

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008—S. CON. RES. 21; FURTHER REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR SCHIP LEGISLATION

(In millions of dollars)

Current Allocation to Senate Finance Committee:	
FY 2007 Budget Authority	1,011,527
FY 2007 Outlays	1,017,808
FY 2008 Budget Authority	1,086,142
FY 2008 Outlays	1,081,969
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	6,064,784
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	6,056,901
Adjustments:	
FY 2007 Budget Authority	0
FY 2007 Outlays	0
FY 2008 Budget Authority	300
FY 2008 Outlays	311
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	7,877
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	14,527
Revised Allocation to Senate Finance Committee:	
FY 2007 Budget Authority	1,011,527
FY 2007 Outlays	1,017,808
FY 2008 Budget Authority	1,086,442
FY 2008 Outlays	1,082,280
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	6,072,661
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	6,071,428

FURTHER CHANGES TO S. CON. RES. 21

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, earlier today, pursuant to section 301 of S. Con. Res. 21, the 2008 budget resolution, I filed revisions to S. Con. Res. 21. Those revisions were made for amendment No. 2602, as modified, an amendment offered by Senator KERRY to amendment No. 2530 regarding the reauthorization of the State Children's Health Insurance Program, SCHIP.

The Senate did not adopt amendment No. 2602, as modified. As a consequence, I am further revising the 2008 budget resolution and the adjustments made today pursuant to section 301 to the aggregates and the allocation provided to the Senate Finance Committee for amendment No. 2602.

I ask unanimous consent that the following revisions to S. Con. Res. 21 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

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(In billions of dollars)

Section 101:	
(1)(A) Federal Revenues:	
FY 2007	1,900,340
FY 2008	1,022,084
FY 2009	2,121,502
FY 2010	2,176,951
FY 2011	2,357,680
FY 2012	2,494,753
(1)(B) Change in Federal Revenues:	
FY 2007	-4,366
FY 2008	-28,712
FY 2009	14,576
FY 2010	13,230
FY 2011	-36,870
FY 2012	-102,343
(2) New Budget Authority:	
FY 2007	2,376,360
FY 2008	2,503,290
FY 2009	2,524,710
FY 2010	2,577,981
FY 2011	2,695,425
FY 2012	2,732,230
(3) Budget Outlays:	
FY 2007	2,299,752

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008—S. CON. RES. 21; FURTHER REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR SCHIP LEGISLATION—Continued

(In billions of dollars)

FY 2008	2,470,369
FY 2009	2,570,622
FY 2010	2,607,048
FY 2011	2,701,083
FY 2012	2,713,960

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008—S. CON. RES. 21; FURTHER REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR SCHIP LEGISLATION

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IRAQ

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it continues to be my hope that there will be a consensus reached among Senators as to how to move forward in Iraq. This is indispensable if there is to be an accommodation between the President and Congress.

I had hoped to make a floor statement on Iraq during the Senate's consideration of the DoD authorization bill, but the majority leader took that bill off the floor after there was only consideration of the Levin-Reed amendment. That action deprived the Senate of an opportunity to consider the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander amendments and perhaps other amendments which might have secured the requisite 60 votes to structure a new U.S. policy for Iraq.

When a tally is made of the Senators who have voted for or cosponsored legislation aimed at altering or reevaluating U.S. policy in Iraq, the total is 62. When Senators are added who have made public statements critical of the President's policy, the number could possibly reach or exceed two-thirds of the Senate membership.

A July 2007 vote, had it been successful, would have had no binding effect since the President already had sufficient funding to continue until September 30 and would need additional funding only in the next fiscal year, 2008, beginning October 1.

The time for Congress to have asserted its constitutional power of the purse to withhold funding was this

spring during consideration of supplemental funding for approximately \$120 billion. On April 26, 2007, following a vote in the House of Representatives of 218-208, the Senate passed the conference report to H.R. 1591, the fiscal year 2007 Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act on a vote of 51-46. However, because this bill contained target dates for withdrawal, on May 1, 2007, the President vetoed the bill.

After the House failed to gather the two-thirds majority required to override the President's veto, on May 24, 2007, the Congress approved a bill, H.R. 2206, which did not include targeted dates for withdrawal and which was subsequently signed into law by President Bush on May 25, 2007, Public Law 110-28.

When the Levin-Reed amendment was considered, it was a forgone conclusion that there were not anywhere near 60 votes to invoke cloture, let alone the 67 votes needed to override a veto. With the removal of the bill from the floor, the Senate was prevented from considering alternatives to the Levin-Reed proposal, and denied the opportunity to have a vote or votes to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the President's policy.

This action deprived the Senate of an opportunity to craft a compromise around Warner-Lugar or Salazar-Alexander to get the 60 votes and put the president squarely on notice that funding in September was unlikely unless the President's policy showed significant progress. Perhaps the Levin-Reed proponents would have rejected the other amendments as being insufficiently forceful, but Senators never know for sure how they will ultimately vote until there is floor debate, careful analysis, informal discussions on the floor and corridors, and talk in the cloakroom. Much of the Senate's productive work occurs during quorum calls when Members hassle and jaw-bone on the issues. Since so many Senators demonstratively want a change, it was at least worth a try in daylight compared to the futile all-nighter.

Of particular interest to me were the provisions of the Warner-Lugar proposal on having a contingency plan and redefining the mission. For three decades, Senators LUGAR and WARNER have served on the Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee, respectively, with both rising to chairman. Their combined tenures in the Senate are more than 60 years. To say these colleagues bring a significant amount of thought and authority to this debate is an understatement.

