

I urge Members to join me, Mr. Speaker, in passing H.R. 2127 to name this post office for Clem Rogers McSpadden.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I am pleased to join my colleague in the consideration of H.R. 2127, which names a postal facility in Chelsea, Oklahoma, after Clem Rogers McSpadden. H.R. 2127, which was introduced by the gentleman from Oklahoma, Dan Boren, on May 3, 2007, was reported from the Oversight Committee on June 12, 2007, by a voice vote. This measure has the support of the entire Oklahoma congressional delegation.

Clem Rogers McSpadden was born on November 9, 1925, on a ranch near the small town of Bushyhead in Rogers County, Oklahoma. He served in the United States Navy during World War II from 1944 to 1946.

He was first elected to public office in November of 1954 to the Oklahoma State senate. In November of 1972, he was elected to the 93rd Congress and served one term from 1973 to 1975. Mr. McSpadden ran for Governor of Oklahoma in 1974 and lost the Democratic nomination. Presently, Mr. McSpadden is retired and living in Chelsea, Oklahoma.

Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleague, Representative DAN BOREN, for introducing this legislation and urge its swift passage.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SALI. Mr. Speaker, we have no other speakers, so I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, to simply close, let me again commend DAN BOREN for his introduction of this legislation.

□ 1545

I guess Representative McSpadden was kind of a chip off the block, and I asked if he could also make people laugh, and Dan said that he could indeed, as well as do any number of other things. So he is indeed a tribute to the Rogers and McSpadden families. I would urge passage of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DAVIS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2127.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACE AND NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2007

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 885) to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 885

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 103. Statements of policy.

Sec. 104. Report.

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United States has believed that an increase in the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear weapons.

(2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all countries, and in the vital national security interest of the United States, that the number of countries that possess a nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and ultimately reduced.

(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing their possessor to be just months away from the production of a nuclear explosive device.

(4) It is also therefore in the general security interest of all countries that the number of countries that operate uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for nuclear power reactor fuel.

(5) The financing and construction of additional uranium enrichment and spent-fuel

reprocessing facilities in additional states around the world is indefensible on economic grounds alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing services to the world market.

(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries, therefore, is often based upon considerations other than economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is often elevated to a matter of national pride—a demonstration to the world that the country that possesses this technology has arrived at a level of technological development comparable to that of the United States and other countries with advanced civil nuclear power programs.

(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a demonstration of the developing world’s independence from technological domination by the more developed states. Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” or the “NPT”) recognizes that State Parties have an “inalienable right . . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” However, this is a qualified right conditioned by a State Party acting in conformity with the NPT’s obligation for such countries not to acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

(8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments, nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for decades recognized the need to address this problem through multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to develop and construct such facilities themselves.

(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new urgency.

(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.

(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities providing nuclear fuel services—fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel—to other countries that agree to employ nuclear energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities.

(12) The United States also joined France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, in proposing a “Concept for a

Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel" that would facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and recipients to provide fuel to countries with good nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.

(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on February 11, 2004, that "The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing."

(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international management and oversight, as part of a "Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure" proposal to create international nuclear fuel cycle centers.

(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities and are committed to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the "Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel", proposed by the United States, France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;

(2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities under international management and oversight is also a welcome development and should be encouraged by the United States;

(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of \$50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively at least an additional \$100,000,000 in matching funds to fulfill the NTI proposal; and

(4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs (1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify additional incentives to be included in an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market prices, including participation in non-weapons-relevant technology development and fuel leasing to further persuade countries that participation in such a multilateral arrangement far outweighs the temptation and expense of developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities.

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

(a) GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(b) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is further the policy of the United States to—

(1) oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT;

(2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the right to "develop research, pro-

duction and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," as described in Article IV of the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and

(3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by Nuclear Suppliers Group members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

SEC. 104. REPORT.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market prices under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report shall include an assessment of the feasibility of establishing an international fuel services center within the United States.

