

Only 25 miles south of Richmond, the city of Petersburg served as an important supply center to the Confederate capital. With its five railroad lines and key roads, Petersburg was recognized as a lynchpin of all Confederate efforts by both General Ulysses S. Grant and General Robert E. Lee, which is why on June 1864 General Grant moved to surround and isolate the City. Remarkably, for 9 1/2 months, General Lee held off the Northern troops, in what became one of the longest sieges in the history of American warfare. Eventually, both armies were forced to abandon Petersburg, leaving behind 70,000 casualties as they began their trek toward Appomattox Court-house, where General Lee would ultimately surrender.

The historic sites at Petersburg National Battlefield tell this incredible story, and serve as an important reminder of an extraordinary chapter in American history. The numerous battlefields, monuments, and museums allow not only Virginians, but all Americans, to appreciate those who came before us during one of the most trying conflicts in the history of our great Nation.

The bill before us today, H.R. 3388, expands the area of the Petersburg National Battlefield in Virginia by over 7,000 acres. The bill allows the National Park Service to acquire the land by purchase, easement, exchange, and donation from private and nonprofit land-owners. This bill would also allow for the administrative jurisdiction transfer of approximately 1.17 acres of land between the Fort Lee Military Reservation, through the Department of the Army, and the National Park Service, through the Department of the Interior. H.R. 3388 is supported by all parties involved, including each surrounding locality.

The Petersburg National Battlefield is an integral part of the local community, an important tourist destination for the Commonwealth of Virginia, and a touchstone of America's past. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3388 to ensure that this important historic site is enhanced for generations of Americans to come.

Mr. BROWN of South Carolina. I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Speaker, I again urge Members to support the bill, and I want to thank my colleague from South Carolina for managing the bills on the floor today.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Guam (Ms. BORDALLO) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3388, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, December 7, 2009.
Hon. NANCY PELOSI,
The Speaker, The Capitol, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MADAM SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 2(h) of Rule II of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Clerk received the following message from the Secretary of the Senate on December 7, 2009, at 9:31 a.m.:

That the Senate agreed to S. Res. 370.
With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,

LORRAINE C. MILLER,
Clerk of the House.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 2009, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. POE of Texas addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WOOLSEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. WOOLSEY addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONES) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. JONES addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DEFAZIO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. DEFAZIO addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. DEAL) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. DEAL of Georgia addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. KAPTUR addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. MORAN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. MORAN of Kansas addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. BURTON of Indiana addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

A DEFINABLE VICTORY IN IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 2009, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. KING) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. KING of Iowa. Madam Speaker, I appreciate being recognized and the privilege to address you here on the floor of the House of Representatives. And I've just returned within the last few hours from Afghanistan, arriving here this morning sometime around, oh, 7 or so after a long and very busy weekend in places in Afghanistan that we know as Kabul and Kandahar, Bagram, and also, a forward operating base called Spin Boldak.

And it's been my opinion for a long time, and having made at least nine different visits over to theaters that we do call theaters of war, that would include six to Iraq and three trips to Afghanistan, there are some other trips along there that I haven't chronicled, Madam Speaker, but I've found that sitting in classified briefings here in the United States Congress, here in the Capitol Building or over in the secure building in Rayburn, or going out to briefings at the White House and listening to our top military officers, our top civilian officers, including the State Department officers, give us their briefing on what's taking place in a region like that is not a fair substitute for actually going into the theater and receiving the briefings there from the people that are hands-on, on the ground, in the field.

And having an opportunity to sit down and eye-to-eye discuss these situations, generally with people from our home State, where we always have something in common and where we can get down to the frank matters of fact without hesitation because we more naturally trust each other, and we also know somebody that knows somebody, and whether we actually know the troops or not, we know the family members that are related to their family members, at a minimum. And so we build that level of trust and rapport.

This trip was similar to a number in the past. It included briefings from top military personnel, top State Department and civilian personnel, included a meeting that lasted for an extended period of time with President Mohammed Karzai of Afghanistan in the palace in Kabul, and the trip, as I mentioned, out to the forward operating base south and a little bit east of Kandahar, right on the Pakistani border.

The position that I have taken over these years has been a strong national defense position, Madam Speaker. And I would go back and catalog some of that for the benefit of your attention, and that is that, from the time we went into Iraq, and as I watched things, the liberation of Iraq and then the stagnation of our operations in Iraq, the war of attrition that we fought there for a while that wasn't coming to a successful conclusion.

And on one of my trips into that area before the "surge" became a word that was used in the common vernacular here in the United States at least, I had worked through that policy and agreed with the officers who were about to request that President Bush order the surge in Iraq.

So, in short, Madam Speaker, I was for the surge before the surge had a name. And it has proven itself, I believe, to be the successful tactic that's brought about what I have also defined in this Congress—to have achieved a definable victory in Iraq. And I will get to Afghanistan. But I introduced a resolution in February of this year that defines the victory that we've achieved in Iraq. And it goes through the list or the chronology or the history of the incidents that took place in that country, the things that we and coalition forces did to liberate the Iraqi people, and the milestones along the way, the ups and the downs of the struggle that's taken place in Iraq.

And yet, if you put it all together, and you look at the successful ratification of a Constitution, successful elections in Iraq, the emergence of the Iraqi security forces as becoming ever more proficient and ever more stable, the definition of what we were seeking to achieve in Iraq has been very closely achieved to this point. Now, there's no such thing as a locked in, guaranteed, free, and moderate people of any kind. There's not a guarantee in the United States. But by comparison with what Iraq was to what it is today, it's significantly more stable. And we expect there will be a continued transition of power in Iraq, a sharing of power in Iraq that will be brought about by legitimate elections.

And so this accomplishment in Iraq, I bring out and make this point, Madam Speaker, so that should I utter a contrast, I want you and everyone listening to understand the foundation that I build this judgment on, and that's that foundation that I believe we have achieved a definable victory in Iraq. And now, that being said, and I can certainly discount some of the

things that are going on there, and I could lay some conditions on the statement like anyone who might choose to rebut such a position. But, by the same token, a lot's been achieved.