Regrettably, we did not have the opportunity to debate and vote on their proposal.

The Warner/Lugar amendment is an attempt to ensure that the U.S. is prepared to implement changes to U.S. policy following the September report, to be provided by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, on the progress

of the President's current strategy in Iraq.

The Warner-Lugar amendment recognizes that conditions in Iraq have changed considerably since the initial invasion to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and States that the joint resolution passed by Congress in 2002 to authorize "the use of the Armed Forces of the United States against Iraq" requires "review and revision."

In addition, the amendment calls for enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Iraq to establish a consistent diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties in the Middle East. Because of the potential for the Warner-Lugar amendment to provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this amendment.

As explained on the floor by Senator LUGAR on July 13, 2007:

The purpose of the forum would be to improve transparency of national interests so that neighboring states and other actors avoid missteps . . . Such a forum could facilitate more regular contact with Syria and Iran with less drama and rhetoric. The existence of a predictable and regular forum in the region would be especially important for dealing with refugee problems, regulating borders, exploring development initiatives, and preventing conflict between the Kurds and Turks.

This type of planning and diplomatic engagement should be occurring today. I believe a vote confirming this could have led the President to do that.

Prior to the 2002 U.S. invasion of Iraq, I publicly stated my concerns about the potential fallout from such an action. On February 13, 2002, I took to the Senate floor to express my belief that there should be a comprehensive analysis of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and what an invasion would amount to in terms of U.S. casualties:

We need to know, with some greater precision, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein with respect to weapons of mass destruction. There also has to be an analysis of what the costs would be, some appraisal in terms of casualties. Then there is the issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled.

As I stated on the Senate floor on December 6, 2006:

It has been my view that had we known Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, we would not have gone into Iraq.

Eight months after my February 13 statement, on October 7, 2002, I returned to the floor to express my concerns over the lack of a comprehensive plan for Iraq:

What happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled has yet to be answered in real detail.

What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the Arab world, and the impact on Israel?

In previous briefings, I have sought the administration plan as to what will be done after Saddam Hussein is toppled, and I think that is an area where a great deal more thought needs to be given. The situation in

Iraq would obviously be contentious, with disputes between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites, with the interests of the Kurds in an independent state, and it means a very long-term commitment by the United States.

Five years later, we are in the midst of a highly controversial troop surge in Iraq.

Following the announcement of the President's plan to surge, I met with President Bush on two occasions. Following these meetings I told the President directly that I could not support a troop surge. I also had extensive discussions on the President's plan with the highest ranking members of his national security team including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte.

I met with GEN David Petraeus on January 31, 2007, who has been confirmed as the United States' top commander in Iraq. Following these meetings, I was not convinced the administration possessed a comprehensive plan to deal with the situation in Iraq and too many uncertainties persisted to warrant my support for a surge of U.S. personnel.

On February 5, 2007, I spoke on the Senate floor regarding the surge:

On this state of the record, I cannot support an additional allocation of 21,500 troops because it is my judgment that would not be material or helpful in what is going on at the present time. This comes against the backdrop of extensive hearings in the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee, and in the context of the military having given many estimates with many of those in key command position saying that no more troops are necessary. This comes with the Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki saying a variety of things but at some times saying he doesn't want any more troops.

At this time, I have not seen a plan that sufficiently addresses a strategy for victory in Iraq. Various reports indicate military advisers differ on the impact of an increased troop level in Iraq. It is not clear what the surge will ultimately accomplish and if it will be successful. Nonetheless, there are indicators that mandate we create contingency plans and consider other options. The Iraqi Government has failed to deliver on prior pledges which makes me hesitant to think they have the ability to deliver on new ones. According to many measurements, progress in Iraq has been poor and the situation is deteriorating. What is clear is that any solution will necessarily include political compromises by Iraq's various sects as well as an emphasis on a regional dialogue—something for which the Iraq Study Group advocated.

Another proposal offered by Senators SALAZAR and ALEXANDER would have used the work of the Iraq Study Group, which was led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton, as a guide for our policy in Iraq. This legislation garnered bipartisan support including five Republicans and seven Democrats.

The amendment states that U.S. support should be conditioned on the Gov-

ernment of Iraq's political will and substantial progress towards national reconciliation, revision of de baathification laws, equitable sharing of Iraqi oil revenues, free and fair provincial elections and mechanisms to ensure the rights of woman and minorities.

Like the Warner-Lugar proposal, this amendment calls for enhanced diplomatic efforts. Specifically, the measure calls for a new "Diplomatic Offensive" to deal with the problems in Iraq and the region; energize other countries to support reconciliation in Iraq; engage directly with the Governments of Iran and Syria to obtain their commitment to constructive policies towards Iraq and the region, encourage the holding of a conference in Baghdad of neighboring countries and convey to the Iraqi Government that continued American support is contingent upon substantial progress toward and assist in the achievement of the milestones.

Because of the potential for the Salazar-Alexander amendment to provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this amendment. There is no inconsistency in cosponsoring both Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander. They complement each other.

Both the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander proposals address the issue of diplomacy in the region. I have consistently urged the administration to work with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, in order to develop cooperative stabilization efforts. To that end, I have met with President Bashar Assad of Syria. I have met with Iran's Ambassadors to the United Nations, Seyed Muhammed Hadi Nejad Hosseini and Muhammad Javad Zarif, on four occasions in New York and Washington, DC. Additionally, I was the only Member of Congress to attend the September 2006 address by former President Khatami at the National Cathedral.

