

legislation to ensure the equal division of Iraqi oil revenues; drafting and implementing legislation to reform the de-Ba'athification process; implementing a fair process for amending the Iraqi Constitution to ensure minority rights are protected; and implementing new rules to protect minority rights in the Iraqi Parliament.

I support this Iraq resolution. It says what the Iraq Study Group has already told us: the problems in Iraq cannot be solved by the U.S. military—they require a political solution by the Iraqis and diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors. It says Congress and the American people will not only support the troops but continue to protect them as well.

I want to end this war, and the resolution in this bill will do just that. Yet in ending the war, it is my responsibility as a Senator to ensure that our troops are brought home not only swiftly but safely. I will not vote to end funding for the pay that supports military spouses and children; body armor and armored humvee's our troops need for survival; tourniquets and surgical hospitals on the battlefield; jet fuel for the airplanes that take injured troops from Baghdad to Germany and then home; or the medical care they need when they get here.

In the last few weeks, we have all been shocked and awed by the conditions facing our wounded warriors. We know that more than 22,000 Purple Hearts have been awarded in Iraq. Yet our troops are being twice wounded. We know that acute care for our injured troops has been astounding, with historic rates of survival from even the most brutal battlefield injuries. Yet while we have saved their lives, we are failing to give them their life back. Outpatient care, facilities, social work, case workers, disability benefits—the whole system is dysfunctional.

I thank Senator INOUYE and Senator BYRD for their leadership in providing funding in this bill for military and veterans' health care. This supplemental includes an additional \$20 million to improve conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and an additional \$100 million for research and treatment of traumatic brain injury, posttraumatic stress disorder, and other physical and mental trauma. It also adds \$454 million for veterans health care, including \$73 million for new polytrauma facilities and services and \$100 million for mental health treatment.

We know this is only a downpayment for our troops and veterans. We need to overhaul the disability benefits system that is outdated and adversarial. We need a better system for transitioning our troops from active duty to the Veterans Administration to ensure they get the health care, job training, and educational benefits they deserve. We need to hear the recommendations of the Dole-Shalala Commission on how to fix the problems in our military and veterans' hospitals. And I look forward to working with Senator MURRAY, Sen-

ator LEVIN, and Senator INOUYE on a comprehensive reform package that will ensure our troops have the medical care they will need for the rest of their lives.

This supplemental supports our troops, follows the will of the American people, and follows the advice of the Iraq Study Group. It is time to change our direction in Iraq and bring our forces home. Let's send in the diplomats and bring our troops home safely and soon.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE PARITY ACT

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, today the Senate Rules Committee reported S. 223, the Senate Campaign Disclosure Parity Act. I am a cosponsor of this legislation, and I voted in favor of reporting the measure.

This bill would require Senate candidates to file election-related designations, statements, and reports in electronic form with the Secretary of the Senate. It also would require that the Secretary of the Senate forward a copy of those filings to the Federal Election Commission within 24 hours so that they can be made available to the public.

I note for the RECORD that the bill as introduced and reported would require that Senate candidates file directly with the Secretary of the Senate, and not the Federal Election Commission. I support continuing this policy, and ensuring that the Senate as an institution retains custody of these campaign-related filings. According to testimony before the Rules Committee last month, the office of the Secretary of the Senate is fully capable of implementing this requirement and ensuring that these documents are made available to the public expeditiously.

I support the efforts of the Rules Committee on this matter

VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I regret that I was unable to vote the afternoon of March 27 on the confirmation of the nomination of George H. Wu, of California, to be United States District Judge for the Central District of California. I wish to address this confirmation so that the people of the great State of Kansas, who elected me to serve them as U.S. Senator, may know my position.

Regarding vote No. 115, I support the confirmation of George H. Wu. My vote would not have altered the outcome of this confirmation.

NSL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to speak today about the recent report by the inspector general of the Department of Justice on the FBI's use of national security letters. According to the inspector general's testimony before the Judiciary Committee, there was "widespread and serious misuse of the FBI's national security letter authorities"—misuse that violated statutes, Attorney General guidelines, and internal FBI policies. I was deeply concerned by the findings in that report. Unfortunately, I was not surprised.