And on my first trip into Afghanistan which was some time, I believe, in 2005, without checking the records, and perhaps 2004, but we were in some of the more difficult times in Iraq at the time that I first went to Afghanistan. But when I came back from Afghanistan, even then, in the middle part of this decade that we're in now, I said then that we'll be in Afghanistan a lot longer than we'll be in Iraq. It wasn't conventional wisdom at the time. People didn't know how we were going to get out of Iraq. They didn't know how we were going to achieve a definable victory there.

But even then, I said we'll be in Afghanistan a lot longer because, Madam Speaker, Afghanistan is a lot closer to the Stone Age than is Iraq. Iraq has resources, they have oil, they have a tradition of education. They have a history of a more moderate and more modern government that has, actually, a central government that reached out to the corners of Iraq.

Afghanistan has none of those traditions and none of those histories, and they don't have the natural resources at this point, at least, that have been developed that's going to help the treasury of Afghanistan. They had a gross domestic product, the previous time that I was there, I remember the briefing documents, of \$7.5 billion. That's the gross domestic product of Afghanistan.

Now it's reported it's gone up to around \$11.4 billion in the GDP. That's only over the last couple of years. Almost a 50 percent increase. And I suspect, Madam Speaker, that some of that has to do, since it's measured in American dollars, with the fall of the American dollar, the diminishment of the value of our American dollar. And when that happens, it's going to automatically and inversely increase the GDP of any country that's indexed to it, such as Afghanistan. But the GDP of Afghanistan is very minimal.

And at one time I compared Afghanistan's GDP to the value of the beer brewed in Wisconsin. They were about the same. A couple of years ago, the \$7.5 billion GDP of Afghanistan and the value of the beer brewed in Wisconsin was \$7 billion. So that gives you a sense of how tiny this economy is, not to disparage the beer brewers in Wisconsin of course, Madam Speaker. And this tiny little economy has struggled along. It's very much agriculture and agrarian-based, and a large percentage of the agricultural value output in Afghanistan is poppies, poppies from which heroin and opium are made, and that produce about half of the value of the ag products in Afghanistan, and perhaps more, if one were able to get an accurate accounting.

The poppy business in Afghanistan, much of it in Helman province, and

neighboring Kandahar province to a lesser degree, those poppies in Afghanistan represent about two-thirds of the world's supply of opium and heroin in the world. So Afghanistan has long been a producer of poppies. But the system that has emerged and developed, we knew it then, we knew when we went in to liberate Afghanistan in the late fall or early winter of 2001, that the heroin trade from poppies was a significant component of the funding of our enemies, the funding of the Taliban.

□ 1345

Glad it remains that way today, and in some respects it may be worse than it was before. And yet there has been an effort under way to reduce the production of poppies in Afghanistan and thereby reducing the amount of dollars that go to the people that we declare to be our enemies. And these would be presumably the people who have attacked the United States, or plotted to do so.

I advocated, Madam Speaker, that on the day we went into Afghanistan, the time that American forces arrived there and became a predominant force there on the ground in Afghanistan was the time that we should have gone in and taken out the poppies. Just sprayed them. We can eradicate most any kind of foliage if we want to do that. And I've made this argument with every United States ambassador—and with one exception, their representative instead because the ambassador wasn't available—that we've had in Afghanistan since the beginning. And their response to me has been, We can't upset the economy in Afghanistan by taking them out of the poppy business. And besides, do I, as a Member of Congress, who advocates such a thing, understand the difficulty and logistics of spraying that many poppies?

And certainly I do understand the difficulty. I'm not sure the ambassadors do. They lay out a comparison that it would be something like four football fields wide, all the way around the Earth at the equator, the equivalent of taking out that much crop. Well, that's an awful lot of crop, Madam Speaker. But we sprayed almost the entire crop in Iowa on average more than once just last summer, and we have a few squadrons of spray planes in Iowa that have the capability of going in and taking out that poppy crop. And if we did that, that would shut down billions of dollars that go into the hands of the Taliban and al Qaeda, billions of dollars that are used against the United States.

Now, some of these briefings will say it's somewhere between \$70 million and \$120 million. Well, if that's the case, I would ask the question, If it's \$3 billion, \$3.5 billion worth of poppies altogether, if that's what the crop is worth, how does only \$70 million to \$120 million get into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda, and where does the rest of the money go?

I'll submit, I think it's a lot more money than that. I don't think it's possible for us to track that money. And I don't accept the values that have been put on it with such confidence in places like Afghanistan when I can't, Madam Speaker, find out from the director of the Drug Enforcement Agency here in the United States how many dollars are spent on illegal drugs in the streets of America in a year.

When they tell me, We don't know; we don't know what the drugs are worth that are bought and sold and used and go in people's bloodstream and up the noses of Americans, we can't put a value on that within a billion dollars, how can the State Department tell me in a country that is that close to the Stone Age that doesn't have communications like we have, doesn't have a transportation network as anybody would imagine for any kind of a country, how can we get that estimate close in Afghanistan but we can't even guess at it in the United States?

So I will submit this: if they're right, the poppy crop is worth about half of the GDP of Afghanistan 2 years ago, may or may not be right, then we should be thinking of it in terms of roughly half the GDP in Afghanistan today.

In any case, it's lots of money. It's tens of millions at a very minimum, more likely hundreds of millions and maybe billions of dollars, and large shares of that go into the coffers of the Taliban and al Qaeda; and that money is used to pay the people that they recruit that plot and plan and train against us and to provide for them supplies, munitions, weaponry that get used around this world in terrorist plots.

So the number one effort to eradicate the terrorists that are in the breeding and training grounds in the areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be to shut off the money that comes from the illegal drugs that come from the poppy trade.

