Economic Development recently released its 2006 Georgia Farm Gate Value Report. Watermelon ranked 16th among all Georgia commodities with a farm gate value of a little over $111 million from almost 24,000 acres of watermelon. I am also proud to represent Cordele, Georgia, which is known as the, ''Watermelon Capital of the World.''

Recognizing July as ''National Watermelon Month'' will provide the watermelon industry with many avenues to not only market their product but also educate the public about the health benefits associated with consuming watermelon through different watermelon related programs and activities. Watermelon enjoys a long history as one of our Nation's favorite foods. As Mark Twain once said, ''When one has tasted watermelon he knows what the angels eat.'' I encourage my colleagues to join me in acknowledging the wisdom of Mark Twain by supporting this resolution.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 2001. Mr. WEBB (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. MCCASKILL, Mr. TESTER, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mr. BYRD) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1585, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 2002. Mr. REID (for Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. SHELBY)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1610, to ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such investments are examined for any effect they may have on national security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and for other purposes.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 2001. Mr. WEBB (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. MCCASKILL, Mr. TESTER, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mr. BYRD) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1585, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1031. MINIMUM PERIODS BETWEEN DEPLOYMENT FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

(a) MINIMUM PERIOD FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR COMPONENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (2) may be deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom unless the period between the deployment of the unit or member is equal to or longer than the period of such previous deployment.

(2) COVERED UNITS AND MEMBERS.—The units and members of the Armed Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:

(A) Units and members of the regular Army.

(B) Units and members of the regular Marine Corps.

(C) Units and members of the regular Navy.

(D) Units and members of the regular Air Force.

(E) Units and members of the regular Coast Guard.

(b) MINIMUM PERIOD FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (2) may be deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom if the unit or member has been deployed at any time within the three years preceding the date of the deployment covered by this subsection.

(2) COVERED UNITS AND MEMBERS.—The units and members of the Armed Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:

(A) Units and members of the Army Reserve.

(B) Units and members of the Army National Guard.

(C) Units and members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

(D) Units and members of the Navy Reserve.

(E) Units and members of the Air Force Reserve.

(F) Units and members of the Air National Guard.

(G) Units and members of the Coast Guard Reserve.

(c) WAIVER BY THE PRESIDENT.—The President may waive the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) with respect to the deployment of a unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in such subsection if the President certifies to Congress that the deployment of the unit or member is necessary to meet an operational emergency posing a threat to vital national security interests of the United States.

(d) WAIVER BY THE MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF.—The chief of staff of the Armed Force concerned may waive the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) with respect to the deployment of a member of the Armed Forces specified the applicable subparagraph under such subsection upon the voluntary request of the member.

SA 2002. Mr. REID (for Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. SHELBY) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1610, to ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such investments are examined for any effect they may have on national security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and for other purposed; as follows:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ''Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007''.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

SEC. 2. UNITED STATES SECURITY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS; CLARIFICATION OF REVIEW AND INVESTIGATION PROCESS.

Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by striking subsections (a) and (b) and inserting the following:

''(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

''(1) COMMITTEE; CHAIRPERSON.—The terms 'Committee' and 'chairperson' mean the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the chairperson thereof, respectively.

''(2) CONTROL.—The term 'control' has the meaning given to such term in regulations which the Committee shall prescribe.

''(3) COVERED TRANSACTION.—The term 'covered transaction' means any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.

''(4) FOREIGN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TRANSACTION.—The term 'foreign government-controlled transaction' means any covered transaction that could result in the control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States by a foreign government or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government.

''(5) CLARIFICATION.—The term 'national security' shall be construed so as to include those issues relating to 'homeland security', including its application to critical infrastructure.

''(6) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term 'critical infrastructure' means, subject to rules issued under this section, systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national security.

''(7) CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—The term 'critical technologies' means critical technology, critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense, identified pursuant to this section, subject to regulations issued at the direction of the President, in accordance with subsection (h).

''(8) LEAD AGENCY.—The term 'lead agency' means the agency, or agencies, designated as the lead agency or agencies pursuant to subsection (k)(5) for the review of a transaction.

''(b) NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIONS.—

''(1) NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—Upon receiving written notification under subparagraph (C) of any covered transaction, or pursuant to a unilateral notification initiated under subparagraph (D) with respect to any covered transaction, the President, acting through the Committee—

''(i) shall review the covered transaction to determine the effects of the transaction on the national security of the United States; and

''(ii) shall consider the factors specified in subsection (f) for such purpose, as appropriate.

''(B) CONTROL BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—If the Committee determines that the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction, the Committee shall conduct an investigation of the transaction under paragraph (2).

''(C) WRITTEN NOTICE.—

''(i) IN GENERAL.—Any party or parties to any covered transaction may initiate a review of the transaction under this paragraph by submitting a written notice of the transaction to the Chairperson of the Committee.

''(ii) WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE.—No covered transaction for which a notice was submitted under clause (i) may be withdrawn from review, unless a written request for such withdrawal is submitted to the Committee by any party to the transaction and approved by the Committee.