The national security letter, or NSL, authorities were dramatically expanded by Sections 358 and 505 of the PATRIOT Act. Unfortunately, in its haste to pass this flawed legislation, Congress essentially granted the FBI a blank check to obtain some very sensitive records about Americans, including people not under any suspicion of wrong doing, without judicial approval. So it is not surprising that the inspector general identified serious problems with the implementation of these broad authorities. Congress gave the FBI very few rules to follow. As a result, Congress shares some responsibility for the apparently lax attitude and in some cases serious misuse of these potentially very intrusive authorities by the FBI.

This inspector general report proves that "trust us" doesn't cut it when it comes to the Government's power to obtain Americans' sensitive business records without a court order and without any suspicion that they are tied to terrorism or espionage. It was a grave mistake for Congress to grant the Government broad authorities and just keep its fingers crossed that they wouldn't be misused. We have the responsibility to put appropriate limits on Government authorities—limits that allow agents to actively pursue criminals and terrorists but that also protect the privacy of innocent Americans.

But let me back up a few steps. What are NSLs, and why are they such a concern? I am going to spend a little time on this because it is important. I believe there should be a legislative response to this report, so I want my colleagues to understand what we are dealing with here.

National security letters are issued by the FBI to businesses to obtain certain types of records. So they are similar to the controversial section 215 business record orders but with one very critical difference. While section 215 involves an application to the FISA Court, the Government does not need to get any court approval whatsoever to issue NSLs. It doesn't have to go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or any other court and make even the most minimal showing. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI can simply

issue the order signed by the special agent in charge of a field office or some other supervisory official—although we now know that many NSLs were issued without even the signatures required by the PATRIOT Act.

Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the FBI had to certify specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the records sought with an NSL pertained to a terrorist or spy.

But the PATRIOT Act expanded the NSL authorities to allow the Government to use them to obtain records of people who are not suspected of being or even being connected to terrorists or spies. The Government need only certify that the documents are either “sought for” or “relevant to” an authorized intelligence investigation, a far-reaching standard that—even if followed closely, which we now know it was not—could be used to obtain all kinds of records about innocent Americans. Indeed, as the inspector general suggested, it could be used to “access NSL information about parties two or three steps removed from their subjects without determining if these contacts reveal suspicious connections.” And just as with section 215, the recipient is subject to an automatic, permanent gag rule.

NSLs can be used to obtain three categories of business records, while section 215 orders can be used to obtain “any tangible things.” But even the categories reachable by an NSL are quite broad, and the PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation expanded them further.

Specifically, NSLs can be used to obtain the following: First, subscriber and transactional information related to Internet and phone usage, including information about the phone numbers and e-mail addresses that an individual is in communication with. Second, full credit reports. Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could not get a full credit report without obtaining a court order—it could only obtain what is called “credit header” information, which includes name, current and former addresses, current and former places of employment, and the names of financial institutions at which the individual has accounts. But the PATRIOT Act expanded that authority to include full credit reports, which generally include many personal details about loans, credit scores, and other aspects of individuals’ financial situations. And the third category is financial records, a category that includes bank transactions but also was expanded in 2002 to include records from all kinds of everyday businesses like jewelers, car dealers, travel agents and even casinos.

Unfortunately, the PATRIOT Act re-authorization legislation that was enacted last year—over my opposition—did nothing to address the standard for issuing an NSL. It left in place the breathtakingly broad “relevance” or “sought for” standards. Not only that, but it left in place the automatic gag rule for NSL recipients, albeit with a new exception for notifying a lawyer.

What did the reauthorization legislation do with regard to NSLs? Well, primarily it created the illusion of judicial review, both for the letters themselves and for the accompanying gag rule. At a Judiciary Committee hearing this week, the FBI Director pointed to this after-the-fact judicial review provision as a privacy protection for NSLs. But if you look at the details, it was drafted in a way that makes that review virtually meaningless. With regard to the NSLs themselves, the reauthorization permits recipients to consult their lawyer and seek judicial review, but it also allows the Government to keep all of its submissions secret and not share them with the challenger, regardless of whether there are national security interests at stake.

The other significant problem with the judicial review provisions is the standard for getting the gag rule overturned. In order to prevail, the recipient has to prove that any certification by the Government that disclosure would harm national security or impair diplomatic relations was made in bad faith. This is a standard of review that is virtually impossible to meet.

Now, judicial review is not at issue in the IG’s report, and indeed, the chances that a business receiving an NSL would seek judicial review rather than just comply are relatively slim, but I think it is important to point out that even on the one issue that the reauthorization legislation did address with regard to NSLs, judicial review, the result was entirely inadequate.

I want to make one additional point about national security letters. There is a crucial difference between obtaining records in national security investigations and in standard criminal investigations. As the General Counsel of the FBI testified before the House Judiciary Committee last week, actions in national security investigations “are typically taken in secret and they don’t have the transparency of the criminal justice system.” She explained that in the criminal system, agents know that “if they mess up during the course of an investigation, they’re going to be cross-examined, they’re going to have a federal district judge yelling at them.” That means that more vigorous controls and compliance mechanisms are needed with respect to sensitive authorities like national security letters than their analogues in the criminal justice system—something I think the inspector general report demonstrates.

With that background, what did the inspector general find as a result of his audit of the use of NSLs from 2003 to 2005? He found that even the very limited protections in the existing statute were not being followed.

The inspector general found, based on FBI records, that the FBI’s use of NSLs expanded exponentially after the PATRIOT Act, moving from approximately 8,500 requests in 2000, to 39,000 requests in 2003, 56,000 requests in 2004, and 47,000 requests in 2005. The total number of requests was 143,074 over the 3-year period.

But the inspector general also found that even those numbers are inaccurate because the FBI had no policies in place with respect to the retention or tracking of NSLs. In many cases, agents did not even keep copies of signed NSLs. As a result, the FBI significantly undercounted its NSL requests. In a sample of 77 case files that the IG looked at, the NSL requests were undercounted by roughly 22 percent.

Although it is hard to know how much can be extrapolated from that figure, if that figure holds throughout the Bureau, that could mean that there were roughly 30,000 more NSL requests issued that the FBI didn’t keep track of. That is appalling—that the privacy rights of Americans would be treated so cavalierly that there are potentially tens of thousands of NSL requests out there that the FBI itself doesn’t even have a record of. And it resulted in inaccurate information being reported to Congress about the use of NSLs, raising another grave concern.

What else did the inspector general find? He found that the use of NSL requests regarding U.S. persons—that is, citizens and legal permanent residents—shifted from 39 percent of all NSL requests in 2003 to 53 percent of all NSL requests in 2005, at least with respect to the NSL requests for which the FBI kept track of the U.S. person status of the target. And, until 2006, the FBI did not keep track of how many NSL requests pertain to individuals who are not the subjects of authorized national security investigations. Obviously, if the FBI is using NSLs frequently to obtain information about people who are not the subjects of open investigations, that would present serious concerns about their use.

The inspector general also found that the FBI significantly underreported violations of the NSL statutes and internal guidelines from 2003 to 2005, with respect to notifying both the FBI’s Office of General Counsel, or OGC, and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, or IOB, as required by Executive order. FBI employees did report 26 violations to OGC, but the IG found examples of 22 more unreported violations in 17 investigative case files out of a sample of 77 investigative files in 4 field offices.

Some of these were significant violations, others less so. But that means that 22 percent of investigative files surveyed by the IG contained one or more violations not identified by the FBI or reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board, as required. According to the IG, “we have no reason to believe that the number of NSL-related possible IOB violations we identified in the four field offices was skewed or disproportionate to the number of possible IOB violations that exist in other

offices." Thus, the IG's findings "suggest that a significant number of NSL-related possible IOB violations through the FBI have not been identified or reported by FBI personnel."

What else did the inspector general find? Perhaps the most disturbing revelation in his report, among many disturbing revelations, is that on more than 700 occasions, the FBI obtained telephone toll billing records or subscriber information from 3 telephone companies without first issuing NSLs or grand jury subpoenas. Instead, it relied on what it called "exigent letters" signed by personnel not authorized by statute to sign NSLs. Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does contain an emergency provision permitting the FBI to obtain certain communications records in emergencies where there is an immediate threat to a person's physical safety, many of these exigent letters were issued, admittedly, in nonemergency circumstances. Indeed, they were used as a matter of course by one headquarters unit. This violated both the statute and internal FBI policy.

The inspector general also found that FBI headquarters issued more than 300 NSLs without determining whether there was an authorized investigation in progress. Issuing an NSL without tying it to an authorized investigation is a violation of the statute.

The inspector general also found that internal FBI guidance on how to properly use NSLs was woefully lacking, and that even to the degree there were FBI policies in place to govern the use of NSLs, those policies were not being followed. In 60 percent of the 77 case files that the IG examined in detail, there was some infraction of FBI guidance. Sixty percent. That is absolutely astounding.

But that is not all. Once information is obtained through an NSL, the Inspector general reported that the FBI retains it indefinitely and uploads it into databases like the "Investigative Data Warehouse," where it is retrievable by the thousands of authorized personnel, both inside and outside the FBI, who have access to these types of FBI databases. The FBI has no process for removing that information from its databases depending on the results of the investigation. So if a person's full credit report is obtained with an NSL as part of a preliminary investigation and that preliminary investigation is closed because the FBI determines that the person has done nothing wrong, it doesn't matter—the FBI can keep it anyway.

Although the FBI keeps all the data it collects using NSLs, it does not tag or mark that information to indicate that it was derived through an NSL. So the FBI does not track whether information from NSLs ends up in intelligence analysis products or is passed on to prosecutors for criminal investigations. You would think that these would be key indicators of the usefulness and effectiveness of NSLs, but that information is not available, other than anecdotally.

That is what the inspector general's report told us. The report revealed that the FBI took a shockingly cavalier attitude toward the privacy of innocent Americans in its implementation of the PATRIOT Act NSL authorities.

Congress meant for the inspector general's report to help it in its oversight of the use of national security letters, which are issued and enforced entirely in secret, and there is no question it has done that. The inspector general deserves a great deal of credit for his thorough and careful report. As I have already mentioned, much of the reporting to Congress on the use of NSLs since the PATRIOT Act has been inaccurate or misleading due to FBI recordkeeping problems, so having the results of this independent audit is invaluable.

But the report also reveals that the Justice Department essentially tried to whitewash this issue over the past several years. When Congress was considering whether to make changes to the NSL authorities as part of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization debate, the Attorney General came to Congress and resisted any changes, touting the strength of the checks on its power to obtain NSLs and assuring us that the power was being used carefully.

On April 5, 2005, Attorney General Gonzales told the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[T]he PATRIOT Act includes a lot of safeguards that critics of the Act choose to ignore." On November 23, 2005, the Justice Department wrote Senators Specter and Leahy a ten-page letter defending the FBI's use of National Security Letters, asserting that "the use of NSLs is subject to significant internal oversight and checks," and that there are "robust mechanisms for checking misuse," and that "[t]he FBI must and does conduct its investigations within the bounds of our Constitution, statutes, strict internal guidelines, and Executive Orders."

On December 14, 2005, the Washington Post quoted Attorney General Gonzales as saying, "[T]he PATRIOT Act has already undergone extensive review and analysis by Congress, by the DOJ Inspector General, and by other bodies . . . This extensive review has uncovered not one verified example of abuse of any of the Act's provisions."

It is now quite evident that the Attorney General must not have been looking very hard, and certainly not trying very hard to ensure the protection of Americans' privacy rights. There is a lot going on right now that suggests we should be skeptical of assurances from the Justice Department, but this report highlights just how overtly political, and how lacking in fact, were DOJ's representations regarding the implementation of the Patriot Act.

Indeed, as recently as November 2006, the Justice Department asserted—in response to an inspector general memo warning against the potential for abuse of national security letters—that the FBI is "aggressively vigilant in guard-

ing against any abuse," a claim we now know was simply false.

It is an understatement to say that the inspector general's report uncovered serious flaws in the use of national security letters. But these were flaws waiting to happen. It should not have taken this type of highly critical report to convince Congress to do something about such wide-ranging Government power.

In fact, a bipartisan group of Senators proposed changes to the NSL statutes years ago, in the Security and Freedom Enhancement Act, or SAFE, Act. I, along with Senators CRAIG, DURBIN, SUNUNU, MURKOWSKI, SALAZAR, and many others, pushed for changes to the NSL statutes to try to prevent precisely the types of abuses that have now come to light. For example, the SAFE Act would have required that agents demonstrate that the records pertain to a suspected terrorist or spy before the FBI can issue an NSL, rather than the extremely loose standard in the PATRIOT Act.

The SAFE Act also would have given the recipient of an NSL a meaningful right to challenge the letter and the nondisclosure requirement, and placed a time limit on the nondisclosure requirement, which could be extended by the court. As is the case for FISA authorities, the SAFE Act would have required notice to the target of an NSL if the Government sought to use the records obtained from the NSL in a subsequent proceeding and given the target an opportunity to challenge the use of those records.

So the idea that the NSL statutes need to be revised is not new. But the inspector general's report has now highlighted the need for legislation and suggested some problems with the statutes that had not previously been identified.

The time for changing the lax and unchecked system for issuing national security letters is now. The hearings the Judiciary Committee has held with the inspector general and the FBI Director have been immensely helpful.

But we must not stop there. Legislation is needed. During the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, we were unable to fix the NSL statutes. The administration and its supporters even refused to put a sunset on the NSL powers. So we need to act, and soon. I hope to work closely with the bipartisan group of Senators who cosponsored the SAFE Act. I plan to press for Senate action on sensible reforms to help prevent future abuses of national security letters.

Let me say, in conclusion, that this report shows beyond doubt that Congress made a grave mistake when it let this administration intimidate us into silence and inaction rather than protecting the rights and freedoms of the American people. The Justice Department's credibility concerning the powers contained in the PATRIOT Act is in

shreds. Congress needs to exercise extensive and searching oversight of those powers, and it must take corrective action. The inspector general's report has shown both that current safeguards are inadequate and that the Government cannot be trusted to exercise those powers lawfully. Congress must address these problems and fix the mistakes it made in passing and reauthorizing the flawed PATRIOT Act.

TRIBUTE TO HOWARD ARTHUR TIBBS

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, it is my privilege to call to the attention of my colleagues a great Ohioan and distinguished Tuskegee Airman, Howard Arthur Tibbs, who this week will be posthumously awarded the Congressional Gold Medal.

Much has been written about the valiant service and tremendous bravery of these African-American men during World War II. Collectively the Airmen flew over 15,000 sorties and 1,500 missions in their legendary P-51 Mustangs. They were awarded two Presidential Unit Citations, 744 Air Medals, 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and numerous individual bronze and silver stars.

But this simple listing of their military accomplishments does not capture the true breadth of their commitment and sacrifice to this country. Not only did they greatly contribute to the Allies' defeat of the Axis Powers, but they did so within a highly segregated military. It has been stated that "These airmen fought two wars—one against a military force overseas and the other against racism at home and abroad."

Howard Arthur Tibbs exemplified the qualities for which the Tuskegee Airmen are so admired. At the age of 24, the Salem, OH native enlisted into the service of his country at Fort Hayes in Columbus, OH. He fought bravely and served honorably under tremendously challenging conditions. Our State and our Nation are indebted to him and his fellow airmen for their sacrifice.

A window into the character of Howard Arthur Tibbs is provided by the advice he gave his children. "Give each day your best," he told them, "and the best is bound to come back to you." Howard Tibbs certainly gave his best to this country, and this country is right to recognize his bravery and accomplishment.

I proudly celebrate the life and sacrifice of this great Ohioan on the occasion of his posthumous award of the Congressional Gold Medal.

NEW MEXICO'S TUSKEGEE AIRMEN

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today I pay tribute to New Mexico's Tuskegee Airmen. With the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to John Allen, Robert Lawrence, and James Williams, we express our gratitude for their service, sacrifice, and leadership. Their military service in

World War II helped pave the way for the future desegregation of our Armed Forces and country.

Each of these men distinguished themselves while serving our Nation. Robert Lawrence flew 33 separate combat missions over Italy, defending American bombers from the Luftwaffe. John Allen spent 20 years working for the Strategic Air Command following his World War II service. James Williams fought against segregationist policies at his base before becoming an accomplished surgeon. The Congressional Gold Medal, and invitation to the Capitol, shows how far we have come; many of the Tuskegee Airmen can recall when Black Americans were excluded from these hallowed hallways. However, I know it will take more than this award to eradicate the remaining vestiges of racism and prejudice these men have experienced. I pledge to continue working in that spirit and will keep these men in mind in the process.

The great State of New Mexico can be proud it is home to three such outstanding men. I hope that each of them knows how very much we value their contributions to our society in their efforts working for justice, our military for what the service they performed while in uniform, and our nation for teaching all Americans the importance of equality at any cost. I again thank them for all they have done.

GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. REED. Mr. President, in 1821, the Greeks began their 8-year battle for independence against the Ottoman Empire after over 400 years of Turkish rule. The beginning of the Greek Revolution eventually led to Greece's recognition as an autonomous power in 1832, secured with the signing of the Treaty of Constantinople.

The United States and Greece are very fortunate to have always had strong ties. James Monroe, President during the beginning of the Greek Revolution, publicly expressed a "strong hope" for Greece, which led to increasing support for the Greek people. These interactions of the past significantly represent the current relationship between the United States and Greece.

Our two countries continue as allies today, sharing the common ideals of freedom and democracy. We fought side by side in both world wars and currently work together in the war on terrorism. Greece has been a strong contributor to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and in providing security at the Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan. The support that Greece has offered in the war on terrorism has proved to be invaluable.

The historic friendship between Greece and United States has been one of mutual respect and support. A Greek proverb says "Take an old man's counsel and an experienced man's knowledge." The United States has been continuously influenced by the history,

principles, and culture of Greece. I am proud to recognize March 25 as Greek Independence Day, including as an original cosponsor of a Senate resolution to so designate this day. I send all Greek-Americans in Rhode Island and throughout the world my best wishes as they celebrate their independence.

SOMALIA

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in recent weeks, we have seen a level of chaos and brutal violence in Mogadishu, Somalia, that is tragic and horrific, not to mention extremely dangerous to our national security interests. According to the U.N., 40,000 people fled Mogadishu in February, and conditions have only deteriorated this month. Humanitarian access is severely restricted. Ugandan troops serving in an African Union peacekeeping force have been attacked. Last week a cargo plane was shot down. The Transitional Federal Government has been overwhelmed by the violence, and appears unable or unwilling to work with rival clans and other opponents. A mere 3 months after the Ethiopian incursion, the TFG is isolated and a dangerous power vacuum is forming.

These are the conditions that permit terrorist organizations to operate in Somalia, as they have for years. Insecurity and lawlessness facilitated the rise of the Islamic courts in recent years and now circumstances are again conducive for extremist elements to regroup and return. In other words, without a consistent, comprehensive plan for fostering stability in Somalia, we could find ourselves faced with the same conditions that preceded the Ethiopian incursion against the courts and subsequent U.S. military operations.

The United States and the international community has approached Somalia, and continues to approach Somalia, sporadically, with policy made on the fly and with few resources directed toward long-term political and economic development. When required by Congress to provide a comprehensive plan for Somalia, the Administration has failed to do so. In February, when I asked the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs why this legally mandated report was overdue, she indicated that that the Department was busy responding to "fast-moving events on the ground." But that is precisely the problem. Ad hoc approaches to Somalia have not worked; they have never worked. There was no comprehensive plan last year, when the Islamic courts took advantage of years of civil conflict to consolidate their power. There was no plan when Ethiopian troops entered Somalia, even though the international community had no ready peacekeeping capability to follow. There was no plan when the TFG was installed in Mogadishu with no effective international framework to ensure that it could govern. And there was no broader plan when U.S.