So instead, we have State Department personnel, USAID and USDA and other personnel that are seeking to negotiate with Afghan farmers to encourage them to raise pomegranates and fruits and nuts of all kinds, especially vines and trees, so they have to invest in longer than an annual crop, a perennial crop that makes them stick with that crop a little bit longer.

We're investing millions in that, and we're providing subsidies to Afghanistan of significant dollars. Now, here I will just pose this number: a billion dollars, a billion U.S. dollars invested in subsidies in Afghanistan to try to convince them that there are crops that pay better than raising the illegal poppy crop.

Well, I think a big degree of this is poppycock, Madam Speaker, to think that we can negotiate with people that are raising illegal drugs and convince them if we just gave them enough subsidy, they will stop doing that. They will always do what pays the best. That's the way things work.

And the world does have a free market economy. Can you imagine going down to pay the people in Mexico and Central and South America not to raise coca or not to raise the tree that produces cocaine, and can we convince them not to raise marijuana crops? Can we convince them not to convert the products that are now smuggled in from China or shipped directly into the United States into methamphetamines because there is something that pays better? It will always find its way to the market.

So we need to raise the cost of transaction. If we raise the cost of transaction, that means knock out these poppies. They will blossom. It's the nature of a poppy. They're easy to see from the air. I know we have poppies growing in places where we don't go with our military, and we're looking at perhaps as much as 90 percent of the poppies raised in Afghanistan, which is someplace two-thirds or more of the world production of poppies taking place in Helmand province down there where we are going to send reinforcements.

And, Madam Speaker, I applaud the President for finally making the decision after 3 months of—what shall I say—floating trial balloons and deliberating, and having discussions at the White House and deliberations. When the request that emerged in the public, a request that was submitted by General McChrystal—and if my date is correct it would be August 30 of this year—and by September 23, that report was leaked into the media. Who knows where it came from, Madam Speaker, and I'm generally a harsh critic of people inside the military system that would leak anything that's classified information.

Now, I don't know if this request was classified, but it was leaked. And I have not heard anyone report how it was leaked, but I suspect it was somebody who wanted the American people to know the request was made by General McChrystal. And I suspect that if that request of General McChrystal, at least the substance of that request that was leaked, that was put out into the press that was reported to be 40,000 troops necessary or risk failure in Afghanistan, if that report, if that request had not been submitted, Madam Speaker, I suspect that we would have never found out what General McChrystal's actual request was.

In fact, back channels tell me that was the lowest number that General McChrystal asked for. And back channels tell me that the number between 40,000 and 80,000 was incrementally dialed in so that if there were 80,000 troops sent rather than 40,000, the odds of success increased in proportion with the number of troops. Less than 40,000, we risk failure; and 80,000 troops would bring us to the highest probability of success. It could be dialed down from 80,000 and still have success, taking the risks, of course, in proportion. But dialed down below 40,000, I don't under-

stand that General McChrystal entertained the thought that 30,000 troops would be enough to do the job.

However, our military, being the brave and noble warriors that they are, do keep a stiff upper lip, and none of them would not utter these things to me because they know what their orders are from the Commander in Chief by rights, by the rights of the Constitution, by the rights of the results of the election, the President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of our military; and implicitly in the Constitution, the President sets the foreign policy.

Our foreign policy now is 30,000 more troops deployed into Afghanistan starting sometime in January and then with a look at 18 months as a period of time to start to withdraw troops out of Afghanistan. And having achieved the goals that have been defined to the American people in the speech the President gave over a little over a week ago—and again, I would reiterate that I was part of the first delegation of Members of Congress to arrive in Afghanistan after the President's speech when he announced he would send an additional 30,000 troops—this deployment of 30,000 troops and the stiff upper lip that's being kept by our military requires one to read between the lines to draw conclusions of what their real judgment is because they have their orders, and they will make due.

But when I see that the lowest number—and again this is back-channel information to me; it's not classified and it's not a briefing. Back channel information to me says 40,000 was the lowest number asked for by General McChrystal. General McChrystal and our troops in Afghanistan got a number that was 75 percent of the minimum number I believe was offered as a necessary number of troops to conduct the operations in Afghanistan with prospects of, let me say, avoiding mission failure in Afghanistan.

So they will make do with what they have. And we have gone out and negotiated with some of our NATO partners; and I saw troops there from Germany and Great Britain and from Canada and a number of other countries that are part of our NATO partners. They are there. And they're working hand-in-glove with American troops.

So the additional anticipation of 7,000 or more coming from the NATO section will be very helpful, Madam Speaker. And it doesn't substitute for the request, I don't believe. I don't think we get to say now it's 37,000. I would have rather seen—if it's going to be the minimum number asked for by General McChrystal, I don't think his request was, Oh, by the way, you don't need to send me any if NATO will come up with 40,000. I don't think that was part of the equation at all because our commanders value—and they should—our American troops as being more effective than the troops that are put together in the coalitions from NATO

themselves, even though we have valuable partners and even though they send some very, very good people there.

A little aside: I looked around the airport in Kandahar, and I hadn't thought about the Europeans that were deployed there in Kandahar. It'd been a little over a year since I'd been there. But when I saw all of these bicycles out there, I knew that I actually was in a place where there were a lot of Europeans that were deployed, and that turned out to be the case, Madam Speaker.

In any case, it will be 30,000 troops, not a minimum of 40,000. It certainly won't be 80,000. One might argue we're 50,000 troops short of what the optimum would have been, as back channels say would have been the best wish list for General McChrystal.

And now what I find on the ground is this: the city of Kabul is more stable than I have seen it. The streets of Kabul seem to have a certain order to them. If you watch the people who are moving around, they're not looking over their shoulder, they're not worried about IEDs going off. They're conducting the business there as they have for centuries in Kabul. Little markets, meat hanging on hooks out in the open air collecting that Afghan dust. And if there is one word I would use to describe Afghanistan, it's always been "dust." Dust everywhere, dust all the time. And if it rains, there's dust underneath the little layer of crust that forms if it rains a little bit in Afghanistan. Dust there all the time. But the streets of Kabul being, I think, as stable and orderly as I have seen them and the signs of war have diminished some in Kabul.

