

are few standards or requirements that compel the Services to educate servicemembers and their families about disability, death, education and survivor benefits. Thus, I believe that our joint approach with the Services will go a long way to bring uniformity of content and access to all servicemembers and their families.

So, after gathering the information, I spoke with the Pentagon about the changes I was proposing and the possibility that I would file legislation. The Department provided numerous improvements to the legislation, including additional requirements for more information to be provided to servicemembers and their families. I appreciate their engagement and their thoughtful responses. I think it made for a better bill and a better amendment.

Requiring benefits education about service-related benefits will help achieve the basic goal of raising awareness, not only about servicemembers' benefits, but also about the offsets to those benefits.

This legislation is another step in the right direction; another step toward raising awareness about the law that requires the unjust SBP-DIC offset.

However, as awareness is raised we must continue to work hard to enact a law that will repeal the unjust offset. Our servicemembers not only earned or purchased this annuity; they and their survivors rely on the government to provide them with accurate information and the benefits they expect and deserve. We must continue to right these wrongs.

SITUATION IN YEMEN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to bring to the attention of my colleagues the burgeoning threat of a potential safe haven for extremists in Yemen. As I am sure is true of many of my colleagues, I continue to monitor the press reports surrounding the future of the Yemeni detainees currently being held at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. However, what I believe too few people are following is the growing threat of Yemen becoming a failed state and potential safe haven for members of al-Qaida.

A recent New York Times article, "Some in [al] Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen," highlighted the growing concern within the U.S. Government about relocations of some al-Qaida operatives to Yemen. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy also highlighted the growing threat in Yemen in a recent paper, "Waning Vigilance: al Qaeda's Resurgence in Yemen," that discusses how the threat in Yemen has simmered in recent years and urgently needs the attention of policymakers. Mr. President, I will ask that the New York Times and Washington Institute for Near East Policy articles be printed in the RECORD following my comments.

To appreciate fully the concerns about Yemen's stability, it is important to recall the association of terrorist activities with Yemen. It is perhaps best known as the site of the U.S.S. *Cole* attack in October 2000. But Yemen is also one of the top sources of foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, the source of weapons trafficked into Gaza, and the country of origin of almost 100 of the remaining detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. It was also where many mujahedeen returned to after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and, often forgotten, it is the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden. Further, in 2008, the U.S. Embassy in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a was attacked twice—first by a mortar attack and the second time by highly trained terrorists using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, small arms, and suicide vests.

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair also highlighted the significance of the situation in Yemen earlier this year in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Director Blair testified that losses within al-Qaida's command structure since 2008 have been significant and that sustained pressure against al-Qaida in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, of Pakistan may eventually force it to vacate the FATA. He stated that it is conceivable that al-Qaida could relocate to the gulf where it could exploit a weak central government and close proximity to established recruitment, fundraising, and facilitation networks.

Yemen is the type of country the Director is concerned about, and, for good reason. I would direct my colleagues to the most recent issue of Foreign Policy magazine, which ranks Yemen 18th on its failed states index, an annual index based on 12 indicators ranging from availability of public services to demographic pressures to refugee and internally displaced populations. The failed state index additionally says of Yemen: "a perfect storm of state failure is now brewing there; disappearing oil and water reserves; a mob of migrants, some allegedly with al Qaeda ties, flooding in from Somalia . . . ; and a weak government increasingly unable to keep things running."

The article goes on to suggest what many Yemen observers have been saying for years: "Yemen is the next Afghanistan: a global problem wrapped in a failed state." Report after report reaches the same conclusion about—Yemen—it is a failing state with all the makings of an extremist safe haven. I believe it is critical that we monitor this situation closely; fund developmental and counterterrorism assistance for the Government of Yemen at robust levels; and urge the Obama administration to engage actively with the Yemeni Government. The consequences of inaction can be seen right across the Gulf of Aden in Somalia.