During my meetings with Iranian officials, I developed a proposal for an exchange of visits by Members of Congress to Iran and Iranian parliamentarians to the United States to try to open dialogue between our two countries. In January 2004, my efforts to foster such a dialogue were successful. There was a tentative agreement for U.S. Members of Congress to meet with Iranian parliamentarians in Geneva. Regrettably, this parliamentary exchange never came to fruition.

In an effort to jumpstart this exchange, on May 3, 2007, I sent a letter, with support from Senators BIDEN, HAGEL and DODD and Representatives LANTOS, ENGLISH, MORAN, GILCHREST and MEEKS, to the Speaker of Iran's Parliament suggesting we convene a meeting of U.S. and Iranian parliamentarians.

I have amplified my strong belief that dialogue with nations such as Iran and Syria is necessary in an extensive Senate speech on June 16, 2006 and most recently in an essay "Dialogue

With Adversaries'' published in the winter edition of *The Washington Quarterly*. While we can't be sure that dialogue will succeed, we can be sure that without dialogue there will be failure.

I am not alone in calling for enhanced dialogue with U.S. adversaries. Of the many suggestions gleaned from the Baker-Hamilton commission, one passage crystallizes their conclusion:

Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another.

However, the President's plan places a disproportionate emphasis on military force while neglecting the needed diplomacy and political efforts.

Having served in the Senate for 26 years, holding the chairmanship of the Intelligence Committee and senior positions on the Appropriations subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations, I am aware of what challenges nations like Iran and Syria pose to the United States. A world in which Iran seeks nuclear weapons and supports terrorist groups such as Hezbollah is not a safe world. A world in which Syria provides refuge for Hamas and Hezbollah and permits its territory to be used as a conduit for terrorism is counterproductive to peace and stability. I expressed my views on the danger the connectivity between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah poses to peace and security in an August 2, 2006, floor statement.

Today, however, Americans are not dying from nuclear weapons or from direct attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah. Many are dying policing a civil conflict.

President Assad, during our December 2006 meeting in Damascus, suggested that a conference with regional players and the United States would be beneficial to addressing the issues confronting Iraq. On January 22, 2007, I conveyed this proposal and my support for it to Secretary Rice in a meeting in her office at the State Department. One month later, on February 27, 2007, during her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Rice announced such a proposal:

Before I discuss our specific request for Iraq, I would like to take this opportunity to announce a new diplomatic initiative relating to Iraq's future. I am pleased to tell Members of Congress that there is now being formed a neighbors' conference to support Iraq. Invitees will include Iraq's immediate neighbors, as well as representatives from other regional states, multilateral organizations, and the UN Permanent Five (the U.S., France, Britain, Russia and China). I would note that both Syria and Iran are among Iraq's neighbors invited to attend.

The violence occurring within Iraq has a decided impact on Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's neighbors have a clear role to play in helping Iraq to move forward, and this conference will provide a needed forum in order to do just that.

Very little has happened to effectuate that "new diplomatic initiative." The Iraq Study Group clearly states:

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.

It would have been my hope that these types of meetings would have occurred frequently in the intervening months. However, I am pleased that the President has recently indicated a commitment to ramp up diplomatic efforts in the region.

Had there been Senate consideration and debate on the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander proposals, there would have been an opportunity for more senators to explicitly put the President on notice that funding beyond September was in jeopardy without significant improvement.

I think this time would have also allowed Members to share concerns about the overall struggle to combat terrorism. While considering U.S. policy in Iraq, it is important we do not neglect other threats to U.S. security.

Waziristan is a semi-autonomous tribal region in Pakistan's mountainous Northwest Frontier province that shares a porous border with Afghanistan. It is populated primarily by ethnic Pashtuns who do not recognize the authority of President Musharraf's government in Islamabad. Many of the Taliban who fled Afghanistan in 2001 found safe haven in Waziristan with their Pashtun brethren.

Some accounts, including the 9/11 Commission report, indicate Pakistan's willingness to assist the United States. Following direct U.S. engagement with Pakistan after the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission report stated that, "Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism."

However, that was 6 years ago. According to the Congressional Research Service, CRS, "Despite clear successes in disrupting al-Qaida and affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are increasing signs that anti-U.S. terrorists are now benefiting from what some analysts call a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border."

GEN Pervez Musharraf took a largely hands-off approach to the region after signing a truce with tribal leaders in September 2006. The truce came after 4 years of unsuccessful army operations into the region in which the government forces suffered heavy casualties and achieved little. Some accounts indicate this policy has enhanced al-Qaida's abilities: "By seeking accommodation with pro-Taliban leaders in these areas, the Musharraf government appears to have inadvertently allowed foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets."

Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher confirmed that al-Qaida thrived under the truce between the tribal leaders and General Musharraf: "they were able to operate, meet, plan, recruit, and obtain financing in more comfort in the tribal areas than previously."

Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who served for 29 years with the CIA and held various positions such as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East Affairs at the National Security Council, 1997-2002, stated in his May/June 2007 essay in *Foreign Affairs*:

Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever been before and the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq.

