CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009—S. CON. RES. 70; REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 225 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR AMERICA'S VETERANS AND SERVICEMEMBERS

[In billions of dollars]

| | |
|---|---|
| *Section 101* | |
| (1)(A) Federal Revenues: | |
| FY 2008 | 1,875.401 |
| FY 2009 | 2,029.661 |
| FY 2010 | 2,204.695 |
| FY 2011 | 2,413.285 |
| FY 2012 | 2,506.063 |
| FY 2013 | 2,626.571 |
| (1)(B) Change in Federal Revenues: | |
| FY 200 | −3.999 |
| FY 2009 | −67.738 |
| FY 2010 | 21.297 |
| FY 2011 | −14.785 |
| FY 2012 | −151.532 |
| FY 2013 | −123.648 |
| (2) New Budget Authority: | |
| FY 2008 | 2,564.237 |
| FY 2009 | 2,538.265 |
| FY 2010 | 2,566.826 |
| FY 2011 | 2,692.486 |
| FY 2012 | 2,734.102 |
| FY 2013 | 2,858.843 |
| (3) Budget Outlays: | |
| FY 2008 | 2,466.678 |
| FY 2009 | 2,573.277 |
| FY 2010 | 2,625.751 |
| FY 2011 | 2,711.447 |
| FY 2012 | 2,719.529 |
| FY 2013 | 2,851.939 |

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[In millions of dollars]

| | |
|---|---|
| Current Allocation to Senate Armed Services Committee | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 119,050 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 118,842 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | 126,030 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 125,863 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | 668,567 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | 667,908 |
| Adjustments | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 0 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 0 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | −27 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 7 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | −2 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | −8 |
| Revised Allocation to Senate Armed Services Committee | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 119,050 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 118,842 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | 126,003 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 125,870 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | 668,565 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | 667,900 |

## FURTHER CHANGES TO S. CON. RES. 70

Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, section 223 of S. Con. Res. 70, the 2009 budget resolution, permits the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee to revise the allocations, aggregates, and other levels in the resolution for legislation that invests in America's infrastructure, including rail projects. The revisions are contingent on certain conditions being met, including that such legislation not worsen the deficit over the period of the total of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 or the period of the total of fiscal years 2008 through 2018.

I find that H.R. 2095, the Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act, satisfies the conditions of the reserve fund for investments in America's infrastructure. Therefore, pursuant to section 223, I am adjusting the aggregates in the 2009 budget resolution, as well as the allocation provided to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following revisions to S. Con. Res. 70.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009—S. CON. RES. 70; REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 223 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR INVESTMENTS IN AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE

[In billions of dollars]

| | |
|---|---|
| *Section 101* | |
| (1)(A) Federal Revenues: | |
| FY 2008 | 1,875.401 |
| FY 2009 | 2,029.667 |
| FY 2010 | 2,204.701 |
| FY 2011 | 2,413.291 |
| FY 2012 | 2,506.069 |
| FY 2013 | 2,626.577 |
| (1)(B) Change in Federal Revenues: | |
| FY 2008 | −3.999 |
| FY 2009 | −67.732 |
| FY 2010 | 21.303 |
| FY 2011 | −14.779 |
| FY 2012 | −151.526 |
| FY 2013 | −123.642 |
| (2) New Budget Authority: | |
| FY 2008 | 2,564.237 |
| FY 2009 | 2,538.268 |
| FY 2010 | 2,566.829 |
| FY 2011 | 2,692.492 |
| FY 2012 | 2,734.110 |
| FY 2013 | 2,858.852 |
| (3) Budget Outlays: | |
| FY 2008 | 2,466.678 |
| FY 2009 | 2,573.280 |
| FY 2010 | 2,625.754 |
| FY 2011 | 2,711.453 |
| FY 2012 | 2,719.537 |
| FY 2013 | 2,851.948 |

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009—S. CON. RES. 70; REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 223 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR INVESTMENTS IN AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE

[In millions of dollars]

| | |
|---|---|
| Current Allocation to Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 13,964 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 9,363 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | 14,432 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 10,250 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | 75,918 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | 49,960 |
| Adjustments | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 0 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 0 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | 3 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 3 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | 29 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | 29 |
| Revised Allocation to Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee | |
| FY 2008 Budget Authority | 13,964 |
| FY 2008 Outlays | 9,363 |
| FY 2009 Budget Authority | 14,435 |
| FY 2009 Outlays | 10,253 |
| FY 2009–2013 Budget Authority | 75,947 |
| FY 2009–2013 Outlays | 49,989 |

## INSPECTOR GENERAL REFORM ACT

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I am proud to note that Congress, Saturday, voted to pass and send to the President the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. This bipartisan bill reflects the broad congressional support for the outstanding work of our inspectors general and our desire to ensure that these important and unique Government officials are given the tools and the accountability to perform at their very best. I want to commend my colleagues, Senator MCCASKILL and Senator COLLINS, with whom I cosponsored this bill in the Senate, for their leadership and hard work on this issue. I also want to recognize the efforts of Congressman COOPER of Tennessee in the House, who has worked diligently on this legislation or some version of it through several Congresses.

It has been 30 years since Congress, as part of its post-Watergate reforms, passed the Inspectors General Act of 1978 that created an Office of Inspector General in 12 major departments and agencies to hold those agencies accountable and report back both to the agency heads and Congress on their findings. The law was amended in 1988 to add an inspector general to almost all executive agencies and departments.

The experiment has been a great success, hailed as a sort of consumer protector for the taxpayer deep within each agency. IG audits generate billions of dollars in potential savings each year. They also safeguard something even more valuable public trust in our Government by exposing shortcomings in Government practices and official conduct. Some of these efforts generate front page headlines, but most of it unfolds quietly but critically behind the scenes as the IGs help their respective agencies establish effective and efficient programs and practices that make the most of the taxpayers' hard-earned dollars.

It is not an easy job to undertake and, over the years, we have become aware of several instances where the independence of inspectors general appears to be under siege. It is vital that Congress reiterate its strong support for the internal oversight IGs can provide and ensure they have the independence they need to carry out this vital, but often unpopular work.

Unfortunately, we are also aware of instances in which the watchdog needs watching—that is, situations where the inspector general has behaved improperly or failed to provide vigorous oversight.

This legislation attempts to address both problems.

It includes an array of measures designed to strengthen the independence of the inspectors general, such as requiring the administration to notify Congress 30 days before attempting to remove or transfer an IG. This would give us time to consider whether the administration was improperly seeking to displace an inspector general for political reasons because the IG was, in effect, doing his or her job too well. It requires that all IGs be chosen on the basis of qualifications, without regard to political affiliation.

The legislation would codify and strengthen the existing IG councils, creating a unitary council that can provide greater support for IGs throughout the Government.

The bill would provide greater transparency of IG budget needs, including funds for training and council activities, to help ensure the IG offices have the resources they need for their investigations.

The legislation also adjusts IG pay. It prohibits bonuses for IGs to remove a potential avenue for improper influence by the agency head. To compensate for this ban and to reflect the importance of the work they do, most IGs would receive an increase in their regular pay. Currently, some IGs earn less than other senior officials in their agency and sometimes even less than some of their subordinates.

Our bill also enhances IG accountability by strengthening the Integrity Committee that handles allegations against inspectors general and their senior staff, and facilitating greater oversight of the Integrity Committee by Congress.

Both the House and Senate versions of this bill received overwhelming bipartisan support, and since Senate passage last spring we have worked with the House to craft the consensus language that has now won congressional approval. We have also worked with the administration to address many of their initial concerns, and it is my great hope that the President will promptly sign this bill into law.