For its part, the administration has increased its focus on this threat. Ear-

lier this year, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, Deputy Director Stephen Kappes reportedly met with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sana'a to discuss security and counterterrorism cooperation. This visit is one of many that the CIA and National Security Council officials have made in recent months, and in addition to a visit by General Petraeus shortly after taking command at U.S. Central Command.

All of these visits confirmed that the political landscape in Yemen remains fragile. Throughout his decades of rule, President Saleh has successfully balanced the various political forces in Yemen—tribes, political parties, military officials, political elites, and radical Islamists—to create a stable ruling coalition that has kept his regime intact. While in many cases this stability has been purchased via corruption and payoffs, in cases where groups and/or individuals have not been willing to join President Saleh, he has used law enforcement, military, and intelligence services to manage threats to stability. In recent years, al-Qaida has entered into the political landscape and complicated this delicate 30-year balance. President Saleh has addressed this situation by reportedly reaching understandings with al-Qaida that it would be left alone to recruit fighters if it did not attack the Yemeni Government.

In the Washington Institute for Near East Policy article I mentioned earlier, the author makes a number of points that underscore this delicate balancing act and the role of al-Qaida in the political landscape of Yemen. The author argues that the Yemeni Government is preoccupied, and its security services overtaxed by increasingly violent calls for secession from the south, threats of renewed fighting in the north, and a faltering economy that is dependent on revenue from rapidly dwindling petroleum reserves.

Between 2002 and 2004, the Yemeni Government, largely with U.S. assistance, was able to disrupt al-Qaida-inspired terrorist activity in Yemen. However, in recent years, a new generation of militants, with either experience in Iraq and Afghanistan or time spent in the Yemeni prison system, has emerged. This new generation of militants is inclined to target the Yemeni Government itself, in addition to foreign interests in Yemen.

The start of this resurgence was a 2006 jailbreak, in which 23 convicted terrorists escaped from a prison in the capital of Sana'a. Escapees from this jailbreak formed the core of a new group, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, which is led by a 2006 escapee whose deputy is a former Guantanamo detainee. While many Yemen observers believe that AQAP is not yet strong enough to topple President Saleh's regime, it is capable of striking high value targets; contributing to instability across Yemen; and recruiting individuals to strengthen its ranks. The ideological demands of AQAP are

familiar: release militants from prison; end cooperation with the United States; renounce democracy; and implement a strict form of sharia law.

If al-Qaida operatives and their leadership in Pakistan look for a new home, Yemen will seem attractive. As in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has large areas of naturally defensible land where President Saleh's regime has little authority; a robust tribal structure that could host relocating operatives; and a security infrastructure which lacks the capacity to defend Yemen's sovereign territory. It is also worth mentioning that these same tribes, in some cases, share the hard-line views of these relocating al-Qaida operatives and are inclined to help enlist their own family into AQAP's efforts. This reality only complicates further the work of President Saleh in balancing counterterrorism efforts and the survival of his regime.

In June 2007, al-Qaida officially announced its rebirth in Yemen with a suicide attack on a convoy of Spanish tourists. Since then, the organization has grown stronger and its attacks more frequent. In January 2008, it launched a series of attacks, culminating in the assault on the U.S. Embassy in September 2008. Earlier this year, a pair of suicide bombers targeted South Koreans, attacking first a group of tourists in the countryside and then the officials sent to investigate. Just last month, AQAP demonstrated that it is also adopting the kidnapping for ransom tactic, which has proven profitable for other terrorist groups. And, just last month, the Associated Press reported that security was upgraded in Yemen's capital after intelligence reports warned of attacks planned against the U.S. Embassy and other potential targets. In response, the Yemeni chief of intelligence has reportedly directed an increase in security around diplomatic missions in the capital and elsewhere in the country. The culmination of these developments gives the AQAP the ability to attract relocating foreign fighters and broaden its operational reach.