Riedel further suggests that:

The United States and its partners, including NATO, also need to take a firmer position with the Pakistani government to enlist its help in tracking down al-Qaida leaders. President Pervez Musharraf has taken some important steps against al-Qaida, especially after its attempts to assassinate him, and he has promised more than once a full crackdown on extremism. But mostly he has sought to tame jihadists—without much success—and his government has tolerated those who harbor bin Laden and his lieutenants, Taliban fighters and their Afghan fellow travelers, and Kashmiri terrorists. Many senior Pakistani politicians say privately that they believe Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) still has extensive links to bin Laden; some even claim it harbors him. Apprehending a few al-Qaida officers would not be enough, and so a systematic crackdown on all terrorists—Arab, Afghan, and Kashmiri—is critical. Hence, Pakistan should no longer be rewarded for its selective counterterrorism efforts.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has provided Pakistan with roughly \$9 billion in aid. According to the Congressional Research Service, CRS:

The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they tributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan.

As Congress considers administration's request for an additional \$785 million for fiscal year 2008, it is incumbent upon us to evaluate our relationship with them and their performance in the war on terror.

Waziristan provides al-Qaida with much of what it lost in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001: safe haven; territory to train and base operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and beyond; and a populace sympathetic to their aims. Failing to recognize and address the situation in Waziristan risks negating the costly advances made in Afghanistan over the past 6 years and jeopardizes U.S. security.

As the Senate continues to deliberate, it is my hope that we will return to the proposals offered by Senators WARNER, LUGAR, SALAZAR and ALEXANDER. These should have been debated in great length as they make more

sense in the context of not infringing on the President's authority as Commander in Chief. Rather, these bipartisan efforts would allow the President to fulfill a congressional requirement that he ought to be considering and planning for the next steps.

The Senate is known as the most deliberative body in the world. Regrettably, the Senate was not permitted the opportunity to demonstrate this as we did not debate the various options before us.

As I stated on the Senate floor on March 14, 2007, during a similar debate on whether to continue with the status quo in Iraq or to legislate a date certain for withdrawal:

It is equally undesirable, however, to view the current situation in Iraq, which looks like an endless tunnel—a tunnel without a light at the end. We are faced with very considerable discomfort in this body. I think it is very important that we debate this matter, that we exchange our views, that we stimulate discussion that will go beyond this Chamber and will resound throughout the country, resound throughout the editorial pages and the television and radio talk shows, and by our colleagues in the corridors and in the cloakroom so that we can try to work our way through an extraordinarily difficult situation where, as I see it, there is no good answer between the two intractable alternatives to set a timetable where our opponents simply have to wait us out or to keep proceeding down a tunnel which, at least at this juncture, appears to be endless and has no light. We don't know where the end is, let alone to have a light at the end of the tunnel.

In a democracy, the voters ultimately decide U.S. policy. As detailed in Federalist No. 57, elected representatives must be responsive to the people:

Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which [representatives] will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. Hence, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.

If this is not understood and reflected by elected representatives, the framers placed elections into the system to remind them. Federalist No. 57 further states:

The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government . . . The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people.

This was the case last November when the electorate spoke loudly disagreeing with United States policy in Iraq. As I stated on March 14, 2007:

Last November, the American people spoke in a resounding manner, in a way that could only rationally be interpreted as rejecting the conduct of the war in Iraq.

I am making this extensive floor statement at this time to put the administration on notice of my reservations on supporting open-ended appropriations for the Iraq war in September. This statement further urges the majority leader to structure the Senate debate in September to consider the Warner-Lugar amendment, the Salazar-Alexander amendment, and other possible amendments, as well as the Levin-Reed amendment, to give the Senate the full range of alternatives to provide the basis for 60 or more votes to change U.S. policy in Iraq.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, during the recent debate of the Defense authorization bill, we saw attempt after attempt to declare the new strategy, General Petraeus' strategy, in Iraq a failure. The other side of the aisle wanted to declare that the strategy, which had been in full force only a couple of weeks, had failed and direct the President to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, which is today the central front in the war against terrorists. Indeed, after the other side lost a vote to withdraw the troops, the majority leader pulled the bill from the floor, thus leaving important business for our military unfinished.

The Democratic majority's insistence that the General Petraeus' strategy has failed makes it easy to overlook what the strategy has accomplished and what the strategy seeks to accomplish.

In that regard, I ask unanimous consent to have an article by Michael Gordon from New York Times of July 24 printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From nytimes.com, July 24, 2007]

U.S. IS SEEN IN IRAQ UNTIL AT LEAST '09

(By Michael R. Gordon)

BAGHDAD, July 23.—While Washington is mired in political debate over the future of Iraq, the American command here has prepared a detailed plan that foresees a significant American role for the next two years.

The classified plan, which represents the coordinated strategy of the top American commander and the American ambassador, calls for restoring security in local areas, including Baghdad, by the summer of 2008. "Sustainable security" is to be established on a nationwide basis by the summer of 2009, according to American officials familiar with the document.

The detailed document, known as the Joint Campaign Plan, is an elaboration of the new strategy President Bush signaled in January when he decided to send five additional American combat brigades and other units to Iraq. That signaled a shift from the previous strategy, which emphasized transferring to Iraqis the responsibility for safeguarding their security.

That new approach put a premium on protecting the Iraqi population in Baghdad, on the theory that improved security would provide Iraqi political leaders with the breathing space they needed to try political reconciliation.

The latest plan, which covers a two-year period, does not explicitly address troop levels or withdrawal schedules. It anticipates a decline in American forces as the "surge" in

troops runs its course later this year or in early 2008. But it nonetheless assumes continued American involvement to train soldiers, act as partners with Iraqi forces and fight terrorist groups in Iraq, American officials said.

The goals in the document appear ambitious, given the immensity of the challenge of dealing with die-hard Sunni insurgents, renegade Shiite militias, Iraqi leaders who have made only fitful progress toward political reconciliation, as well as Iranian and Syrian neighbors who have not hesitated to interfere in Iraq's affairs. And the White House's interim assessment of progress, issued on July 12, is mixed.

