

which is a straight minimum wage with no small business set-asides on it.

Today, we have had 4 amendments laid down, and there has been good debate. Tomorrow, we can have our party caucuses at 12:30. We may vote in the morning. There are four amendments pending. We have the Enzi amendment, and the HELP Committee majority is working with him to see if there can be a couple of changes made and, if so, we can vote on that.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, let me just say, with regard to the cloture motion just filed by the distinguished majority leader, that if cloture were to be invoked on the underlying bill, the opportunity to pass what has developed into a bipartisan minimum wage proposal, including both an increase in the minimum wage and tax provisions, which are important for the small businesses that tend to hire people who work at the minimum wage, would be lost. So certainly it is my hope that cloture will not be invoked on Wednesday on the underlying bill so that we could continue in the bipartisan spirit in which we have begun this session of Congress and move forward on a bill that in all likelihood will receive, at the end of the process, a very large bipartisan vote of support, and that is a combination of the minimum wage increase and the small business tax provision.

So I encourage my colleagues on this side of the aisle to, in the spirit of bipartisanship, defeat that so we can continue to deal with the substitute that I think will enjoy broad bipartisan support.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, during the next couple of days, until we vote on the two cloture matters, if cloture is not invoked on the matter relating to Senator JUDD GREGG, then that matter, it is my understanding, would be withdrawn and we would go to cloture on the underlying bill. If that is, of course, passed, it would be just as Senator MCCONNELL said—it would eliminate the matters the Finance Committee placed on the bill. If it is not invoked, we are right back where we started from and would work off the substitute.

Mr. President, I hope Senators would look at and offer whatever amendments they want on this matter. There is going to come a time, because we have so much other business to do and, besides, there is ample opportunity to file amendments on this bill, that I will be required to file cloture. It would be great if I didn't have to. We could agree on a finite list of amendments, dispose of those amendments, and move to final passage of the bill.

Next week sometime it is likely, as I explained to the distinguished Republican leader, we are going to have to go to the Iraq resolution or resolutions reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee. What the Republican leader and I have talked about doing—and we don't know if that is doable in the Senate—is to limit the votes that

would be on that issue, whether we have a couple competing resolutions or one resolution. Whatever we do, we will try to work something out to the satisfaction of the body.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, briefly, five amendments have been pending, three have been filed. I will have a better sense, I say to my friend, the majority leader, after lunch tomorrow how many amendments my side will be interested in filing. I certainly share the majority leader's view, provided cloture is not invoked on Wednesday, that we would work with the majority leader in the hopes of winding up this bill at the earliest possible time.

ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 23; that on Tuesday, following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and that there then be a period for the transaction of morning business for 60 minutes, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each, with the first half under control of the Republicans and the second half under the control of the majority; that following morning business, the Senate then resume consideration of H.R. 2, the minimum wage bill; that on Tuesday, the Senate recess from 12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. in order to accommodate the respective party conference luncheons.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we began, as we have just spoken about, a very good debate today on minimum wage. Senator GREGG offered his line-item veto amendment. We had very stimulating debate on that matter from both sides. I filed cloture on that amendment. The cloture vote will occur on Wednesday, unless we decide to move it up earlier.

Also, today I filed cloture on the underlying bill. The Republican leader and I discussed that at some length. If cloture is not invoked on the Gregg amendment, then we will go immediately to a cloture vote on the underlying bill.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

I ask unanimous consent that the live quorum, with respect to these two cloture motions, be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators have until 2:30 p.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, to file first-degree amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, does the Republican leader have anything further?

Mr. MCCONNELL. No. I say to my friend, as I indicated, we have several amendments pending. We will know a little more tomorrow how many amendments will be offered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. REID. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that following the remarks of Senator WARNER, the Senate stand adjourned under the previous order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESOLUTION ON THE NEW STRATEGY IN IRAQ

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I first thank the Presiding Officer for addressing the Senate earlier this evening with regard to the proposed resolution which you and our distinguished colleague from Maine, Senator COLLINS, have been working on now for several days and throughout the weekend, placing it into the RECORD for all Senators to have an opportunity to study it.

I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD following my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as I said when I was joined by you and Senator COLLINS in our brief press conference this afternoon, the resolution we currently anticipate will not be filed formally at the desk until the State of the Union is completed tomorrow and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee works its will on a resolution which is pending before it, authored by the chairman, Senator BIDEN, and Senator HAGEL of Nebraska and other Senators who have joined in that resolution. As that resolution works its way through the Foreign Relations Committee, we, the three of us who have worked on this resolution, will take an examination of what is sent to the floor for purposes of floor consideration, and at that time I anticipate we could indicate to the Senate a desire that our resolution be considered as a substitute resolution and therefore an alternative to the resolution that will be reported out from the Foreign Relations Committee.