''(iii) CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS.—A request for withdrawal under clause (ii) shall not be construed to preclude any party to the covered transaction from continuing informal discussions with the Committee or any member thereof regarding possible resubmission for review pursuant to this paragraph.

''(D) UNILATERAL INITIATION OF REVIEW.—Subject to subparagraph (F), the President or the Committee may initiate a review under subparagraph (A) of—

''(i) any covered transaction;

''(ii) any covered transaction that has previously been reviewed or investigated under this section, if any party to the transaction submitted false or misleading material information to the Committee in connection with the review or investigation or omitted material information, including material documents, from information submitted to the Committee; or

''(iii) any covered transaction that has previously been reviewed or investigated under this section, if—

''(I) any party to the transaction or the entity resulting from consummation of the transaction intentionally materially breaches a mitigation agreement or condition described in subsection (l)(1)(A);

''(II) such breach is certified to the Committee by the lead department or agency monitoring and enforcing such agreement or condition as an intentional material breach; and

''(III) the Committee determines that there are no other remedies or enforcement tools available to address such breach.

''(E) TIMING.—Any review under this paragraph shall be completed before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date of the acceptance of written notice under subparagraph (C) by the chairperson, or beginning on the date of the initiation of the review in accordance with subparagraph (D), as applicable.

''(F) LIMIT ON DELEGATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITY.—The authority of the Committee to initiate a review under subparagraph (D) may not be delegated to any person, other than the Deputy Secretary or an appropriate Under Secretary of the department or agency represented on the Committee.

''(2) NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—In each case described in subparagraph (B), the Committee shall immediately conduct an investigation of the effects of a covered transaction on the national security of the United States, and take any necessary actions in connection with the transaction to protect the national security of the United States.

''(B) APPLICABILITY.—Subparagraph (A) shall apply in each case in which—

''(i) a review of a covered transaction under paragraph (1) results in a determination that—

''(I) the transaction threatens to impair the national security of the United States and that threat has not been mitigated during or prior to the review of a covered transaction under paragraph (1);

''(II) the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction; or

''(III) the transaction would result in control of any critical infrastructure of or within the United States by or on behalf of any foreign person, if the Committee determines that the transaction could impair national security, and that such impairment to national security has not been mitigated by assurances provided or renewed with the approval of the Committee, as described in subsection (l), during the review period under paragraph (1); or

''(ii) the lead agency recommends, and the Committee concurs, that an investigation be undertaken.

''(C) TIMING.—Any investigation under subparagraph (A) shall be completed before the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the investigation commenced.

''(D) EXCEPTION.—

''(i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subparagraph (B)(i), an investigation of a foreign government-controlled transaction described in subclause (II) of subparagraph (B)(i) or a transaction involving critical infrastructure described in subclause (III) of subparagraph (B)(i) shall not be required under this paragraph, if the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the lead agency jointly determine, on the basis of the review of the transaction under paragraph (1), that the transaction will not impair the national security of the United States.

''(ii) NONDELEGATION.—The authority of the Secretary or the head of an agency referred to in clause (i) may not be delegated to any person, other than the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury or the deputy head (or the equivalent thereof) of the lead agency, respectively.

''(E) GUIDANCE ON CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.—The Chairperson shall, not later than 180 days after the effective date of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, publish in the Federal Register guidance on the types of transactions that the Committee has reviewed and that have presented national security considerations, including transactions that may constitute covered transactions that would result in control of critical infrastructure relating to United States national security by a foreign government or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government.

''(3) CERTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—

''(A) CERTIFIED NOTICE AT COMPLETION OF REVIEW.—Upon completion of a review under subsection (b) that concludes action under this section, the chairperson and the head of the lead agency shall transmit a certified notice to the members of Congress specified in subparagraph (C)(iii).

''(B) CERTIFIED REPORT AT COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.—As soon as is practicable after completion of an investigation under subsection (b) that concludes action under this section, the chairperson and the head of the lead agency shall transmit to the members of Congress specified in subparagraph (C)(iii) a certified written report (consistent with the requirements of subsection (c)) on the results of the investigation, unless the matter under investigation has been sent to the President for decision.

''(C) CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES.—

''(i) IN GENERAL.—Each certified notice and report required under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, shall be submitted to the members of Congress specified in clause (iii), and shall include—

''(I) a description of the actions taken by the Committee with respect to the transaction; and

''(II) identification of the determinative factors considered under subsection (f).

''(ii) CONTENT OF CERTIFICATION.—Each certified notice and report required under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, shall be signed by the chairperson and the head of the lead agency, and shall state that, in the determination of the Committee, there are no unresolved national security concerns with the transaction that is the subject of the notice or report.

''(iii) MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—Each certified notice and report required under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, shall be transmitted—

''(I) to the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate;

''(II) to the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and of any committee of the Senate having oversight over the lead agency;

''(III) to the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;

''(IV) to the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and of any committee of the House of Representatives having oversight over the lead agency; and

''(V) with respect to covered transactions involving critical infrastructure, to the members of the Senate from the State in which the principal place of business of the acquired United States person is located, and the member from the Congressional District in which such principal place of business is located.