But at a time when critics at home are defining patience in terms of weeks, the strategy may run into the expectations of many lawmakers for an early end to the American mission here.

The plan, developed by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American commander, and Ryan C. Crocker, the American ambassador, has been briefed to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. William J. Fallon, the head of the Central Command. It is expected to be formally issued to officials here this week.

The plan envisions two phases. The "near-term" goal is to achieve "localized security" in Baghdad and other areas no later than June 2008. It envisions encouraging political accommodations at the local level, including with former insurgents, while pressing Iraq's leaders to make headway on their program of national reconciliation.

The "intermediate" goal is to stitch together such local arrangements to establish a broader sense of security on a nationwide basis no later than June 2009.

"The coalition, in partnership with the government of Iraq, employs integrated political, security, economic and diplomatic means, to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009," a summary of the campaign plan states.

Military officials here have been careful not to guarantee success, and recognized they may need to revise the plan if some assumptions were not met.

"The idea behind the surge was to bring stability and security to the Iraqi people, primarily in Baghdad because it is the political heart of the country, and by so doing give the Iraqis the time and space needed to come to grips with the tough issues they face and enable reconciliation to take place," said Col. Peter Mansoor, the executive officer to General Petraeus.

"If eventually the Iraqi government and the various sects and groups do not come to some sort of agreement on how to share power, on how to divide resources and on how to reconcile and stop the violence, then the assumption on which the surge strategy was based is invalid, and we would have to re-look the strategy," Colonel Mansoor added.

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will provide an assessment in September on trends in Iraq and whether the strategy is viable or needs to be changed.

The previous plan, developed by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who served as General Petraeus's predecessor before being appointed as chief of staff of the Army, was aimed at prompting the Iraqis to take more responsibility for security by reducing American forces.

That approach faltered when the Iraqi security forces showed themselves unprepared to carry out their expanded duties, and sectarian killings soared.

In contrast, the new approach reflects the counterinsurgency precept that protection of the population is the best way to isolate insurgents, encourage political accommodations and gain intelligence on numerous

threats. A core assumption of the plan is that American troops cannot impose a military solution, but that the United States can use force to create the conditions in which political reconciliation is possible.

To develop the plan, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker assembled a Joint Strategic Assessment Team, which sought to define the conflict and outline the elements of a new strategy. It included officers like Col. H. R. McMaster, the field commander who carried out the successful "clear, hold and build" operation in Tal Afar and who wrote a critical account of the Joint Chiefs of Staff role during the Vietnam War; Col. John R. Martin, who teaches at the Army War College and was a West Point classmate of General Petraeus; and David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert who has a degree in anthropology.

State Department officials, including Robert Ford, an Arab expert and the American ambassador to Algeria, were also involved. So were a British officer and experts outside government like Stephen D. Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The team determined that Iraq was in a "communal struggle for power," in the words of one senior officer who participated in the effort. Adding to the problem, the new Iraqi government was struggling to unite its disparate factions and to develop the capability to deliver basic services and provide security.

Extremists were fueling the violence, as were nations like Iran, which they concluded was arming and equipping Shiite militant groups, and Syria, which was allowing suicide bombers to cross into Iraq.

Like the Baker-Hamilton commission, which issued its report last year, the team believed that political, military and economic efforts were needed, including diplomatic discussions with Iran, officials said. There were different views about how aggressive to be in pressing for the removal of overtly sectarian officials, and several officials said that theme was toned down somewhat in the final plan.

The plan itself was written by the Joint Campaign Redesign Team, an allusion to the fact that the plan inherited from General Casey was being reworked. Much of the redesign has already been put into effect, including the decision to move troops out of large bases and to act as partners more fully with the Iraqi security forces.

The overarching goal, an American official said, is to advance political accommodation and avoid undercutting the authority of the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. While the plan seeks to achieve stability, several officials said it anticipates that less will be accomplished in terms of national reconciliation by the end of 2009 than did the plan developed by General Casey.

The plan also emphasizes encouraging political accommodation at the local level. The command has established a team to oversee efforts to reach out to former insurgents and tribal leaders. It is dubbed the Force Strategic Engagement Cell, and is overseen by a British general. In the terminology of the plan, the aim is to identify potentially "reconcilable" groups and encourage them to move away from violence.

However, groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a Sunni Arab extremist group that American intelligence officials say has foreign leadership, and cells backed by Iran are seen as implacable foes.

"You are not out there trying to defeat your enemies wholesale," said one military official who is knowledgeable about the plan. "You are out there trying to draw them into a negotiated power-sharing agreement where they decide to quit fighting you. They don't

decide that their conflict is over. The reasons for conflict remain, but they quit trying to address it through violence. In the end, we hope that that alliance of convenience to fight with Al Qaeda becomes a connection to the central government as well."

The hope is that sufficient progress might be made at the local level to encourage accommodation at the national level, and vice versa. The plan also calls for efforts to encourage the rule of law, such as the establishment of secure zones in Baghdad and other cities to promote criminal trials and process detainee cases.

To help measure progress in tamping down civil strife, Col. William Rapp, a senior aide to General Petraeus, oversaw an effort to develop a standardized measure of sectarian violence. One result was a method that went beyond the attacks noted in American military reports and which incorporated Iraqi data.

"We are going to try a dozen different things," said one senior officer. "Maybe one of them will flatline. One of them will do this much. One of them will do this much more. After a while, we believe there is chance you will head into success. I am not saying that we are absolutely headed for success."