The United States is by no means the only player in the country. Saudi Arabia provides the most assistance to Yemen, some of it via official channels to the government and some portions of it unofficially. A myriad of countries are involved in the Yemeni energy sector, and Russia and China are the Yemeni Government's major arms suppliers. To complicate matters further, Yemen's tribal leaders, powerful within the Yemeni political landscape, are suspicious of U.S. policy in the region. These tribal leaders are often the proxies used by President Saleh, Saudi Arabia, and others interested in influencing the government and other elites.

Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average between \$20 and \$25 million annually in total U.S. foreign aid. For fiscal year 2009, the U.S. provided over \$40 million

in assistance for Yemen, an increase from its \$18 million aid package in fiscal year 2008. Between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, Yemen also received approximately \$31.5 million from the U.S. Department of Defense's section 1206 account to train and equip Yemeni counterterrorism units. The Obama administration also recently sent to Congress a new package of 1206 funded projects, which includes \$65 million in counterterrorism assistance for various Yemeni military units. The recently passed fiscal year 2009 supplemental included \$10 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development to support U.S.-sponsored rural engagement measures, focused on civil affairs activities and civilian capacity building in the ungoverned regions of Yemen.

While these programs are important and need to be funded, Yemen observers have expressed frustration with how little "bang for the buck" the U.S. gets for its financial assistance to Yemen on counterterrorism operations. This is one area where I hope the administration will continue to press the Yemeni Government. In the past, the Yemeni Government has complained that the United States has provided them with insufficient assistance. However, based on the most recent administration efforts, the situation has clearly changed, and it is time for President Saleh's government to be more responsive. And, just as in Pakistan, it is critical that our government make two things very clear: first, we stand ready to assist in training and equipping counterterrorism forces; and second, the threats confronting Yemen are ultimately a threat to its own existence. American security assistance will ultimately only be as effective as the Yemeni Government's will to execute an aggressive counterterrorism and counter-recruitment mission.

To date, the administration has not officially characterized Yemen as an al-Qaida safe haven, but should President Saleh prove unwilling to confront adequately the threat posed by relocating foreign fighters; the growing threat of AQAP; and the sympathy of some tribal leaders in his country to support extremist elements, the administration should consider more vigorous action. While the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a is working hard to find an amenable resolution for the transfer of the Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo, it is also working on these very complex counterterrorism efforts. I would urge my colleagues to look at the threats emanating from Yemen and to support efforts by the administration to cooperate with the Yemeni Government and other regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, to address the burgeoning threat in the country.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the New York Times and Washington Institute for Near East Policy articles to which I referred.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 12, 2009]
SOME IN QAEDA LEAVE PAKISTAN FOR SOMALIA AND YEMEN

(By Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger)

WASHINGTON.—American officials say they are seeing the first evidence that dozens of fighters with Al Qaeda, and a small handful of the terrorist group's leaders, are moving to Somalia and Yemen from their principal haven in Pakistan's tribal areas. In communications that are being watched carefully at the Pentagon, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency, the terrorist groups in all three locations are now communicating more frequently, and apparently trying to coordinate their actions, the officials said.

Some aides to President Obama attribute the moves to pressure from intensified drone attacks against Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, after years of unsuccessful American efforts to dislodge the terrorist group from their haven there.

But there are other possible explanations. Chief among them is the growth of the jihadist campaigns in both Somalia and Yemen, which may now have some of the same appeal for militants that Iraq did after the American military invasion there in 2003.

Somalia is now a failed state that bears some resemblance to Afghanistan before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, while Yemen's weak government is ineffectually trying to combat the militants, American officials say.

The shift of fighters is still small, perhaps a few dozen, and there is no evidence that the top leaders—Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—are considering a move from their refuge in the Pakistani tribal areas, according to more than half a dozen senior administration, military and counterterrorism officials interviewed in recent days.

Most officials would not comment on the record about the details of what they are seeing, because of the sensitivity of the intelligence information they are gathering.

Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, said in remarks here on Thursday that the United States must prevent Al Qaeda from creating a new sanctuary in Yemen or Somalia.

The steady trickle of fighters from Pakistan could worsen the chaos in Somalia, where an Islamic militant group, the Shabab, has attracted hundreds of foreign jihadists in its quest to topple the weak moderate Islamist government in Mogadishu. It could also swell the ranks of a growing menace in Yemen, where militants now control large areas of the country outside the capital.

"I am very worried about growing safe havens in both Somalia and Yemen, specifically because we have seen Al Qaeda leadership, some leaders, start to flow to Yemen," Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in remarks at the Brookings Institution here on May 18.

For the United States, the movement creates opportunities as well as risks. With the Obama administration focusing its fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a shift of fighters and some leaders to new locations could complicate American efforts to strike a lasting blow.

But in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Qaeda and Taliban forces have drawn for protection on Pashtun tribes with whom they have deep familial and tribal ties. A move away from those areas could expose Qaeda leaders to betrayal, while communications among militants in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen have

created a new opportunity for American intelligence to zero in on insurgents who gave up many electronic communication devices shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks to avoid detection.

A senior Obama administration official attributed some of the movement to “the enormous heat we’ve been putting on the leadership and the mid-ranks” with Predator strikes, launched from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Obama’s strategy so far has been to intensify many of the strikes begun under the Bush administration.

“There are indications that some Al Qaeda terrorists are starting to see the tribal areas of Pakistan as a tough place to be,” said an American counterterrorism official. “It is likely that a small number have left the region as a result. Among these individuals, some have probably ended up in Somalia and Yemen, among other places. The Al Qaeda terrorists who are leaving the tribal areas of Pakistan are predominantly foot soldiers.”

Measuring the numbers of these movements is almost as difficult as assessing the motivations of those who are on their way out of the tribal areas.

But American officials say there is evidence of a shift. One senior American military official who follows Africa closely said that more than 100 foreign fighters had trained in terrorism camps in Somalia alone in the past few years. Another senior military officer said that Qaeda operatives and confederates in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia had stepped up communications with one another.

“What really has us worried is that they’re communicating with each other much more—Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen,” the senior military officer said. “They’re asking, ‘What do you need? Financing? Fighters?’”

Mr. Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan placed the defeat of Al Qaeda as the No. 1 objective, largely to make sure that the group could not plot new attacks against the United States.

Thus, the movement of the fighters, and the disruption that causes, has been interpreted by some of the president’s top advisers as a sign of success.

But the emergence of new havens, from which Al Qaeda and its affiliates could plot new attacks, raises difficult questions for the United States on how to combat the growing threat, and creates the possibility that increased missile strikes are in the offing in Yemen and Somalia.

“Those are issues that I think the international community is going to have to address because Al Qaeda is not going away,” Admiral Mullen told a Senate committee on May 21.

The C.I.A. says its drone attacks in Pakistan have disrupted Al Qaeda’s operations and damaged the group’s senior ranks. American officials say that strikes have killed 11 of the top 20 Qaeda leaders in the past year.

“Al Qaeda has been hit by drones and it has generated a lot of insecurity among them,” said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general and military analyst in Islamabad.

“Many among them are uneasy and it is possible that they are leaving for Somalia and other jihadi battle fronts,” he said. “The hard core, however, will like to stay on.”

Without singling out any countries, Adm. Eric T. Olson, the head of the Special Operations Command, spoke in general terms last week about how the increased Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley and early indications of a new Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan had put militants on the run.

“As the Pakistanis are applying pressure,” Admiral Olson told a House panel, “it will

shift some of the sanctuaries to other places.”