That is what we stated today, and it is my intention to continue to work along in that vein because my motivation solely is to do what is in the best interests of the United States of America, and most particularly the men and women of the Armed Forces at this very pivotal time in the history of our Nation's commitment to Iraq, considering the President's plan.

As I said earlier, America's contribution to try to bring about a settlement of so many of the controversies in the Middle East is done in the spirit only of trying to bring peace and freedom to that very troubled region. Iraq, at this moment, is very much before the Congress because the President has, on the 10th of this month, laid down a plan. I say it is very much before us at this time, but also there are the very serious questions relating to Iran and their desire to go ahead and develop certain aspects of nuclear energy which could at some point in time undertake a program that would lead to the development of nuclear weapons. That is a very serious question. The question of Lebanon is before this body, as is the question of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian people. So what we do in the context of Iraq is not isolated from all of these serious problems.

But for the moment, we have before us the plan laid down by the President on the 10th of this month. We go back and we trace the evolution of this problem from, say, early last fall when clearly, in the minds of many of us, the situation was not measuring up to our expectations. Our strategy at that time was not bringing about clear benchmarks with positive results.

We had an extraordinary chapter of history when our military campaign, together with our coalition partners, enabled the Iraqi people to have free and open elections, to elect a government, and for that government to take office. They were enabled to begin the fundamental steps to create, No. 1, a sovereign nation with the full exercise of sovereignty in the hands of the government and the Iraqi people, and No. 2, an improved security situation in Iraq which would reflect throughout the region.

Those were all very positive accomplishments. It is owing to the commitment of the nations forming the coalition of forces—to some extent the United Nations and the Security Council, so many institutions and commitments, and the bravery of the men and women of the Armed Forces—that they brought about a nation now that is a sovereign nation, Iraq, whose government was elected by a free people.

But the security situation has deteriorated, and it deteriorated in the fall to the point that I and others began to express our concern publicly. Senator LEVIN and I returned from a trip to that region—specifically Iraq—and in the context of reporting back to this body, the Senate, I indicated that, in my judgment, the situation was drift-

ing sideways. We were simply not seeing the improvements in security. The reins of sovereignty which we put into the hands of the Iraqi people and their elected government were not bringing about the results we wished.

The level of attacks was quite significant, and a measure of total distrust was beginning to evolve between the various factions—the Sunnis distrusting the Shias, the Shias distrusting the Sunnis—and this has led to where the sectarian violence is now the predominant problem, bringing back instability into Iraq.

Following comments by leaders of our administration, leaders here in the Congress and, indeed, very respected experts in the private sector, the President—and I commend him—instituted a total analysis of the situation. I had specifically said, when I mentioned it was drifting sideways, that we ought to consider all aspects of changing this strategy we were currently employing at that time. I am not suggesting my remarks were the motivation, but the President took the initiative and the leadership, and he is to be commended. Every entity within the Federal system, from the Departments of State and Defense to all other entities, made contributions to what should be done to change his strategy.

The Joint Chiefs did a very significant study on their own initiative, and I commend Chairman Pace. I think the Baker-Hamilton commission did a remarkably fine study and of value, certainly, in my judgment, to this institution and all those who are concentrating on how to resolve the problems in Iraq.

So the President's plan presumably was his analysis of all of this extraordinary input into a change of strategy, and he laid down his proposal. At the same time he addressed the country, he said—and I would like to quote him. He said very clearly that “he would welcome and encourage others to make contributions.”

So what we did by way of putting this together was not to contravene in any way the constitutional authorities of our President which are expressed, his role as Commander in Chief, but to accept the offer to the Congress and others made by the President on January 10, 2007, and I quote:

If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.

Now, I commend the President for that, and it is in that vein that the three of us came together and began our concentrated effort shortly after January 10, and this is the work product.

It is clear to us that the U.S. strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with the support of the American people and with a level of bipartisanship in the Congress. On that note, indulge me to reflect a little bit on the Vietnam era where I was privileged to serve as Under Secretary, Secretary of the Navy for 5

years and some months during that extraordinary chapter of American history. I can say unequivocally that my heart goes out to the men and women in the Armed Forces in that chapter of our history. There was a great deal of public misunderstanding about their role and what they were trying to do individually and collectively in the cause of freedom.

