

fight any effort to reform the current system, but speculators shouldn't be given free rein. They have to let the American people know that in fact if they are high risk, hey, you are on your own. But those firms should not be allowed to gamble with regular commercial banking.

The American people should think about how to restore normal credit flows, because until we do that this economy is not going to heal.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. PAUL addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

BIPARTISAN COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WOLF) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, earlier this week, the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton and Thomas Kean, in an op-ed for the *USA Today*, wrote that "national security is too important to become a partisan issue." And I could not agree more.

That is why I wrote President Obama yesterday with three specific actions that I recommended he could take immediately, with strong bipartisanship support, to help prevent future terrorist attacks against America. First, I recommended that he immediately bring back the two co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission for a six-month period to conduct a formal review and follow-up to the 9/11 report. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Kean would be charged with evaluating which of the commission's original recommendations have been implemented and to what end, and which have failed to be implemented and at what cost.

Second, I urged the creation of a Team B concept, separate from the review that would be conducted by the 9/11 Commission co-chairs. Historically, the phrase Team B refers to a group of outside experts brought together to analyze the threats posed by the Soviet Union to the United States and counter the positions of intelligence officials within the CIA and government, known as Team A. The Team B concept has been successful in previous administrations when fresh eyes were needed to provide the commander in chief with objective information to make informed policy decisions. I believe it can work now.

Third, I urged the President to support the legislation that I introduced today to establish a 10-year term of office for the administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, similar to what the Congress has done in the past for the appointment process for the director of the FBI. Bob

Mueller has done an outstanding job, and that process has worked well.

Since TSA's creation following 9/11, TSA has had six administrators, six, averaging terms of just 1.5 years. The attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner points to the need for long-term, strong, and capable leadership that is outside of the political process.

In a separate letter to Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan, I posed a series of pointed questions concerning the security situation in Yemen and the circumstances surrounding the failed Christmas Day attack. Specifically, I asked the administration how it plans to deal with the possible radicalization of some 55,000 Americans, 55,000 Americans that are currently visiting, living, or studying in Yemen, pointing out that these individuals can fly back to the United States with American passports.

The dangers of radicalization in Yemen are very troubling. The alleged Fort Hood terrorist, Major Nidal Hasan was radicalized by Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al Aulaqi. The alleged terrorist who killed a U.S. Army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, was also radicalized by al Aulaqi. And now we have learned that the alleged Christmas Day terrorist was reportedly also in contact with al Aulaqi in Yemen. Convicted terrorist John Walker Lindh was radicalized in Yemen while studying Arabic in 1998 and 2000, leading to his collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Last week, President Obama said, "Now is not the time for partisanship, it is the time for citizenship—a time to come together, work together with the seriousness of purpose that our national security demands." However, working together demands that this administration work with Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, in good faith to provide information, answer questions, and consider solutions, and to develop a strategy to defeat al Qaeda, whenever and however we can.

The administration must live up to the President's challenge to involve Congress in the active participation on counterterrorism matters. This can only happen, however, if the legislative branch, Republicans and Democrats, are included in the process.

In closing, I urge my colleagues in the House to support bringing back the 9/11 team, Kean and Hamilton, for 6 months, create a Team B to consider innovative solutions to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda, and to make the TSA administrator position independent and nonpartisan, that will go for a long term, similar to what we currently do with regards to the FBI. These are good bipartisan steps to protect the homeland, and ultimately to defeat al Qaeda.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I thank you for your courtesy, and yield back the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, January 12, 2010.

HON. BARACK H. OBAMA,
The President, The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: "National Security is too important to become a partisan issue." This sentence was the opening line in a January 11 *USA Today* op-ed jointly authored by Lee Hamilton and Thomas Kean, co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission. Last week, you, too, said, "Now is not a time for partisanship, it's a time for citizenship—a time to come together and work together with the seriousness of purpose that our national security demands." I could not agree more with this sentiment.

No nation, including America, can hope to win this long battle against al Qaeda and like foes if the war effort is marked by partisanship. Sadly, not only has partisanship infused the rhetoric surrounding national security discussions, it has actually obstructed the critical role of congressional oversight. Too often in recent months partisanship has resulted in withholding of information, unanswered letters and briefings denied by this administration.

The stakes are too high and the cost of failure is too great for petty politics to rule the day. The White House has a moral obligation to actively and consistently reach out to the minority party in Congress, to be forthcoming with information and to provide access to all levels of government.

Hamilton and Kean go on to write, "We intend to monitor the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and report on new national security threats." I urge you to encourage this effort by bringing back these two co-chairs for a six-month period to conduct a formal review and 9/11 Commission follow-up. They would be charged with evaluating which of the Commission's original recommendations have been implemented and to what end, and which have failed to be implemented and at what cost.

This past weekend, *The Washington Post* featured an op-ed by Bruce Hoffman, respected professor of security studies at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center. Hoffman wrote, "(W)hile al-Qaeda is finding new ways to exploit our weaknesses, we are stuck in a pattern of belated responses, rather than anticipating its moves and developing preemptive strategies. The 'systemic failure' of intelligence analysis and airport security that Obama recently described was not just the product of a compartmentalized bureaucracy or analytical inattention, but a failure to recognize al-Qaeda's new strategy. The national security architecture built in the aftermath of Sept. 11 addresses yesterday's threats—but not today's and certainly not tomorrow's. It is superb at reacting and responding, but not at outsmarting . . . a new approach to counterterrorism is essential."

Distinct from temporarily bringing back the two 9/11 Commission co-chairs, I also urge the creation of a "Team B." As you may know, historically the phrase "Team B" refers to a group of outside experts, commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970's and headed by Richard Pipes, to analyze the threats posed by the Soviet Union to the United States and counter the positions of intelligence officials within the CIA, known as "Team A." In your remarks last week following the review of the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack, you rightly referred to our enemy as "nimble." Too often our response to the evolving threat posed by al Qaeda, and others sympathetic to their murderous aims, is anything but.

The Team B concept has been successful in previous administrations when fresh eyes were needed to provide the commander-in-chief with objective information to make informed policy decisions. I believe it can work now, too, and suggest that among the individuals, but not exclusively, whose expertise and forward-thinking would be well-suited to a Team B are: Bruce Hoffman; Andrew McCarthy and Patrick Fitzgerald, both of whom were involved in the prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in the first World Trade Center bombings; Fouad Ajami, professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University; Jean Bethke Elshtain, professor of social and political ethics at the University of Chicago; economist Judy Shelton, National Endowment for Democracy board member; foreign policy columnist and author Anne Applebaum; Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., author of *Seven Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century*; Elliot Cohen, professor of Strategic Studies at SAIS; Philip D. Zelikow, diplomat and author who worked as executive director of the 9/11 Commission; and Joshua Muravchik, formerly a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and presently a Foreign Policy Institute fellow at SAIS.

The 9/11 Commission report was issued nearly six years ago. Even if every recommendation had been implemented, which it has not, our enemy has evolved since that time. Our current intelligence infrastructure is at times overwhelmed by data, information and the urgency of daily events, and as such is unable to dedicate the time and resources necessary to think outside the box and better comprehend this multidimensional threat. "Team B" would possess the necessary expertise but would be free from these daily pressures. The team would represent a "new approach to counterterrorism" which focuses not just on connecting the dots of intelligence, but which seeks to stay a step ahead in understanding how to break the radicalization and recruitment cycle that sustains our enemy, how to disrupt their network globally and how to strategically isolate them.

I also believe there is an urgent need to make the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) administrator a long-term position. Since TSA's inception following the 9/11 attacks, there have been six Transportation Security Agency administrators and acting administrators. For a position of this import to turn over with such frequency and to automatically change hands with each new administration simply does not make sense. I am introducing legislation that mirrors the language used to establish a 10-year term and Senate confirmation for FBI directors. I am hopeful that members of both parties will see the merits of this proposal and I urge your support for this change.

America is a great nation facing an enemy unlike any other we have ever known. We must steel ourselves for the struggle ahead, frankly assessing the nature and scope of the threat we face and guarding against partisanship at all costs. The people of this country deserve nothing less.

Sincerely,

FRANK R. WOLF,
Member of Congress.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, January 12, 2010.

MR. JOHN BRENNAN,
Deputy National Security Adviser, The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR JOHN: I write today in light of the proliferation of attempted al Qaeda-sponsored attacks against the U.S. homeland last year to request that you work to engage

both Congress and the administration in the process of making the prevention of future attacks our nation's paramount priority. I come to this issue as the author of the language in 1998 creating the National Commission on Terrorism and the ranking Republican on the House Commerce-Justice-Science Appropriations Subcommittee that funds key counterterrorism programs, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG)—which was established by your administration to address the concerns about detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay—and the U.S. Marshals Service. From that experience, I am concerned that there has been inadequate oversight by this Congress on federal counterterrorism programs and responses.

I have recently learned from the State Department legislative affairs office that there are an estimated 55,000 Americans currently visiting, living, or studying in Yemen, along with other Westerners. As you know, alleged Fort Hood terrorist Major Nidal Hasan was radicalized by Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al Aulaqi. The alleged terrorist who killed the U.S. Army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, was also reportedly radicalized by al Aulaqi. Now we have learned that the alleged Christmas Day terrorist, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was also in contact with al Aulaqi in Yemen. You may also be aware that convicted terrorist John Walker Lindh was radicalized in Yemen while studying Arabic in 1998 and 2000, leading to his collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan. How many of the 55,000 Americans now in Yemen are subject to radicalization by al Aulaqi and other al Qaeda recruiters? How is your administration planning to deal with the possible radicalization of those who can fly back to the U.S. with American passports? This is especially troubling in light of the fact that the Yemeni government does not control large portions of the country outside the capital city.

In his remarks last week, President Obama said, "Now is not a time for partisanship, it's a time for citizenship—a time to come together and work together with the seriousness of purpose that our national security demands." I could not agree more. However, working together demands that both the Congress, including Republicans and Democrats, and the administration work in good faith to provide information, answer questions, consider solutions, and to develop a strategy to defeat al Qaeda wherever it may be active.

It is disappointing that this administration has been, thus far, unresponsive to my letters and requests for information as well as letters from other Republican members of the House and Senate. I have sent six letters to the president and administration officials since October 1, 2009, expressing concern over the security situation in Yemen and the efforts of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to attack the U.S. I have read the classified biographies of the Guantanamo Bay detainees that have been released to Yemen and other unstable countries and have urged that this information be provided in unclassified form to the American people. If the American people could see the backgrounds of some of these detainees being sent back to these countries, I believe they would be shocked. For example, Ayman Batarfi, one of the Yemeni detainees released by this administration on December 19, 2009, has worked closely with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and trained with a microbiologist who taught al Qaeda how to produce anthrax in August 2001, according to unclassified Pentagon documents from 2004. These detainees are, in many cases, highly trained terrorists with close ties to al Qaeda.

In December, I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 2010 omnibus appropriations legislation that would have required unclassified notifications about impending detainee releases. Unfortunately, my amendment was defeated along party lines. We can and must do better to end this reflexive partisan opposition. To this end, I would appreciate your responses to the following questions relating to Yemen and the recent terrorist acts committed against the United States:

1. The president has indicated that six Guantanamo detainees released to Yemen in December remain in government custody, although other accounts indicate that they may have been paroled to their families. What is the current custody status of these former detainees?

2. According to an article in today's Washington Post, "Yemen's fragile government fears that Somali fighters from al-Shabab will swell the ranks of Yemen's Islamist militants at a time when links between the Somali group and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are growing." Do the same security concerns expressed by the administration with regard to Yemen apply to Somaliland?

3. Does the U.S. government now recognize Somaliland as an independent state? Does it have relations with the region's government? Are U.S. officials receiving cooperation from the Somaliland regional government?

4. It is my understanding that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab indicated to authorities that he had trained in Yemen with other al Qaeda members prepared to launch similar attacks targeting U.S. airliners. Is this correct? If so, what countries are these suspected terrorists from?

5. Following the thwarted Christmas Day attack, who interrogated Mr. Abdulmutallab? Which agencies were consulted for questions prior to the interrogation? Which agencies submitted questions for the interrogation? Was he interrogated prior to being read Miranda rights? Given that this attack occurred on the Christmas holiday, did the appropriate high-level officials come to Detroit to conduct or support the interrogation?

6. Was Mr. Abdulmutallab considered a "high-value" detainee upon his arrest? What qualifies a detainee to be considered of "high-value"? Was the new High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) involved in his interrogation? Did every agency (that is represented on the HIG) participate in the interrogation?

7. I was told in September 2009 that the Interrogation Task Force had made recommendations to the president, which he had approved. What is the new interrogation policy and how was it applied, if at all, in the interrogation of Mr. Abdulmutallab? If it was not applied, why not?

8. Does the new interrogation policy draw distinctions based upon whether the detainee is apprehended inside or outside the U.S.? If so, please specify.

9. What are the restrictions—legal, policy or procedure—that limit which agencies can take part in such interrogations? Were other intelligence agencies involved?

10. Who made the decision to arrest Mr. Abdulmutallab rather than transfer him to military custody to be held as an enemy combatant? Which agencies were consulted in this decision?

11. Was Mr. Abdulmutallab advised to stop cooperating with interrogators after being provided with legal counsel? If so, did he?

12. Why were the terms "al Qaeda," "Yemen," "terrorism," or "jihad" not mentioned to describe Mr. Abdulmutallab's activities in the seven-page charging instrument?

13. Was Christmas Day chosen for attack by al Qaeda for symbolic value?

14. What connections exist between the radical cleric al Aulqi and the Christmas Day, Fort Hood, and Arkansas attacks—as well as other terrorist plots last year?

15. How many former Guantanamo detainees have returned to terrorism?

16. Has the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on detainee recidivism been revised upward? If so, when will this report be released publicly? Has the president seen the updated report?

17. In a recent op-ed in *The Washington Post*, Professor Bruce Hoffman, a respected professor of security studies at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center, wrote, "During the past 18 months, American and British intelligence officials have said, well over 100 individuals from such countries have graduated from terrorist training camps in Pakistan and have been sent West to undertake terrorist operations." Is this assessment low or high?

18. Does al Qaeda monitor congressional hearings or think tank publications relating to U.S. counterterrorism strategy?

19. What are the primary strategies al Qaeda uses to recruit Westerners? Which strategies have been most successful?

I would appreciate a response to these questions as soon as possible. The answers to these questions will be critical in helping Congress play an active and participatory role in working with the administration on counterterrorism matters. This can only happen, however, if the legislative branch—including the minority party—is included in this process.

I look forward to your response. Please do not hesitate to contact me or my staff member, Thomas Culligan, at 202-225-5136 if I can be of assistance.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

FRANK R. WOLF,
Member of Congress.

STATUS REPORT ON CURRENT LEVELS OF ON-BUDGET SPENDING AND REVENUES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010 AND THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD FY 2010 THROUGH FY 2014

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gen-

tleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SPRATT. Madam Speaker, I am transmitting a status report on the current levels of on-budget spending and revenues for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and for the five-year period of fiscal years 2010 through 2014. This report is necessary to facilitate the application of sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act and sections 424 and 427 of S. Con. Res. 13, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2010.

The term "current level" refers to the amounts of spending and revenues estimated for each fiscal year based on laws enacted or awaiting the President's signature.

The first table in the report compares the current levels of total budget authority, outlays, and revenues with the aggregate levels set by S. Con. Res. 13. This comparison is needed to enforce section 311(a) of the Budget Act, which establishes a point of order against any measure that would breach the budget resolution's aggregate levels.

The second table compares the current levels of budget authority and outlays for each authorizing committee with the section 302(a) allocations made under S. Con. Res. 13 for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and fiscal years 2010 through 2014. This comparison is needed to enforce section 302(f) of the Budget Act, which establishes a point of order against any measure that would breach the section 302(a) discretionary action allocation of new budget authority for the committee that reported the measure.

The third table compares the current levels of discretionary appropriations for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 with the section 302(a) allocation of discretionary budget authority and outlays to the Appropriations Committee. This comparison is needed to enforce section 302(f) of the Budget Act, which establishes a point of order against any measure that would breach section 302(b) sub-allocations within the Appropriations Committee.

The fourth table gives the current level for fiscal years 2011 and 2012 for accounts identified for advance appropriations under section 424 of S. Con. Res. 13. This list is needed to enforce section 424 of the budget resolution, which establishes a point of order against appropriations bills that include advance appro-

priations that: (1) are not identified in the joint statement of managers; or (2) would cause the aggregate amount of such appropriations to exceed the level specified in the resolution.

REPORT TO THE SPEAKER FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET—STATUS OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ADOPTED IN S. CON. RES. 13

[Reflecting action completed as of January 5, 2010—On-budget amounts, in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal years		
	2009 ¹	2010 ²	2010–2014
Appropriate Level:			
Budget Authority	3,668,601	2,882,149	n.a.
Outlays	3,357,164	3,001,027	n.a.
Revenues	1,532,579	1,653,728	10,500,149
Current Level:			
Budget Authority	3,670,974	2,869,949	n.a.
Outlays	3,364,358	3,012,314	n.a.
Revenues	1,532,579	1,633,383	11,271,543
Current Level over (+)/under (–) Appropriate Level:			
Budget Authority	2,373	–12,200	n.a.
Outlays	7,194	11,287	n.a.
Revenues	0	–20,345	771,394

n.a. = Not applicable because annual appropriations Acts for fiscal years 2010 through 2013 will not be considered until future sessions of Congress.

¹ Notes for 2009: Current resolution aggregates exclude \$7,150 million in budget authority and \$1,788 million in outlays that was included in the budget resolution as a placeholder to recognize the potential costs of major disasters.

² Notes for 2010: Current resolution aggregates exclude \$10,350 million in budget authority and \$5,488 million in outlays that was included in the budget resolution as a placeholder to recognize the potential costs of major disasters.

BUDGET AUTHORITY

Enactment of measures providing new budget authority for FY 2010 in excess of \$12,200 million (if not already included in the current level estimate) would cause FY 2010 budget authority to exceed the appropriate level set by S. Con. Res. 13.

OUTLAYS

Outlays for FY 2010 are above the appropriate levels set by S. Con. Res. 13.

REVENUES

Enactment of measures resulting in revenue reduction for FY 2010 excess of \$20,345 million (if not already included in the current level estimate) would cause revenues to fall below the appropriate levels set by S. Con. Res. 13.

Enactment of measures resulting in revenue reduction for the period of fiscal years 2010 through 2014 in excess of \$771,394 million (if not already included in the current level estimate) would cause revenues to fall below the appropriate levels set by S. Con. Res. 13.

DIRECT SPENDING LEGISLATION—COMPARISON OF CURRENT LEVEL WITH AUTHORIZING COMMITTEE 302(a) ALLOCATIONS FOR RESOLUTION CHANGES, REFLECTING ACTION COMPLETED AS OF JANUARY 5, 2010

[Fiscal years, in millions of dollars]

House Committee	2009		2010		2010–2014 Total	
	BA	Outlays	BA	Outlays	BA	Outlays
Agriculture:						
Allocation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Current Level	0	0	0	0	0	0
Difference	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armed Services:						
Allocation	0	0	0	0	35	35
Current Level	0	0	8	8	278	251
Difference	0	0	8	8	243	216
Education and Labor:						
Allocation	–187	–202	32	36	–812	–801
Current Level	–187	–202	32	36	188	199
Difference	0	0	0	0	1,000	1,000
Energy and Commerce:						
Allocation	11	2	10	13	–10	–2
Current Level	11	2	10	–337	–10	–2
Difference	0	0	0	–350	0	0
Financial Services:						
Allocation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Current Level	–564	3,226	318	11,346	527	8,061
Difference	–564	3,226	318	11,346	527	8,061
Foreign Affairs:						
Allocation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Current Level	0	0	0	0	0	0
Difference	0	0	0	0	0	0
Homeland Security:						
Allocation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Current Level	0	0	0	0	0	0