''(iv) SIGNATURES; LIMIT ON DELEGATION.—

''(I) IN GENERAL.—Each certified notice and report required under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, shall be signed by the chairperson and the head of the lead agency, which signature requirement may only be delegated in accordance with subclause (II).

''(II) LIMITATION ON DELEGATION OF CERTIFICATIONS.—The chairperson and the head of the lead agency may delegate the signature requirement under subclause (I)—

''(aa) only to an appropriate employee of the Department of the Treasury (in the case of the Secretary of the Treasury) or to an appropriate employee of the lead agency (in the case of the lead agency) who was appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with respect to any notice provided under paragraph (1) following the completion of a review under this section; or

''(bb) only to a Deputy Secretary of the Treasury (in the case of the Secretary of the Treasury) or a person serving in the Deputy position or the equivalent thereof at the lead agency (in the case of the lead agency), with respect to any report provided under subparagraph (B) following an investigation under this section.

''(4) ANALYSIS BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the United States posed by any covered transaction. The Director of National Intelligence shall also seek and incorporate the views of all affected or appropriate intelligence agencies with respect to the transaction.

''(B) TIMING.—The analysis required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided by the Director of National Intelligence to the Committee not later than 20 days after the date on which notice of the transaction is accepted by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C), but such analysis may be supplemented or amended, as the Director considers necessary or appropriate, or upon a request for additional information by the Committee. The Director may begin the analysis at any time

prior to acceptance of the notice, in accordance with otherwise applicable law.

''(C) INTERACTION WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community remains engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination to the Committee of any additional relevant information that may become available during the course of any investigation conducted under subsection (b) with respect to a transaction.

''(D) INDEPENDENT ROLE OF DIRECTOR.—The Director of National Intelligence shall be a nonvoting, ex officio member of the Committee, and shall be provided with all notices received by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C) regarding covered transactions, but shall serve no policy role on the Committee, other than to provide analysis under subparagraphs (A) and (C) in connection with a covered transaction.

''(5) SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—No provision of this subsection shall be construed as prohibiting any party to a covered transaction from submitting additional information concerning the transaction, including any proposed restructuring of the transaction or any modifications to any agreements in connection with the transaction, while any review or investigation of the transaction is ongoing.

''(6) NOTICE OF RESULTS TO PARTIES.—The Committee shall notify the parties to a covered transaction of the results of a review or investigation under this section, promptly upon completion of all action under this section.

''(7) REGULATIONS.—Regulations prescribed under this section shall include standard procedures for—

''(A) submitting any notice of a covered transaction to the Committee;

''(B) submitting a request to withdraw a covered transaction from review;

''(C) resubmitting a notice of a covered transaction that was previously withdrawn from review; and

''(D) providing notice of the results of a review or investigation to the parties to the covered transaction, upon completion of all action under this section.''.

SEC. 3. STATUTORY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by striking subsection (k) and inserting the following:

''(k) COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.—

''(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11858, shall be a multi agency committee to carry out this section and such other assignments as the President may designate.

''(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Committee shall be comprised of the following members or the designee of any such member:

''(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.

''(B) The Secretary of Homeland Security.

''(C) The Secretary of Commerce.

''(D) The Secretary of Defense.

''(E) The Secretary of State.

''(F) The Attorney General of the United States.

''(G) The Secretary of Energy.

''(H) The Secretary of Labor (nonvoting, ex officio).

''(I) The Director of National Intelligence (nonvoting, ex officio).

''(J) The heads of any other executive department, agency, or office, as the President determines appropriate, generally or on a case-by-case basis.

''(3) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee.

''(4) ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.—There shall be established an additional position of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary appointed under this paragraph shall report directly to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. The duties of the Assistant Secretary shall include duties related to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, as delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury under this section.

''(5) DESIGNATION OF LEAD AGENCY.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall designate, as appropriate, a member or members of the Committee to be the lead agency or agencies on behalf of the Committee—

''(A) for each covered transaction, and for negotiating any mitigation agreements or other conditions necessary to protect national security; and

''(B) for all matters related to the monitoring of the completed transaction, to ensure compliance with such agreements or conditions and with this section.

''(6) OTHER MEMBERS.—The chairperson shall consult with the heads of such other Federal departments, agencies, and independent establishments in any review or investigation under subsection (a), as the chairperson determines to be appropriate, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the covered transaction under review or investigation (or the designee of any such department or agency head).

''(7) MEETINGS.—The Committee shall meet upon the direction of the President or upon the call of the chairperson, without regard to section 552b of title 5, United States Code (if otherwise applicable).''.

SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.