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wanted to insert this article in the RECORD because it provides an objective description of the Petraeus plan and how it came to be. The goals of the strategy are "ambitious," as the article notes, but that is all the more reason to support the plan and not undermine it in the Senate.

Those who have criticized the surge at this early stage have offered few options for dealing with the aftermath. One option is to follow the recommendation of the Baker-Hamilton Commission.

At this point, I request unanimous consent to print in the RECORD a column by Steven Biddle that appeared in the July 11 Washington Post.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From washingtonpost.com, July 11]

IRAQ: GO DEEP OR GET OUT

(By Stephen Biddle)

The president's shaky political consensus for the surge in Iraq is in danger of collapsing after the recent defections of prominent Senate Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Ind.), Pete Domenici (N.M.) and George Voinovich (Ohio). But this growing opposition to the surge has not yet translated into support for outright withdrawal—few lawmakers are comfortable with abandoning Iraq or admitting defeat. The result has been a search for some kind of politically moderate "Plan B" that would split the difference between surge and withdrawal.

The problem is that these politics do not fit the military reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S. commitment to something like half of today's troop presence there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense militarily.

Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the American mission to one of training and supporting the Iraqi security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the country by about half. This idea is at the

heart of the proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill.

The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat effort to keep the violence down, the American training effort would face challenges even bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing civil war.

The American combat presence in Iraq is insufficient to end the violence but does cap its intensity. If we draw down that combat presence, violence will rise accordingly. To be effective, embedded trainers and advisers must live and operate with the Iraqi soldiers they mentor—they are not lecturers sequestered in some safe classroom. The greater the violence, the riskier their jobs and the heavier their losses.

That violence reduces their ability to succeed as trainers. There are many barriers to an effective Iraqi security force. But the toughest is sectarian factionalism. Iraq is in the midst of a civil war in which all Iraqis are increasingly forced to take sides for their own survival. Iraq's security forces are necessarily drawn from the same populations that are being pulled apart into factions. No military can be hermetically sealed off from its society—the more severe the sectarian violence, the deeper the divisions in Iraqi society become and the harder it is for Americans to create the kind of disinterested nationalist security force that could stabilize Iraq. Under the best conditions, it is unrealistic to expect a satisfactory Iraqi security force anytime soon, and the more severe the violence, the worse the prospects.

The result is a vicious cycle. The more we shift out of combat missions and into training, the harder we make the trainers' job and the more exposed they become. It is unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet productive mission of training but not fighting—this would be neither safe nor productive.

If the surge is unacceptable, the better option is to cut our losses and withdraw altogether. In fact, the substantive case for either extreme—surge or outright withdrawal—is stronger than for any policy between. The surge is a long-shot gamble. But middle-ground options leave us with the worst of both worlds: continuing casualties but even less chance of stability in exchange. Moderation and centrism are normally the right instincts in American politics, and many lawmakers in both parties desperately want to find a workable middle ground on Iraq. But while the politics are right, the military logic is not.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Biddle provides a need evaluation of the flaws in the Baker-Hamilton. Among those flaws, as he explains, our combat forces are restraining the intensity of the violence in Iraq, and removing them would cause the violence to rise. This rise in violence would put the safety of Americans who remain to train Iraqis in even greater jeopardy.

Of course, prematurely withdrawing our troops would have many other consequences. Indeed, a sobering assessment of the risks of withdrawal is too often missing from debates about the U.S. mission in Iraq.

In this regard, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the July 17 Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From the Washington Post, July 17, 2007]

EXIT STRATEGY: WOULD IRAN TAKE OVER IRAQ, WOULD AL-QAEDA? THE DEBATE ABOUT HOW AND WHEN TO LEAVE CENTERS ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AFTER THE U.S. GOES

(By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks)

If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near future, three developments would be likely to unfold. Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.

That was the conclusion reached in recent "war games" exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson. "I honestly don't think it will be apocalyptic," said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now works for a major defense contractor. But "it will be ugly."

In making the case for a continued U.S. troop presence, President Bush has offered far more dire forecasts, arguing that al-Qaeda or Iran—or both—would take over Iraq after a "precipitous withdrawal" of U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda, he said recently, would "be able to recruit better and raise more money from which to launch their objectives" of attacking the U.S. homeland. War opponents in Congress counter that Bush's talk about al-Qaeda is overblown fear-mongering and that nothing could be worse than the present situation.

Increasingly, the Washington debate over when U.S. forces should leave is centering on what would happen once they do. The U.S. military, aware of this political battlefield, has been quietly exploring scenarios of a reduced troop presence, performing role-playing exercises and studying historical parallels. Would the Iraqi government find its way, or would the country divide along sectarian lines? Would al-Qaeda take over? Would Iran? Would U.S. security improve or deteriorate? Does the answer depend on when, how and how many U.S. troops depart?

Some military officers contend that, regardless of whether Iraq breaks apart or outside actors seek to take over after a U.S. pullout, ever greater carnage is inevitable. "The water-cooler chat I hear most often . . . is that there is going to be an outbreak of violence when we leave that makes the [current] instability look like a church picnic," said an officer who has served in Iraq.

However, just as few envisioned the long Iraq war, now in its fifth year, or the many setbacks along the way, there are no firm conclusions regarding the consequences of a reduction in U.S. troops. A senior administration official closely involved in Iraq policy imagines a vast internecine slaughter as Iraq descends into chaos but cautions that it is impossible to know the outcome. "We've got to be very modest about our predictive capabilities," the official said.

MISTAKES OF THE PAST

In April of last year, the Army and Joint Forces Command sponsored a war game called Unified Quest 2007 at the Army War College in Pennsylvania. It assumed the partition of an "Iraq-like" country, said one player, retired Army Col. Richard Sinnreich, with U.S. troops moving quickly out of the

capital to redeploy in the far north and south. "We have obligations to the Kurds and the Kuwaitis, and they also offer the most stable and secure locations from which to continue," he said.

"Even then, the end-of-game assessment wasn't very favorable" to the United States, he said.

Anderson, the retired Marine, has conducted nearly a dozen Iraq-related war games for the military over the past two years, many premised on a U.S. combat pull-out by a set date—leaving only advisers and support units—and concluded that partition would result. The games also predicted that Iran would intervene on one side of a Shiite civil war and would become bogged down in southern Iraq.

T.X. Hammes, another retired Marine colonel, said that an extended Iranian presence in Iraq could lead to increased intervention by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states on the other side. "If that happens," Hammes said, "I worry that the Iranians come to the conclusion they have to do something to undercut . . . the Saudis." Their best strategy, he said, "would be to stimulate insurgency among the Shiites in Saudi Arabia."

In a secret war game conducted in December at an office building near the Pentagon, more than 20 participants from the military, the CIA, the State Department and the private sector spent three days examining what might unfold if the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group were implemented.

One question involved how Syria and Iran might respond to the U.S. diplomatic outreach proposed by the bipartisan group, headed by former secretary of state James A. Baker III and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.). The gamers concluded that Iran would be difficult to engage because its divided government is incapable of delivering on its promises. Role-players representing Syria did engage with the U.S. diplomats, but linked helping out in Baghdad to a lessening of U.S. pressure in Lebanon.

The bottom line, one participant said, was "pretty much what we are seeing" since the Bush administration began intermittent talks with Damascus and Tehran: not much progress or tangible results.

Amid political arguments in Washington over troop departures, U.S. military commanders on the ground stress the importance of developing a careful and thorough withdrawal plan. Whatever the politicians decide, "it needs to be well-thought-out and it cannot be a strategy that is based on 'Well, we need to leave,'" Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon, a top U.S. commander in Iraq, said Friday from his base near Tikrit.

History is replete with bad withdrawal outcomes. Among the most horrific was the British departure from Afghanistan in 1842, when 16,500 active troops and civilians left Kabul thinking they had safe passage to India. Two weeks later, only one European arrived alive in Jalalabad, near the Afghan-Indian border.

The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, which began in May 1988 after a decade of occupation, reveals other mistakes to avoid. Like the U.S. troops who arrived in Iraq in 2003, the Soviet force in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly conventional, heavy with tanks and other armored vehicles. Once Moscow made public its plans to leave, the political and security situations unraveled much faster than anticipated. "The Soviet Army actually had to fight out of certain areas," said Army Maj. Daniel Morgan, a two-tour veteran of the Iraq war who has been studying the Soviet pullout at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., with an eye toward gleaned lessons for Iraq. "As a matter of fact, they had to airlift out of Kandahar, the fighting was so bad."

War supporters and opponents in Washington disagree on the lessons of the departure most deeply imprinted on the American psyche: the U.S. exit from Vietnam. "I saw it once before, a long time ago," Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a Vietnam veteran and presidential candidate, said last week of an early Iraq withdrawal. "I saw a defeated military, and I saw how long it took a military that was defeated to recover."

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), also a White House hopeful, finds a different message in the Vietnam retreat. Saying that Baghdad would become "Saigon revisited," he warned that "we will be lifting American personnel off the roofs of buildings in the Green Zone if we do not change policy, and pretty drastically."

THE AL-QAEDA THREAT

What is perhaps most striking about the military's simulations is that its post-drawdown scenarios focus on civil war and regional intervention and upheaval rather than the establishment of an al-Qaeda sanctuary in Iraq.

For Bush, however, that is the primary risk of withdrawal. "It would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-Qaeda," he said in a news conference last week. "It would mean that we'd be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we'd allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan." If U.S. troops leave too soon, Bush said, they would probably "have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous."

Withdrawal would also "confuse and frighten friends and allies in the region and embolden Syria and especially Iran, which would then exert its influence throughout the Middle East," the president said.

Bush is not alone in his description of the al-Qaeda threat should the United States leave Iraq too soon. "There's not a doubt in my mind that Osama bin Laden's one goal is to take over the Kingdom of the Two Mosques [Saudi Arabia] and reestablish the caliphate" that ended with the Ottoman Empire, said a former senior military official now at a Washington think tank. "It would be very easy for them to set up camps and run them in Anbar and Najaf" provinces in Iraq.

U.S. intelligence analysts, however, have a somewhat different view of al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, noting that the local branch takes its inspiration but not its orders from bin Laden. Its enemies—the overwhelming majority of whom are Iraqis—reside in Baghdad and Shiite-majority areas of Iraq, not in Saudi Arabia or the United States. While intelligence officials have described the Sunni insurgent group calling itself al-Qaeda in Iraq as an "accelerant" for violence, they have cited domestic sectarian divisions as the main impediment to peace.

In a report released yesterday, Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that al-Qaeda is "only one part" of a spectrum of Sunni extremist groups and is far from the largest or most active. Military officials have said in background briefings that al-Qaeda is responsible for about 15 percent of the attacks, Cordesman said, although the group is "highly effective" and probably does "the most damage in pushing Iraq towards civil war." But its activities "must be kept in careful perspective, and it does not dominate the Sunni insurgency," he said.

'SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES'

Moderate lawmakers such as Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) have concluded that a unified Iraqi government is not on the near horizon and have called for redeployment, change of mission and a phased drawdown of

U.S. forces. Far from protecting U.S. interests, Lugar said in a recent speech, the continuation of Bush's policy poses "extreme risks for U.S. national security."

Critics of complete withdrawal often charge that "those advocating [it] just don't understand the serious consequences of doing so," said Wayne White, a former deputy director of Near East division of the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau. "Unfortunately, most of us old Middle East hands understand all too well some of the consequences."

White is among many Middle East experts who think that the United States should leave Iraq sooner rather than later, but differ on when, how and what would happen next. Most agree that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover would be unlikely, and say that Washington should step up its regional diplomacy, putting more pressure on regional actors such as Saudi Arabia to take responsibility for what is happening in their back yards.

Many regional experts within and outside the administration note that while there is a range of truly awful possibilities, it is impossible to predict what will happen in Iraq—with or without U.S. troops.

"Say the Shiites drive the Sunnis into Anbar," one expert said of Anderson's war-game scenario. "Well, what does that really mean? How many tens of thousands of people are going to get killed before all the surviving Sunnis are in Anbar?" He questioned whether that result would prove acceptable to a pro-withdrawal U.S. public.

White, speaking at a recent symposium on Iraq, addressed the possibility of unpalatable withdrawal consequences by paraphrasing Winston Churchill's famous statement about democracy. "I posit that withdrawal from Iraq is the worst possible option, except for all the others."

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a premature withdrawal would have severe consequences, all of which would pose severe risks. Clearly, we should allow General Petraeus's plan time to succeed.

Finally, Mr. President, as I noted previously, by setting the aside the Defense authorization bill because he lost a vote to withdraw our troops, the Majority Leader left important business for our military undone. Recently, the Senate passed parts of the bill—a pay raise and "wounded warriors" provisions—but more needs to be done.

For instance, the Defense authorization bill should be the vehicle for setting our national security priorities, one of which is how we should deal with antisatellite weapons the Chinese could use against us.

I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that an article on China's space weapons that appeared in the July 23 Wall Street Journal be inserted into the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007]

CHINA'S SPACE WEAPONS

(By Ashley J. Tellis)

On Jan. 11, 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile slammed into an aging weather satellite in space. The resulting collision not only marked Beijing's first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test but, in the eyes of many, also a head-on collision with the Bush administration's space policies.

As one analyst phrased it, U.S. policy has compelled China's leaders to conclude "that only a display of Beijing's power to launch . . . an arms race would bring Washington to the table to hear their concerns." This view, which is widespread in the U.S. and elsewhere, misses the point: China's ASAT demonstration was not a protest against the Bush administration, but rather part of a maturing strategy designed to counter the overall military superiority of the U.S.

Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese strategists have been cognizant of the fact that the U.S. is the only country in the world with the capacity—and possibly the intention—to thwart China's rise to great power status. They also recognize that Beijing will be weak militarily for some time to come, yet must be prepared for a possible war with America over Taiwan or, in the longer term, over what Aaron Friedberg once called "the struggle for mastery in Asia." How the weaker can defeat the stronger, therefore, becomes the central problem facing China's military strategy.

Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of solving this conundrum ever since the dramatic demonstration of American prowess in Operation Desert Storm. And after carefully analyzing U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan, they believe they have uncovered a significant weakness.

The advanced military might of the U.S. is inordinately dependent on a complex network of space-based command, control, communications, and computer-driven intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that enables American forces to detect different kinds of targets and exchange militarily relevant information. This network is key to the success of American combat operations. These assets, however, are soft and defenseless; while they bestow on the American military definite asymmetric advantages, they are also the source of deep vulnerability. Consequently, Chinese strategists concluded that any effort to defeat the U.S. should aim not at its fundamental strength—its capacity to deliver overwhelming conventional firepower precisely from long distances—but rather at its Achilles' heel, namely, its satellites and their related ground installations.

Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S. space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese calculations, this represents the best way of "leveling the playing field" in the event of a future conflict.

The importance of space denial for China's operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power. Because having this capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.

This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they are right. Any "weaponization" of space will indeed be costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are correct when they emphasize that advanced

powers stand to gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be pursued.

Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because of its deleterious consequences for their particular interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific costs to Beijing—in the context of executing China's national military strategy—would be remarkably high.

Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change only given a few particular developments. China might acquire the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict between a weaker China and any other superior military power, such as the U.S., disappears entirely.

Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S. should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the security of its space assets, in addition to developing its own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues—as the Bush administration has correctly recognized—offer the promise of protecting American interests in space and averting more serious threats to its global primacy.

Mr. KYL. I asked that this article be printed in the RECORD because it is a wake-up call to a new threat we need to take seriously. By setting aside the Defense authorization bill, we missed an opportunity to deal with this threat from China.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment on proposed legislation to revise the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to facilitate the electronic surveillance of targets reasonably believed to be outside the United States in order to obtain foreign intelligence information relating to international terrorism. When the act was passed in 1978, communications outside the United States were characteristically transmitted via satellite and were not covered by the act which applied to wires. In the intervening 29 years, such communications now travel by wire and are covered by the act.

The civil and constitutional rights of U.S. persons would ordinarily not be involved in electronic surveillance of targets outside the United States. If persons inside the United States were surveilled while targeting outside the United States, then the minimization procedures would reasonably protect