Same would go to Kandahar to a certain degree, although Kandahar not being quite as safe in the sense that you get in Kabul itself.

That tells me that we've made some progress. Two-thirds of the population of Afghanistan can be influenced around those urban zones that I have mentioned, the cities in Afghanistan. The balance of that is out there in the countryside: people that live in the valleys and mountains. And those that have an agricultural base and foundation whether they're raising a crop out of the soil or whether they're herding the sheep or their goats, that rural agrarian Afghanistan is the hardest part to reach out to. They have never had a centralized powerful government in Afghanistan. They've never been able to project power out of Kabul out to the corners of Afghanistan. And, today, that's our challenge.

Our challenge, as has been laid out by the President, is to rebuild and in some cases just simply go out and construct the institutions in Afghanistan that are necessary to get government services out to the corners of Afghanistan.

And to provide first for security. We have learned—and it has been true, I believe, for all of human experience—and sometimes we have to relearn that

we can't put down insurrection if we can't provide for stability and security. Security is number one. And then once you establish security, then you can establish the institution of government, the institutions of education, the institutions of a peaceful society.

But without safety, without security, nothing can flow from it when you have only anarchy and that bloody clash of the power struggles that take place, if there's a vacuum for power.

□ 1400

So the charge for President Karzai, for our American people, and for the NATO people is to be able to clear those areas that the Taliban now occupy and control, where the Taliban are providing actually some function of government, including dispute resolution. However brutal it might be, the Taliban are providing some dispute resolution. We need to clear those areas—this is going to sound familiar, Madam Speaker—clear and hold and build, and then transfer.

First we need to clear those areas of the Taliban and to whatever extent al Qaeda might exist in Afghanistan, and we need to hold them. Once we clear a place, we can't leave it. We found out in Iraq that if we would go in and clear al Qaeda, or any of the militia, out of a community in Iraq and then pull our troops out of there, they would just form back again. I don't know why we ever thought that that could be successful.

I remember hearing reports that there was a city or two in Iraq that were controlled by the enemy. And I was astonished that we would go in, liberate a country, and then tolerate the enemy coming into the cities, setting up shop and running the government there, and more or less setting up a fortress and a training camp right there within those cities in Iraq. We learned that lesson the hard way, and we had to go in with the surge and clean out these cities and restabilize.

According to General Petraeus, we brought our own troops in and essentially bunked them right there in the community so they were invested in the security 24/7; not a patrol that just went in and pulled back out again, but Americans that lived right there and provided 24/7 security for the people in those communities. We are going to have to do some of that in Afghanistan as well. But in Iraq we had to go in under the surge, clear and hold those communities and not give that real estate back, clear it and hold it, and then we needed to rebuild some infrastructure.

It's not as big a job to rebuild infrastructure to prewar conditions in Afghanistan as it is probably anywhere else I can think of. We have to rebuild infrastructure, establish the institutions of local government, and any educational institutions that we can set up, outreach to the farmers to try to do the things that we can do with American advisers and whatever comes from

the NATO people, establish a stability of security and the stability of the unity of the institutions and hold that area. And while that is going on, we need to go to other areas and clear and hold and build and set it up so we could transfer then to full Afghan control.

Well, here are some contrasts, again, between Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq has a population of 28 million. Afghanistan has a population of 28 million. It's the same population, as close as we can count.

The geographical area of Iraq is about the size of California. The geographical area of Afghanistan is about the size of Texas. And so those are the differences. It means the Afghans are stretched out a little more thinly in their population density.

The geography is significantly different in some of the areas. The Iraq geography we know—desert and sand. When you get into the north, then you run into some mountains and some greenness up there in the Kurdish area. But a lot of Iraq looks the same to me when I see it.

In Afghanistan there is a sharper difference in the topography across the country. There are a lot of stark, brutal, bold, stone mountains in the east, around to the south and over towards the west. But also, the further west you go, the more high plains and dust you have out that way. It is a forbidding topography in Afghanistan as compared to that in Iraq.

But on the security side, in Iraq we have managed to, working with our partners and with the full cooperation and support of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Government, including President Maliki, now provide a number of over 600,000 trained security personnel in Iraq with Iraqi military and Iraqi police forces joined together. I have watched them drill and watched some of their special forces operations. And even though the best that the Iraqis have to offer doesn't match up with the best America has to offer, they look pretty good. There are just over 600,000. The last number I saw was 609,000 Iraqis trained and on line and up and running for the security personnel.

But in Afghanistan, and I'm going to have to work off of memory here, Madam Speaker, because it looks as though my notes don't include these numbers. But in Afghanistan, we are struggling to put together a 100,000 Afghan Army and, at the same time, around 130,000 Afghan police. The Afghan police have significant difficulty in achieving credibility. The people's lack of confidence in the Afghan police comes because of a long history of corruption. The police have been, I will say, not paid a lot, except when it came to bribes. They supplemented their income with bribes. The corruption that has been there in the Afghan police makes it very hard to stand them up and think that they are going to look like, say, New York's Finest, for example. They will never be that. And the culture and the history of the country won't allow that.

But we need to get the Afghan police to be as good as they can be and the Afghan Army to be as good as they can be. And even then, our best hopes are, by the time the President has scheduled a beginning of the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, the 18 months takes us into the summer of 2011, by that period of time, the goal, the target, is about 230,000 Afghanistan Army and Afghan police that will be providing the security in a country that is spread out more than Iraq is with the same population of Iraq. Where Iraq has 609,000, Afghanistan would have presumably 230,000, a good number of them just trained within the last 18 months.

We know there will be turnover. We know there will be corruption. We know some of them will have to be pulled out by their roots and made an example of, and others will need to be created. And those that have credibility, honor, and integrity will have to be lifted up and promoted.