Section 721(f) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(f)) is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ''among other factors'';

(2) in paragraph (4)—

(A) in subparagraph (A) by striking ''or'' at the end;

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C);

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:

''(B) identified by the Secretary of Defense as posing a potential regional military threat to the interests of the United States; or''; and

(D) by striking ''and'' at the end;

(3) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

''(6) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major energy assets;

''(7) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical technologies;

''(8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction, as determined under subsection (b)(1)(B);

''(9) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to transactions requiring an investigation under subsection (b)(1)(B), a review of the current assessment of—

''(A) the adherence of the subject country to nonproliferation control regimes, including treaties and multilateral supply guidelines, which shall draw on, but not be limited to, the annual report on 'Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments' required by section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act;

''(B) the relationship of such country with the United States, specifically on its record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, which shall draw on, but not be limited to, the report of the President to Congress under section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; and

''(C) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications, including an analysis of national export control laws and regulations;

''(10) the long-term projection of United States requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and material; and

''(11) such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be appropriate, generally or in connection with a specific review or investigation.''.

SEC. 5. MITIGATION, TRACKING, AND POSTCONSUMMATION MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT.

Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(l) MITIGATION, TRACKING, AND POSTCONSUMMATION MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT.—

''(1) MITIGATION.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The Committee or a lead agency may, on behalf of the Committee, negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national security of the United States that arises as a result of the covered transaction.

''(B) RISK-BASED ANALYSIS REQUIRED.—Any agreement entered into or condition imposed under subparagraph (A) shall be based on a risk-based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of the threat to national security of the covered transaction.

''(2) TRACKING AUTHORITY FOR WITHDRAWN NOTICES.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—If any written notice of a covered transaction that was submitted to the Committee under this section is withdrawn before any review or investigation by the Committee under subsection (b) is completed, the Committee shall establish, as appropriate—

''(i) interim protections to address specific concerns with such transaction that have been raised in connection with any such review or investigation pending any resubmission of any written notice under this section with respect to such transaction and further action by the President under this section;

''(ii) specific time frames for resubmitting any such written notice; and

''(iii) a process for tracking any actions that may be taken by any party to the transaction, in connection with the transaction, before the notice referred to in clause (ii) is resubmitted.

''(B) DESIGNATION OF AGENCY.—The lead agency, other than any entity of the intelligence community (as defined in the National Security Act of 1947), shall, on behalf of the Committee, ensure that the requirements of subparagraph (A) with respect to any covered transaction that is subject to such subparagraph are met.

''(3) NEGOTIATION, MODIFICATION, MONITORING, AND ENFORCEMENT.—

''(A) DESIGNATION OF LEAD AGENCY.—The lead agency shall negotiate, modify, monitor, and enforce, on behalf of the Committee, any agreement entered into or condition imposed under paragraph (1) with respect to a covered transaction, based on the expertise with and knowledge of the issues related to such transaction on the part of the designated department or agency. Nothing in

this paragraph shall prohibit other departments or agencies in assisting the lead agency in carrying out the purposes of this paragraph.

''(B) REPORTING BY DESIGNATED AGENCY.—

''(i) MODIFICATION REPORTS.—The lead agency in connection with any agreement entered into or condition imposed with respect to a covered transaction shall—

''(I) provide periodic reports to the Committee on any material modification to any such agreement or condition imposed with respect to the transaction; and

''(II) ensure that any material modification to any such agreement or condition is reported to the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General of the United States, and any other Federal department or agency that may have a material interest in such modification.

''(ii) COMPLIANCE.—The Committee shall develop and agree upon methods for evaluating compliance with any agreement entered into or condition imposed with respect to a covered transaction that will allow the Committee to adequately assure compliance, without—

''(I) unnecessarily diverting Committee resources from assessing any new covered transaction for which a written notice has been filed pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(C), and if necessary, reaching a mitigation agreement with or imposing a condition on a party to such covered transaction or any covered transaction for which a review has been reopened for any reason; or

''(II) placing unnecessary burdens on a party to a covered transaction.''.

SEC. 6. ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT.

Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by striking subsections (d) and (e) and inserting the following:

''(d) ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (4), the President may take such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.

''(2) ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT.—The President shall announce the decision on whether or not to take action pursuant to paragraph (1) not later than 15 days after the date on which an investigation described in subsection (b) is completed.

''(3) ENFORCEMENT.—The President may direct the Attorney General of the United States to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district courts of the United States, in order to implement and enforce this subsection.

''(4) FINDINGS OF THE PRESIDENT.—The President may exercise the authority conferred by paragraph (1), only if the President finds that—

''(A) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security; and

''(B) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security in the matter before the President.

''(5) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—For purposes of determining whether to take action under paragraph (1), the President shall consider, among other factors each of the factors described in subsection (f), as appropriate.

''(e) ACTIONS AND FINDINGS NONREVIEWABLE.—The actions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) shall not be subject to judicial review.''.

SEC. 7. INCREASED OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS.

(a) REPORT ON ACTIONS.—Section 721(g) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(g)) is amended to read as follows:

''(g) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CONGRESS; CONFIDENTIALITY.—

''(1) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT ON REQUEST.—The Committee shall, upon request from any Member of Congress specified in subsection (b)(3)(C)(iii), promptly provide briefings on a covered transaction for which all action has concluded under this section, or on compliance with a mitigation agreement or condition imposed with respect to such transaction, on a classified basis, if deemed necessary by the sensitivity of the information. Briefings under this paragraph may be provided to the congressional staff of such a Member of Congress having appropriate security clearance.

