

the MCC's eligibility criteria, including controlling corruption and investing in health and education.

I look forward to the results of Sunday's election and the opportunity for our two countries to work together for a brighter future.

10-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE EXPANSION OF NATO

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the 10-year anniversary of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

During the debate on whether to expand NATO, I said that this debate holds special resonance for me. Growing up as a Polish American in east Baltimore, I learned about the burning of Warsaw at the end of the Second World War. The Germans burned Warsaw to the ground—killing a quarter of a million people—as Soviet troops watched from the other side of the Vistula River. I learned about the Katyn massacre—where Russia murdered more than four thousand Polish military officers and intellectuals in the Katyn Forest at the start of the Second World War.

The tragedies that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary experienced in the aftermath of the Second World War are etched on my heart. That was the one reason I fought so long and so hard for Poland and the others to be part of the western family of nations.

Despite the importance of history, my support for NATO enlargement was based on the future. My support was based on what is best for America. Thankfully when we voted to bring Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO, the yeas carried the day. Since that day, those three nations have exceeded every expectation as strong allies of the United States, and the naysayers' fears during the debate on the NATO expansion have also been shown as unwarranted.

The NATO expansion nations of 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have more than lived up to their obligations under the NATO alliance. Poland has made enormous investments into all areas of its military. As a result, over the last 10 years the number of Polish troops serving on NATO missions has steadily grown from 1500 to over 3500. Another 300 Polish military personnel serve in prestigious academic and administrative positions in NATO institutions around the world. Polish naval vessels also operate as part of NATO standing reaction forces all over the world, providing cutting edge mine detection and countermeasures expertise.

Poland has also emerged as one of the United States' strongest allies in the war against terrorism and extremism around the globe. Polish troops accompanied American soldiers into Iraq when they invaded in 2003, and maintained a mission that grew as large as 2500 troops up until the end of 2008. Nearly 30 Polish soldiers gave

their lives in Iraq. Poland also has one of the largest contingents in Afghanistan. Over 1600 Polish soldiers fight every day to stabilize the Afghan province of Ghazni. Nine Polish soldiers have been killed and dozens wounded in Iraq.

In closing, I wish to speak a bit about history. My colleagues have heard me speak about Poland's history many times in the past. For 40 years, I watched the people of Poland live under brutal, communist rule. They did not choose Communism—it was forced upon them. Each ethnic group in America brings our own history to our wonderful American mosaic. Bringing these three nations into NATO family of nations 10 years ago was one of the best decisions we made in the post-cold war era. Of all the things I have done in my years in the Senate, this is one of those for which I am most proud.

LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to express my grave concern at the continuing massacres, kidnappings, and terror orchestrated by the Lord's Resistance Army, the LRA, in northeastern Congo and southern Sudan. As many of my colleagues know, I have long been engaged in efforts to bring an end to this—one of Africa's longest running and most gruesome rebel wars. In 2004, I authored and Congress passed the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, which committed the United States to work vigorously for a lasting resolution to this conflict. In 2007, I visited displacement camps in northern Uganda and saw first-hand the impact the violence orchestrated by the LRA has had throughout the region. I have been frustrated as the LRA has been able to move in recent years across porous regional borders to gain new footholds in northeastern Congo, southern Sudan, and even the Central African Republic, with little consequence.

Just over 2 months ago, the Ugandan, Congolese, and South Sudanese militaries launched a joint offensive against the LRA's primary bases in northeastern Congo. Serious concerns have been raised about the planning and implementation of this operation. Since the military strike began, the LRA has been able to carry out a series of new massacres in Congo and Sudan, leaving over 900 people dead. That is a killing rate that, according to the Genocide Intervention Network, exceeds that in Darfur or even in Somalia. Hundreds of new children have been abducted and new communities have been devastated and displaced. It is tragically clear that insufficient attention and resources were devoted to ensuring the protection of civilians during the operation. Meanwhile, the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, and his commanders escaped the initial aerial assault and have continued to evade the militaries. Thus far, this operation has resulted in the worst-case scenario: it has failed to stop the LRA, while

spurring the rebels to intensify their attacks against civilians.

I am not ruling out that this offensive—still ongoing—may yet succeed. Indeed, I strongly hope it does. On several occasions last year, Kony refused to sign a comprehensive peace agreement with the Government of Uganda, an agreement that even included provisions to shield him from an International Criminal Court indictment. At the same time, as negotiations were still underway, his forces launched new attacks in Congo, Sudan, and, for the first time, Central African Republic. They abducted hundreds of youths to rebuild their ranks. It was apparent that Kony was not interested in a negotiated settlement, despite the good efforts of mediators and northern Ugandan civil society leaders. I supported those peace negotiations, but it became increasingly clear that the LRA's leaders would only be stopped when forced to do so.

For many years I have pressed for a political solution to the crisis in northern Uganda. I pressed for the international community to work collectively to support efforts to bring peace and stability to this war-torn area. And against all odds, the most recent peace talks in Juba, South Sudan, did see a collective effort but to no avail. These negotiations were not perfect but for some time offered a path forward and provided a framework to address the underlying grievances of communities in northern Uganda. But then, it became increasingly clear that Joseph Kony had no intention of ever signing the final agreement and had instead been conducting new abductions to replenish his rebel group. It became increasingly clear that Kony and his top commanders would stand in the way of any comprehensive political solution.

These failed talks justify military action against the LRA's top command, but that action must be carefully considered. As we have seen too many times, offensive operations that are poorly designed and poorly carried out risk doing more harm than good, inflaming a situation rather than resolving it. Before launching any operation against the rebels, the regional militaries should have ensured that their plan had a high probability of success, anticipated contingencies, and made precautions to minimize dangers to civilians. It is widely known that when facing military offensive in the past, the LRA have quickly dispersed and committed retaliatory attacks against civilians. Furthermore, to be sustainable, military action needs to be placed within a larger counterinsurgency strategy that integrates outreach to local populations, active programs for basic service provision and reconstruction in affected areas, and mechanisms for ex-combatant disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Those mechanisms are especially important in the case of the LRA because of the large number of child abductees who make up the rebel ranks.

As this operation continues, I hope the regional militaries are identifying their earlier mistakes and adjusting their strategy in response. Meanwhile, the international community cannot continue to stay on the sidelines as these massacres continue. The United Nations Security Council should take up this matter immediately and, in coordination with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for LRA-affected areas, develop a plan and new resources to enhance civilian protection. I urge the Obama administration to use its voice and vote at the Security Council to see that this happens. At the same time, I urge the administration to develop an interagency strategy for how the United States can contribute to longer term efforts to disarm and demobilize the LRA, restore the rule of law in affected areas of Congo and Sudan, and address political and economic marginalization in northern Uganda that initially gave rise to this rebel group.

This is not to suggest the United States has not already been involved with the ongoing operation. AFRICOM officials have acknowledged that they provided assistance and support for this operation at the request of the regional governments.

As a 17-year member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs and someone who has been involved with AFRICOM since its conception, I would like to offer some thoughts on this matter. While I supported AFRICOM's creation, I have been concerned about its potential to eclipse our civilian agencies and thereby perpetuate perceptions on the continent of a militarized U.S. policy. It is essential that we get this balance right and protect chief of mission authority. By doing so, we can help ensure AFRICOM contributes to broader efforts to bring lasting peace and stability across Africa. When I visited AFRICOM's headquarters last December and talked with senior officials, we discussed the important roles that it can play. They include helping to develop effective, well-disciplined militaries that adhere to civilian rule, strengthening regional peacekeeping missions, and supporting postconflict demobilization and disarmament processes. In my view, assisting a multilateral operation to disarm an armed group that preys on civilians and wreaks regional havoc fits this job description, theoretically, at least.