Eventually, that public opinion began to infuse itself here in the two bodies of the Congress, and the rest is history. The Congress began to pull back and, as I say, the rest is history.

I do not suggest there is a parallel between the combat situations, although there was enormous suffering and a tremendous level of casualties—over 50,000 men and women killed, wounded and missing in Vietnam—a great sacrifice for our country in the cause of freedom. But today I see an absolute magnificent response all across this Nation among the American citizens to that brave individual in uniform, both men and women. And the same for our many dedicated civilians who are also taking risks in connection with carrying out the instructions our President has laid down for the military, as well as all branches of this Government, to achieve our goals in Iraq.

Our group agreed with the President that a loss, a failed state in Iraq will affect peace in the region and indeed possibly peace elsewhere in the world. The stakes are very high, and we weighed that always, as the three of us prepared these documents. But that is why I say during the Vietnam chapter the support of the American people and a level of bipartisanship in this institution were essential, and that is the purpose of this resolution: to hopefully achieve that.

The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces at their present level, nor to institute and force a timetable for withdrawal. That is a matter—those are both matters that have to be left to the President—but, rather, to express the genuine concerns of a number of Senators from both parties about the President's plan and to set forth a strategy.

Unlike some of the other resolutions that have been before the body, we detail a change in strategy which offers to the President the possibility of modification of his plan. We do not mean to be confrontational with our President but instead to provide a sense of bipartisan resolve on recommendations, alternatives, modifications, we should say, to the plan that he laid down. Our thoughts were in many respects guided by the Baker-Hamilton report.

As I say, I personally, and I think the Presiding Officer and others, attach a great deal of significance to that report.

Now, the primary objective we see of our strategy in Iraq should be the following: First, to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that

will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity of government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation. Further, our resolution states the military part of this strategy should focus on the following. Now, let me address the military part. I think the President very wisely—and this reflects on the strength of his proposal. It is really three parts. It is diplomacy. It is economic support in the nature of reconstruction, a greater emphasis on helping the civilian infrastructure, whether it be their electricity, their sanitation, their water, or many things that are very much lacking, regrettably. Irrespective of the enormity of the contributions we have made thus far to improve those situations, they just haven't improved.

So this plan of the President's is really three parts, but I address now the military part. But I caution that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. All three of these vital parts of the President's program, in order to have any measure of success, have to work together. Our committee, the Armed Services Committee on which the Presiding Officer, Senator COLLINS and I serve, a year or so ago put in specific legislation to encourage the Secretaries of the Cabinet positions here, the Cabinet Secretaries and the administrators of our Government—we put into law giving them flexibility to encourage more of their people to get into the mainstream to support the economic and reconstruction parts of the President's program. That part has to be every bit as strong as whatever the final military components will be, and the same with the diplomacy.

But our military strategies should focus on the following: First, maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq; second, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security. Further, our resolution states that the U.S. military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and charges the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence. That has been a matter of intense interest for this particular Senator, and I drew up this paragraph accordingly, with the Presiding Officer's help and concurrence.

That is, I said, charges—it says to the Iraqi military: We have invested in this military, over years and years, of training, 2 full years, plus—equipment. Now, this sectarian violence is something that you should be out on the point to handle. That is your primary responsibility. The coalition GI, be it American or British or the others, should not be cast into situations—whenever possible, trying not to let them be cast into situations—or firefights, to be more precise—where Sunni is shooting at Shia, or vice versa, and for them to try and make the decisions of how to solve that. That, to me, we

should charge the Iraqis as their responsibility, with their armed forces which we have trained, and which number over 200,000 because they understand the language, they understand the culture, and they understand the complexity of this deep-rooted distrust, this hatred which propels the Sunni versus the Shia, or the Shia versus the Sunni.

This results in these wanton killings, the horrible tortures every day. The bodies are in the streets. I will not describe how those bodies have been desecrated as a symbol of this hatred and distrust. That is not for us to solve. That is for the Iraqis to solve.

As such, our resolution states that the Senate disagrees with the President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Take a look at 21,500. That sends a difficult signal, a tough signal. We have discussed Anbar Province, the province where the Marines are fighting. There we recognize that an augmentation of forces is necessary; namely, because we are engaged directly with al-Qaida.

I say respectfully to the President, we urge him to consider other options, to use a lesser number of troops. Particularly, we have had briefings recently about the growing sentiment among the Iraqi people, the rank and file, that they do not want more troops on their soil. They are anxious to have them leave now. Leaving precipitously could topple that situation into an all-out civil war, an imploding which has disastrous consequences, as we all know.