''(2) APPLICATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The disclosure of information under this subsection shall be consistent with the requirements of subsection (c). Members of Congress and staff of either House of Congress or any committee of Congress, shall be subject to the same limitations on disclosure of information as are applicable under subsection (c).

''(B) PROPRIETARY INFORMATION.—Proprietary information which can be associated with a particular party to a covered transaction shall be furnished in accordance with subparagraph (A) only to a committee of Congress, and only when the committee provides assurances of confidentiality, unless such party otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure.''.

(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(m) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The chairperson shall transmit a report to the chairman and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction in the Senate and the House of Representatives, before July 31 of each year on all of the reviews and investigations of covered transactions completed under subsection (b) during the 12-month period covered by the report.

''(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT RELATING TO COVERED TRANSACTIONS.—The annual report under paragraph (1) shall contain the following information, with respect to each covered transaction, for the reporting period:

''(A) A list of all notices filed and all reviews or investigations completed during the period, with basic information on each party to the transaction, the nature of the business activities or products of all pertinent persons, along with information about any withdrawal from the process, and any decision or action by the President under this section.

''(B) Specific, cumulative, and, as appropriate, trend information on the numbers of filings, investigations, withdrawals, and decisions or actions by the President under this section.

''(C) Cumulative and, as appropriate, trend information on the business sectors involved in the filings which have been made, and the countries from which the investments have originated.

''(D) Information on whether companies that withdrew notices to the Committee in accordance with subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii) have later refiled such notices, or, alternatively, abandoned the transaction.

''(E) The types of security arrangements and conditions the Committee has used to mitigate national security concerns about a transaction, including a discussion of the methods that the Committee and any lead agency are using to determine compliance with such arrangements or conditions.

''(F) A detailed discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions on the national security or critical infrastructure of the United States that the Committee will take into account in its deliberations during the period before delivery of the next report, to the extent possible.

''(3) CONTENTS OF REPORT RELATING TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—In order to assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities with respect to this section, the President and such agencies as the President shall designate shall include in the annual report submitted under paragraph (1)—

''(i) an evaluation of whether there is credible evidence of a coordinated strategy by 1 or more countries or companies to acquire United States companies involved in research, development, or production of critical technologies for which the United States is a leading producer; and

''(ii) an evaluation of whether there are industrial espionage activities directed or directly assisted by foreign governments against private United States companies aimed at obtaining commercial secrets related to critical technologies.

''(B) RELEASE OF UNCLASSIFIED STUDY.—All appropriate portions of the annual report under paragraph (1) may be classified. An unclassified version of the report, as appropriate, consistent with safeguarding national security and privacy, shall be made available to the public.''.

(c) STUDY AND REPORT.—

(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—Before the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, shall conduct a study on foreign direct investments in the United States, especially investments in critical infrastructure and industries affecting national security, by—

(A) foreign governments, entities controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government, or persons of foreign countries which comply with any boycott of Israel; or

(B) foreign governments, entities controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government, or persons of foreign countries which do not ban organizations designated by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations.

(2) REPORT.—Before the end of the 30-day period beginning upon the date of completion of each study under paragraph (1), and thereafter in each annual report under section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (as added by this section), the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress, for transmittal to all appropriate committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, containing the findings and conclusions of the Secretary with respect to the study described in paragraph (1), together with an analysis of the effects of such investment on the national security of the United States and on any efforts to address those effects.

(d) INVESTIGATION BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall conduct an independent investigation to determine all of the facts and circumstances concerning each failure of the Department of the Treasury to make any report to the Congress that was required under section 721(k) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as in

effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.

(2) REPORT TO THE CONGRESS.—Before the end of the 270-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall submit a report on the investigation under paragraph (1) containing the findings and conclusions of the Inspector General, to the chairman and ranking member of each committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives having jurisdiction over any aspect of the report, including, at a minimum, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 8. CERTIFICATION OF NOTICES AND ASSURANCES.

Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(n) CERTIFICATION OF NOTICES AND ASSURANCES.—Each notice, and any followup information, submitted under this section and regulations prescribed under this section to the President or the Committee by a party to a covered transaction, and any information submitted by any such party in connection with any action for which a report is required pursuant to paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (l), with respect to the implementation of any mitigation agreement or condition described in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (l), or any material change in circumstances, shall be accompanied by a written statement by the chief executive officer or the designee of the person required to submit such notice or information certifying that, to the best of the knowledge and belief of that person—

''(1) the notice or information submitted fully complies with the requirements of this section or such regulation, agreement, or condition; and

''(2) the notice or information is accurate and complete in all material respects.''.

SEC. 9. REGULATIONS.

Section 721(h) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(h)) is amended to read as follows:

''(h) REGULATIONS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct, subject to notice and comment, the issuance of regulations to carry out this section.

''(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Regulations issued under this section shall become effective not later than 180 days after the effective date of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007.