When we look at an Afghan Army that is perhaps 100,000 strong and an army that has not functioned in a fashion that we would imagine, and we think of the Afghan Army as something that goes out and operates independently, but, truthfully, they are operating with American and NATO advisers in almost every case. An army of 100,000 for a population of 28 million compared to an army of around 400,000, a little more than that in Iraq, for a population of 28 million.

We have many times listened to our military advisers tell us how long it takes to stand up a brigade commander, and they will tell us it takes about 20 years of training and active duty to stand up a brigade commander for our military. And yet, the charge is that we take an army, an Afghan Army that doesn't have the traditions that the United States has nor the knowledge nor the command and control structure, and many times they have illiterate troops that can't read or write. In fact, the literacy rate among Afghans is about 20 percent among the men and 1 or 2 percent among the women. So it's awfully hard to educate someone who can't read and write in their own language. It is hard to identify the best talent in the population if they can't take the written exam. They can only be given an oral exam. It's pretty hard to command troops if you can't read. So, naturally, the literate Afghans will be the ones that will move up through the chain of command. And we have a whole society that needs to be educated and taught to function in a literate fashion.

But to imagine that we can stand up an army in Afghanistan and do so in 18 months by training brigade commanders and on up, officers to do that in an 18-month period of time when it takes 20 years in the United States, and do so in a language that they understand many of them only orally, that they can't read and write in, it boggles the mind to think about how

difficult this task will be to reach this goal where we can start to draw troops down in a year and a half.

I listened to the strategy of clear and hold and build and transfer. I'm not surprised to hear it. I expected that's what I would hear.

I have looked at the numbers of troops that we've committed and the numbers that we hope to recruit out of Afghanistan and the numbers that we hope to be able to convince to come to Afghanistan from the other NATO countries, and it looks like we've got at least a verbal agreement on that, roughly 7,000 additional troops. I have looked at the geography being stretched out the way it is, and I stand and look at the Pakistani border and realize that even though we can control most of the real estate in Afghanistan and probably will control all the real estate in Afghanistan, by the time those additional 30,000 troops arrive, we won't have a license to go into Pakistan. They still have a sanctuary in the neighboring country of Pakistan. Pakistan has a population of, I believe, 173 million. The number indicates a lot of high population in Pakistan and more resources in Pakistan. There are a lot of big mountains there.

The Pakistanis themselves are like people everywhere. They are going to look out for their own interests. Well, their own interests aren't necessarily to put all their resources in defeating the Taliban and rooting out what is left of al Qaeda in the mountains in Pakistan. Their interests are in protecting the Pakistani people. There aren't a lot of them up in the mountains where we think their military needs to go. And their interests are in protecting the Pakistani Government and not overreaching so that the Pakistani Government doesn't get overthrown by the Taliban. That's the struggle that is going on there. So they will take on the Taliban that threatened the Pakistanis, but they don't want to go out and pick a new fight with those elements that are there whose primary objective is to damage the United States and damage the rest of the free world.

So in a lot of the cases, Madam Speaker, it's where you sit is where you stand, that the position that each country takes is a lot like the position that individuals take. We will make our argument at the table for the things that advantage us. And we are pretty creative, and we can self-rationalize and sit down at the table and make the arguments that defend our interests. It's true with people, it's true in this Congress, and it's true when nations negotiate with nations.

So we should always look at what is the interests of Afghanistan; what are the interests of Mohammed Karzai, the President. He would like to stay in power. He would like to serve out his second full term. He is the one that says that he was not reelected, that there was an election. He regrets the corruption, but because his nearest op-

ponent pulled out of the race, he was awarded the election by default. He does regret that, Madam Speaker; at least, those are the words he used to speak to us on this.

But President Karzai has his interests, and the Afghan people that have influence with President Karzai and the Afghan Government have their interests. Taliban have their interests and al Qaeda theirs. There are different groups of the Taliban and other groups that we are fighting as well. It is very complicated, and it is not simple, and it's not at all completely militarily tactical. It's very much how do we put together the solutions of first providing security, maintaining that security, building the institutions and the infrastructure that are necessary so that the central government in Afghanistan can reach out to the corners of the country, such as the place where I was just yesterday at Spin Boldak down on the Pakistani border, and other places.

All of that needs to happen, Madam Speaker. And as General Petraeus said, the enemy gets a vote, too, and they will be working against us and mounting operations where they can. But my general overall impressions are this: I believe that the strategy that has been put together is one where we have to thread the needle. We have the very minimal amount of resources necessary to provide the security. If everything works according to time frame and schedule, there is a chance this can be successful.

But I do not see, when I look at the plan, that there is a redundancy that's built in, that there is a fallback position, that there's an overbuild that comes in. The "just in case" resources don't appear to be there.

Now, I have spent a lot of my life planning logistics and taking on projects. No, not directing wars. But, for example, if I would go into a construction site, and it might be 40 acres of cornfield, and we need to turn it into a school complex, there are a lot of challenges that go on. Things go wrong. The weather works against you. You have people with different interests that are undermining the overall goal. They are breaking up the sequence of the scheduling you set up. Machines break down. And sometimes they throw a wrench in the works, a permit that wasn't required before. You have to plan. You set a schedule. You plan to meet the schedule, and you have to have reserve resources to make sure you can make up for the difference. It might be bring in more men, more workers we say now. It might be bring in more machines. It might be overlap the duties that are assigned from contractor to contractor. It might be go to a different supplier if one of them can't get the materials in time for you. It might be work 7 days a week. It might be work 24/7. It might be double up with crews and go 24/7. But however it is when you have to meet the deadline, when you have the

goal, you have to be planning what you'll do if things don't work out.