[From the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 14, 2009]

WANING VIGILANCE: AL-QAEDA’S RESURGENCE IN YEMEN

(By Gregory Johnsen)

Recent reports suggesting that al-Qaeda fighters are leaving Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the group has suffered serious setbacks, have renewed international concerns that Yemen is reemerging once again as a major terrorist safe haven. Although the assessments of al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Yemen are accurate, the deteriorating situation is not due to U.S. successes elsewhere; rather, it is the result of waning U.S. and Yemeni attention over the past five years. Renewed cooperation between Sana and Washington in tackling al-Qaeda and addressing Yemen’s systemic problems could help reduce the terrorist organization’s appeal in this troubled country.

THE APPARENT DEFEAT OF AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN

By late 2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen had been largely defeated through the close cooperation of U.S. and Yemeni security forces. This cooperation reached its zenith in November 2002 when the CIA assassinated the head of the organization, Abu Ali al-Harithi, but the Pentagon bypassed the agreed-on cover story and leaked the operation to the press. Washington needed an early victory in the war on terror and the assassination of an al-Qaeda leader was too good to go unacknowledged.

Yemen, however, believed it was sold out to U.S. domestic concerns. Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih paid a high price for allowing the United States to carry out the attack—something al-Qaeda still uses to great propaganda effect—and it took more than a year for the government to publicly admit that it had authorized Washington to act.

In November 2003, the United States was still paying for this mistake when Yemen arrested al-Harithi’s replacement, Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, on the streets of Sana. Instead of being granted direct access to al-Ahdal, U.S. officials were forced to work through Yemeni intermediaries; however, with its leadership dead or in jail, its infrastructure largely destroyed, and its militants more attracted to the insurgency in Iraq than jihad at home, al-Qaeda in Yemen appeared largely defeated.

AL-QAEDA REBUILDS

The United States and Yemen both treated this victory as absolute, failing to realize that a defeated enemy is not necessarily a vanquished one. In effect, al-Qaeda was crossed off both countries’ list of priorities and replaced by other, seemingly more pressing, concerns. For Washington, democratic reforms and anticorruption campaigns dominated the bilateral agenda as part of the Bush administration’s desire to mold a new Middle East. For Yemen, attention was increasingly diverted by a five-year-old sectarian civil war in the north and more recently by threats of secession from the south. Over the next two years of relative calm, the threat from al-Qaeda, while not necessarily forgotten, was certainly ignored. Tourism flourished, and the U.S. State Department initiated a Yemen study-abroad program.

Even the prison break of twenty-three al-Qaeda suspects in early 2006, which U.S. officials privately blamed on Yemeni government collaboration, was treated more like an aberration than the opening volley of a new battle. Among the escapees were Qasim al-Raymi and Nasir al-Wahayshi, a former secretary to Usama bin Laden and a veteran of the fighting at Tora Bora. The nearly two

and a half years of government neglect had created a great deal of space for the two men to reorganize and rebuild al-Qaeda in Yemen.

The involvement of al-Raymi and al-Wahayshi, along with numerous other Yemenis from across the country, illustrates one of the more worrying facts about al-Qaeda’s current incarnation: it is the most representative organization in the country. Al-Qaeda in Yemen transcends class, tribe, and regional identity in a way that no other Yemeni group or political party can match. Al-Wahayshi and others within the organization have proven particularly talented at articulating a narrative designed to appeal to a local audience, using everything from Palestine to the plight of Sheikh al-Muayyad—a Yemeni cleric who ran a popular charity and is currently in a U.S. prison for providing funds to terrorists—to increase their rhetorical appeal to young Yemenis. Both the U.S. and Yemeni governments have been incapable of countering this approach and have effectively ceded the field to al-Qaeda.

In June 2007, al-Qaeda officially announced its presence in the country with al-Wahayshi as its commander. It underscored its intentions within days by a suicide attack on a convoy of Spanish tourists. Since then, the organization has grown stronger. In January 2008, it released the first issue of its bimonthly journal, Sada al-Malahim (“The Echo of Battles”), and that same month it launched a series of attacks, culminating in the assault on the U.S. embassy in September 2008. Earlier this year, a pair of suicide bombers targeted South Koreans, attacking first a group of tourists and then the officials sent to investigate.