''(3) CONTENT.—Regulations issued under this subsection shall—

''(A) provide for the imposition of civil penalties for any violation of this section, including any mitigation agreement entered into or conditions imposed pursuant to subsection (l);

''(B) to the extent possible—

''(i) minimize paperwork burdens; and

''(ii) coordinate reporting requirements under this section with reporting requirements under any other provision of Federal law; and

''(C) provide for an appropriate role for the Secretary of Labor with respect to mitigation agreements.''.

SEC. 10. EFFECT ON OTHER LAW.

Section 721(i) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(i)) is amended to read as follows:

''(i) EFFECT ON OTHER LAW.—No provision of this section shall be construed as altering or affecting any other authority, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure, or review provided by or established under any other provision of Federal law, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or any other authority of the President or the Congress under the Constitution of the United States.''.

SEC. 11. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) TITLE 31.—Section 301(e) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ''8 Assistant'' and inserting ''9 Assistant''.

(b) TITLE 5.—Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended in the item relating to ''Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury'', by striking ''(8)'' and inserting ''(9)''.

SEC. 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this Act shall apply after the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 2007

Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 197, S. 1610.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1610) to ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such investments are examined for any effect they may have on national security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and for other purposes.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. DODD. Madam President, section 721 of the Defense Production Act, also known as the Exon-Florio amendment, Exon-Florio, established a statutory framework for the U.S. Government to analyze foreign acquisitions, mergers, and takeovers of privately owned entities within the United States to determine whether such transactions affect the national security of the United States. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 amends section 721 for the purpose of strengthening the process by which such transactions are reviewed and, when warranted, investigated for national security concerns. In addition, the act provides for a system of congressional notification so that Congress is able to conduct proper oversight of the national security implications of foreign direct investment in the United States to ensure that it is beneficial and has no adverse impact on U.S. national security.

Exon-Florio established a four-step process for examining a foreign acquisition: (1) voluntary notice by the companies; (2) a 30-day review to identify any national security concerns; (3) an optional 45-day investigation to determine whether identified concerns require more extensive mitigation efforts or a recommendation to the President for possible action; and (4) a Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit an acquisition in those instances where potential national security concerns cannot be mitigated.

During the standard review period, CFIUS conducts a national security analysis to determine whether any national security issues exist with a particular transaction, and if so, whether those concerns can be mitigated. In practice, companies sometime ''prefile'' with CFIUS, providing information about the transaction in order to ensure that CFIUS has all necessary information during the formal review period. Further, companies may withdraw from the formal review in order to address concerns on the condition that they re-file promptly with CFIUS or abandon the transaction.

Therefore, while the vast majority of CFIUS transactions are approved by the end of the 30-day review, the total time devoted to transactions is sometimes longer. If national security concerns have not been resolved during the 30-day review, CFIUS can extend its review to a second stage 45-day investigation. At the end of a 45-day investigation, the transaction is sent to the President for a decision, accompanied by a CFIUS report and recommendation. Any transaction that goes to the President must be reported to Congress. Transactions that enter investigation may also be terminated before reaching the President, with the companies voluntarily withdrawing and abandoning the investment. Presidential decisions are also avoided in cases where a mitigation agreement has been reached during the investigation period and the companies withdraw from investigation and immediately refile.

Mitigation agreements, which are contracts with CFIUS or CFIUS agencies entered into by the parties to the transaction, are an important element of the CFIUS review and investigation process. These agreements are intended to mitigate possible national security threats posed by a transaction short of requiring that the parties abandon the transaction altogether. The Department of Defense, hereafter DOD, has for many years used various types of mitigation agreements under existing DOD authority and regulations such as the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, NISPOM, to address the impact of foreign ownership and control over companies that have classified contracts with the Pentagon or intelligence agencies. In recent years, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have also done so.

S. 1610 reinforces CFIUS's capacity to refuse, suspend, modify or reverse any transaction if a written notice of such transaction is not filed with CFIUS or if there is an intentional material omission or falsehood in connection with a completed CFIUS review or investigation, or an intentional material breach in any posttransaction mitigation agreement, and establishes a formal requirement that all filings with CFIUS must be complete and accurate to the best of the filing party's ability. Thus, the committee establishes a

clear signal that all violations of such notice certification should be considered in the context of title 18, section 1001, and all intentional breaches or misstatements could also lead to severe modification or divestment of an acquisition of a previously reviewed transaction at any time.

The bill also establishes a mechanism by which CFIUS can unilaterally reopen a transaction that had previously been approved. My expectation is that this authority will only be used in exceptional circumstances when no other remedies exist and where there has been an intentional breach that affects national security. For that reason, the bill requires important procedural safeguards to ensure that this authority is not used lightly—among other safeguards, it requires, for example, that the decision to reopen a case is made at the same level of seniority as is required in the bill for the approval of transactions. The bill makes clear that CFIUS can only reopen a transaction if these threshold tests are met.

Of necessity, the reviews and investigations, which contain classified evaluations of national security vulnerabilities as well as extensive proprietary business information, remain highly confidential. Given this lack of transparency, there have been concerns over the years about CFIUS's accountability to Congress and to the public, particularly with regard to fundamental questions of whether CFIUS policies are consistent with the statute, executive orders, and regulations that govern its operations and whether CFIUS policies are applied consistently from transaction to transaction.

