

took the lives of their loved ones and the nature of their vital work.

This legislation will provide \$500,000 to identify historic landmarks, like the Mount Charleston crash site, to recognize and pay tribute to the sacrifices of these men and others.

I would like to reiterate my thanks for Mr. Steve Ririe of Las Vegas, whose tireless efforts brought to light the events surrounding the death of these fourteen men on Mount Charleston over fifty years ago, and for the efforts of State Senator Raymond Rawson, who shepherded through the Nevada legislature a resolution honoring these heroes.

A grateful Nation owes a debt of supreme gratitude to the silent heroes of the Cold War. I urge my colleagues to support this long-overdue tribute to the contribution and sacrifice of these Americans.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

S. 2561

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

(1) **ADVISORY COMMITTEE.**—The term “Advisory Committee” means the Cold War Advisory Committee established under section 3.

(2) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Interior.

(3) **THEME STUDY.**—The term “theme study” means the national historic landmark theme study conducted under section 2(a).

SEC. 2. COLD WAR THEME STUDY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary shall conduct a national historic landmark theme study to identify sites and resources in the United States that are significant to the Cold War.

(b) **RESOURCES.**—In conducting the theme study, the Secretary shall consider—

(1) the inventory of sites and resources associated with the Cold War completed by the Secretary of Defense under section 8120(b)(9) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public Law 101-511; 104 Stat. 1906); and

(2) historical studies and research of Cold War sites and resources, including—

(A) intercontinental ballistic missiles;

(B) flight training centers;

(C) manufacturing facilities;

(D) communications and command centers (such as Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado);

(E) defensive radar networks (such as the Distant Early Warning Line);

(F) nuclear weapons test sites (such as the Nevada test site); and

(G) strategic and tactical aircraft.

(c) **CONTENTS.**—The theme study shall include—

(1) recommendations for commemorating and interpreting sites and resources identified by the theme study, including—

(A) sites for which studies for potential inclusion in the National Park System should be authorized;

(B) sites for which new national historic landmarks should be nominated; and

(C) other appropriate designations;

(2) recommendations for cooperative agreements with—

(A) State and local governments;

(B) local historical organizations; and

(C) other appropriate entities; and

(3) an estimate of the amount required to carry out the recommendations under paragraphs (1) and (2).

(d) **CONSULTATION.**—In conducting the theme study, the Secretary shall consult with—

(1) the Secretary of the Air Force;

(2) State and local officials;

(3) State historic preservation offices; and

(4) other interested organizations and individuals.

(e) **REPORT.**—Not later than 3 years after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report that describes the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the theme study.

SEC. 3. COLD WAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—As soon as practicable after funds are made available to carry out this Act, the Secretary shall establish an advisory committee, to be known as the “Cold War Advisory Committee”, to assist the Secretary in carrying out this Act.

(b) **COMPOSITION.**—The Advisory Committee shall be composed of 9 members, to be appointed by the Secretary, of whom—

(1) 3 shall have expertise in Cold War history;

(2) 2 shall have expertise in historic preservation;

(3) 1 shall have expertise in the history of the United States; and

(4) 3 shall represent the general public.

(c) **CHAIRPERSON.**—The Advisory Committee shall select a chairperson from among the members of the Advisory Committee.

(d) **COMPENSATION.**—A member of the Advisory Committee shall serve without compensation but may be reimbursed by the Secretary for expenses reasonably incurred in the performance of the duties of the Advisory Committee.

(e) **MEETINGS.**—On at least 3 occasions, the Secretary (or a designee) shall meet and consult with the Advisory Committee on matters relating to the theme study.

SEC. 4. INTERPRETIVE HANDBOOK ON THE COLD WAR.

Not later than 4 years after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this Act, the Secretary shall—

(1) prepare and publish an interpretive handbook on the Cold War; and

(2) disseminate information in the theme study by other appropriate means.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act \$500,000.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 432—URGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE THE UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN WITH ESSENTIAL TACTICAL AND UTILITY HELICOPTERS

Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. DURBIN) submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 432

Whereas, on August 30, 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved United Na-

tions Security Council Resolution 1706, providing that the existing United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) “shall take over from [the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)] responsibility for supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement upon the expiration of AMIS’ mandate but in any event no later than 31 December 2006”;

Whereas, on July 31, 2007, the United Nations Security Council approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 reaffirming Resolution 1706 and stating that the Security Council “[d]ecides . . . to authorize and mandate the establishment . . . of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) . . . [and] [d]ecides that UNAMID, which shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each”;

Whereas, on December 31, 2007, the United Nations-African Union hybrid mission formally assumed control of peacekeeping operations in Darfur, but did so with only approximately 9,000 troops and police on the ground, far short of both the authorized and necessary levels;

Whereas the Government of Sudan continues to obstruct implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1706 and 1769 in several respects, including by refusing to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement or to cooperate on issues such as the force composition, the authorization of night flights, customs clearance, land access, and visas for staff;

Whereas, on January 7, 2008, uniformed elements of the army of Sudan attacked a clearly marked UNAMID supply convoy, severely wounding a Sudanese civilian driver;

Whereas rebels, militias, government forces, bandits, and others continue to prey upon the people of Darfur and upon humanitarian workers, increasing the urgency of both deploying the full complement of peacekeepers and police and of reaching a lasting political settlement;

Whereas the preliminary results of a United Nations assessment entitled the “Food Security and Nutrition Assessment of the Conflict-Affected Population of Darfur (August/September 2007)” reveal that global acute malnutrition in Darfur increased in 2007, exceeding emergency levels in some regions;

Whereas the United Nations-African Union Mission in Sudan has been hampered not only by obstruction by the Government of Sudan and other obstacles to peace in the region, but by the failure of the international community to commit the resources, equipment, and personnel needed to carry out the peacekeeping mission, most notably the failure to provide critically needed aviation and transportation assets;

Whereas the United Nations-African Union Mission in Sudan needs, among other critical mobility capabilities that have not been met, 18 utility helicopters and 6 tactical helicopters and crews;

Whereas, in a report to the Security Council dated December 24, 2007, the Secretary-General termed these helicopters indispensable and stated that “UNAMID must be capable of rapid mobility over large distances, especially over terrain where roads are the exception. Without the missing helicopters, this mobility—a fundamental requirement for the implementation of the UNAMID mandate—will not be possible.”;

Whereas a large number of countries possess the military assets that could help to fulfill this requirement;

Whereas the United States continues to lead the world in its contributions to efforts to end the genocide in Darfur, including by providing more than \$4,500,000,000 since 2004 in response to the Darfur crisis;

Whereas continued failure on the part of the international community to take all steps necessary to generate, deploy, and maintain an effective United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force will result in the continued loss of life and further degradation of humanitarian infrastructure in Darfur; and

Whereas it would be inexcusable for the international community to allow an authorized peacekeeping mission intended to help bring an end to genocide and its effects to founder or be compromised because of a failure to commit critical elements, such as the 24 helicopters needed to meet the critical mobility capabilities of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Sudan: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) urges the members of the international community, including the United States, that possess the capability to provide the tactical and utility helicopters needed for the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur to do so as soon as possible; and

(2) urges the President to intervene personally by contacting other heads of state and asking them to contribute the aircraft and crews for the Darfur mission.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on December 31, the United Nations and the African Union jointly assumed control of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. But, sadly, little has changed for the people of Darfur.

The United Nations Security Council has authorized over 26,000 peacekeepers, but just over 9,000 are on the ground in Darfur.

The government of Sudan has promised to abide by the United Nations resolution, but it continues to obstruct it at almost every turn.

Some of the rebel leaders have begun to join in coalitions with one another, an important step for the peace process, but others continue to prey on civilians and humanitarian aid workers and to threaten peacekeepers.

And the nations of the world had pledged to help end the genocide, but they are falling short where it counts.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reports that no one has stepped up to provide the 24 helicopters that are needed to transport and protect the peacekeepers and to give them the mobility that they need to do their jobs.

That is inexcusable. We cannot allow genocide and suffering to continue because the combined nations of the world cannot find 24 helicopters to help stop it.

That is why today, joined by Senator LUGAR and a number of other colleagues, I have introduced a resolution expressing the Sense of the Senate that the world must not allow this peacekeeping mission to founder because we cannot find 24 suitable aircraft within our vast arsenals.

I recognize that helicopters are expensive vehicles that are in short supply, with wars raging in Afghanistan and Iraq and with peacekeeping missions in the Congo and now being deployed to Chad as well.

But a considerable number of nations possess aerial vehicles with the capabilities that are needed for this mission. Together, we could fill this gap.

The United Nations is seeking 18 utility and 6 tactical helicopters. According to a piece in the Washington Post, the member nations of NATO alone possess over 18,000 helicopters.

Not all of these 18,000 aircraft would be suitable for this mission. NATO reserves are taxed in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but the potential vehicles certainly exist. NATO is not alone in this capability. Other countries could also step up to fill this need.

Secretary General Ban has stated that these vehicles are indispensable. He reports that the United Nations-African Union mission must "be capable of rapid mobility over large distances, especially over terrain where roads are the exception." Ban also said that "Without the missing helicopters, this mobility—a fundamental requirement for the implementation of the [Security Council's] mandate—will not be possible."

Helicopters alone will not save Darfur. The needs there are immense and growing. The United Nations revealed last month that acute malnutrition in the region is rising and surpassing emergency levels in some areas. To make matters worse, the Government of Khartoum is continuing to obstruct deployment of U.N. peacekeepers. They have objected to non-African peacekeepers, such as a team of Norwegian engineers, and they are slowing deployment by denying visas and land permits and denying night flights. Most seriously of all, earlier this month, Sudanese troops opened fire on a clearly marked U.N. convoy, badly injuring a driver.

The world must not allow the Khartoum government to dictate terms to the UN mission. The European Union and United Nations Security Council should, I believe, join the United States in imposing strong economic sanctions on the Sudanese government.

We should also continue to pressure the rebel groups to cease all attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers and engage in a peace process to bring a real solution for the people of Darfur.

We should do all these things and more, but, first and foremost, we should ensure that the United Nations and African Union have the tools that they need to carry out their mission.

The United States has already provided more than \$4.5 billion since 2004 in response to the Darfur crisis. That is an enormous contribution and it should not fall on our shoulders to fill this particular gap in the peacekeeping mission.

That is why I have repeatedly written President Bush asking him to use the powers of persuasion of his office to personally contact other heads of state to ask them to commit the needed vehicles and crews. I have also written the Secretary General of NATO and President Hu of China, asking them to help fill this gap.

Our resolution urges the members of the international community with the necessary assets to contribute the needed vehicles and crews.

Preventing genocide is a global responsibility. Too often the world has failed to keep this commitment, and it has failed Darfur for too long.

We cannot allow the government of Khartoum to block deployment of the 26,000 peacekeepers, but it would perhaps be even more unforgivable if the international community refuses to provide the peacekeepers with the equipment and vehicles that they need. Then we will have done Khartoum's job for them by obstructing ourselves.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 3951. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3930 submitted by Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Ms. MIKULSKI) and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 2248, to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to modernize and streamline the provisions of that Act, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3952. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3901 submitted by Mr. KENNEDY and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3953. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3859 submitted by Mr. CARDIN and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3954. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3955. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3915 submitted by Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. DODD) and intended to be proposed to the amendment SA 3911 proposed by Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself and Mr. BOND) to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3956. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3918 proposed by Mr. REID to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3957. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3932 submitted by Mr. WHITEHOUSE and intended to be proposed to the amendment SA 3911 proposed by Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself and Mr. BOND) to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3958. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3929 submitted by Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. MENENDEZ, and Ms. MIKULSKI) and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 3959. Mr. WHITEHOUSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3903 submitted by Mr. KYL and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 2248, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 3951. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3930 submitted by Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Ms. MIKULSKI)