Al-Qaeda has also capitalized on its recent successes, attracting recruits from both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In January, two former Guantanamo Bay detainees joined the group as commanders, spearheading the merger of local branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen into a single regional franchise. One of the leaders, Muhammad al-Awfi, has since turned himself in to Saudi authorities, but this gesture appears to be prompted more from a desire to protect his family than from a change of heart.

This new regional organization, which calls itself al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is indicative of al-Wahayshi’s growing ambition. Throughout the first two years of his leadership, he worked hard to create a durable infrastructure that could survive the loss of key commanders. His success in this regard is demonstrated by the fact that even though the organization lost a particularly skilled local commander, Hamza al-Quayti, in a shootout with Yemeni security forces in August 2008, it was still able to launch an attack on the U.S. embassy just one month later. Al-Wahayshi is now looking to use the undergoverned regions of Yemen as a staging ground for attacks not only in Yemen but also throughout the Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa.

LESSONS LEARNED

Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Yemen does not stem from displacement of U.S. successes elsewhere. Rather, the United States and its allies need to understand that defeating one generation of al-Qaeda does not eliminate the threat completely. In conjunction with Yemen and Gulf Cooperation Council allies, Washington must develop a two-track strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda in Yemen. In the short term, the United States must discretely partner with Yemen and Saudi Arabia once again and target al-Qaeda’s leadership and infrastructure. Although successfully doing so will be much harder the second time around, it can be accomplished with careful and coordinated strikes.

The long-term approach, however, is both more important and more difficult to implement. The current incarnation of al-Qaeda in

Yemen has more recruits—and younger recruits—than ever, due to al-Wahayshi's powerful propaganda as well as the lack of opportunity and an incipient breakdown in traditional social authorities. Furthermore, Yemen is preoccupied, and its security services overtaxed with the increasingly violent calls for secession from the south, threats of renewed fighting in the north, and, most importantly, a faltering economy that makes traditional modes of patronage-style governance nearly impossible. The United States and Yemen are also facing an al-Qaeda group that is now more accepted as a legitimate organization. Killing or arresting al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen and dismantling its infrastructure will be an important step forward, but will unlikely eliminate the problem in the long term. Tackling the underlying issues, although very difficult, will be key to ensuring that al-Qaeda does not reemerge in Yemen once again.

COMMENDING SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I appreciate having this opportunity to join my colleagues in expressing our great appreciation of the many contributions Norm Coleman has made to the work of the Senate and the future of our country during his service here. He is quite a remarkable individual, and I know I am going to miss seeing him on the Senate floor and working with him on issues of concern to the people of Minnesota and my constituents in Wyoming.

Ever since Norm's political career began, it was clear he had a mind of his own and, like the old adage about baseball umpires, he was going to call them as he saw them. That meant taking each issue as it came, carefully studying what was proposed and its consequences, and then making up his own mind on how he thought he should vote.

His independent streak and his determination to be true to his principles, his commitment to the people of Minnesota, and his internal compass transcended party politics and kept both sides guessing as to how he would vote on any given issue.

I remember the first time I met him, shortly after his election to the Senate. It turned out we had some things in common. For starters, early on in our political careers, Norm and I both served as mayors, so we had an appreciation for the demands that are made upon local officials.

Norm was elected mayor of St. Paul. I was elected mayor in my hometown of Gillette, WY. We both had some tough challenges to deal with as our communities felt the aches and pains of growth and we were fortunate enough to put together a good team who helped us to deal with the needs of the people who were counting on us to solve some pretty vexing problems.