CFIUS has explicit authority in the regulations to open a case in the event that CFIUS discovers there has been a material misstatement or omission in the information provided by the parties to the transaction. CFIUS agencies also have all of the remedies that are normally available under a contract in order to enforce the terms of the mitigation agreement. In addition, in a large number of CFIUS cases, and particularly those involving the Defense Department, CFIUS approvals can be effectively nullified simply by ending the federal agency's contracting relationship with the company. Defense-related contracts are often a central element of CFIUS transactions, so the threat of being denied a contract going forward ensures compliance with the terms of mitigation agreements or other conditions agreed to by the foreign investor.

On October 6, 2005, under the leadership of then-Chairman RICHARD SHELBY, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs conducted a hearing into the findings of the GAO report. Discussion between the GAO witnesses and Banking Committee members further highlighted deficiencies in implementation of Exon-Florio and the level of dissatisfaction with the lack of communication between CFIUS and the appropriate oversight committees of Congress. That hearing was followed on October 20, 2005, by another hearing that allowed the Banking Committee to hear directly from many of the agencies that comprise CFIUS, including the Department of the Treasury, which has the lead role in implementing Exon-Florio, as well as private sector representatives.

In late January 2006 congressional offices became aware of the proposed acquisition of terminal operations at a number of U.S. maritime ports by Dubai Ports World, hereafter DPW, an established port operator owned by the government of the Emirate of Dubai. Concern within Congress about a transaction that would transfer control of terminal operations to a company owned by a Persian Gulf emirate through whose financial system funds had been transferred to the terrorists who carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks upon the United States, and that had been a central conduit for nuclear weapons components being smuggled to hostile regimes, provided further impetus for review of the manner in which foreign transactions were being analyzed by CFIUS.

That senior White House officials, and the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security were unaware of the Dubai Ports World transaction, combined with the fact this transaction was not subjected to a formal investigation in violation of the Byrd amendment, compounded congressional concerns about the nature of the underlying transaction.

In response to congressional criticism related to the DPW case in 2006, CFIUS agencies pledged to address flaws in the CFIUS process identified by Congress. There were 113 transactions filed with CFIUS in 2006, up 74 percent from the previous year. Because companies seek CFIUS consideration voluntarily, this increase reflected greater sensitivity among foreign investors, which in turn may reflect a more aggressive stance from CFIUS. CFIUS conducted seven second-stage investigations, the same number of investigations that had been conducted over the previous five-year period. There was also an increase in the number of companies withdrawing from CFIUS reviews and investigations, which suggests a higher degree of scrutiny: either companies withdrew for the purpose of terminating the underlying transaction or in order to restructure the transaction to address CFIUS concerns.

The number of cases in which CFIUS approved transactions with conditions attached through mitigation agreements also increased. CFIUS has also increased its Congressional outreach, notifying the Congressional leadership and committees of jurisdiction upon completion of CFIUS action on each transaction. Treasury also finally produced the long-overdue quadrennial report on CFIUS-related issues as mandated by the Defense Production Act of 1950.

In response to continued concerns regarding implementation of Exon-Florio, on April 30, 2006, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs reported an original bill, S. 109–264, which made significant amendments to Section 721 to strengthen the review and oversight process. Senate bill 109–264 passed the Senate on July 26, 2006. On the same day the House passed its own reform legislation, H.R. 5337. No further action occurred on the bills prior to the adjournment of the 109th Congress.

On February 28, 2007, The House once again passed legislation amending section 721 to strengthen the foreign investment review process, H.R. 556—The National Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency Act of 2007. On May 16, 2007, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs convened to consider and report an original bill—the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007—Proposed by Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, working closely with Ranking Member RICHARD SHELBY and drawing upon the extensive work that members of the committee had undertaken on this subject in the 109th Congress.

Let me offer a brief summary of the most important provisions of the bill.

The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007—

Establishes the membership of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, in statute;

Strengthens the role of the Director of National Intelligence, hereafter DNI, by making the DNI an ex-officio member of CFIUS and requiring that the Director undertake a thorough analysis of the transaction with respect to any national security implications, engage the intelligence community, and report the DNI's findings to the committee within 20 days of the commencement of the CFIUS review. Requires the DNI to update CFIUS with any additional relevant intelligence information that becomes available during the course of a review and/or investigation;

Mandates the designation of a lead agency or agencies for each covered transaction, in addition to the Treasury Department, charged with negotiating any mitigation agreement or other conditions to ensure that national security is protected, and for follow-up compliance with the terms of the agreement after the transaction has been approved by CFIUS;

Provides for the 30-day review of covered transactions by CFIUS to determine its effects on national security, and for sign-off at the assistant secretary-level, or above, that there is no threat to national security by the proposed transaction;

Provides for the 45-day investigation of covered transactions that threaten to impair national security, including transactions involving foreign government-owned companies and control of

critical infrastructure, and for sign-off at the Deputy Secretary level that there is no threat to the national security by the proposed transaction;

Provides for certain exceptions for the requirement that a state-owned entity automatically go to the investigation stage if the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and the equivalent level official in the lead agency, determine after review of the transaction that national security will not be impaired by the transaction;