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

(a) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS AUTHORIZED.—The President is authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "IAEA") for the purpose of supporting the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market mechanisms.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that—

(1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not less than \$100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than \$75,000,000 of such pledges for the purpose of supporting the establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in subsection (a);

(2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state, and will be under the oversight of the IAEA, only if—

(A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among other things—

(i) has a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and an additional protocol for safeguards in force;

(ii) has never been determined by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA full scope safeguards agreement and its additional protocol for safeguards; and

(iii) has effective enforceable export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other sensitive materials

comparable to those maintained by the United States; and

(B) the Secretary of State has never determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, that the government of the non-nuclear weapon state has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism;

(3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country only if, at the time of the request for nuclear reactor fuel—

(A) the country is in full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for safeguards in force;

(B) in the case of a country that at any time prior to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors determines that the country has taken all necessary actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director General regarding the activities that led to the prior determination of noncompliance;

(C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;

(D) the country has effective and enforceable export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other sensitive materials comparable to those maintained by the United States;

(E) the country does not possess uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale; and

(F) the government of the country is not a state sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law;

(4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities; and

(5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in paragraph (3) will be provided to a country referred to in such paragraph only at current market prices.

(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirement of subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the President—

(1) determines that it is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so; and

(2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that contains the basis of the determination under paragraph (1).

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize voluntary contributions under subsection (a) to support subsidization of the price of nuclear reactor fuel whose supply would be assured by the United States, the IAEA, or any other state or international entity covered by this section.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—To carry out section 201, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President \$50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROSEHTINEN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of our resolution, and I yield myself such time as I might consume.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is a dramatic step forward in the epic struggle to contain the spread of nuclear arms around the globe. Our bill provides a safe, efficient and collaborative means of getting nuclear fuel to any country that pledges not to develop nuclear arms and delivers on that promise. It will help ensure stability and expose the subterfuge that we know Iran is perpetrating in order to further its nuclear weapons pursuit.

We know full well, Mr. Speaker, that Tehran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. But many are persuaded by Iran's argument that it needs access to a reliable nuclear fuel supply to meet its civilian power needs.

Now, of course we know that Iran's argument is bogus, but Tehran has used the illusory threat of a global breakdown in the supply of nuclear reactor fuel to argue that it must have its own facilities to guarantee that its reactors are forever supplied with fuel. At the moment, Iran is going to have two of these reactors.

We know that the Iranian pretext has been long recognized as a gap in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. A state can exploit the non-proliferation treaty's recognition of its good standing to develop peaceful uses of the atom and acquire potentially dangerous technology such as uranium enrichment. It could then turn around and use the technology to support a nuclear weapons program.

Our legislation, the International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Non-proliferation Act, addresses this gap in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and removes Iran's pretext for its so-called peaceful enrichment plan. It does so by promoting the development of an international regime of assured supply of peaceful nuclear power fuel to countries in good standing on their nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Our legislation, Mr. Speaker, authorizes \$50 million to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This money will match the \$50 million offered by Mr. Warren Buffett to the Sam Nunn Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The Sam Nunn program support is crucial to the realization of this initiative, but so is the political will of coun-

tries around the globe capable of cooperating in such a regime. So after this bill's passage today, I intend to work with key nations to establish the international nuclear fuel bank.

I am very pleased, Mr. Speaker, that our Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, and our former distinguished colleague Senator Sam Nunn, who has perhaps done more to advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation than anyone else, have fully embraced this bill, and the administration is on record supporting it.

Ours is a broadly supported, bipartisan bill. It would not have come to fruition without the enthusiastic support of my good friend, the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, our colleague ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN. It was approved by our committee unanimously, a rare phenomenon in this era of divisive partisanship.

It is imperative that we keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran and provide a source of peaceful nuclear fuel to all countries that are currently flirting with nuclear development programs. I, therefore, urge all of my colleagues to support this most important measure.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, again, it's a joy to bring another truly bipartisan bill to the floor, thanks to the very able and skilled leadership of Chairman LANTOS of our Foreign Affairs Committee.

