

flavors such as Twista Lime, Warm Winter Toffee, and Winter Mocha Mint. Bright colorful ads for these cigarettes have appeared in magazines that are very popular with our children.

Who do we think candy and fruit-flavored products are for? Certainly they are not for the adults who have been smoking Marlboros or Camels all their lives. Survey evidence shows what we would expect: that these candy and fruit-flavored products are far more popular with our young people than among adults.

Targeting our children like this is absolutely unacceptable—unacceptable for the health of our children and for the well-being of our health care system. Here we are debating health care reform at a time when we realize that it is 18 percent of our GDP, and over the next 10 years health care is going to be one-fifth of our economy. To be advertising to our children to start something that we know is going to be detrimental to their health is absolutely unacceptable.

If we are ever going to address the No. 1 preventable cause of death in the United States, we need to provide the FDA with the authority to restrict tobacco companies marketing to our children.

While progress has been made in the last decade, youth tobacco use remains far too high. More than 20 percent of high school students in my home State of Arkansas smoke, and more than 18 percent of Arkansas's high school boys use smokeless tobacco. Each year, a staggering 13,100 Arkansas kids try cigarettes for the first time, and another 3,900 additional kids become new and regular daily smokers. Ninety percent of all adult smokers began smoking in their teen years. Tobacco companies know they have to attract kids to be able to survive. They know that if they get kids hooked, then they will have those adult smokers, and their marketing efforts have paid off.

According to recent studies by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 80 percent of kids smoke the three most heavily advertised brands. While tobacco companies claim they do not market to our children, they are surely doing a good job of getting kids to use their products.

We simply must do more to protect our children from the tobacco company advertising and promotion. Effective regulation of the tobacco industry must provide FDA with the authority to restrict tobacco company marketing to children. That is one of the key goals of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act. It imposes those specific marketing restrictions on tobacco products, restrictions on those forms of tobacco marketing I mentioned earlier that have been shown to increase youth tobacco use.

Even more importantly, the bill gives the FDA the flexibility to further restrict tobacco marketing so it can respond to the inevitable innovative at-

tempts by the tobacco companies to get around specific restrictions. The restrictions on marketing included in the FDA tobacco bill are critical to any effort to prevent kids from starting to smoke and reduce the toll caused by tobacco.

Even though tobacco companies claim they have stopped intentionally marketing to kids, they continue their tradition of designing products that appeal explicitly to new users. The large majority—and we cannot ignore it—the large majority of those new users are our children.

I mentioned that my children are about to be teens, and as the mother of twins about to be teens, I know that parents want to do all they can to protect their children. Children are faced with so much in today's world, whether it is violence, whether it is issues such as this, whether it is peer pressure. Our children are faced with many things. We want to protect them. We want to help them learn to wear seatbelts and bicycle helmets. We want to teach them all that we can, the skills they need in life so they can remain safe and healthy.

I look at the restrictions we put on our children each day to make sure they are wearing those helmets, to make sure they are not on the computer too much, to make sure they are using the computer safely. All of these things we do as parents to ensure we are doing our job to keep our children as safe as we possibly can.

We also need to protect our children from tobacco companies—their advertising and promotion. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act does this. It would end special protection for the tobacco industry, and it would be safeguarding our children and creating a healthier nation in the process.

Again, I encourage my colleagues to work with me and all of the other Senators working on this bill to move this bill forward on behalf of our children, certainly on behalf of the health care needs of this country but, most importantly, for parents who are trying so hard to ensure their kids will get off on the right foot and that they will learn to make wise decisions and will not be faced with these types of temptations and others to stray in a way that is going to be unhealthy for them and unhealthy for their future.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to reserve the remaining majority time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. McCain. Mr. President, today we celebrate the unveiling in the Capitol

of a statue of Ronald Reagan, one of our country's great Presidents and a personal hero to me throughout my political life. While there are many aspects of President Reagan's legacy we might reflect on today, I would like to take the opportunity to discuss one of them—his dream of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Speaking before the Japanese Diet on November 11, 1983, President Ronald Reagan said:

The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they can't ever be used. I know I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.

That is my dream, too, and it is one shared by many of our most distinguished national security practitioners. In 2007, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, along with former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Senator Sam Nunn, authored an article entitled "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," in which they laid out their vision of the globe free of the most dangerous weapons ever known.

