miniature person and such a huge miracle! The wonder of life!!!

My own first child came into the world almost 3 months early. We didn't get to hold her for over 2 months. We could only watch as she struggled for life. and I am often doing little instant replays in my mind and thanking God for that and the other opportunities he's given me—from finding Diana who became my wife, to learning about prayer with our first child—the daughter who was born premature, who showed us how worthwhile fighting for life is—then the birth of our son, then