This bill, as amended, Mr. Speaker, is a version of the original introduced by our esteemed Chairman LANTOS and contains several new and important provisions that I would like to explain today.

The first of these addresses the supposed right of all countries to manufacture their own nuclear fuel through enrichment or repossessing.

The central problem of this assertion, Mr. Speaker, is that there's very little difference, as we know, in the technology that is used for civilian or for military purposes. So countries such as Iran, which are undoubtedly trying to acquire nuclear weapons, can innocently claim to be establishing a legitimate civilian nuclear program, a claim which can be virtually impossible for the outside world to disprove. For this reason, the acquisition of a similar capability by more and more countries, for whatever reason, means that the technology and the infrastructure needed to manufacture nuclear weapons will expand as well.

The continued spread of this deadly capacity poses an existential threat to the United States and, indeed, the entire world. We cannot allow this to continue. Unfortunately, efforts to stop this growing danger are undermined by a common but erroneous interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, specifically

article IV, which some assert gives every signatory country an absolute right to enrich and to reprocess.

It is both surprising and disappointing that many of the most ardent opponents of continued proliferation throughout the globe are also strong advocates of this supposed unrestricted right. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the treaty clearly states that the right to nuclear technology is conditioned by articles I and II, which are aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, including the capacity to manufacture them.

As such, it is the responsibility of countries seeking this capability to go beyond mere assertion and adopt measures that will conclusively demonstrate that it can be used only for peaceful purposes. It should not be the responsibility of the rest of the world to prove that the opposite is true. Iran has taught us the deadly foolishness of that approach.

I believe that it is profoundly wrong to hold the security of American people hostage to this flawed interpretation. Therefore, we have a responsibility to the people whom we represent to openly state the truth, that the NPT does not grant to all signatories an absolute right to enrich and reprocess. And the U.S. must work with our allies and others, as Mr. LANTOS has pointed out, to ensure that this position becomes an integral element in the global non-proliferation effort.

A second set of changes to the original legislation places conditions on any country seeking to host a nuclear fuel bank, as well as on states that wish to receive fuel from the bank. The most important of these conditions, Mr. Speaker, is that state sponsors of terrorism would be prohibited from hosting a nuclear fuel bank and also from receiving fuel from it. This provision is essential to ensure that terrorist states, such as Iran, especially in their nuclear programs, do not benefit from the establishment of such a bank.

A further provision mandates that both host and recipient states have an effective and enforceable export control program regarding nuclear and dual-use technology comparable to that of the United States.

In addition, there is a stipulation that countries seeking assistance from a fuel bank cannot possess enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

A final set of changes, Mr. Speaker, would ensure that any fuel made available by the bank would be at the current market price, thereby sparing U.S. taxpayers from the open-ended burden of subsidizing the nuclear programs of other countries.

With the inclusion of these measures, Mr. Speaker, I am proud to cosponsor Mr. LANTOS' legislation, and I believe that it will prove to be a significant addition to the global non-proliferation effort.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I have no other speakers, and I yield back the balance of our time.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, we have no additional requests for time, and we yield back the balance of our time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 885, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1600

CALLING ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO CHARGE IRANIAN PRESIDENT WITH CERTAIN VIOLATIONS BECAUSE OF HIS CALLS FOR DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 21) calling on the United Nations Security Council to charge Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the United Nations Charter because of his calls for the destruction of the State of Israel, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 21

Whereas the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly referred to as the “Genocide Convention”) defines genocide as, among other things, the act of killing members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the targeted group, and it also prohibits conspiracy to commit genocide, as well as “direct and public incitement to commit genocide”;

Whereas Article 4 of the Genocide Convention provides that individuals committing any of the listed genocidal crimes shall be punished “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”;

Whereas 133 Member States of the United Nations have ratified the Genocide Convention and thereby pledged to prosecute those individuals who violate its criteria for incitement to commit genocide, as well as those individuals who commit genocide directly;

Whereas 62 years ago the United Nations was founded in the wake of the Holocaust, the Nazi genocide carried out during World War II that resulted in the slaughter of 6 million Jews in Europe, in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and uphold and protect the “dignity and worth of the human person”;