Looking back, Norm was able to compile quite a record and he became a very popular mayor. His administration promoted policies that helped to spur an increase in the number of jobs in the St. Paul area. He also helped to

oversee a downtown revitalization that came at a time when many other similar areas across the country were downsizing and becoming a shadow of their former selves. He also managed to help engineer the return of professional hockey to Minnesota. The presence of the Minnesota Wild soon became a source of great pride to the people of his State. He was able to do all of that and so much more without increasing property taxes. That was the result of careful planning, and it understandably earned him the respect and admiration of his constituents.

Then, with a key election approaching, Norm was giving some thought to his political future. There were a lot of rumors as to his next run for office, but the people of Minnesota made it clear that they wanted him to run for the Senate, so Norm began what was to become a very difficult and emotionally charged race. When it was all over, Norm Coleman had defeated a Minnesota political icon and was sworn in to represent the people of his home State in the Senate.

Ever since that day, Norm has been working to serve the people of Minnesota and do whatever was in their best interests. Always focused on getting results, he supported the President when he agreed with him, and he never hesitated to speak up when he felt there was another way to get things done that ought to be taken up as part of the mix.

Of all his accomplishments during his service here in the Senate, there are two that I will always remember. The first was a factfinding mission we took along with several of our colleagues to Africa to determine what we could do as a nation to help combat the AIDS epidemic there. For both of us our visit turned out to be a great cultural shock. There were barriers of all kinds we had to deal with—language, customs, and technology. All of the things we take for granted here are virtually nonexistent there. The lack of any regular distribution of the written word, like a community newspaper, makes getting the most basic of information to the people an incredible challenge.

When we returned to the United States we joined with our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to develop a program that has been producing tremendous results for the past few years. The great strides that have been made have not eliminated the disease, but they have greatly increased the quality of life there. Our efforts have also helped to make people more aware of what they can do to ensure they don't get AIDS, or if they are already infected, what they must do to avoid transmitting the disease to anyone else.

We both learned from that experience the truth of the old adage—you may not be able to save the whole world, but you can always make a good effort to save part of it, and the results we have achieved in Africa and the lives we have saved will be part of Norm Coleman's legacy of service in the Senate.

Another part of the change he brought that will be felt for many years to come is the leadership he showed as the chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. In 2006, Norm led the effort to determine how safe and secure our Nation's ports were. The results of his investigations were unsettling and soon became the subject of headlines across the country.

Norm wasn't looking for headlines, however. He was looking to craft a workable solution to the problem, and he did when the Senate approved a program that authorized the use of pilot technology to screen incoming cargo containers for their contents. As a result of his efforts, people all across the country will be better protected from those who might wish to do us harm. Thanks to Norm, that once open door has now been closed.

Norm will not be a part of this current Congress, but his impact will continue to be felt for some time to come. He was a tireless worker for Minnesota, and although I don't know what the future holds for him, I have every confidence that we haven't heard the last of Norm Coleman. He has been and will always be an individual of vision and action. That is a combination that can't help but produce results, and I am certain he will continue to set new goals in his life and achieve them—one after the other. Good luck, my friend, and keep in touch. We will always be interested to hear from you and to benefit from your take on our work in the Congress to make Minnesota and the rest of the Nation a better place for us all to live.

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF CAMP RAINBOW GOLD

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize a program in my home State of Idaho that provides an outstanding service to many who are greatly challenged in a battle for life. Twenty-five years ago this summer, Dr. David McClusky planted the seeds of a dream he had nurtured for many years: opening a camp for kids with cancer in the mountains of Idaho.

Armed with a grant, a group of committed volunteers and the support of the American Cancer Society, 15 campers with cancer kicked off the first of 25 years of very special summers. This new retreat was called Camp Rainbow Gold.

The camp provided an opportunity for these kids to swim, ride horses, fish, hike, paint, bike, eat and laugh. They developed deep bonds with one another as they fought a disease that knows no bounds in the lives it ravages. This one week allowed them an opportunity to escape from the daily emotional and physical battle with an insidious disease.

Today, Camp Rainbow Gold continues to provide that week-long respite from the ever-present cancer fight