Again, the signal we are sending 21,500 is, in our judgment, not a wise strategy. We are looking at Baghdad, which is the central focus of sectarian violence, the central focus of the majority of the insecurity, the failure of security in that sovereign country. There are nine different districts, as I understand the President's plan. Sequentially, we will take a district, go into it, and see whether we can lower the level of violence, provide some stability and confidence for their people so they can look forward to some quality of life and personal safety. However, as we take the initial section of Baghdad and do that, we should lay down clear and precise benchmarks that the Iraqi forces must follow.

First, the commitment of their troop level, together with the troop level of the United States, should be all present and accounted for on the day before that operation starts. Unlike the failure of the previous surge efforts in Baghdad, where the United States showed up and a far less number of Iraqis—although committed—showed up. That is the first thing.

The second thing is, it is imperative the political leadership in that Government, which has tried to reach down and make decisions affecting the tactics of the Armed Forces—both Iraqi

Armed Forces and the coalition forces, principally the American forces—that comes to an absolute end. The military commanders should be entrusted to make the tactical decisions, to take the missions they see fit for each of the nine districts—the missions can be different in the nine districts—and carry them out halfway through, after perhaps sacrificing life and limb to accomplish some measure of success, will not be reversed by a political decision made somewhere in the Iraqi Government. That is important.

We had the benchmarks. Before we go to a second location in Baghdad, we will have, hopefully, a clearly documented case of this operation going according to plan. It will document the Iraqis taking the point, as we say in military work, with regard to incidents of sectarian violence. Before we go to another sequenced operation in Baghdad, we better be sure. Words will not do it. Statements will not do it. Only deeds will be convincing that there is a full and unqualified commitment to the Iraqi Government.

Our resolution is worthy of consideration by our colleagues. There is a great deal of concern in the Senate and adversity of opinion. I respect that. I hope it will be considered. The three of us will be glad to work with colleagues individually, collectively, and most respectfully of our own leadership, as to what guidance they might wish to give us.

I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank Senator COLLINS. I wish to thank staff who worked throughout the weekend and over the past few days: Tim Becker, from the staff of the Presiding Officer; Christiana Gallagher, also of your staff; Jane Alonso, of Senator COLLINS' staff; John Ullyot, of my staff; Bill Caniano and Ann Loomis and Sandy Luff, of my staff. We have had quite a team working. They all made possible the completion of this resolution today.

EXHIBIT 1

Language Sponsored by Mr. Warner (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, and Ms. Collins)

Resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the new strategy in Iraq.

Whereas, we respect the Constitutional authorities given a President in Article II, Section 2, which states that "The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;" it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 that, "if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust;"

Whereas, the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship;

Whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly;

Whereas, many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families;

Whereas, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas, these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force;

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that "calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq;"

Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 2006, "determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;"

Whereas, a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists;

Whereas, Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating an ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;

Whereas, Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;

Whereas, the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;

Whereas, U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, "I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future;"

Whereas, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006 that "The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and blood-letting of innocents are the politicians;"

Whereas, there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level;

Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components of the Executive branch;

Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes "new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly;"

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as the "plan,") the central element of which is an augmentation of the present U.S. military force structure through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq;

Whereas, this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500;

Whereas, the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those promises, little has been achieved;

Whereas, the President said on January 10, 2007 that "I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended" so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists;

Whereas, the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now therefore, be it

Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Senate disagrees with the "plan" to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below with reduced force levels than proposed;

(2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation;

(3) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security;

(4) United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, and charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence;

(5) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities;

(6) the United States Government should transfer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is necessary;

(7) the Senate believes the United States should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven;

(8) the United States Government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq;

(9) the Administration should provide regular updates to the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end.

(10) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy should not be regarded as an "open-ended" or unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks that must be specified by the Administration.

I yield the floor.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, the Senate stands in adjournment until 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 23, 2007.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 6:59 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, January 23, 2007, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate January 22, 2007:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RYAN C. CROCKER, OF WASHINGTON, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE WITH THE RANK PERSONAL RANK OF CAREER AMBASSADOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ.

JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, OF NEW YORK, TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, VICE ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, RESIGNED.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, VICE JOHN D. NEGROPONTE.

IN THE MARINE CORPS

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

To be brigadier general

COL. REX C. MCMILLIAN, 0000