To put it bluntly, I believe supporting viable and legitimate efforts to disarm and demobilize the LRA is exactly the kind of thing in which AFRICOM should be engaged. Of course, the key words there are viable and legitimate. We should not be supporting operations that we believe are substantially flawed and do not have a high probability of success. Furthermore, we should ensure that operations we assist do not exacerbate inter-state tensions or violate international humanitarian law. If we get involved, even in an advisory capacity, we have

to be willing to take responsibility for outcomes, whether anticipated or not. To that end, it is critical that the State Department is not only involved but plays a leading role in ensuring that any military activities are coordinated with long-term political strategies and our overarching foreign policy objectives.

In the case of this current operation against the LRA, as I have already outlined, I do not believe these conditions were met or the necessary due diligence undertaken before its launch. But we cannot just give up on the goal of ending the massacres and threat to regional stability posed by this small rebel group. That is precisely why I am urging the development of an interagency strategy to drive U.S. policy going forward. By putting in place such a proactive strategy, we can better help the region's leaders to get this mission right and protect their people from the LRA's continuing atrocities. This could finally pave the way for a new future for this region and its people and help shape an AFRICOM that works effectively for both Africa and America's security interests.

CLEAN TEA

Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the Senate many times to discuss the importance of curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Over the past several Congresses, I have introduced legislation to create a mandatory cap-and-trade program to help utilities reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide, while also regulating unhealthy emissions of mercury, nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide. Hopefully, later this year, Congress will consider an economy-wide, cap-and-trade bill to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

But one area that has not received enough attention or comprehensive treatment in climate change proposals is the transportation sector.

In all fairness, it is tricky to address. Mobile sources—like cars and trucks—are numerous and do not stay in any one jurisdiction. The amount of pollution they produce is impacted by the efficiency of the vehicle, the type of fuel it uses, as well as how far, fast and often the vehicle is driven. Managing all of those different inputs is not an easy thing to do. But we must find a way if we are serious about addressing climate change.

The transportation sector produces 30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions and is the fastest growing source of pollution. If we do not curb emissions from transportation, we will either fail to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the level scientists tell us is necessary to stave off climate change. Or we will have to ask other sectors to make up the difference.

When the transportation sector has been considered before, the focus has always been on vehicle fuel economy standards or tailpipe emissions standards. Last Congress, I was extremely

proud to play a role in increasing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy, CAFE, standard for cars and trucks for the first time in 32 years. The new standard requires the entire U.S. fleet of cars and trucks to average 35 mph by 2020.

The new standard has a better chance of success because it applies across the entire U.S. fleet, removing the loophole that encouraged auto manufacturers to build larger cars. At the same time, we structured the standard in a way that allows manufacturers to specialize in the vehicles for which they are known. Instead of having every manufacturer meet the 35 mph standard, those that build smaller cars will meet a higher standard and those that build larger cars will meet a lower one. But in the end, the fleet as a whole will reach 35 mph. We increased CAFE in a way that garnered the support of both environmentalists and the automobile industry—a model I hope we can follow in developing climate change legislation.

In the same bill that raised CAFE, Congress also established a Renewable Fuel Standard, RFS, requiring that 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel is sold in 2020—up from 9 billion gallons today.

Taken together, the CAFE and RFS is expected to save two million barrels of oil per day and save consumers more than \$80 billion at the pump. It will also reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 18 percent.

While this is a major improvement, we must remember that our goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60 to 80 percent. We need to look for other ways to make the transportation system cleaner.

That is where the bill we are introducing today comes in. The Clean Low-Emission Affordable New Transportation Act, or CLEAN TEA, would reserve a portion of any auction proceeds from a climate change bill, and dedicate it to funding transportation projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

This is a critical piece of the puzzle which, if left out, hampers the effectiveness of the other measures taken by car companies and fuel producers. For example, in 1975, we created CAFE standards to reduce oil use. But at the same time, we closed down transit systems and built homes far from workplaces, schools, groceries and doctors. As a result, driving increased by 150 percent. Therefore, even though cars got significantly more efficient, American use of oil increased 50 percent. We cannot afford to make that mistake again.

CLEAN TEA requires States and metropolitan planning organizations to review their long-range transportation plans to determine what they could do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by making their transportation system more efficient and providing alternative forms of transportation. Once they establish a goal that is appropriate for their area and a list of