## AFRICA

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, last week I chaired a hearing on the ''resource curse'' and Africa's management of its extractive industries. In too many parts of Africa, a wealth of natural resources that should be fueling economic development are instead sources of corruption and conflict. This is especially the case with Sub-Saharan Africa's leading oil-producing nations. Just a few days ago, Transparency International released its corruption index, naming of Africa's top 3 oil producers—Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan—among the top 10 most corrupt countries. This corruption as well as the discrepancy between persisting poverty and skyrocketing revenues is a recipe for instability in these countries, breeding weak and failing states.

Nowhere are the consequences of the ''resource curse'' more acute or alarming than Nigeria's Delta region. For the last three decades, local communities there have been marginalized politically and economically as oil companies, with the government's backing, have seized some of the world's richest oil deposits. And, while the private sector is pervasive, the federal government is virtually absent—replaced by roving bands of criminals, working in many cases for local governors. The weak infrastructure, lack of opportunities for political participation by local communities, endemic poverty, influx of arms, and presence of lootable extractives have turned the delta into a powder keg over recent years.

In that swamp—and I say ''swamp'' both literally and metaphorically—have arisen several armed groups that seek to appeal to the legitimate grievances of communities for both political and criminal ends. These groups, many of which claim to be part of a loose coalition called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or MEND, have targeted oil companies operating in the region, kidnapping employees for ransom and attacking pipelines and other installations. Simultaneously, they have become heavily involved in the lucrative trade in oil stolen from the delta's vast pipelines which is called ''bunkering.'' Some estimates suggest that as much as 10 percent of Nigeria's current production is siphoned off illegally, creating a shadow economy that undermines the security of the wider Gulf of Guinea region.

The Nigeria Government's response to the Delta crisis—sporadic military campaigns, empty promises of development and half-hearted attempts at political dialogue—has only made matters worse. In many cases there are definite but ambiguous links between the military and the militants—each out for personal gain as the political economy of war perpetuates the illicit nature of these activities. In addition, the military campaigns to date have only served to provoke the insurgency, leading to fighting that has left civilians killed and displaced. Furthermore, the lack of clear distinction between the security forces of the oil companies and the Nigerian military feeds communities' perception that the two are interchangeable. Meanwhile, despite promises made, there has still not been a serious initiative to address the underdevelopment of the region. The necessary revenues are clearly available with Nigeria's economic boom, but a lack of political will prevails. This is in part because there are officials at the federal, state, and local levels who continue to benefit from the instability in the delta, either by their involvement in the illegal oil trade or other corruption.

Without a commitment from the top leadership in Nigeria—as well as support from key members in the international community—a growing number of individuals at the top will continue to profit, while those at the bottom have almost no say in the development of their society. Genuine peacemaking in the delta region will require not only legitimate political negotiations but a convincing case for transforming the illicit war economy into one of peace. There will need to be viable institutions, not one hollowed out from corruption, which can address economic and political decision-making. And there will need to be opportunities for local communities to engage and hold their leaders accountable. Only then will we begin to see change in the delta.

Under this administration, the United States has made few efforts to address the instability in the Niger Delta, despite Nigeria being a key U.S. partner and the fifth largest source for U.S. oil imports. I recognize that the insecurity in the delta makes it very hard for our embassy officials—who are doing great work in an already tough posting—to travel there, but without consistent diplomatic outreach and presence in the region, our ability to engage is severely handicapped. How can we be sure the information we are getting is valid if we don't have our own eyes and ears to help inform our strategic thinking? The information gap in the Niger Delta is a very real deficit even though it may not seem pressing compared to some of the other national security threats we face. Getting our diplomatic corps into one of the world's most neglected regions will help us identify the full scope of the area's problems and come up with a sound plan for addressing them.

In June, I wrote to Secretary Rice, expressing my concern and inquiring about the potential for more frequent diplomatic travel to the region. I understand that along with the security concerns, financial costs also play a role here. But the costs to U.S. long-term security of not directly engaging this problem now are much greater.