This is a distant and difficult goal. We must proceed toward it prudently and pragmatically and with a focused concern for our security and the security of allies that depend on us. But the Cold War ended almost 20 years ago, and the time has come to take further measures to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals. In so doing, the United States can—and indeed must—show the kind of leadership the world expects from us, in the tradition of American Presidents who worked to reduce the nuclear threat to mankind.

Our highest priority must be to reduce the danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used. Such weapons, while still important to deter an attack with weapons of mass destruction against us and our allies, represent the most abhorrent and indiscriminate form of warfare known to man. We do, quite literally, possess the means to destroy all mankind. We must seek to do all we can to ensure that nuclear weapons will never again be used. As the administration renews its nuclear weapons posture, it should, I believe, seek to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest number possible, consistent with our security requirements and global commitments. This means a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force. As we take such steps, it will be crucial to continue to deploy a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent, robust missile defenses, and superior conventional forces capable of defending the United States and our allies.

Today, we find ourselves at a nuclear crossroads. As rogue nations, including North Korea and Iran, push the nuclear envelope, the perils of a world awash in nuclear weapons is clear. Yet we should also consider the more hopeful alternative—a world in which there are far

fewer such weapons than there are today and in which proliferation, instability, and nuclear terrorism are far less likely.

In achieving this world, Ronald Reagan's dream will be more important than ever before. As Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz wrote with their colleagues in 2008:

Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving towards zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.

Make no mistake, we must arrest the downward spiral. North Korea's recent nuclear test is just the latest provocative demonstration of the troubling reality the world faces today. Together with Iran's ongoing commitment to nuclear development, we face real dangers in the proliferation of the world's most terrible weapons. The United States must lead the world not only in reducing the size of existing nuclear arsenals but also in reversing the course of nuclear proliferation. This requires a tough-minded approach to both Iran and North Korea, both of which have gotten away with too much for far too long.

We must also help ensure that other potential nuclear programs do not get off the ground. Last week, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft joined two colleagues in calling on the President to promote the international ban on the spread of fissile materials that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. I agree and urge the President to do so.

But we must also strengthen enforcement. We must insist that countries that receive the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation return or dismantle what they have received if, at any point, they violate or withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Leading up to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference, we should lay the groundwork for building an international consensus to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the tools to be a meaningful agent for achieving the dream of a nuclear weapon-free world. We should work with allies and partners to interdict the spread of nuclear weapons and materials—including any borne on vessels traveling to and from North Korea—under the Proliferation Security Initiative.

As a nation, we have a number of important decisions in the coming months, including those related to a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, the administration's planned resubmission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for ratification, and the need for a robust missile defense shield.

As we move ahead with these and other decisions, let us keep in mind the dream of a nuclear-free world, enunciated so eloquently by our 40th Presi-

dent. As Secretary Shultz has written, this was a dream President Reagan pursued with great patience and depth of conviction. We would be wise to follow his lead.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two articles by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, one of January 4, 2007, and the other of January 15, 2008.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2007]

A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn)

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium—potentially to weapons grade—highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies worldwide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the

way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago—the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world

without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.

Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.

Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.

Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.

Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.

Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.

Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

[From the Wall Street Journal Online, Jan. 15, 2008]

TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

(By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn)

The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.

The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger.

With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.

One year ago, in an essay in this paper, we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the world.

Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: "It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious."

In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: "What we need is both a vision—a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons—and action—progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak."

We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former U.S. officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. These include: Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell.

Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that will pull us back from the nuclear precipice.

The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join.

Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include:

Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. Much has been learned about the vital task of verification from the application of these provisions. The treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, and the further reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed as soon as possible.

Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environ-

ment. Furthermore, developments in cyberwarfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.

Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days. Interpreting deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia formally having declared that they are allied against terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.

Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting. This should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.

Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in helping to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security—by offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, effective security of these materials.

As Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger put it in his address at our October conference, "Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?" To underline the governor's point, on Aug. 29-30, 2007, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a U.S. Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. For 36 hours, no one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.

Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination. These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.

Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies. More progress in this direction is urgent, and could be achieved through requiring the application of monitoring provisions (Additional Protocols) designed by the IAEA to all signatories of the NPT.

Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. This calls for a bipartisan review, first, to examine improvements over the past

decade of the international monitoring system to identify and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technical progress made over the past decade in maintaining high confidence in the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear arsenal under a test ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in place new monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests—an effort the U.S. should urgently support even prior to ratification.

In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.

Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. The government of Norway will sponsor a conference in February that will contribute to this process.

Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing global interest in developing nuclear energy and the potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, an international program should be created by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, and spent fuel management—to ensure that the means to make nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.

There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved.

President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify" should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.

We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.

Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.

In some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENNET). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENERGY

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, as the ranking member and previously the chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, I understand we are actually the committee of jurisdiction over a lot of the energy concerns we have in this country. It is a real crisis. I know there are other things happening now that people are focused on, but this is certainly something the Presiding Officer is aware of, given the committees on which he is serving. When it comes to developing a comprehensive energy policy in the United States, we are faced with a stark contrast. We can develop and produce domestic supplies of reliable and affordable energy that will help jump-start our economy, create high-paying jobs, and bring down energy costs on consumers, all while making our Nation less dependent on foreign energy supplies, or we can implement policies designed to drive up the costs of energy on American families, shift jobs overseas, and deepen this recession.

For the sake of our economy, our energy security, and environmental goals, I choose the "all of the above" approach.

I sit and listen to people who say we want to do something about our dependence on foreign countries for our ability to run this machine called America. At the same time, they are against coal, they are against oil, they are against gas, they are against nuclear. Those are the things that are there, the technology is there and we can use them. But they are looking somehow into the future and saying there has to be some green solution. I am the first one to say, when the technology is there, I am going to be right there with them. It is not there yet.

Over the next several weeks, I am planning to speak on the floor several times about the benefits of nuclear energy and my proposals for reinvigorating that industry. Today, I will discuss how nuclear will help put Americans back to work and move our economy forward as well as focus on the regulatory challenges facing new nuclear construction and what I plan to do to help nuclear energy play an increasing role in meeting our energy needs.

One of the problems we have had is we have had several colleagues coming down, talking about why nuclear is good and why we should do it, but they have not addressed the barriers there and the bureaucratic problems we have right now.

The need to grow our domestic energy supply is clear. The Energy Information Administration projects that our demand for electricity will increase 26 percent by the year 2030, requiring 260 gigawatts of new electricity generation. Every source will need to grow to produce more energy to meet

that demand. Curtis Frasier, the executive vice president of Shell America Gas & Power, was recently quoted in *Greenwire*, warning that the recession could be masking a global energy shortage.

He said:

When the economy returns, we're going to be back to the energy crisis.

He said:

Nothing has been done to solve that crisis. We've got a huge mountain to climb.

This is a very significant chart. It shows electricity growth is linked to the American economy. Mr. Frasier voices real concern. As you can see, this graph shows the total energy and shows the GDP. The GDP is the blue line going up and the electricity use and the total energy are lines that go right along with it. In fact, when it flattens out, such as it did in 1990 for about a 3-year period, all three flattened out at the same time. The same thing is true up here when it flattened out during 2005. So we see there is that linkage there, and it is a very real one.

This is not your father's nuclear industry. Today's nuclear industry has demonstrated marked improvement in safety, reliability, and costs since the late 1980s. The industry also has proved that safety and reliable performance are closely linked.

We have a chart here, "Improved Safety Yields Better Performance." If you look at the two lines, we are talking about the line that would be the capacity factor, and this line, the red line, would be significant events. Significant events are things that are problems. We all remember significant events in nuclear energy. The press always highlights these and tries to make us believe this is a dangerous form when it is, in fact, not dangerous. The significant events have been going down. It is hard to see there. It goes from 1988 all up to the present year and it goes down as the capacity factor is going up. This is an indicator of the results, that the industry has dramatically increased its capacity by 45 percent and has operated roughly 90 percent of the time in the last 5 years. This improved performance is demonstrating that nuclear is both safe and reliable. It has made nuclear energy more affordable.

We have another chart that is the "U.S. Electricity Production Costs." Nuclear energy generates nearly 20 percent of the energy that powers our economy and has the lowest production cost compared to other sources. You can see by the chart, not only has nuclear energy had the lowest production costs for the last 7 years, its production cost is very stable and not vulnerable to the price fluctuations here shown by the other resources.

These lines here represent nuclear and coal. They go along pretty much the same. However, if you look at fluctuations in gas and in petroleum, you can see they are moving. This is something that is very significant.

I might mention, even though we only are using 22 percent of our energy