□ 1415

Now we have a plan in Afghanistan, 30,000 more troops, starting to insert them in January to get them in position for the beginning of the fighting season, which, I guess, nobody can really tell you when that is—that's when the enemy attacks us in a greater number than it is right now—but roughly mid-to-late March would be what we can anticipate. And that we have 18 months to clear any areas in Afghanistan that are held by our enemy—and I am going to define that enemy as they define the enemy to me, the Taliban; clear and hold, and build the institutions and rebuild the infrastructure, and then transfer in 18 months.

Now, we've been there for 8 years, Madam Speaker, 8 years in Afghanistan. There has been a lot accomplished. And we should not diminish the accomplishments in Afghanistan. They have been significant in that Afghanistan has a Constitution that has been ratified, they have held successful national elections—and some here will object that there was voter fraud in the last election, and there was, no one denies that. And to the extent that the voter fraud was there, I would like to know exactly how many votes were stolen or how many ballot boxes were stuffed by the supporters of either side. And I don't think Karzai would tell us that it didn't happen on his side—I think it's almost certain that it did. Were those numbers great enough to change the result of the election? Probably not.

I will lament any ballot that is not a legitimate one, but the question then becomes: Is this government legitimate? Well, it is among the most legitimate governments that Afghanistan has ever had. We know that the first election electing nationwide offices and leaders on the soil in Afghanistan took place because American and NATO forces allowed that to happen. They provided the security so people could go to the polls.

I remember that there were Iowa National Guard troops on the ground guarding the polling places for the first time in the history on that real estate for people to go to the polls and vote in a national election. It had never happened before. So they have come a long way, Madam Speaker, and we should not diminish the accomplishments.

When you think of the United States of America establishing the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and we fought a war that went on for several years—I'll say 7 years or 8 years—the Treaty of Paris was signed by John Jay in, I think, 1783. By 1787, we produced a Constitution; by 1789 we ratified a Constitution. Thirteen years from the date of the Declaration of Independence until the ratification of the Constitution—which didn't guarantee the centuries-old existence of the United States; it laid down the foundation

where we could continue to fight for liberty and fight for freedom and shape a Nation.

I don't think it was imagined that the United States of America would become the unchallenged greatest Nation in the world. I don't think they knew where the Pacific Ocean was—in, fact I know they didn't. They had to guess how far it was. And Lewis and Clark chartered it in 1803 and 1804, that's when we found out, not in 1789, when the Constitution was ratified.

So this dream of manifest destiny, this dream of this great Nation, wasn't really in the imagination of the Founding Fathers. And yet in 13 years we got where we did with a ratified Constitution from the time of the Declaration. When you look at Iraq and Afghanistan, both of those countries have outpaced the development speed of the United States of America itself, if you measure elections, and even if you measure legitimate elections, and if you measure the ratification of constitutions where there was no tradition before.

So we should be, I think, respectful of the accomplishments that have been made in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It takes a long time to build institutions. We shouldn't just automatically think that because when we opened up the geography book when we were studying eighth-grade geography and looked at the map of the world, and that wooden pointer up there by the chalk board said, here's Pakistan, here's Afghanistan, here's Iran. When we looked at those borders, we envisioned them as borders like we would envision borders of the United States of America, at least. And those borders don't look like I anticipated that they would, Madam Speaker.

But the borders of Afghanistan, especially with Pakistan, are not clearly defined. We have a place that we declare to be the border, but it's not recognized in the same fashion by the people that live near the border. They want to be able to move back and cross across the border and do commerce and trade like they always have. And the agreement on exactly where that is is not a handshake even between Afghanistan and Pakistan; there are still tensions there, there is distrust there. There is the worry that Pakistan focuses towards India with a fear of India as their primary enemy, and they're afraid that Afghanistan will make common cause with India. Those little tensions play out just like they play out between people and neighbors and other countries as well.

But the difficulty of the task in Afghanistan needs to be measured with the reality of what is going on there on the ground and within the historical context of what we are living with today, and that is that a lot of progress has been made, and that the central government in Kabul has never reached out to those borders, those borders that we see on the map that aren't really at all like the borders we would imagine

when we look at Afghanistan and look at the map itself.

We need to understand that many of the enemy are living undisturbed in the mountains in Pakistan. And even though we get a report occasionally that an unmanned drone strayed across the border and dropped a missile into a household that happened to have some al Qaeda terrorists in it, even though we get some reports of that, operations in Pakistan, if they exist, they don't exist formally and they don't exist in any kind of an organized tactical sense.

And so I ask the question, Madam Speaker: Has there ever been an example in the history of the world where a foreign power went into another country and took on an insurgency that operated within that country that also had a sanctuary in a neighboring sovereign nation? In other words, as it was impossible to defeat the Vietnamese as long as they could pull back to North Vietnam or go back up the Ho Chi Minh trail, as long as they could choose the time of engagement and the method of engagement, as long as they had a sanctuary to hide in, a line across which we would not go, it was, I don't believe, possible to defeat the Vietnamese. Same with North Korea. We didn't go after them where they planned their operations, and therefore we ended up with a negotiated settlement.

As I pose this question, I bring it out, Madam Speaker, so we understand here the great difficulty in defeating an enemy that has a sanctuary in a neighboring sovereignty. In other words, if al Qaeda or the Taliban can come into Afghanistan, attack American troops or attack the Afghan people or their military or their police, security personnel, and disengage and go back to Pakistan, and we can chase them to the border, and we've got to stop, and if the Pakistanis are not standing there to meet them, then they can choose the time and the place of their engagement. They can build up and train and gather munitions and then conduct those operations. They can plan operations all over the world, and they have, because they are protected in a sanctuary.

So my argument here, Madam Speaker, is, there needs to be political support for going to the sanctuaries of our enemies, wherever they may be, to take out our enemies that have pledged to kill us. And I remember sitting through a whole weekend of analysis of this—it would have been in January or February of 2003—when we brought in experts. It was a bipartisan retreat weekend, Democrats and Republicans together. And in this retreat weekend, Tom Friedman gave the opening address and raised a series of question. And we sat around all weekend going, What did we ever do to make them hate us? How can we make them like us again so they don't attack us like they did on September 11? What was

wrong with us that caused them to attack us? Who do we repair who we are as Americans?

Madam Speaker, that was the mindset going on here in the United States, especially over on this side of the aisle, and to some degree over on the Republican side of the aisle as well. What if there was nothing wrong with us? What if it was all that was wrong with them? We didn't anticipate in 2001 that there was an enemy that believed as strongly as they did that their path to salvation is in killing Jews, Christians and capitalists, probably in that order. And if they could get a twofer—and they almost always did—they counted that to be a very good thing.

That's why they attacked the economic center of the United States, because they believed that they could kill capitalists at the same time. They despise freedom, they despise liberty, they despise capitalism, they despise Judeo-Christianity. All of that is the enemy of the radical jihadis that we are seeking to psychoanalyze instead of defeat. And believing that we can rebuild institutions in 18 months that we haven't been able to rebuild in 8 years, it smacks of a significant degree of optimism, which I am willing to cautiously buy into provided we provide the resources to do that, and provided we are willing to go where the enemy is.

If that is in Pakistan, I don't want to sit and wait for them to decide to come and attack American troops, or plant IEDs and take out Americans that are there trying to rebuild the institutions and allow the enemy to hide in a neighboring Pakistan. When Pancho Villa came into the United States and murdered about 17 people back in 1912—in fact, Madam Speaker, it might have been the other way around; it might have been 12 people murdered in 1917—we sent our military down there to chase Pancho Villa around because we wouldn't tolerate attacks that came from foreign countries. We knew we couldn't let them have a sanctuary.

If we let our enemies have sanctuaries, they chose the time and the place that they attacked us. We knew that in the early part of the 20th century; we seem to have somehow forgotten that in the early part of the 21st century. We've got to go take the enemy on where they live, where they train, where they lay up, where their munitions are, where their equipment is. We've got to be willing to do that.

And any country that will harbor terrorists doesn't deserve the support of the United States of America. I remember President Bush saying words to the effect of, If you harbor terrorists, you're a terrorist. You are either with us or against us. He made it very clear at the onset of this, and now we seem to be reluctant to even declare who our enemies are.

Another component that I think is significant, Madam Speaker, for the American people to know is that there has been a significant diminishment in

the focus on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. It seems as though the position today of the White House and the military is that al Qaeda no longer exists in any significant way in Afghanistan. I remember about two weeks ago or a little more, General Jones—a general handpicked by President Obama—said that the numbers of al Qaeda in Afghanistan are less than 100, less than 100 al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Now, maybe that's true, I don't know. I don't think we have a way of knowing. But if that is the best intelligence that we have, and that is the intelligence that's been delivered in public to the American people by General Jones, then I have to say I don't have any supplemental intelligence that trumps that number.

It just doesn't seem plausible to me that we would mobilize all of this effort and focus ourselves on an enemy called al Qaeda, and have the President of the United States repeatedly, at least 40 times, declare his dedication to going after Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and defeating them where they are. That was at least 40 times as candidate Obama, then United States Senator Obama, sold himself to the American people and sold his national security credentials to the American people. Forty times, at least, he said he would go after Osama bin Laden, and that he would defeat al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and occasionally he added the Taliban to it.

Now, al Qaeda has been pulled out of the dialogue with Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's name has only been uttered four times by the President of the United States in the year and a month and 3 days since he has been elected President, and those four times, three of them were in response to direct questions asked by the press, and the other time he brought it into another discussion. But at no time has the President said, since he was elected in 1 year and 1 month and 3 days, I will go get Osama bin Laden, I will defeat bin Laden and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. That stopped. That rhetoric stopped abruptly. The 3rd of November, 2008 was the last time Barack Obama spoke of taking out Osama bin Laden. So that actually makes it 1 year, 1 month, and 4 days, to be precise, since the President has said he is going to take out Osama bin Laden.

And now here we are with a minimum number of troops, minus about 25 percent of the minimum number, to go in and stand up the security forces in Afghanistan, take those numbers up to around 230,000, and then have a goal to take that number up higher than that, but to get that recruitment done and the training done with the commanding officers necessary. Even though we know it takes 20 years to get them ready, we are going to do it in 18 months, with a minimum number of resources, and we are going to rebuild the institutions, we are going to clear, we are going to hold, we are going to build, and we are going to transfer.

□ 1430

All of that sounds right, and it sounds good to me. I know a plan when I read one. I understand when I read the contingency plans the redundancies that are built in. I look for that because, for part of a success in a mission, it is necessary to make the contingency plans because things never go the way you plan them to be. There are always pitfalls along the way. There are always things that don't work well. Sometimes it's just bad luck.

I know from my own experience, when I plan logistics as precisely as I can and when I build in the contingency plans and build in the redundancy, then things fall apart anyway. I have to go back and put together a new plan and present that new approach; but about the third time I do that, I finally get to that point where I realize I can keep throwing resources at this over and over again and always add just the minimum to get it done.

Sometimes just the minimum to get it done is just enough to guarantee it isn't going to work. At a certain point, you have to pour enough resources in where you can say, by golly, this will fix it, and I'm done re-devising the plan, and I'm done dragging this out through days and months and weeks and years. We're going to solve this problem.

We're going to solve it with enough resources. If we don't do that, we can't move on to the next thing, the next mission, the next challenge for America.

So I'm going to stand here, proposing that we provide not only the resources that are necessary for our military to protect and to advance the destiny of America but that we provide backup plans, contingency plans, redundancy and that we're ready to alter this plan with more resources, if necessary, in order to achieve or to set about achieving in both Iraq and in Afghanistan a definable victory. We have done so in Iraq. We seek to do that in Afghanistan.

President Karzai recognizes that the Bush doctrine remains intact, that promoting freedom and a stable self-governing country in Afghanistan lays out the foundation consistent with the Bush doctrine, which is to provide for that foundation of legitimate government. If that happens, the voice of the people is heard. When the voice of the people is heard through the ballot box and through other means of self-expression—freedom of the press will be another one—then the tension diminishes.

We don't have to have revolutions in America because we have elections in America. They don't have to have terrorists and revolutions in places like Iraq or Afghanistan if they have elections there, if the voice of the people is heard and if there is dispute resolution by a legitimate means under the rule of law.

President Karzai understands the Bush doctrine is not dead. The Bush

doctrine is very much alive. The directive of the strategy that was laid out by President Obama actually maintains and holds the Bush doctrine intact. It just does so with a minimum number of resources, and we're going to have to look forward to, I'll say, the utter excellence of our noble American troops to bring about an accomplishment there that, I think, could use more resources to ensure a successful result in Afghanistan.

While this is going on, I want to, Madam Speaker, continue to press the President of the United States and the people in America to look at a strategy that goes beyond this amorphous line around through the mountains and between Afghanistan and Pakistan that we cannot defeat an enemy that has a sovereign sanctuary, an enemy that can choose its time to attack us and to lay up and hold up and train.

Furthermore, we'd better start paying attention to this global war on terror. It is not a police action. It is a war against people who ideologically oppose us. We are now raising in the United States terrorists from within the United States who are attacking free people in other parts of the world. We had five terrorist operations that emerged in a single day.

There was one in Dallas, two in New York, one in Chicago, and another one in North Carolina. I think that covers most of them, homegrown to some extent. We have the Somali terrorists out of Minneapolis—homegrown. We have the individual who was just arrested today, or charged today, with helping to plan the massacre that took place a little over a year ago in Mumbai. These are Americans who are now projecting terror around other parts of the world.

We need to get with this and understand the enemy that we are fighting. We need to put a plan in place to clean this up in the United States of America, to eradicate the habitat that breeds terrorists like that, to defeat the culture that breeds people who believe their path to salvation is in killing freedom-loving, God-fearing people like we are here in the United States of America.

This is not just a little bit of an engagement of our law enforcement. This is a clash of ideologies. They are committed. We need to be. We need to understand our enemy, Madam Speaker.

That has been the purpose of my discussion here this afternoon. I appreciate your attention to this matter.

To all of the Members of Congress, as you tune in and listen and to the American people who have the benefit of this open dialogue, I urge our attention to the matter, to the educational upgrade of all of the people in this country.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Ms. BORDALLO) to revise and

extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Ms. WOOLSEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DEFAZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. KAPTUR, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. BROWN of South Carolina) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. POE of Texas, for 5 minutes, December 11 and 14.

Mr. JONES, for 5 minutes, December 11 and 14.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, for 5 minutes, today, December 8, 9 and 10.

Mr. HALL of New York, for 5 minutes, December 8.

Mr. DEAL of Georgia, for 5 minutes, December 8.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. KING of Iowa. Madam Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 8, 2009, at 9 a.m., for morning-hour debate.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

4877. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting authorization of three officers to wear the authorized insignia of the grade of Rear Admiral; to the Committee on Armed Services.

4878. A letter from the Under Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting a letter regarding the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems and the Joint Tactical Radio System procurements; to the Committee on Armed Services.

4879. A letter from the Chair, Congressional Oversight Panel, transmitting the Panel's monthly report pursuant to Section 125(b)(1) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343; to the Committee on Financial Services.

4880. A letter from the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting the Department's final rule — Suspension of Community Eligibility [Docket ID: FEMA-2008-0020; Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-8101] received November 13, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Financial Services.

4881. A letter from the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting the Department's final rule — Changes in Flood Elevation Determinations [Docket ID: FEMA-2008-0020; Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-B-1067] received November 12, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Financial Services.

4882. A letter from the Chief Counsel, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting the Department's final rule — Changes in Flood Elevation Determinations [Docket ID: FEMA-2008-0020; Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-B-1070] received November 13, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Financial Services.

4883. A letter from the Chairman and President, Export-Import Bank, transmitting a report on transactions involving U.S. exports

to United Kingdom pursuant to Section 2(b)(3) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended; to the Committee on Financial Services.

4884. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Education, transmitting the Department's final rule — Institutional Eligibility under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, and the Secretary's Recognition of Accrediting Agencies [Docket ID: ED-2009-OPE-0009] (RIN: 1840-AD00) received October 29, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

4885. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Education, transmitting the Department's final rule — General Non-Loan Programmatic Issues [Docket ID: ED-2009-OPE-0005] (RIN:1840-AC99) received October 29, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

4886. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Education, transmitting the Department's final rule — Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program [Docket ID: ED-2009-OPE-0004] (RIN: 1840-AC98) received October 29, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

4887. A letter from the Director, Office of Policy, Reports and Disclosure, Department of Labor, transmitting the Department's final rule — Labor Organizations Annual Financial Reports (RIN: 1215-AB62) received November 2, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

4888. A letter from the Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury, transmitting a six-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Syria that was declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(c); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

4889. A letter from the Under Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting Pursuant to Section 27(f) of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 1(f) of Executive Order 11958, Transmittal No. 18-09 informing of an intent to sign a Project Agreement with Czech Republic; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

4890. A letter from the Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, Department of State, transmitting report prepared by the Department of State concerning international agreements other than treaties entered into by the United States to be transmitted to the Congress within the sixty-day period specified in the Case-Zablocki Act; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

4891. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Policy, Management and Budget, Department of the Interior, transmitting the Department's Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 Report; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4892. A letter from the Associate Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, transmitting a report pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4893. A letter from the Commissioner, Social Security Administration, transmitting the Administration's Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2009; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

4894. A letter from the Program Analyst, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Revision of Colored Federal Airway; Washington [Docket No.: FAA-2009-0970; Airspace Docket No. 09-ANM-15] (RIN: 2120-AA66) received November 13, 2009, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to