Whereas Article 2, Section 4, of the United Nations Charter, to which Iran has agreed as a Member State of the United Nations, requires all Member States of the United Nations to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against

the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”;

Whereas on October 26, 2005, at the World Without Zionism Conference in Tehran, Iran, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be “wiped off the map”, described Israel as “a disgraceful blot [on] the face of the Islamic world”, and declared that “[a]nybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury”;

Whereas on December 12, 2006, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addressed a conference in Tehran questioning the historical veracity of the Holocaust and said that Israel would “soon be wiped out”;

Whereas on December 15, 2000, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated to thousands of Muslim worshippers in Tehran that “Iran’s stance has always been clear on this ugly phenomenon (Israel). We have repeatedly said that this cancerous tumor of a state should be removed from the region”;

Whereas other Iranian leaders have made similar statements and the Government of Iran has displayed inflammatory symbols that express similar intent;

Whereas on December 14, 2006, incoming United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that Iran’s calls for Israel’s destruction and its dismissal of the Holocaust are “unacceptable”, and expressed concern about the regional and global security implications of Tehran’s nuclear program;

Whereas on August 3, 2006, in a speech during an emergency meeting of Muslim leaders, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that the Middle East would be better off “without the existence of the Zionist regime”, called Israel an “illegitimate regime” with “no legal basis for its existence”, and accused the United States of using Israel as a proxy to control the region and its oil resources;

Whereas Iran funds, trains, and openly supports terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad among many others, all of which have murdered Americans, Israelis, and non-Israeli Jews and are determined to destroy Israel:

Whereas on December 14, 2001, former leader of Iran and current leader of Iran’s influential Expediency Council Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani threatened Israel with destruction by nuclear attack, saying, “[i]f one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything [in Israel], while it will merely harm the Islamic world”;

Whereas Iran has aggressively pursued a clandestine effort to arm itself with nuclear weapons; and

Whereas the longstanding policy of the Iranian regime is aimed at destroying the democratic State of Israel, a vital United States ally and longstanding friend, which is confirmed by statements such as those made by Iranian leader Ahmadinejad, Supreme Leader Khamenei, and Expediency Council leader Rafsanjani, demonstrating the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress—

(1) condemns, in the strongest terms, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s offensive remarks, contemptible statements, and reprehensible policies aimed at the destruction of the State of Israel;

(2) calls on the United Nations Security Council to take up charges against Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Article 2, Section 4, of the United Nations Charter;

(3) further calls on the United Nations Security Council and all Member States of the United Nations to consider stronger measures to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which would be both a dangerous violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a potential means to the end of carrying out Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s threats against Israel; and

(4) reaffirms the unwavering strategic partnership and close friendship between the United States and Israel and reasserts the steadfast commitment of the United States to defend the right of Israel to exist as a free and democratic state.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATSON) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROSELEHTINEN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.

Every Member of Congress is disturbed by the offensive comments that regularly emanate from the mouth of the Iranian President. His pledge to wipe Israel off the map and his denial of the Holocaust have shocked the civilized world.

I am among those who feel it is no longer enough simply to shake our heads disapprovingly and go about our business. Context is everything.

We are talking about a Jewish majority nation, Israel, whose very existence is threatened by another nation developing a nuclear bomb. Less than three-quarters of a century ago, Hitler and Nazi Germany wiped out more than a third of the world’s Jewish population. We cannot stand by and watch if the Iranian President has similar designs.

When Ahmadinejad says that Israel is a legitimate regime with no basis for its existence, our sense of justice tells us we cannot simply ignore it. When he describes Israel as “a disgraceful blot [on] the face of the Islamic world” and declares that “anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury,” we can’t, as people of conscience, dismiss these words as mere rhetoric.

That is the premise of this resolution. This resolution urges us not to shrug, but to take action. It calls on the United Nations Security Council to charge Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with Article 2, section 4, of the United Nations Charter, which requires all member states of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat