

U.S. forces. Far from protecting U.S. interests, Lugar said in a recent speech, the continuation of Bush's policy poses "extreme risks for U.S. national security."

Critics of complete withdrawal often charge that "those advocating [it] just don't understand the serious consequences of doing so," said Wayne White, a former deputy director of Near East division of the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau. "Unfortunately, most of us old Middle East hands understand all too well some of the consequences."

White is among many Middle East experts who think that the United States should leave Iraq sooner rather than later, but differ on when, how and what would happen next. Most agree that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover would be unlikely, and say that Washington should step up its regional diplomacy, putting more pressure on regional actors such as Saudi Arabia to take responsibility for what is happening in their back yards.

Many regional experts within and outside the administration note that while there is a range of truly awful possibilities, it is impossible to predict what will happen in Iraq—with or without U.S. troops.

"Say the Shiites drive the Sunnis into Anbar," one expert said of Anderson's wargame scenario. "Well, what does that really mean? How many tens of thousands of people are going to get killed before all the surviving Sunnis are in Anbar?" He questioned whether that result would prove acceptable to a pro-withdrawal U.S. public.

White, speaking at a recent symposium on Iraq, addressed the possibility of unpalatable withdrawal consequences by paraphrasing Winston Churchill's famous statement about democracy. "I posit that withdrawal from Iraq is the worst possible option, except for all the others."

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a premature withdrawal would have severe consequences, all of which would pose severe risks. Clearly, we should allow General Petraeus's plan time to succeed.

Finally, Mr. President, as I noted previously, by setting the aside the Defense authorization bill because he lost a vote to withdraw our troops, the Majority Leader left important business for our military undone. Recently, the Senate passed parts of the bill—a pay raise and "wounded warriors" provisions—but more needs to be done.

For instance, the Defense authorization bill should be the vehicle for setting our national security priorities, one of which is how we should deal with antisatellite weapons the Chinese could use against us.

I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that an article on China's space weapons that appeared in the July 23 Wall Street Journal be inserted into the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007]

CHINA'S SPACE WEAPONS

(By Ashley J. Tellis)

On Jan. 11, 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile slammed into an aging weather satellite in space. The resulting collision not only marked Beijing's first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test but, in the eyes of many, also a head-on collision with the Bush administration's space policies.

As one analyst phrased it, U.S. policy has compelled China's leaders to conclude "that only a display of Beijing's power to launch . . . an arms race would bring Washington to the table to hear their concerns." This view, which is widespread in the U.S. and elsewhere, misses the point: China's ASAT demonstration was not a protest against the Bush administration, but rather part of a maturing strategy designed to counter the overall military superiority of the U.S.

Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese strategists have been cognizant of the fact that the U.S. is the only country in the world with the capacity—and possibly the intention—to thwart China's rise to great power status. They also recognize that Beijing will be weak militarily for some time to come, yet must be prepared for a possible war with America over Taiwan or, in the longer term, over what Aaron Friedberg once called "the struggle for mastery in Asia." How the weaker can defeat the stronger, therefore, becomes the central problem facing China's military strategy.

Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of solving this conundrum ever since the dramatic demonstration of American prowess in Operation Desert Storm. And after carefully analyzing U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan, they believe they have uncovered a significant weakness.

The advanced military might of the U.S. is inordinately dependent on a complex network of space-based command, control, communications, and computer-driven intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that enables American forces to detect different kinds of targets and exchange militarily relevant information. This network is key to the success of American combat operations. These assets, however, are soft and defenseless; while they bestow on the American military definite asymmetric advantages, they are also the source of deep vulnerability. Consequently, Chinese strategists concluded that any effort to defeat the U.S. should aim not at its fundamental strength—its capacity to deliver overwhelming conventional firepower precisely from long distances—but rather at its Achilles' heel, namely, its satellites and their related ground installations.

Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S. space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese calculations, this represents the best way of "leveling the playing field" in the event of a future conflict.

The importance of space denial for China's operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power. Because having this capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.

This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they are right. Any "weaponization" of space will indeed be costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are correct when they emphasize that advanced

powers stand to gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be pursued.

Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because of its deleterious consequences for their particular interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific costs to Beijing—in the context of executing China's national military strategy—would be remarkably high.

Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change only given a few particular developments. China might acquire the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict between a weaker China and any other superior military power, such as the U.S., disappears entirely.

Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S. should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the security of its space assets, in addition to developing its own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues—as the Bush administration has correctly recognized—offer the promise of protecting American interests in space and averting more serious threats to its global primacy.

Mr. KYL. I asked that this article be printed in the RECORD because it is a wake-up call to a new threat we need to take seriously. By setting aside the Defense authorization bill, we missed an opportunity to deal with this threat from China.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment on proposed legislation to revise the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to facilitate the electronic surveillance of targets reasonably believed to be outside the United States in order to obtain foreign intelligence information relating to international terrorism. When the act was passed in 1978, communications outside the United States were characteristically transmitted via satellite and were not covered by the act which applied to wires. In the intervening 29 years, such communications now travel by wire and are covered by the act.

The civil and constitutional rights of U.S. persons would ordinarily not be involved in electronic surveillance of targets outside the United States. If persons inside the United States were surveilled while targeting outside the United States, then the minimization procedures would reasonably protect

civil and constitutional rights of persons inside the United States.

As the Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, outlined the current threat, there is an urgent need to enact this legislation promptly, certainly before the Congress adjourns for the August recess. Such modifications to FISA should have been enacted long ago and legislation has been pending for months as proposed by Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN and myself.

I am concerned by provisions of the proposed legislation which would give extensive authority to the Attorney General. Regrettably, Attorney General Gonzales does not enjoy the confidence of many, if not most, Members of Congress. There is in the Congress generally considerable skepticism about the administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program because it was kept secret for so long and concerns continue to be expressed that some portions have still not been adequately explained to the public, even where that might be done consistent with national security.

There has been considerable discussion among Members of the Senate raising at a minimum serious concerns and, beyond that, objections to giving Attorney General Gonzales any additional, even if temporary, authority.

Discussions have been undertaken with the Director of National Intelligence to substitute his position for that of the Attorney General; or, in the alternative, to substitute the Secretary of Homeland Security or some other official outside of the Department of Justice who has been confirmed by the Senate.

I am putting these concerns on the record now so that they may be considered and resolved at the earliest time so that legislation can be concluded before Congress adjourns for the August recess.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

REMEMBERING GEORGE EDWARD "SKIP" PROSSER

• Mr. BURR. Mr. President, I wish to honor the life of George Edward "Skip" Prosser, head coach of the Wake Forest University basketball team.

As a Demon Deacon alumni myself, I join the entire Wake Forest University community in mourning his untimely passing.

I knew Skip personally. Skip was a friend of mine. And before I mention many of his accomplishments as a basketball coach, perhaps Skip's most admirable achievement in life was that he was a good husband and good dad.

When I first heard the news of Skip's passing, my first thoughts were not of basketball but of his wife Nancy and his sons, Scott and Mark. My heartfelt thoughts and prayers go out to Skip's family and to the Wake Forest community that adored him.

Coach Prosser had countless basketball accomplishments, and as I stand here today, I can only scratch the surface of what he has achieved.

When he joined Wake Forest University for the 2001 to 2002 season, after successful coaching at Loyola, Maryland, and Xavier, he added a much needed spark to our basketball program that yielded immediate success.

Coach Prosser is the only coach in NCAA history to take three different schools to the NCAA Tournament in his first season at each of those schools.

In his first four seasons coaching at Wake Forest, Coach Prosser led the Demon Deacons to the NCAA tournament, and in 2003 he led the team to its first outright regular season ACC title in over 40 years.

In the 2004 to 2005 season, Coach Prosser's Demon Deacons rose to No. 1 in the national rankings for the first time in school history.

One of his most impressive statistics was his career wins percentage of .666 that is among the highest winning percentages of active coaches.

More impressive, however, is the statement Coach Prosser often made about his personal coaching record. It personified the kind of man Skip was. When his record was applauded, he often responded by saying, "I don't have a career record. The players won those games."

In addition to the honor and praise Coach Prosser got for his achievements on the court, his work off the court also deserved high marks.

Coach Prosser always emphasized that academic success was the first priority for his athletes. In fact, every senior on Coach Prosser's team graduated with a diploma in 4 years.

The Wake Forest student body embraced him as one of their own because he took every opportunity to spend time with them—frequently walking through the Wake Forest Quad, talking with students, and game after game filling our home basketball coliseum with Demon Deacon pride.

Skip Prosser will be missed. He was an outstanding man who brought a community together through the game he so loved.

Again, I send my deepest condolences to Skip's family, his athletes, his fans, and his friends. •

COMMENDING WEYERHAEUSER CORPORATION

• Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I wish to recognize the Weyerhaeuser Corporation for its assistance in the relief efforts and the rebuilding of the gulf coast that was devastated by Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005. This outstanding company has gone well beyond the call of duty, truly exemplifying community service.

Weyerhaeuser was incorporated in 1900 and is one of the world's largest integrated forest product companies. Headquartered in Federal Way, WA,

Weyerhaeuser employs over 49,000 people in 18 countries. In 2005, Weyerhaeuser recorded sales of \$22.6 billion and managed more than 6.5 million acres of timberland in nine States.

On November 29, 2006, Weyerhaeuser received the Ron Brown Award, the only Presidential award to honor companies "for their exemplary quality of their relationships with employees and communities." The Ron Brown Award, originally established by President Bill Clinton, is named after the late Secretary of Commerce who believed that "businesses do well by doing good."

I am honored to have such a dedicated company operating in Mississippi in places such as Magnolia, Philadelphia, Richland, Columbus and Bruce. Weyerhaeuser has been operating in Mississippi since 1956 with approximately 1,700 employees at 14 locations, as well as 776,000 acres of timberland.

To date, over 300 employees and retirees from across the United States have volunteered more than 42,000 hours of their time, helped rebuild more than 50 homes, and contributed more than \$2.8 million for disaster relief. Weyerhaeuser has a generous policy of allowing employees 2 to 4 weeks of paid leave to help volunteer in the rebuilding efforts of the gulf coast.

The people touched by Weyerhaeuser's response say it best. As one family wrote in response to help from Weyerhaeuser volunteers, "Because of all your efforts, we are home! Words cannot truly express the outpouring of love we have received. We are eternally grateful to our Weyerhaeuser family."

The high caliber of Weyerhaeuser employees can be seen in their comments after volunteering on the gulf coast. One man noted, "The days were long and hot, the work was intense, but the rewards were immeasurable. This has been an experience I won't soon forget." Another volunteer employee commented, "This experience was such a blessing. I got so much more from it than I felt I gave." One Weyerhaeuser retiree said, "Having once more the opportunity to work side by side with other Weyerhaeuser employees and retirees made me realize anew why I enjoyed working for Weyerhaeuser so much. It's all about the people and the values the company ascribes to. Thanks again." Testimonies such as these speak volumes about Weyerhaeuser's dedication to its employees and others.

I cannot thank the company enough for the work they have done and continue to do. It is truly deserving of such a prestigious award, and I am delighted to see Weyerhaeuser's efforts have been recognized. •

NATIONAL NIGHT OUT

• Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I wish to recognize the statewide effort my great State of New Mexico will put forth for the National Night Out. National Night Out is a community event