Requires assessment of a country's compliance with U.S. and multilateral counterterrorism, nonproliferation and export control regimes for acquisitions by stateowned companies in the investigation stage;

Provides authority to the President to suspend or prohibit a covered transaction if there is credible evidence that such transaction threatens to impair U.S. national security;

Provides authority to CFIUS, or the lead agencies acting on behalf of CFIUS, to negotiate, impose and enforce conditions necessary to mitigate any threat to national security related to a covered transaction;

Adds to the list of factors that CFIUS should consider in the conduct of its reviews and investigation to include among other things consideration of the potential impact of a transaction on critical infrastructure, energy assets, or critical technologies;

Provides for written notice, to the Congress at the conclusion of the CFIUS process for both reviews and investigations, providing details about the transaction, including written assurance that the transaction does not threaten to impair national security or that any initial concerns have been mitigated through binding agreements between the parties and CFIUS, or the lead agency or agencies designated by the Chairman of CFIUS;

Provides for detailed annual reports to Congress on the activities of CFIUS, including information concerning the transactions that have been reviewed or investigated during the previous 12 months;

Provides for an investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Treasury to determine why the department failed to comply with provisions of the Defense Production Act with respect to certain reporting requirements related to potential industrial espionage or coordinated strategies by foreign parties with respect to U.S. critical technology by foreign parties; and

Provides for the issuance of regulations and guidance to carry out the provisions of the Act.

Madam President, Ranking Member RICHARD SHELBY and I believe that Senate passage of S. 1610 as amended by the Dodd/Shelby substitute amendment, which is largely technical in nature, will not only implement needed reforms and thereby strengthen national security, but also provide more transparency and predictability to the CFIUS process that is important to ensuring that the U.S. economy continues to benefit from the fruits of foreign direct investment. We strongly urge our colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I rise in support of the Senate's passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007. This important bill reforms the process through which the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States reviews foreign investment in our country. It establishes a process for reviewing foreign investment transactions that thoroughly examines issues relating to national security, involves clear lines of responsibility, and is flexible to meet the demands of the market.

I appreciate the leadership and hard work of Chairman DODD on this matter.

LABOR MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, I rise today to commend Chairman DODD and Ranking Member SHELBY on their work regarding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS.

Last year, a company called Dubai Ports World sought to purchase labor management rights to several U.S. ports, a proposal that was approved by CFIUS. However, numerous Members of Congress, the media and the American public quickly and loudly voiced concerns over the way in which the CFIUS process had occurred. Because of the enormous outcry, Senator SHELBY, then Chairman of the Banking Committee, worked with then-Ranking Member Senator Sarbanes, to make the CFIUS process more transparent and much more effective.

I want to commend both Senators for their work on this legislation, and I believe that their hard work has produced legislation that will bolster American support for foreign investments.

Many different agencies within the Federal Government have the responsibility to investigate foreign investment proposals before they can be approved. Those agencies, including our intelligence community, have a serious responsibility to ensure that each proposed foreign investment in our country will not jeopardize national security. It is my understanding that currently, the Director of National Intelligence has the authority to tap any of the intelligence agencies within our Federal Government to conduct analysis of technology transfers and economic impacts of any foreign investment proposals. Senator SHELBY, is that your understanding of the responsibilities held by the Director of National Intelligence?

Mr. SHELBY. The Senator is correct. Currently the DNI can use different intelligence agencies to conduct economic analysis, including technology transfers, to ensure that such foreign investment proposals will not jeopardize our national security.

Mr. CRAIG. I thank the Senator. Madam President, the reason I bring up that concern is that I do not believe that such analyses are occurring, or that very little economic analysis is being conducted by our intelligence communities.

I am hopeful that this legislation crafted by Senators SHELBY and DODD will pass the Senate quickly and that it can be signed into law, because America should be a country that welcomes foreign investment. However, we must be absolutely certain that any investment into our country will not have a negative economic impact or impair our national security. I sincerely hope that the Director of National Intelligence will participate fully in the CFIUS process and use all available resources to ensure that all foreign investment proposals receive very thorough and timely analysis to ensure congressional and public support for increased investment in our country, while at the same time ensure our national security is not placed in jeopardy.

Again, I would like to commend the chair and ranking member of the Senate Banking Committee for their hard work and dedication to this legislation and I will strongly support its passage.

Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a Dodd-Shelby substitute amendment, which is at the desk, be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read the third time; further, I ask unanimous consent that the Banking Committee be discharged from the consideration of H.R. 556, and the Senate proceed to its consideration; that all after the enacting clause be stricken, and the text of S. 1610, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof; the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, without any intervening action or debate; that S. 1610 be placed back on the calendar; that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 2002) was agreed to.

(The amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ''Text of Amendments.'')

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read the third time.

The bill (H.R. 556), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

PASSPORT BACKLOG REDUCTION ACT OF 2007

Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to Calendar No. 239, S. 966.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 966) to enable the Department of State to respond to a critical shortage of passport processing personnel, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with an amendment, as follows: