

chief, and by representing a journalist sentenced to jail for posting his own political thoughts on line. And perhaps, most importantly, Gao had written an open letter to the Chinese leadership condemning the unfounded persecution of the Falun Gong.

The resolution before the House today commends Gao and other Chinese human rights lawyers for their brave and principled actions on behalf of individual Chinese citizens fighting the government's injustice. It also condemns the Chinese Government's ceaseless efforts to harass, intimidate and imprison lawyers who are simply attempting to uphold China's own Constitution.

Madam Speaker, when Bob Kennedy spoke to South African students four decades ago, it seemed inconceivable that apartheid would fall and that human rights and democracy would one day flourish in South Africa.

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The skeptics were wrong. Today it seems similarly probable that China will one day have a democratically elected government that respects human rights. But Gao and his fellow human rights lawyers have bravely refused to concede defeat, and we remain grateful to their moral courage and willingness to persevere despite all the odds. When the day comes that human rights are respected in China, we will all stand to applaud Gao and his colleagues.

Madam Speaker, I strongly support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. KENNEDY), the author of this resolution.

Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I rise today to call attention to the persecution that has been well laid out to those who dare challenge the Chinese Government on matters of human rights and religious freedom. This resolution calls on the Government of China to stop its persecution of lawyers who defend clients in human rights and religious freedom cases and to repeal its laws designed to prohibit unlicensed religions from meeting freely.

The case of Gao Zhisheng, one of China's best-known lawyers and human rights defenders, is illustrative of the abuse that the Chinese people suffer for the exercise of rights that many Americans take for granted.

Mr. Gao has dared to represent Chinese citizens in lawsuits over corruption, land seizures, police abuse, and violations of religious freedom. One of these lawsuits was filed to appeal a verdict against Cai Zhuohua, who was found guilty of illegal business practices because he dared to distribute Bibles. Because of his human rights de-

fense work, Mr. Gao had his law practice closed and virtually everyone he knew and his family followed by state agents.

Madam Speaker, just as troubling is the case of Chen Guangcheng, a human rights lawyer who is blind and who exposed cases of violence against women, including forced abortion and forced sterilization under China's one-child policy. For his advocacy, last October Mr. Chen was beaten by state agents, placed under house arrest, and this past March taken into police custody. His whereabouts are presently unknown.

These are not isolated cases, according to the Department of State 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China. That report detailed the serious intimidation and abuse that continues to occur in China for those who defend basic human rights and religious freedom. In fact, with the promulgation of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, the Chinese Government has stepped up its efforts to eliminate unregistered religious activity with raids on house church Christian groups and the detention of hundreds of house church leaders, dozens of whom remain in custody.

Last November I stood with Chairman CHRIS SMITH, Ranking Member LANTOS, and Minority Leader NANCY PELOSI and listened as the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom report the active efforts to suppress religion it found in China. The commission's report detailed systematic activity against religious freedom, including the criminalization of unregistered religious organizations and severe penalties for those who engage in unregistered religious activities. Those who defy these rules are subject to harassment, detention, arrest, and closing of their religious facilities. Some, like the members of Falun Gong, face brutal oppression for their beliefs and horrific acts of torture that shock the conscience.

Madam Speaker, when I traveled to China last year, I spoke with government officials, including representatives of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, to address these subjects. I spoke of the need for the U.S. and China to have an open dialogue about the importance of respecting these values. As I said then, fundamental human rights such as religious freedom should face no ideological, political, or geographic boundaries. These are rights given to man by the Almighty. They are part of who we are as human beings and are bigger than any government.

Madam Speaker, I urge the Chinese Government to release Chen Guangcheng and to cease persecution of Gao Zhisheng and reinstate his license. If China wants the respect of the world, it needs to respect its own people. I ask my colleagues to support this resolution. Let us make a statement that the Chinese Government and the Chinese rights defenders will hear.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, this body stands united in calling on the Chinese Government to release this courageous fighter for human rights, and we urge all Members to vote for this resolution.

I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I want to thank Mr. KENNEDY for his eloquent statement as well as TOM LANTOS for his always eloquent statements on behalf of human rights.

Madam Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 365.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

## IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 282) to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 282

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Iran Freedom Support Act".

### SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title

Sec. 2. Table of contents

#### TITLE I—CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

Sec. 101. Codification of sanctions

Sec. 102. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign entities

#### TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

Sec. 201. Multilateral regime

Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions

Sec. 203. Termination of sanctions

Sec. 204. Sunset

Sec. 205. Clarification and expansion of definitions

Sec. 206. United States pension plans

Sec. 207. Technical and conforming amendments

**TITLE III—DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO CURTAIL IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SPONSORSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

Sec. 301. Diplomatic efforts

Sec. 302. Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

**TITLE IV—DEMOCRACY IN IRAN**

Sec. 401. Declaration of Congress regarding United States policy toward Iran

Sec. 402. Assistance to support democracy in Iran

Sec. 403. Waiver of certain export license requirements

**TITLE I—CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN**

**SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.**

(a) **CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.**—United States sanctions, controls, and regulations with respect to Iran imposed pursuant to Executive Order 12957, sections 1(b) through (1)(g) and sections (2) through (6) of Executive Order 12959, and sections 2 and 3 of Executive Order 13059 (relating to exports and certain other transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1, 2006, shall remain in effect until the President certifies to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the Government of Iran has verifiably dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs.

(b) **NO EFFECT ON OTHER SANCTIONS RELATING TO SUPPORT FOR ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.**—Subsection (a) shall have no effect on United States sanctions, controls, and regulations relating to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)) relating to support for acts of international terrorism by the Government of Iran, as in effect on January 1, 2006.

**SEC. 102. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN ENTITIES.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—In any case in which an entity engages in an act outside the United States which, if committed in the United States or by a United States person, would violate Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, or any other prohibition on transactions with respect to Iran that is imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and if that entity was created or availed of for the purpose of engaging in such an act, the parent company of that entity shall be subject to the penalties for such violation to the same extent as if the parent company had engaged in that act.

(b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section—

(1) an entity is a “parent company” of another entity if it owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the equity interest in that other entity and is a United States person; and

(2) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization.

**TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN**

**SEC. 201. MULTILATERAL REGIME.**

(a) **REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**—Section 4(b) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(b) **REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than six months after the date of the enactment

of the Iran Freedom Support Act and every six months thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding specific diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection (a), the results of those efforts, and a description of proposed diplomatic efforts pursuant to such subsection. Each report shall include—

“(1) a list of the countries that have agreed to undertake measures to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to Iran;

“(2) a description of those measures, including—

“(A) government actions with respect to public or private entities (or their subsidiaries) located in their territories, that are engaged in Iran;

“(B) any decisions by the governments of these countries to rescind or continue the provision of credits, guarantees, or other governmental assistance to these entities; and

“(C) actions taken in international fora to further the objectives of section 3;

“(3) a list of the countries that have not agreed to undertake measures to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to Iran, and the reasons therefor; and

“(4) a description of any memorandums of understanding, political understandings, or international agreements to which the United States has acceded which affect implementation of this section or section 5(a).”.

(b) **WAIVER.**—Section 4(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(c) **WAIVER.**—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may, on a case by case basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of a country, if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days before such waiver is to take effect that—

“(A) such waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

“(B) the country of the national has undertaken substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Iran.

“(2) **SUBSEQUENT RENEWAL OF WAIVER.**—If the President determines that, in accordance with paragraph (1), such a waiver is appropriate, the President may, at the conclusion of the period of a waiver under paragraph (1), renew such waiver for subsequent periods of not more than six months each.”.

(c) **INVESTIGATIONS.**—Section 4 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(f) **INVESTIGATIONS.**—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions against a person upon receipt by the United States of credible information indicating that such person is engaged in activity related to investment in Iran as described in section 5(a).

“(2) **DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION.**—

“(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after an investigation is initiated in accordance with paragraph (1), the President shall determine, pursuant to section 5(a), whether or not to impose sanctions against a person engaged in activity related to investment in Iran as described in such section as a result of such activity and shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the basis for such determination.

“(B) **EXTENSION.**—If the President is unable to make a determination under subparagraph (A), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees and shall extend such investigation for a subsequent period, not to exceed 180 days, after

which the President shall make the determination required under such subparagraph and shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the basis for such determination in accordance with such subparagraph.

“(3) **DETERMINATIONS REGARDING PENDING INVESTIGATIONS.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, with respect to any investigation that was pending as of January 1, 2006, concerning a person engaged in activity related to investment in Iran as described in section 5(a), determine whether or not to impose sanctions against such person as a result of such activity and shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the basis for such determination.

“(4) **PUBLICATION.**—Not later than 10 days after the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees under paragraphs (2) and (3), the President shall ensure publication in the Federal Register of the identification of the persons against which the President has made a determination that the imposition of sanctions is appropriate, together with an explanation for such determination.”.

**SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**

(a) **SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES.**—Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in the heading, by striking “TO IRAN” and inserting “TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN”;

(2) by striking “(6)” and inserting “(5)”;

and

(3) by striking “with actual knowledge.”.

(b) **SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.**—Section 5(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(b) **MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall impose two or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 6 if the President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items knowing that the provision of such goods, services, technology, or other items would contribute to the ability of Iran to—

“(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

“(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”.

(c) **PERSONS AGAINST WHICH THE SANCTIONS ARE TO BE IMPOSED.**—Section 5(c)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “, with actual knowledge,” and by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking “, with actual knowledge,” and by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph:

“(D) is a private or government lender, insurer, underwriter, or guarantor of the person referred to in paragraph (1) if that private or government lender, insurer, underwriter, or guarantor engaged in the activities referred to in paragraph (1).”.

(d) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to actions taken on or after March 15, 2006.

**SEC. 203. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.**

Section 8(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) poses no significant threat to United States national security, interests, or allies.”.

**SEC. 204. SUNSET.**

Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking “; **SUNSET**”;

(2) in subsection (a), by striking the subsection designation and heading; and

(3) by striking subsection (b).

**SEC. 205. CLARIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS.**

(a) **PERSON.**—Section 14(14)(B) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by inserting after “trust,” the following: “financial institution, insurer, underwriter, guarantor, any other business organization, including any foreign subsidiaries of the foregoing,”; and

(2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: “, such as an export credit agency”.

(b) **PETROLEUM RESOURCES.**—Section 14(15) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting after “petroleum” the second place it appears, the following: “, petroleum by-products,”.

**SEC. 206. UNITED STATES PENSION PLANS.**

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States and the international community face no greater threat to their security than the prospect of rogue regimes who support international terrorism obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons.

(2) Iran is the leading state sponsor of international terrorism and is close to achieving nuclear weapons capability but has paid no price for nearly twenty years of deception over its nuclear program. Foreign entities that have invested in Iran's energy sector, despite Iran's support of international terrorism and its nuclear program, have afforded Iran a free pass while many United States entities have unknowingly invested in those same foreign entities.

(3) United States investors have a great deal at stake in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

(4) United States investors can have considerable influence over the commercial decisions of the foreign entities in which they have invested.

(b) **PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.**—Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act and every six months thereafter, the Secretary of State shall ensure publication in the Federal Register of a list of all United States and foreign entities that have invested more than \$20,000,000 in Iran's energy sector between August 5, 1996, and the date of such publication. Such list shall include an itemization of individual investments of each such entity, including the dollar value, intended purpose, and current status of each such investment.

(c) **SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO DIVESTITURE FROM IRAN.**—It is the sense of Congress that, upon publication of a list in the relevant Federal Register under subsection (b), managers of United States Government pension plans or thrift savings plans, man-

agers of pension plans maintained in the private sector by plan sponsors in the United States, and managers of mutual funds sold or distributed in the United States should, to the extent consistent with the legal and fiduciary duties otherwise imposed on them, immediately initiate efforts to divest all investments of such plans or funds in any entity included on the list.

(d) **SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO PROHIBITION ON FUTURE INVESTMENT.**—It is the sense of Congress that, upon publication of a list in the relevant Federal Register under subsection (b), there should be, to the extent consistent with the legal and fiduciary duties otherwise imposed on them, no future investment in any entity included on the list by managers of United States Government pension plans or thrift savings plans, managers of pension plans maintained in the private sector by plan sponsors in the United States, and managers of mutual funds sold or distributed in the United States.

**SEC. 207. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Section 2 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking paragraph (4).

(b) **DECLARATION OF POLICY.**—Section 3 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “(a) **POLICY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.**—”; and

(2) by striking subsection (b).

(c) **TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.**—Section 8 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “(a) **IRAN.**—”; and

(2) by striking subsection (b).

(d) **DURATION OF SANCTIONS; PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.**—Section 9(c)(2)(C) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(C) an estimate of the significance of the provision of the items described in section 5(a) or section 5(b) to Iran's ability to, respectively, develop its petroleum resources or its weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities; and”.

(e) **REPORTS REQUIRED.**—Section 10(b)(1) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking “and Libya” each place it appears.

(f) **DEFINITIONS.**—Section 14 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (9)—

(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by—

(i) striking “, or with the Government of Libya or a nongovernmental entity in Libya,”; and

(ii) by striking “nongovernmental” and inserting “nongovernmental”; and

(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or Libya (as the case may be)”;

(2) by striking paragraph (12); and

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17) as paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), respectively.

(g) **SHORT TITLE.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 1 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking “and Libya”.

(2) **REFERENCES.**—Any reference in any other provision of law, regulation, document, or other record of the United States to the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996” shall be deemed to be a reference to the “Iran Sanctions Act of 1996”.

**TITLE III—DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO CURTAIL IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SPONSORSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM****SEC. 301. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.**

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE**

**INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.**—It is the sense of Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to work to secure support at the United Nations Security Council for a resolution that would impose sanctions on Iran as a result of its repeated breaches of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, to remain in effect until Iran has verifiably dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs.

(b) **PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT INVEST IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.**—

(1) **WITHHOLDING OF ASSISTANCE.**—If, on or after April 13, 2005, a foreign person (as defined in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as renamed pursuant to section 208(g)(1)) or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign government has more than \$20,000,000 invested in Iran's energy sector, the President shall, until the date on which such person or agency or instrumentality of such government terminates such investment, withhold assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to the government of the country to which such person owes allegiance or to which control is exercised over such agency or instrumentality.

(2) **WAIVER.**—Assistance prohibited by this section may be furnished to the government of a foreign country described in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the national security interests of the United States, furthers the goals described in this Act, and, not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, notifies the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of such determination and submits to such committees a report that includes—

(A) a statement of the determination;

(B) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided;

(C) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and

(D) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national security interests.

**SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.**

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds the following:

(1) Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” or “NPT”) states that countries that are parties to the Treaty have the “inalienable right . . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”.

(2) Iran has manipulated Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire technologies needed to manufacture nuclear weapons under the guise of developing peaceful nuclear technology.

(3) Legal authorities, diplomatic historians, and officials closely involved in the negotiation and ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state that the Treaty neither recognizes nor protects such a per se right to all nuclear technology, such as enrichment and reprocessing, but rather affirms that the right to the use of peaceful nuclear energy is qualified.

(b) **DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TO STRENGTHEN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.**—Congress declares that it should be the policy of

the United States to support diplomatic efforts to end the manipulation of Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as undertaken by Iran, without undermining the Treaty itself.

#### TITLE IV—DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

##### SEC. 401. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress declares that it should be the policy of the United States to support independent human rights and peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.

##### SEC. 402. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to provide financial and political assistance (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and entities that support democracy and the promotion of democracy in Iran. Such assistance may include the award of grants to eligible independent pro-democracy radio and television broadcasting organizations that broadcast into Iran.

(2) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—In accordance with the rule of construction described in subsection (b) of section 401, none of the funds authorized under this section shall be used to support the use of force against Iran.

(b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Financial and political assistance under this section may be provided only to an individual, organization, or entity that—

(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the preceding four years;

(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to non-proliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materiel;

(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;

(4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the fundamental equality of women;

(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for people; and

(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.

(c) FUNDING.—The President may provide assistance under this section using—

(1) funds available to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund; and

(2) amounts made available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (g).

(d) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days before each obligation of assistance under this section, and in accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the President shall notify the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Such notification shall include, as practicable, the types of programs supported by such assistance and the recipients of such assistance.

(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in Iran that meet the criteria under subsection (b);

(2) support for a transition to democracy in Iran should be expressed by United States representatives and officials in all appropriate international fora;

(3) efforts to bring a halt to the nuclear weapons program of Iran, including steps to end the supply of nuclear components or fuel to Iran, should be intensified, with particular attention focused on the cooperation regarding such program—

(A) between the Government of Iran and the Government of the Russian Federation; and

(B) between the Government of Iran and individuals from China and Pakistan, including the network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.) Khan; and

(4) officials and representatives of the United States should—

(A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic elections; and

(B) draw international attention to violations by the Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

##### SEC. 403. WAIVER OF CERTAIN EXPORT LICENSE REQUIREMENTS.

The Secretary of State may, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, waive the requirement to obtain a license for the export to, or by, any person to whom the Department of State has provided a grant under a program to promote democracy or human rights abroad, any item which is commercially available in the United States without government license or permit, to the extent that such export would be used exclusively for carrying out the purposes of the grant.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) each will control 20 minutes.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither gentleman is opposed to the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California support the motion?

Mr. LANTOS. Yes, I support the motion, Madam Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Then the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL) is entitled to control 20 minutes in opposition.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in very strong support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. And I want to thank our colleague from Florida, Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN, for sponsoring this important legislation. I am proud to be an original cosponsor.

The United States and the world community, Madam Speaker, are at a crucial point in our efforts to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons. Let us be clear: Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will be a devastating blow to peace and security not only in the Middle East but in the entire world.

Iran has been designated, as we know, as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" for over two decades. The Department of State has declared in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran "remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world." Iran maintains "a high profile role," they go on to say, "in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity," both rhetorically and operationally," according to the State Department. Supreme religious leader Khamenei does not just praise Palestinian terrorist operations; Iran also provides Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist groups, most notably Hamas, with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Iran has now pledged to contribute \$50 million to Hamas so that the Hamas regime in Palestine can continue to resist international pressure to recognize Israel's right to exist.

In October Iran's President Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be "wiped off the map." In December he declared the Holocaust "a myth." Last Monday he attacked Israel as a "fake regime" that "cannot logically continue to live." Can we doubt that such people are capable of carrying out their threats if they ever acquire the means to do so? Have we learned nothing in 60 years?

This prudent measure will strengthen our sanctions regime against Iran's nuclear weapons proliferation. To keep up economic pressure, the bill tightens the existing sanctions against Iran by requiring a yes-or-no decision on whether to impose sanctions on firms reported to be making investments in the Iranian petroleum sector. The bill also amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA, Public Law 104-172, to eliminate the 5-year sunset clause included in the original ILSA. We should certainly not give the Iranians the impression that they can wait us out on the sanctions issue.

The bill requires that all bilateral U.S. sanctions, controls, and regulations on Iran related to weapons of mass destruction remain in effect until Iran has verifiably dismantled its WMD programs. The bill also provides the means and moral pressure to encourage American investors and American pension plans to divest from companies

that invest in Iran's energy sector. Such investment can be a powerful tool in our efforts to stop Iran's march towards nuclear weapons.

In February, Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 passed overwhelmingly by this House, 404-4. We called on all members of the U.N. Security Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to take expeditious action in response to Iran's noncompliance with the mandate of the Security Council, and it calls on "all responsible members of the international community" to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

We were severely criticized by many members of the world community, Madam Speaker, for not relying on the Security Council and on sanctions in our confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Now is the time for the world community, for China and Russia especially, to show that they are indeed responsible members of the international community and take effective action to stop this terrorist regime in Iran.

Time is running out. The world needs to act now. The Bush administration deserves high praise for working with our friends to get Iran to the Security Council where once again next week it will be on the agenda.

This bill renews our call for diplomatic and multilateral action and will strengthen the President's hand with our international partners.

Finally, we must work to change Iran itself by working to promote democracy and human rights within Iran. This bill authorizes the President to provide democracy assistance to individuals who are working through exclusively peaceful means to support democracy and promote democracy in Iran. It does not in any way authorize the use of force.

The bill was introduced, as I noted, by our friend and colleague Ms. ROSELEHTINEN of Florida, who has devoted tremendous efforts to secure its passage. She now has 360 cosponsors. Chairman HYDE had asked her to manage the bill, but she has a family emergency in Florida that required her to leave for Florida and to be with her family. Our thoughts and prayers are with her during this time.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Madam Speaker, I sought the time in opposition mainly because it is a very opportune time to talk about our foreign policy and the disadvantages that intervention poses for us.

There are two types of foreign policy we can have: interventionism, where we tell other people what to do; and the more traditional American foreign policy of nonintervention and not using force to tell other people what to do. The policy of foreign intervention has been around a long time, and it is not only one party that endorses it. In

1998 we had a similar bill come up to the floor. It was called the Iraqi Freedom Act. And that was the preliminary stages of leading to a war, which is a very unpopular, very expensive, and deadly war going on right now in Iraq. So this is a similar bill moving in that direction.

□ 1115

The 1998 resolution, which required regime change and laid the plans out for regime change, did not come up under this administration. That occurred with the previous administration.

But I have no qualms about the goals of the authors of this legislation. They would like to see freedom in Iran. I would, too. It is just that I believe the use of force backfires on us, and when we use force such as sanctions and subsidizing and giving money to dissidents, what we really do is the opposite of what we want. Those individuals who are trying to promote more freedom in Iran actually are forced to ally themselves with the radicals, so instead of undermining the system, it has made it worse. It is always argued that they will welcome us when we march in as liberators, and Iraq proved that that was not the case. Iran won't be much better.

But let me just say a few things about interventionism. Interventionism, which is essentially something that was gradually developed over the 20th century, led to a century of war and killing and was very expensive to the American people in costs. It means that we assume the moral right and the constitutional authority to be involved in the internal affairs of other nations, and yet there is no moral right for us to get involved in the internal affairs of other countries, and there is no constitutional authority for us to do so.

We are not designated as "the nation builder." No matter how well-intended it is, it doesn't work, and we don't have this authority to do this. We have not been designated the "policeman of the world," although we have assumed that role more so every year, and that has been going on for several decades.

There are always more costs than anybody imagines. Iraq was supposed to cost \$50 billion. It is now hundreds of billions of dollars. There is economic harm done. There is inflation that it causes. Yet it continues, and instead of coming to an end, it tends to spread. That is why I fear this so much.

I see the way we are dealing with Iran as just spreading a problem that we contributed to in the Middle East. Too many innocent lives are lost, innocent American lives, GIs that go over and are killed so needlessly, especially since we don't achieve the goal of bringing freedom and liberty and democracy to these countries.

Interventionism endorses the principle that we have this authority to change regimes. We have been doing it for more than 50 years through activi-

ties of the CIA in a secret manner, and now we are doing it in a much more open manner where we literally invade countries. We initiate the force. We start the war because we believe that we have a monopoly on goodness that we can spread and teach other people to understand and live with.

There are too many unintended consequences, too much blow-back. It comes back to harm us in the long run. At one time we were an ally of Saddam Hussein. At one time we were an ally of Osama bin Laden. These things don't work out the way we think they are going to.

The one thing that interventionism endorses, which I strongly disagree with, it really deemphasizes diplomacy. It deemphasizes it to the point where if we don't feel like it, we are not willing to talk to people. When we feel like it, we might demagogue it and pretend we are talking. But it really doesn't encourage diplomacy.

Another reason why interventionism is so bad for us, it encourages special interests to get behind our foreign policy and endorse what we are doing and influence what we are doing, possibly another country and possibly some industry that might influence us.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution. The single-most important action that we will take today is to ensure that the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is not extended. Libya no longer needs to be subject to such punitive measures. It is our partner in the global goal of controlling the spread of unconventional weapons.

In December 2003, Libya took a bold and courageous step. It pledged to rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction. I was in Tripoli immediately thereafter in January 2004 to encourage the leadership of Libya to follow through with its stated goal. After that, Libya loaded its nuclear weapons onto American ships. These weapons, together with all detailed plans and programs, are today under lock and key in Tennessee. As a result, the legislation now before us removes all references to Libya from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILISA. Madam Speaker, is dead, and the Iran Sanctions Act will rise in its place.

The weight of American sanctions will now be focused exclusively on Iran because the mullahs in Tehran continue to pursue blatantly their nuclear ambitions. The message to Tehran is simple: follow the Libya model, and we in Congress are more than prepared to open a new, constructive and happy chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations.

Madam Speaker, the Iran Freedom Support Act will dramatically ratchet up the economic pressure on Tehran to abandon its head-long pursuit of nuclear weapons. If we fail to use both our economic and our diplomatic tools, the world will face a nightmare that

knows no end; a despotic, fundamentalist regime that avidly supports terrorism, exploiting and threatening to use the ultimate weapon of terror.

Just yesterday the leader of Iran indicated that they stand ready to share their nuclear technology with the Government of Sudan, which as we speak here this morning is engaged in genocide in Darfur. This is the regime that we are dealing with.

It is very naive, Madam Speaker, to expect that we can convince Iran to end its nuclear program voluntarily based on reason. We can only hope to inflict economic pain at the highest levels in Tehran and starve the Iranian leadership of the resources it needs to fund a costly nuclear program. And that is the purpose of our legislation.

Some argue that this legislation might undermine our relations with European allies which invest in Iran, but who have also helped lead an important diplomatic effort to bring the Iranian nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council. But that argument, Madam Speaker, is a pure and simple misreading of the contents of our bill.

Our legislation is intended to reinforce diplomacy with economics. We ask our allies to do what the United States did over a decade ago, divest from Iran's energy sector, the cash cow of the ayatollahs' nuclear plans.

At the same time, our legislation does not put the President in a straitjacket. If a verifiable deal to eliminate Iran's nuclear program can be negotiated, or if certain sanctions will undermine the national security of our own Nation, the President may waive implementation of our law.

But, Madam Speaker, let me be clear on one point: Congress will no longer tolerate lax enforcement of American sanctions against Iran. For over a decade both Democratic and Republican administrations failed to implement the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act measures that we do have in place. Meanwhile, Iran's nuclear program has marched forward at a frighteningly rapid pace.

Our legislation will extend the Iran Sanctions Act indefinitely. It will dramatically boost congressional oversight over its implementation. The administration will have to enforce the law fully. Ignoring the law will no longer be an option.

I commend the administration for convincing the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to send its Iran file to the U.N. Security Council. Unfortunately, the Russians have already made clear that the Security Council action will be impeded by them. Just last week, the Russian Foreign Minister announced that Moscow would only consider U.N. sanctions on Iran if it were shown what it called concrete proof of Iran's nonpeaceful intentions.

Madam Speaker, what gall. As we all know, there is no shortage of proof to be found in the numerous International Atomic Energy Agency reports over recent years. These reports demonstrate

conclusively that for two decades, for two decades, Iran has run a clandestine nuclear program in violation of its commitments under the treaty of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I can't help but wonder what the Russians require as proof. Perhaps Iran parading a nuclear device through the streets of Tehran, or Israel being wiped off the map, as the Iranian President has declared.

The leadership in Moscow ought to know that support for terrorists is not a policy that the United States or other civilized nations will accept, especially from a country that expects to be treated as a member of the G-8 nations, seven of which are a true democracy. Russia clearly is not.

Madam Speaker, I would be delighted if our legislation were rendered redundant by serious Security Council action, but the attitudes shown by Russia and China thus far show that that is a most unlikely development. In the meantime, we cannot shirk our responsibility to employ every peaceful means possible to undermine Iran's ugly nuclear ambitions. That, in essence, is the reason for the urgency of passing H.R. 282 today.

Madam Speaker, I strongly support this bill for the sake of staving off a looming, long-term nuclear threat, and I urge all of my colleagues to do as well.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the balance of my time be controlled by my good friend, our colleague from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) since I have responsibilities in the International Relations Committee.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PENCE) will now control the time that the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH) previously had controlled.

There was no objection.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 20 seconds for a quick quote, and then I am going to yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

The quote: "The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Baghdad communique are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. We are today not far from a disaster."

This comes from Lawrence of Arabia, 1920. We should learn from our mistakes and other countries' mistakes.

Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting me to speak on this resolution.

One of the reasons, Madam Speaker, that I argued against our invasion of Iraq long before the war began was because I felt we needed to face far more serious threats like the danger posed by Iran. In the 3 years since that attack, the threat from Iran has grown, and our capacity to meet that threat has diminished. Now Iran has a President who exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate power and has threatened to wipe Israel off the map. Our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should Iran launch a new wave of terrorism.

□ 1130

We have done nothing to break our dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest ability now to blackmail us and other countries.

I appreciate the leadership of my good friend Mr. LANTOS and others bringing the resolution forward to spotlight the problems with Iran. I appreciate their working with us to improve the bill.

For instance, now the bill will not allow us to deal with terrorist groups on our own watch list. I think that is very, very important. Unfortunately, this legislation does not provide solutions. Instead it limits the administration's flexibility to pursue diplomacy without providing any new tools not already at their disposal.

We need allies and partners to address the Iranian threat. We need the cooperation of the European Union, of China and, yes, Russia, since we have no more unilateral sanctions to place on Iran.

Our global standing is at a low point. Yet this bill sanctions not Iran, but the very countries we need for a strong diplomatic effort. This bill tragically gives equal weight to overthrowing the Iranian Government as it does to the immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.

Now, I am strongly opposed to this regime, but preventing them from developing nuclear weapons capacity must be our first priority, not prioritizing behavior change over regime change. We pull the rug out from underneath anybody in the current Iranian leadership who values survival over the nuclear program, and it clearly works to eliminate incentives for diplomatic solutions.

I have a sense of *deja vu* when I think back to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 which did not explicitly authorize the use of force, but certainly got the ball rolling that led to the tragedy of this Iraq war. Knowing what they know today, how many Members of this House would have voted differently 8 years ago?

I am very worried about where all this ends. We have heard reports from the Pentagon of plans to attack Iran, indeed plans for a nuclear strike on Iran, the repercussions of which should make us all recoil with horror. Now, the administration dismisses these news reports, but the American people



and this Congress got better information about what happened in Iraq from reporters like Seymour Hirsch than it got from, sadly, the President, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice.

I do not pretend to imagine the horrific things that Iran would do with nuclear weapons. We are all opposed to that. That is why we need a strong, smart, constructive diplomatic strategy. This bill does not provide it.

For over half a century, Madam Speaker, we have made a series of mistakes regarding Iran, starting in 1953 when the United States led the charge to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Iran and replace them with a dictatorship in the person of the Shah. Our support for that dictatorship and its repressive policies fueled the reaction that led to the Iranian revolution. It was part of what happened with the hostage crisis in Iran.

More recently there are very credible reports that diplomatic feelers extended by the Iranian Government were dismissed by this administration 2 and 3 years ago. I sincerely hope that we do not overwhelmingly and unthinkingly pass a resolution today that makes us feel good because we all hate this regime, but instead sets in motion a process that actually is destabilizing and makes the peaceful future that we all seek harder.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this bill be extended by 40 minutes equally divided, and I yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) which I ask he be permitted to control.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, debates of this nature, I think, are wholly constructive in the life of the Nation. I rise today not just to support the Iran Freedom Support Act, but to engage in a thoughtful debate.

I commend my colleagues, 360 of whom have cosponsored this legislation brought forward by the admirable Representative ROS-LEHTINEN of Florida and supported strongly by the International Relations Committee. But I also speak with admiration on behalf of my colleagues who are here debating and opposing this measure. In fact, the gentleman from Oregon just made some eloquent comments in which he called, and I paraphrase, with respect for strong, smart, diplomatic efforts.

And while we may disagree on the meaning of those words, I would borrow them, Madam Speaker, to say that I believe that is precisely what the Iran Freedom Support Act is. It is strong, it is smart, and it is a diplomatic meas-

ure expressed by the Congress, the will of the American people, into a circumstance that is real, that is meaningful, and for which the clarity of the position of the United States of America is essential at this moment.

Let me speak for just a second about the Iran Freedom Support Act, which does just a couple of things that are worth restating, and then I want to talk about the nature of this confrontation.

This legislation attempts to deny the Iranian regime critical technical and financial resources to pursue unconventional weapons, incite terror and oppress the Iranian people. It is important to note that H.R. 282 does not authorize the use of force against Iran, despite the tone and tenor of some of the debate today.

Specifically this bill requires that WMD-related U.S. sanction controls and regulations on Iraq remain in effect until Iran has verifiably dismantled its WMD program. It also authorizes the President to provide democracy assistance to foreign and domestic individuals and organizations promoting freedom within that country, and engages in a host of additional economic measures and sanctions, including amending the Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act to recognize the historic gains that Ranking Member LANTOS referred to in relation to our relationship with Libya.

Now, that being said, I just want to talk as a Hoosier from the Midwest about the real stakes here, and about the nature of the present leadership in Iran, and the importance of us to speak as the one people and as one Nation forcefully into this diplomatic engagement.

Listen to some of the quotes of the leadership of Iran today. President Ahmadinejad said in September of last year, "Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need."

We are not just dealing with nuclear proliferation within a country that has a long and profound history of association with terrorism, but one that desires to export nuclear technologies.

President Ahmadinejad said in October of last year, "God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and without Zionism." And it was not long ago that he said that Iran would inflict both "harm and pain on the United States."

And his threats against Israel in particular should be deeply offensive to every freedom-loving person in the world, and every American who cherishes our relationship with our ally, Israel. President Ahmadinejad said in October of last year, "As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map." And the President of Iran also said, "Anyone who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic Nations' fury."

This is real, Madam Speaker. This is a confrontation that I pray we will be

able to resolve with strong, smart, diplomatic efforts. But if the United States fails to act with clarity, including adopting the Iran Freedom Support Act, the potential consequences of inaction could be catastrophic.

I urge my colleagues to join the 360 Members, Republicans and Democrats alike, who have supported this legislation when it comes to the floor later today.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, this bill authorizes strong sanctions as well as funding to dissident groups inside Iraq to overthrow that government. In my interpretation that is the use of force, and I yield 6½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for the point that he made that is well taken.

With all due respect to my colleagues who may have a difference of opinion about this bill, I think that most American people know that this administration has already made a mess of international relations with respect to the illegal and unwarranted invasion of Iraq.

We now know that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, that Iraq was not cooperating with al Qaeda with respect to 9/11, that Iraq had neither the intention nor the capability of attacking the United States, and yet we took steps, starting with the policy of regime change, that took us into a war against Iraq that we clearly did not have to initiate, and we clearly should not be there.

Now, if you love the steps which took this country into a war in Iraq, then you are going to like this bill because it does the same thing, which is why I rise in opposition to it. This bill sounds a lot like the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which many Members voted for in good faith, not knowing later on it would be evoked as a cause for the prosecution of war against Iraq.

Overall this bill seriously inhibits the ability of the United States Government to use diplomacy, and diplomacy is the strongest and most rational tool we have to resolve the situation regarding Iran's nuclear program.

Instead I submit that this bill sets our country on a path to war with Iran. You can be sure the Government of Iran will view this bill in this way. First, the bill makes it official U.S. policy to impose international sanctions through the U.N. Security Council for Iran's "repeated breaches" of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

Now, this sounds eerily familiar to actions pursued in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, and which, as we know, were for appearances only. Similarly, advocating international sanctions against Iran through the Security Council is for appearances only. This administration has apparently made up its mind it wants to attack Iran. There is evidence that the U.S.

military is already inside Iran, and I ask to include at this point in the debate an article from the New Yorker by Seymour Hirsch which asserts just that.

Including this section in the bill that I just referred to is simply an attempt to cover the President's slap in the face of the international community with respect to Iran.

Second, H.R. 282 also promotes regime change in Iran as opposed to behavior change, regime change as a solution to the stand-off regarding Iran's nuclear program. By advocating regime change, we indicate our priority is not, in fact, to encourage Iran to adhere to its nonproliferation treaty obligation, but to remove the leadership in Iran even if it were to make some concessions.

□ 1145

This communicates to the world community that, to the U.S., Iran has passed the point of no return, which completely undermines any efforts towards diplomacy and negotiations. Furthermore, while this bill makes the point of so-called not authorizing the use of force against Iran, be assured this is a stepping stone to the use of force, the same way that the Iraq Liberation Act was used as a stepping stone.

Third, H.R. 282 supports anti-government advocates in Iran promoting regime change. Now this is highly problematic. While an important amendment offered by my friend Congressman BLUMENAUER was adopted in this bill during markup to prohibit U.S. assistance to groups that are on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations or have been on the list for the last 4 years, there are ways around this.

For example, according to a Newsweek article from February 14, 2005 that the U.S. has been recruiting individuals from the MEK, a group currently labeled as terrorists by the State Department, who have agreed to form a new group with the same mission as the MEK, regime change in Iraq.

I will insert this article from Newsweek in the RECORD at this point.

[From Newsweek, Feb. 14, 2006]

LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD SPIES

(By Christopher Dickey, Mark Hosenball and Michael Hirsh)

This is a terrorist cultleader? Maryam Rajavi is dressed in a Chanel-style suit with her skirt at midcalf, lilac colored pumps and a matching headscarf. Over a dinner of kebab, rice and French pastries, Rajavi smiles often and laughs easily. She's at once colorful and demure, like many an educated woman in the Middle East. Indeed if George W. Bush—who relies on powerful females for counsel—were pressed to identify a Muslim model of womanhood, this 51-year-old Iranian would look very much the part.

But of course that's exactly the impression Rajavi seeks to give. Behind her smile is a saleswoman's savvy—and a revolutionary's zeal to prove that she and her mysterious husband, Massoud Rajavi, are neither cultists nor terrorists. Maryam Rajavi is de-

manding that the exile groups they lead together, centered on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (People's Holy Warriors) or MEK for short, should be taken off the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, their assets unfrozen and their energies unleashed. The MEK, Rajavi says, is the answer to American prayers as Tehran continues to dabble defiantly in both terrorism and nuclear arms. "I believe increasingly the Americans have come to realize that the solution is an Iranian force that is able to get rid of the Islamic fundamentalists in power in Iran," she told Newsweek in a rare interview at her organization's compound in the quiet French village of Auvers sur Oise. The group's own former role in terrorist attacks dating back to its support for the U.S. Embassy takeover in 1979, Rajavi insists, is ancient history. And the MEK is not a Jim Jones-like cult as critics allege, with forced separation between men and women and indoctrination for children, all overseen by the Rajavis' autocratic style. Instead, she insists, it is "a democratic force."

Whatever Rajavi's true colors, Newsweek has learned that her role may be growing in the calculations of Bush administration hard-liners. At a camp south of Baghdad—it's called Ashraf, after Massoud Rajavi's assassinated first wife—3,850 MEK members have been confined but gently treated by U.S. forces since the invasion of Iraq (once they were allies of Saddam against their own country in the 1980s Iran-Iraq war). Now the administration is seeking to cull useful MEK members as operatives for use against Tehran, all while insisting that it does not deal with the MEK as a group, American government sources say.

Some Pentagon civilians and intelligence planners are hoping a corps of informants can be picked from among the MEK prisoners, then split away from the movement and given training as spies, U.S. officials say. After that, the thinking goes, they will be sent back to their native Iran to gather intelligence on the Iranian clerical regime, particularly its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Some hawks also hope they could help to reawaken the democratic reform movement in Iran, which the mullahs have silenced. "They [want] to make us mercenaries," one MEK official told Newsweek.

These individuals have been conducting military activity in Iran with United States support. I just wanted to remind everyone that the MEK was the group responsible for the U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran in 1979. This group also had a camp in Iraq where Osama bin Laden's first fighters were reportedly trained. The MEK also trained and supported Taliban fighters. Now we are recruiting help from members of the MEK which makes a total mockery of the so-called war on terror.

Fourth, H.R. 282 states that it is U.S. policy to focus attention to stopping cooperation, stopping cooperation, between Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan. Considering Russia and China have the strongest leverage with Iran, yet are also opposed to Iran's violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty obligations, the U.S. should try to work with Russia and China to try to find a path to diplomacy, not to isolate Russia and China.

In the end we are only isolating ourselves and setting our country on another unilateral path of war. Our troops are already extended in Iraq, and they are in a vulnerable position.

Starting a war in Iran is the last thing we should be doing.

I urge a vote against this dangerous bill. Stop this unilateralism. Work with diplomacy and work towards peace.

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of the Iran Freedom Support Act. This legislation received strong bipartisan support when it was passed in the International Relations Committee last month.

I commend my colleague from Florida, Ms. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, for introducing this bill and working both sides of the aisle to produce this strong bipartisan piece of legislation.

I would also like to thank my ranking member, TOM LANTOS, for his continued leadership on ensuring that Iran does not gain access to nuclear weapons. This legislation is not the first step towards war, like I have heard some contend, but I believe a tightening of the current restrictions on Iran. We must use every tool we have, whether it be diplomatically or economically, to limit the development of Iran's nuclear weapons. Iran has shown time and time again that they do not respect the international community, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nation's nuclear watchdog.

Iran made a deal with the international community when they designed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and that was to not seek nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear technology. Iran broke this deal 18 years ago when they began to pursue a secret nuclear program with the aim of producing enough material to create nuclear weapons to threaten the stability of the region and of the world. We cannot allow a terrorist state like Iran to attain such deadly weapons.

On Monday of this week, Iranian President Ahmadinejad vowed to press ahead with uranium enrichment and boasted how he did not expect the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on this terrorist state. This legislation is needed to let our allies know that the House of Representatives and the United States are serious about using economic means to isolate Iran and ensure they end their nuclear weapons ambitions. The permanent five members of the Security Council have all declared they are opposed to Iran gaining the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons, but words are sometimes not enough.

When the IAEA presents its report to the Security Council on Friday, the members of the Security Council must be prepared to move forward with sanctions if Iran chooses to remain in non-compliance of the IAEA. I hope this House speaks with a unified voice today to let our allies know we are serious about stopping Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.



Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BLUNT), our distinguished majority whip.

Mr. BLUNT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act, and I particularly want to join in thanking Representative ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN for her efforts on this bill. The United States and the international community should hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior. We do need to encourage the Government of Iran to change.

We need to focus on the danger of allowing the President of Iran, a man who has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and is willing to support terrorist organizations such as Hamas and others, to be in control of the most dangerous weapons in the world. This is a serious test for the international community. Passing this bill alone will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. However, it will send a message that the United States considers any person or entity that helps Iran develop weapons of mass destruction to be an obstacle to peace and security.

This bill also encourages the forces of democracy in Iran. Among all nations of the world, Iran has one of the longest and strongest national heritages, and many Iranian Americans join in these efforts to strengthen the potential for an Iran that proudly embraces freedom and proudly embraces the idea of the rule of law.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It is essential to the well-being and safety of our country, and the entire international community that the Iranian regime does not possess nuclear weapons to hold the world hostage, and that the Iranian people are allowed to move proudly toward freedom.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CANTOR), our chief deputy majority whip.

Mr. CANTOR. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana.

I too rise today in strong support of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and I would like to also commend the leadership of Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN for her leadership on this bill and all those that she continues to fight for in the defense of freedom around the world.

The world is clearly at a critical juncture. We are in the midst of waging a global war on terrorism to defend the free world from terrorists who seek not only to kill us, but to destroy our way of life. Make no mistake about it; the very essence of the rights and freedoms for which our forefathers fought are at stake.

This bill that stands before us today is a key component of our war on terror. Iran is one of the largest state sponsors of terror in the world. They have funneled money and arms to ter-

rorist cells throughout the Middle East, and have American blood on their hands. Iran, without a doubt, is one of the most dangerous threats to our national security and to world stability.

Now Iran stands on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon, yet another tool in its arsenal of terror and violence. Iran's President Ahmadinejad is a maniacal dictator who thrives on his hatred for the United States and its desire to destroy our freedom. The world cannot and will not tolerate a nuclear Iran.

It is not only the United States which is at risk, but our allies as well. President Ahmadinejad has made clear his intentions to wipe off the map Israel, our longest-standing democratic ally in the Middle East.

This week, Madam Speaker, we commemorate Yom Hashoah, Holocaust Memorial Day. We remember with great reverence and respect the victims of another maniacal dictator who threatened to wipe an entire people off the map and who wanted to impose his theory of a perfect society on the rest of the world.

We must learn from our mistakes of the past to take these threats seriously and act hastily.

The Iran Freedom Support Act is an important step in neutralizing the threat Iran poses to the world. I must stress, however, that passage of this bill should be the first step, not the last. God forbid we stand on this floor 60 years from now memorializing the victims of yet another Holocaust.

Let us fulfill our pledge to never forget. Let us learn from the lessons of our history and continue to strengthen our tools to fight this global war on terror and preserve our freedoms.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute before I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

I want to quote from Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty of which Iran is a signator: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination."

Our position is that they do not have the right to enrich. Those who deny the right to enrich are more in violation of the NPT Treaty than Iran itself.

What do we do for those who are totally in defiance to international law in the NPT Treaty, like India and Pakistan? We reward them and subsidize them. At the same time, there is no proof that there has been any violation of this treaty by Iran, and yet the rewards go to those who are in total defiance.

Madam Speaker, I would yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH).

(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Madam Speaker, I know of no circumstance in the world in

which more options are all bad than this particular one. We all have to be clear-headed about the challenge of Iran. It is a more difficult society to deal with, a more difficult government than Iraq.

It is absolutely clear that Iran does seek nuclear capacity. It is absolutely clear that Iran has been the greatest State promulgator of terrorist activity in the Middle East. Those are bases that we all have to understand.

Then we have to think through what is our response and what are the kinds of strategies that the United States should develop and are there lessons that exist today that might lend to this circumstance.

One of the lessons is that some things we do as a society can be counterproductive. All of us are concerned with the security and the fate of the State of Israel as well as the American national security, but if we think it through, does our policy in Iraq advance the security of Israel? Does a preemption of Iran advance the security of Israel? Does it advance the security of the United States?

If the United States acts militarily, for instance, in Iran, do we spark and ensure the great prediction, that none of us want to come to pass, that we will enter into one of these clashes of civilization made inevitable by another war of the West against another Muslim State? Muslims would view this as a circumstance that the Judeo-Christian world is attacking the world of Muslim culture. We have to think deeply and seriously about this.

Then when it comes to nuclear weapons, it is bad for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but there are things that are worse. One of the things that is worse is to give them reason to use that nuclear weapon, whether it be against ourselves or an ally of the United States.

The administration has informed the committee of jurisdiction that it profoundly opposes this piece of legislation and that it prefers a tack of stressing international diplomacy, and it is suggested to the committee in the strongest possible terms that this type of legislation undercuts their effort to be multilateral.

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And so, while many Members of this body, many members of the public have objected to this administration for being too unilateral, this Congress is saying, with this kind of legislation, that we will be more unilateral than the administration wishes to be. In other words, with an administration that no one of any stripe would argue is not muscular—it is a very muscular administration—this Congress is trying to out-macho the muscular. That is something we should all think very seriously about.

Then we ought to think through what it means if we go forth in a given kind of direction, which words like "regime change" imply. What does preemption mean? It is clear that if we

move in a muscular direction and, for example, preemptively strike Iraq, that that will slow down the capacity of Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon. But will it stop it? Not necessarily, partly because of the capacities Iran has to develop WMD capacity in a more decentralized way than Iraq once did, but there are other ways of getting nuclear weapons. One can get nuclear weapons through the "loose nuke" dilemma of purchase or theft. And if one gives Iran reason to attack, it will, and it will in many ways that are now available in the world through decentralized terrorist activities, but also potentially through nuclear. And the potential of nuclear use increases if they are attacked.

Now we have the other option which is stressed in this bill—but the first, force being implied, but what is stressed is economic sanctions. So our two options are to shoot Iran or to shoot ourselves in the foot economically. And I will tell you that I can't think of anything that is more outrageous in logic. So I think we have to think through new types of approaches involving new ways of dialogue, new ways of international pressure of a very different nature than are proposed by this committee at this time.

While I have enormous respect for the proponents of this legislation, particularly the distinguished chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (Ms. ROSELEHTINEN) and our distinguished ranking member on the full committee (Mr. LANTOS), I am convinced that in its present form the approach brought before this body complicates ongoing diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the building crisis with Iran.

Indeed, it is for this reason that the Department of State indicated that the Administration would be unable to support the legislation. As noted in a letter to Chairman HYDE, the bill would "narrow in important ways the President's flexibility in the implementation of Iran sanctions, create tensions with countries whose help we need in dealing with Iran, and shift the focus away from Iran's actions and spotlight differences between us and our allies. This could play into Iran's hands, as it attempts to divide the U.S. from the international community as well as to sow division between the EU-3, China, and Russia. It would also create dissension among UNSC members, as the Council considers the Iran nuclear dossier."

There are few areas of the world with a more troubling mix of geopolitical problems than the Middle East. The irony is that the war in Iraq which has consumed so much of our country's political and economic capital may hold less far-reaching consequences than challenges posed in neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

To the West, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off remains the sorest point in world relations, complicated by the incapacitation of Ariel Sharon and the rise of a Hamas-led government in the occupied territories. To the East, the sobering prospect of Iran joining the nuclear club stands out.

In life, individuals and countries sometimes face circumstances in which all judgments and options are bad. The Iranian dilemma is a

case-in-point. But it is more than just an abstract bad-option model because at issue are nuclear weapons in the hands of a mullah-controlled society which has actively aided and abetted regional terrorists for years.

Indeed, the issue has become even more acute with the election in Iran of its hard-line, populist President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who suggested late last year that the murder of six million European Jews by the Nazis did not occur and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

In reference to recent disclosures of enhanced Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems to carry such weapons, concerned outside parties are actively reviewing options.

The Europeans have led with diplomatic entreaties; neo-con strategists in the U.S. with open-option planning—including, if investigative journalist Seymour Hersh is to be believed—the possible use of nuclear weapons.

In the background are references to the 1981 preemptive strike by the Israeli Air Force against Iraq's Osirak reactor.

At issue is the question of whether preemption is justified; if so, how it should be carried out; and, if carried out, whether intervention would lead to a more conciliatory, non-nuclear Iran or whether the effects of military action would be short-term, perhaps pushing back nuclear development a year or two, but precipitating a new level of hostility against the U.S. and Israel in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world which could continue for decades, if not centuries.

Since the American hostage crisis which so bedeviled the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, we have had a policy of economic sanctions coupled with comprehensive efforts to politically isolate Iran.

Six years ago, Senator ARLEN SPECTER and I invited Iran's U.N. Ambassador to Capitol Hill, the first visit to Washington by a high-level Iranian representative since the hostage crisis.

On the subject of possible movement toward normalization of relations with Iran, I told the ambassador that while many would like to see a warming of relations, it would be inconceivable for the U.S. to consider normalizing our relationship so long as Iran continued its support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador forthrightly acknowledged that Iran provided help to both these terrorist organizations, but also noted, in what for some might be considered the most optimistic thing he said that day, that his government was prepared to cease support to anti-Israeli terrorist groups the moment a Palestinian state was established with borders acceptable to Palestinians.

For decades in the Muslim world, debate has been on-going whether to embrace a credible two-state (Israel and Palestine) approach or advance an irrevocable push-Israel-to-the-sea agenda. The implicit Iranian position, as articulated by the ambassador, was support for a two-state approach, but if the U.S. on its own, or Israel as a perceived surrogate, were to attack Iran, the possibility that such a compromise can ever become possible deteriorates.

While angst-ridden, the Muslim world understands the rationale for our intervention in Afghanistan where the plotting for the 9/11 attack on the U.S. occurred. It has no sympathy for our engagement in Iraq, which had nothing

to do with 9/11, but if these two interventions were followed by a third in Iran, the likelihood is that such would be perceived in the vocabulary of the Harvard historian, Samuel Huntington, as an all-out "clash of civilizations," pitting the Judeo-Christian against the Muslim world. In the Middle East it would be considered a war of choice precipitated by the United States. We might want it to be seen as a short-term action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, but the Muslim world would more likely view it as a continuance of the Crusades: a religious conflict of centuries' dimensions, with a revived future.

If military action is deemed necessary, the U.S. broadly has only three tactical options: (a) full-scale invasion a la Iraq; (b) surgical strikes of Iranian nuclear and missile installations; or (c) a surrogate strike by Israel, modeled along the lines of Osirak.

The first can be described as manifestly more difficult than our engagement in Iraq, particularly a post-conflict occupation. The second presents a number of difficulties, including the comprehensiveness of such a strike and the question of whether all aspects of a program that is clandestine can be eliminated. The third makes the U.S. accountable for Israeli actions, which themselves are likely to be more physically destructive but less effective than the 1981 strike against Osirak.

In thinking through the consequences of military action, even if projected to be successfully carried out, policymakers must put themselves in the place of a potential adversary. A strike that merely buys time may also be a strike that changes the manner and rationale of Iranian support for terrorist organizations. It may also change the geo-strategic reason and methodology for a country like Iran to garner control of nuclear weapons. "Loose nukes" abound. Countries with money and will can garner almost anything in the world despite efforts by the U.S. and others to make theft or sale difficult.

It is presumed that the major reasons that Iran currently seeks nuclear weapons relates to: (1) Pride: a belief that a 5,000 year-old society has as much right to control the most modern of weapons systems as a younger civilization like America or its neighbors to the west, Israel, and to the east, Pakistan; (2) Power: the implications of control of nuclear weapons with regard to its perceived hegemony as the largest and most powerful country in the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to its nemesis, Iraq, which not only once attacked Kuwait, but Iran itself using chemical weapons; (3) Politics: the concern that Israeli military dominance is based in part on the control of weapons that cannot be balanced in the Muslim world, except by a very distant Pakistan.

The issue of the day from an American perspective is weapons of mass destruction, their development and potential proliferation to nation-states and non-national terrorist groups. The question that cannot be ducked is whether military action against Iran might add to the list of reasons Iran may wish to control such weapons: their potential use against the United States. Perhaps as significantly, American policymakers must think through the new world of terrorism and what might be described as lesser weapons of mass destruction.

Any strike on Iran would be expected to immediately precipitate a violent reaction in the

Shi'a part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support today. With ease, Iranian influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make our ability to constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near hopeless.

And there should be little doubt that in a world in which "tit for tat" is the norm, a strike on Iran would increase the prospect of counter-strikes on American assets around the world and American territory itself. The asymmetrical nature of modern warfare is such that traditional armies will not be challenged in traditional ways. Nation-states which are attacked may feel they have little option except to ally themselves with terrorist groups to advance national interests.

We view terrorism as an illegitimate tool of uncivilized agents of change. In other parts of the world, increasing numbers of people view terrorist acts as legitimate responses of societies and, in some cases, groups within societies who are oppressed, against those who have stronger military forces.

If Afghanistan, an impoverished country as distant from our shores as any in the world, could become a plotting place for international terrorism, such danger would increase manifoldly with an increase in Iranian hostility, especially if based on an American attack.

If there exists today something like a one-in-three chance of another 9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in the next few years, a preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to double or triple such a prospect.

And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its power the ability not only to destabilize world politics, but world economies as well. Oil is, after all, the grease of economic activity, and an Iranian-led cutback in supply precipitated by us or them cannot be ruled out.

Given the risk, if not the untenability, of military action, policymakers are obligated to review other than military options. One, which has characterized our post-hostage taking Iranian policy for a full generation, is isolation of Iran. This policy can be continued, but as tempting as it is, there is little prospect of ratcheting it up much more, except in ways, such as a naval embargo on Iranian oil, that would be difficult to garner international support for and would, in any regard, damage us more than Iran.

The only logical alternative is to consider increasing dialogue without abandoning the possibility of future sanctions with this very difficult government.

Iran—its government and people—has to be fully engaged, and I am pleased that U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad has been authorized to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq. The Iranians played a stabilizing role regarding Afghanistan just several years ago, and logically they have a stake in a stable Iraq. I would urge the leadership in Tehran to re-think its apparent decision to close the door on this potentially productive avenue for dialogue.

With respect to the Iranian nuclear program, however, it is difficult to see how confrontation can be avoided if we will not talk directly with Tehran in appropriate foras about this and other matters. The stakes could not be higher. If diplomacy fails, there is a credible prospect that Iran will follow the North Korean model of rapid crisis escalation, including the cessation of international inspections, with a wholly un-

supervised nuclear program leading in time to the production of nuclear weapons and the dangerously unpredictable regional consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq-like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and alarming consequences both regionally and worldwide.

A proposal that might be suggested is negotiation of a Persian Gulf nuclear-free zone, which would reduce, although given the high possibility of cheating, not eliminate entirely one of the reasons Iran presumably seeks nuclear weapons—fear that it may be at a disadvantage in a conflict with an oil-rich neighbor. In this context, Iran, the EU and Russia, with U.S. support, might agree on a proposal under which Iran would indefinitely and verifiably suspend domestic enrichment activity in exchange for an internationally guaranteed fuel supply, U.S.-backed security assurances, and a gradual lifting of sanctions by and resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., including expanded country-to-country cultural ties.

Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been educated in the United States. The people, although not the government of Iran, have democratic proclivities. While real power in Iran is controlled by the mullahs. Few societies in the world have if given a chance more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction than Iran. And just as it is hard to believe that outside military intervention would lead to anything except greater ensconcement of authoritarian mullah rule, a bettering of U.S. relations with Iran provide a greater prospect of progressive change in Iranian society.

There is nothing the new government of Iran, or for that matter Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda movement, benefit more from than an aggressive, interventionist U.S. policy toward Iran.

Finally, a note about arms control. If the U.S. wishes to lead in multilateral restraint, we might want to consider joining rather than rebuking the international community in development of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). All American administrations from Eisenhower on favored negotiation of a CTB. This one has taken the position the Senate took when it irrationally rejected such a ban seven years ago. The Senate took its angst against the strategic leadership of the Clinton Administration out on the wrong issue. This partisan, ideological posturing demands reconsideration. We simply cannot expect others to restrain themselves when we refuse to put constraints on ourselves.

We are in a world where use of force can not be ruled out. But we are also in a world where alternatives are vastly preferable. They must be put forthrightly on the table.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BOEHNER), the distinguished majority leader of the House of Representatives and an original cosponsor of this legislation.

Mr. BOEHNER. Madam Speaker, I appreciate my colleague for yielding, and I want to congratulate Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS of the International Relations Committee, as well as Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN for her work on this issue, and I rise strongly today to support H.R. 282, the

Iran Freedom Support Act. The Iran Freedom Support Act sends, I think, a strong message: the United States expects Iran to be a responsible member of the international community.

Iran has repeatedly asserted its rights to nuclear power, but its government has remained silent on their international obligations. Iran must be transparent in meeting its international nuclear obligations. In particular, Iran's refusal to answer the International Atomic Energy Agency's questions about critical elements of its nuclear power program is of deep concern to me.

In addition, Iran's sponsorship of terrorism raises troubling questions about its true intentions and its long-term goals. It is impossible to have faith in a regime which spreads fear, violence, and disruption through its support of terrorist organizations and networks.

I support President Bush's efforts to work with the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to compel the Iranian regime to be a responsible member of the international community.

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. BERKLEY).

Ms. BERKLEY. I thank Mr. CROWLEY for yielding time, Madam Speaker, and I rise in strong support of the Iran Freedom Support Act. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this important legislation and ask for its immediate passage.

It would be difficult to overstate the danger Iran represents. Unchecked Iranian nuclear proliferation, combined with increasing support for international terrorism, will help to further destabilize the entire region.

Iran currently possesses ballistic missiles capable of striking 1,200 miles away. This places U.S. forces in this region, moderate Islamic Arab countries located in the region, as well as the State of Israel in grave danger. Imagine, if you will, if these missiles had nuclear delivery capability.

For over two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert and now overt nuclear program. It has manufactured centrifuges, sought completion of heavy-water reactors, and experimented with uranium enrichment. According to one weapons inspector, it has already converted 45 tons of uranium into gas, enough to build more than one nuclear bomb.

In a perfect world, we should be able to rely on the United Nations to curb Iranian nuclear proliferation. In a perfect world, the eight reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be enough to motivate action. In a perfect world, all of the members of the Security Council would appreciate the seriousness and catastrophe of a nuclear Iran. But since we cannot count on the international community, China and Russia are far too interested in Iranian oil and Iranian trade money, the

United States must step up the pressure and do what is right.

This bill, in my opinion, accomplishes that goal. U.S. sanctions would dramatically increase the pressure on the Iranian regime to give up their nuclear ambitions and allow international inspections of their facilities. Since the President of Iran was elected last summer, Iran's stock market has lost 40 percent of its value, there has been a capital flight of more than \$200 billion, and Iran's manufacturing sector is increasingly dependent on imports. Iran is struggling financially. This legislation will further squeeze Iran and deny it the financial resources to continue its path towards nuclear armament.

There is no debate, not anywhere, not in this body, that Iran is a radical and fundamentalist country headed by a President who is willing to share nuclear technology with the most unstable countries in the world, and by mullahs who raise religious fanaticism to a new art form. Every pronouncement this President makes further dramatizes how mentally unstable and unbalanced and dangerous he is. The United States must act quickly and decisively if we are to counter the continuing threat posed by the Iranian regime. We must deny Iran the technology and assistance and financial resources it needs to pursue this unacceptable behavior.

I have no illusions. I can't guarantee that the sanctions contained in this bill will have the desired effect, but I do know that it is a far better alternative to invading Iran or bombing Iran. And unlike the Iraq Freedom Act, which many people have cited today as a reason not to pass this particular piece of legislation, there is nothing in this act that we are debating today, there is nothing in this legislation that can be construed as authorizing use of force against Iran, and none of the assistance should be used to support covert action that is contained in the legislation.

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL).

Mr. ENGEL. I thank the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from Indiana, and I am happy to be an original cosponsor of this bill. I want to compliment Congresswoman ROS-LEHTINEN and Congressman LANTOS for this bill. I rise in strong support of this resolution, and I condemn the actions and statements of the Iranian Government.

I believe this is one of the greatest crises since the end of the Cold War, and we have to be up to the challenge. Under the guise of saying it needs to meet its own energy needs, Iran has, for years, been engaged in secret efforts to develop nuclear technology that has weapons capability.

Let us be very clear. Iran is lying when she says she wants to use this for peaceful purposes. Iran is a major oil exporter and doesn't need nuclear

power for peaceful purposes. She is doing this for one reason and one reason only: to be hostile; defying and misleading the international community.

Iran's President Ahmadinejad has gone to extremes to stir up anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment in Iran and throughout the Arab world. Not only, as was stated before, has he publicly declared his hope for "a world without America," he has also stated his desire "to wipe Israel off the map."

These remarks demonstrate a gross disregard for the rule of law, human life, and the core principles of the United Nations. I wholeheartedly support the United Nations Security Council's looking into taking swift and strong action to counter Iran's growing threat, and I urge prompt adoption of H.R. 282.

This is a commonsense resolution. This has nothing to do with Iraq, to my colleagues who were talking about Iraq. There is no analogy here. This is another threat, and we have to stand up to the threat. If the world had stood up to Hitler in the 1930s, maybe the Holocaust wouldn't have happened. Maybe World War II wouldn't have happened. Every time there is a chance, society and the world has to stand up to prevent worse things from happening in the future. I don't want to be around if Iran detonates a nuclear weapon and say I stood here in Washington and was afraid to act.

As Ms. BERKLEY pointed out, this resolution doesn't say anything about any kind of military action. We hope this can be resolved diplomatically, but, frankly, I believe that all options should be on the table. The military should be an absolute, absolute, ultimate last resort, but we have to tell these thugs in Iran that we are not going to stand idly by and allow them to be destructive, allow them to make threats, allow them to kill people, or allow them to have another Holocaust.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, there has been talk in the media and elsewhere about the necessity of bombing Iran, and we are talking today about regime change, which is an act of force, yet some of us believe we are acting too hastily. Others deny that; that something imminently is going to happen. But I want to read a little quote here from John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence. He says, "Our assessment at the moment is that even though we believe that Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, we believe that it is still a number of years before they are likely to have enough fissile material to assemble into or put into a nuclear weapon; perhaps into the next decade. So I think it is important that this issue be kept in perspective." This is John Negroponte. And I think those who are so eager to pass this legislation and move toward regime change are moving in the wrong direction too hastily, and there are a lot of analogies to this and to Iraq, so we caution you about that.

Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I do think this is an important conversation for us to have on this floor. I am pleased that the debate time was extended, and I hope our colleagues will take the time to scroll through the information that is available and think of the consequences.

For instance, I would enter into the record, a letter from Under Secretary of State Nick Burns to Chairman HYDE. I will just quote a little and then insert the rest in the RECORD.

We have enormous concerns about this proposed legislation, particularly title II. These provisions would impair our ability to continue working closely and successfully with our allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.

Nobody here, nobody here, apologizes for this regime. And my good friend from Indiana is correct, there is a lot of shared interest and deep concern. The notion that this despotic regime would have control of nuclear weapons is terrifying, absolutely terrifying.

We long for the day that the Iranian people are free, in no small measure because the United States' history with the Iranian people over more than half a century is one where we have not always been on the side of democracy for the Iranian people, overthrowing their democratically elected regime in 1953. That was not a proud moment in our history when we helped install a dictator, but we called him the Shah.

We are united in our commitment to deal meaningfully with this problem. This legislation, as the administration has made clear, falls short of the mark. It is not tightening our sanctions against Iran.

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We have done that.

There have been administrations, both Republican and Democrat, who have maybe not been as zealous in implementing those sanctions; but that is on the books. We have done it.

What this talks about doing is extending sanctions against the very people whose cooperation we need to solve this problem. We are confusing our goals. Is it more important to threaten a regime change and thereby consolidate it? This Government of Iran by all indications is not monolithic. There are people who disagree with the sad and repulsive face of the current leader. There are a vast number of young people in Iran who are not at this point violently anti-American. They are pro-Western. There is interest in the United States. If we misplay this, we can end up turning another generation against us in Iran.

We have had empty threats against North Korea that did not stop them from going full speed ahead developing nuclear weapons, in fact, we are probably less safe today because we have not been focused and effective.

I do strongly identify with the words of my friend, the gentleman from Iowa

(Mr. LEACH). I have been one who has been somewhat critical of this administration in its actions in the past. I would find it absolutely inappropriate to not reinforce when I think they are trying to reposition themselves vis-à-vis Iran. There are many people on our side of the aisle who were against the rush to war in Iraq and many more who have found that it was a mistake to do so. We have supported more diplomatic initiatives, and this is the opportunity we have now.

This legislation is not each-handed. It is not focused. The administration does not want it. It sanctions our allies. I strongly urge that we do things that are coming down the pike now that we in Congress can do that will make a difference in Iran. Think about how we deal with India and nuclear weapons. This is a decision that is looming ahead of us that will make a difference for China and other countries that have nuclear technology about how we treat them in that situation.

And for heaven's sake, when people have suddenly discovered \$3-a-gallon gasoline and that we are addicted to foreign oil, which is part of Iran's strength right now, maybe we in Congress can forget the goofy energy bill we passed and get serious about conservation, alternative energy, increasing fuel standards and giving full value to the American public for our oil and gas resources. These are things that we can do now that will make a difference. Let the administration do its job diplomatically; provide oversight, but do not go over the edge with this legislation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, DC.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
*Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to comment on HR 282, the "Iran Freedom Support Act of 2005," that currently is pending before your Committee.

We have serious concerns about this proposed legislation, particularly Title II, which would amend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). These provisions would impair our ability to continue working closely and successfully with our allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.

The Iran issue is sensitive and critically important. The September 24 IAEA resolution, tabled by the EU-3 (Germany, the UK, and France), was an important step forward. We are going to have to continue working with our international partners to isolate Iran and to build and maintain an international coalition to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability. In doing so, the President needs the flexibility that HR 282 would impede.

I note that one portion of the bill, Title IV, regarding support for democracy in Iran, could, with relatively minor modifications, make a positive contribution to our Iran objectives, and we would welcome the opportunity to work with Congress in developing this approach.

Sincerely,

R. NICHOLAS BURNS,  
*Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.*

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

There have been repeated assertions by several of my colleagues today about the administration's position on the bill we are considering today. In fact, it has been characterized repeatedly by several colleagues that the administration "strongly opposes" this legislation.

With great respect to my colleagues, they are referring specifically to an administration letter that expressed an opinion to the chairman of the Committee on International Relations before the bill provided further flexibility to the President, and it is not a response to the text of the bill we are considering today. The administration has not taken a position on the legislation, as amended, that we are considering today.

In specific reference to the concerns that were addressed, I would like to address title II of the legislation before I recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Title II of the bill was the focus of the administration's letter, and it had to do in particular with that section concerning the ability of the President of the United States to waive certain provisions of this act in the national interest. The legislation that we consider today states that the President may on a case-by-case basis waive for a period of not more than 6 months with respect to national security the certifications required in this bill if such a waiver is "vital to the national security interests of the country" and the country of the national has undertaken substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction.

What we in effect did here is we lowered the threshold significantly for the President's waiver in this case. It is significant that the administration has not expressed opposition to the legislation, as amended. For the sake of clarity of the record, I wanted to add that to our debate today.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON), the distinguished vice chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and the leaders for bringing this bill forward.

I just want to refresh the memories of my colleagues who say we should not take any action. It was in 1997 when we had evidence that Iran was getting cooperation on developing a missile system that we brought a bill before this body called the Iran Missile Sanctions Act. For my colleagues who were not here, 398 Members voted "yes," 98 Senators voted "yes," the White House opposed the bill, and President Clinton vetoed the bill that year because he said we did not need it.

Last summer, Iran paraded the Shabab III missile system down the streets of Tehran. It is completed. It is the most capable offensive system in the Middle East. We could have stopped it and we didn't.

Madam Speaker, for the past 3 years I have been feeding the CIA information about Iran's efforts to undermine Iraq, the Middle East, and to foment terrorism around the world. It got so uncomfortable that I had to write a book. Everything that I said that I gave to the CIA for the past 3 years is now true: the support for Bani Sadr, the efforts for taking two teams up into North Korea to acquire nuclear technology, the attempts to assassinate Mullah al-Sastani. All of those things are now verified, and all of them I told the CIA and they ignored.

We do need to be aggressive with Iran and we need an approach that does not call for war. I am not for war with Iran. The people of Iran are not our enemy. It is a young nation. The people there want to be back as friends with America and the West. We need to work with those Iranians in exile, and that is what this legislation calls for.

Madam Speaker, 2 months ago I was out in California where I spoke to the 13 largest Iranian radio and television stations that beamed by satellite into Iran. For 2 hours I spoke directly to the Iranian people by satellite, 12 million households. I came back 8 hours later and took calls from people inside of Iran.

Madam Speaker, 400 Iranians called through the satellite and through cell phones to issue their recommendations and their questions to me live.

Madam Speaker, only 1 of 400 supported the regime of Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khomeini, who really runs the government there. Every other caller said we need your help, we need to do what you did with Ukraine, you need to help us take back our government. You need to do what they did in Georgia, to have an internal revolution, to bring about change so we truly can be friends with the West. That is what this legislation calls for.

But there is one other point this legislation does not focus on that I feel strongly about, and this was mentioned by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH). The closest nation to Iran is Russia, and what we have to do is renew our efforts diplomatically to have Russia play a significant role to peacefully convince the people of Iran to get their government to back off of this nasty rhetoric and of this effort to build up this offensive capability using WMD, including nuclear weapons. This is of vital urgency for us. This is the number-one threat we face in the world.

While this legislation may not be perfect, it certainly sends a signal that we are not going to do what we did back in 1997. We are not going to allow any administration to back us off from stopping the development of technology like the missile system that Iran currently possesses.

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CARDIN).

Mr. CARDIN. Madam Speaker, let me thank my friend for yielding me this time.

Madam Speaker, I agree with many of the comments that have been made on this floor about the dilemma we have now in Iran as a result of our policies in Iraq. I opposed the U.S. involvement in Iraq. I thought it was wrong. And as one of the consequences, it has caused us to lose focus on our war against terror and to make it more difficult for us to deal with Iran.

Having said that, I think this is an important bill that we need to move forward. It is an important effort to make it clear that Iran cannot be permitted to become a nuclear weapons power.

Madam Speaker, let me point out some of the proudest moments in U.S. history have been the use of sanctions. I think back about U.S. leadership and imposing sanctions basically against the Soviet Union which allowed people to be able to leave that country.

I think back about the U.S. leadership in South Africa when it was an apartheid country and how we imposed sanctions against South Africa and were accused of causing problems in doing that. But what we did was bring down the apartheid Government of South Africa without the necessary use of force.

So I think it is critically important that we stand united in our efforts to impose sanctions against Iran to make it clear that we cannot allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons power. Make no mistake about it, Iran is trying to do that. We know Iran is trying to do that. We know about the vote of the IAEA of 27-3 that referred Iran to the Security Council, that they are enriching uranium clearly to develop a nuclear weapon, that they have supported terrorist organizations, the Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad. The Iranian President has made it clear that he wants a world without the United States and he wants to wipe Israel off the face of the map. These are serious threats that we need to take seriously.

Therefore, we need effective sanctions against Iran so they change their way. This legislation is an effort to strengthen the sanctions against Iran by removing the sunset, by taking away some of the discretion and removing the sanctions unless Iran changes its way.

Madam Speaker, I look at this as a way to engage the international community to work with us. We did not do that in Iraq, and that was one of the fatal flaws of our policy in Iraq is that we did not engage the international community.

This legislation says, look, we have a chance with Iran to get them to change their ways through the imposition of sanctions and isolating the country, but we do need the help of our friends around the world. We do need them to work with us. It is in the interest of the civilized world to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. We need their help. Working with them, we can add another proud history to America in its international leadership

of saying yes, we are going to use our international power, our diplomatic skills, to change the direction of a country that otherwise would become even a more dangerous risk to the United States and the civilized world. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation.

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Madam Speaker, there has been a lot of talk here about what this bill is doing and that it does not authorize the use of force. As a matter of fact, the language in the bill says this does not authorize the use of force. But my contention is it is a contradiction to the bill itself because the bill itself does authorize the use of force. No, not tanks and airplanes and bombs yet, but we know that all these options are still on the table.

□ 1230

But what it does authorize is something that is equivalent to force, and that is sanctions. Sanctions are used as an act of war.

Also, this bill has money in it, and it is open-ended, an authorization of appropriation. There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. And what is this section talking about? Subsidies and funding of dissident groups to go in there and undermine the Iranian government.

Yes, we quote Ahmadinejad about his vitriolic statements, and they are horrible, but how do you think they interpret other statements when we say we are going to wipe their regime off the face of the Earth? We are going to have regime change. So from their viewpoint we are saying the same thing, and we should not be blinded to that and pretend, because our language is not quite as violent. We are saying the same thing, because look at the result of the violence in Iraq as a result of our efforts of regime change.

Now, one of the major authors of the Iraqi war, a leader of the neoconservative movement, came before the committee when this resolution was debated and when we had hearings on it. I want to read a quote from him because it clarifies this issue. The quote comes from Michael Ledeen, and he wants regime change. This is what he had to say. "There is much that is praiseworthy in the Iran Freedom Support Act. I think it can be improved by more openly embracing a policy of regime change in Iran and allocating an adequate budget to demonstrate our seriousness in this endeavor. I know some Members would prefer to dance around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this country, but anyone looking closely at the language, and that is what I have done, and content of the Iran Freedom Support Act and its close relative in the Senate can clearly see that it is, in fact, the essence of the matter. You can't have freedom in Iran, that is, we

can't have our way, without bringing down the mullahs."

That is an outright threat. That is the testimony of a neoconservative who led us and promoted and pushed the war in Iraq, and nothing would please him and others who are behind this type of resolution to see regime change. There is no denial of that.

The question is how do we do it? Are we going to do it pussyfooting around? Or are we going to use force and violence? We did, we used bombs for a long time against Iraq. But we had a bill in 1998 that said explicitly we are going to get rid of the Iraqi government, and it took a few years to get the war going.

Both parties are involved in this. It is not just this administration that has promoted this type of foreign policy, which, quite frankly, I see is not in the best interest of our country. This is why I am a strong advocate of minding our own business. Don't get involved in nation building. Don't police the world. Don't get involved in the internal affairs of the other nations. Otherwise, we have a big job ahead of us.

What about the fact that Kim Jong Il is still in power? We are talking to him. We talked to Qadafi. Mao was in power, and he had nuclear weapons. What did we do; did we attack him? No. What did we do with Stalin? Stalin and Khrushchev had 30,000 nuclear weapons. Were we ready to use force and intimidation and yelling and screaming? And Khrushchev was ready to wipe us off the face of the Earth also.

But I am asking you to reconsider the fact that moving in this direction is the same thing as we did against Iraq, and it won't do us any good. It is going to cost us a lot of money, and it is going to cost a lot of lives, and it is un-American. It is not constitutional. It is not moral. We should not pursue this type of foreign policy. We should take care of ourselves, and we should be more friendly with nations. We should be willing to trade. And if you are concerned about the world, why not set a good example? When our house is clean, when we have a good democracy and a worthy Republic, and we do well, believe me, they will want to emulate us.

But attacking and intimidating other nations, the way we go at it now, literally backfires on us. What is it doing to the dissidents, those who would love to overthrow the Islamic radicals in Iran right now? It unifies them. Did we become unified in this country when we were attacked on 9/11? Do you think Republicans and Democrats were divided on 9/11 and 9/12? No, it brings them together. So this policy does exactly the opposite of what you pretend that you want to do, and that is encourage those people who don't like their government. But by doing it this way, you literally are doing the very opposite.

So I just plead with you to be more cautious. Negroponte says there is no rush. Take some time. They are not about to have a nuclear weapon. And



whether or not that is their plan or not probably at this moment is irrelevant. I mean, if we stood down all these nations and all these nuclear weapons in the past, why can't we practice more diplomacy to resolve our differences. I was talking to somebody the other day and they said, well, maybe in 10 years they might have a nuclear weapon, so we must act now. Get the bombs ready. They are talking about a nuclear attack on Iran in order to stop them from producing a nuclear bomb. It is time to step back and look at the policy. The policy of nonintervention and peaceful relations with the world and peaceful trade is the American way to go, and it will lead to peace and prosperity.

I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. EMERSON). The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5¾ minutes.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the gentleman from Texas for his very calm and patient approach to this. I don't think the American people want our Nation set on a path of war with Iran, and I believe the American people are very concerned about the steps which set us on a path to war against Iraq. There are questions that have to be answered by this administration before Congress should rightfully even vote on this.

You know, it has been reported recently that U.S. troops are conducting military operations in Iran. In Iran. Now, if that is true, then apparently the administration has made a decision to commit U.S. military forces to a unilateral conflict with Iran, even before direct or indirect negotiations with the Government of Iran have been attempted, without U.N. support and without authorization from this Congress.

First things first here. Where are we right now? Are we already inside Iran? According to Seymour Hersh, in the New Yorker, there is evidence that suggests that we are. The presence of U.S. troops in Iran would constitute a hostile act against that country.

Now, put that in the context of this particular bill. At a time when diplomacy is urgently needed, this bill would escalate an international crisis that is already percolating by the probability or at least the possibility that this administration has already committed troops to Iran. What we are seeing here is an undermining of any attempt to negotiate with the Government of Iran, and we are seeing the undermining of any diplomatic efforts at the U.N.

I said this before and I will say it again. Any kind of saber rattling against Iran puts our troops in Iraq at jeopardy. The achievement of stability in transition to Iraqi security control will be compromised, reversing any progress that has been cited by the administration.

I am sure that many Americans are saying, you know, it is hard to believe

that the United States could have already taken such an imprudent decision as committing troops to Iran, but we have had a number and variety of sources confirming this. Over a week ago Air Force Colonel Sam Gardner related on CNN that the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA, Aliasghar Soltaniyeh, reported to him that Iranians have captured dissident forces who have confessed to working with U.S. troops in Iran. Earlier that week, Seymour Hersh reported that a U.S. source told him that U.S. Marines were operating in the Baluchi, Azeri and Kurdish regions of Iran.

Now, any kind of military deployment in Iran would and should constitute an urgent matter of national significance. And I think that the administration has an obligation to this Congress, before Congress would vote on this kind of a bill, to tell us exactly what is going on with the activities of American forces with regard to Iran.

Also, there are reports that the U.S. is fomenting opposition and supporting military operations in Iran among insurgent groups and Iranian ethnic minority groups, some of whom are operating from Iraq. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, PEJAK, is one such group, and the other group is called the MEK, the Mujahedin e-Khalq. It is an Iranian antigovernment group which was listed as a terrorist group by the State Department since 1997. An article by Jim Lobe, published in antiwar.com, on February 11, 2005, claims that the Pentagon civilians in Vice President CHENEY's office are among those in the U.S. Government who support MEK. We also know from the Hersh article in the New Yorker which confirms that U.S. troops are establishing contact with antigovernment ethnic minority groups in Iran.

Now, U.S. support for insurgent activity in Iran would not be tolerable. The administration has claimed numerous times that the object of the so-called war on terrorism is to target lawless insurgent groups. It would be a breach of trust if the administration is involved in this. Iran does not present an imminent threat. Any setting the stage for an attack on Iran is setting the stage for a unilateral act of war.

I think that this country needs to move very slowly anytime we are setting the stage for conflict with another nation. Don't we have enough problems in Iraq to clean up without setting the stage for another conflict in Iran? We must use diplomacy. We must use our relationships with Russia and China and other nations in order to avert a conflict with Iran.

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I heard our colleague thank Mr. PAUL of Texas for being calm and patient. I don't know how much more patient we can be with a country that supports international terrorism as Iran does.

Let me point out, this bill does not authorize the use of force. It does not

authorize the use of force. We can say it over and over again. That is clearly not getting through. But this country, we are talking about Iran, is bent on the destruction of our ally Israel, bent on the destruction of our ally Israel and the interests of the United States in that region.

This is a peaceful way to help resolve this issue. It will restrict access to reserves by the mullahs in Iran to pursue development of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. So, Madam Speaker, once again, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle see the wisdom of this legislation that is seen as well in the Senate, and the President understands the wisdom of this legislation and signs it into law.

I yield the balance of my time to my friend, Mr. PENCE.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. PENCE. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding and for his strong leadership on the international stage today and at other times in his career.

To the gentlewoman from Florida who is in our thoughts and prayers today, ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, who authored the Iran Freedom Support Act, I express gratitude.

Mr. CROWLEY of New York just said it best. The bill we will consider today codifies U.S. sanctions on Iran and requires that they remain in place until Iran has verifiably dismantled its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons program. It does not, this legislation today does not authorize the use of force against Iran. It does a host of other things that represent economic sanctions. It supports independent human rights and peaceful prodemocracy forces within Iran.

But the Iran Freedom Support Act is the right bill at the right time. It is a strong diplomatic measure. The potential consequences of inaction could be catastrophic. Congress and this administration must act before it is too late, before our options are severely limited, and this diplomatic measure today, the Iran Freedom Support Act, is such a measure.

I ask my colleagues to render their overwhelming support of this legislation.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, Iran is the full ticket—a defiant rogue state, defined by the State Department as the world's most active—state sponsor of terrorism. Its ambition to develop weapons of mass destruction capabilities has been deliberate, deceptive, and long in the making.

U.S. policy has to date pursued a patient course of diplomacy including working with our allies, heeding the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and accepting ineffectual incentives.

However, diplomacy does not mean surrender and of the "constructive engagement", incentives, and inducements of the Iranian regime have been no more effective than Neville Chamberlain's famous failed policies of appeasement during World War II.

It is time for the U.S. and our allies to undertake the sacrifices required to deny Iran the political legitimacy, technology, materials, and financial resources to pursue its destructive policies—policies that threaten U.S. and global security.

It is our hope that H.R. 282 will serve as leverage for cooperation from those allies who claim to be concerned about the growing Iranian threat but who continue to invest billions in Iran's energy sector and continue to assist Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

Ten years ago, the U.S. called on our European allies to take steps to deny Iran the financial resources to nuclear capabilities.

The U.S. also called on Russia and China to cease their support for Iran's nuclear and missile program.

These calls were ignored.

Then, four years ago, the Iran saga within the context of the IAEA begins.

According to multiple IAEA reports Iran's deceptions and breaches of its international obligations have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear cycle.

By September of 2004, as Iran resumed large-scale uranium conversion, then Secretary of State Colin Powell called for the Iran case to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions to be imposed.

That was not to be. The response from the international community was to offer Iran yet more incentives and to increase its investments in Iran's energy sector.

Every step along the way, Iran has demonstrated contempt for the IAEA and has mocked the international community.

In fact, Iran's former nuclear negotiator recently boasted: "When we were negotiating with the Europeans in Tehran we were still installing some of the equipment at the Isfahan site . . . In reality, by creating a same situation, we could finish Isfahan."

That is but a microcosm of how concessions and inaction—inaction including the failure to implement U.S. laws such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act—have only served to embolden the Iranian regime and increase the threat Iran poses to U.S. national security interests and global stability.

Just in the last few months, Iran: Resumed its nuclear efforts, removing the IAEA seals on uranium conversion plants; announced it could successfully use biotechnology for its nuclear program, thereby improving its capacity to build nuclear weapons; called for Israel to be wiped off the map; Iran's Defense Minister said that it is "Iran's absolute right to have access to nuclear arms . . ."; Iran is identified by U.S. military commanders as the source of some of the IEDs being used in terrorist attacks in Iraq; Iran's leader announces that Iran would inflict "harm and pain" on the U.S.

Just over a week ago, Iran's so-called president announces that Iran has an indigenous capability to enrich uranium and that it continues to pursue a more sophisticated technology, P-2 centrifuges, that could speed Iran's path to nuclear weapons.

Just yesterday, Iran's Grand Ayatollah underscored that Iran would share nuclear technology with other Islamic nations.

This announcement was made during a meeting with Sudan's brutal leader where the Ayatollah praised the Sudanese regime's policies.

This clearly indicates that the Iranian threat is more than just about its nuclear pursuits.

This is a repressive regime that denies the Iranian people the most fundamental freedoms.

It is a regime that, since the infamous day in November 1979 when the U.S. embassy was overrun by Iranian radicals and Americans were taken hostage and held for 444 days, has increasingly viewed terrorism as a legitimate means to further its ideological and strategic aims.

Iran provides Hezbollah with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons that have been estimated by some at more than \$80 million per year.

Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon.

Hezbollah has also been linked to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the Embassy annex, in Beirut in 1984.

Iran is directly linked to the June 1996 truck bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia.

Iran has used Hezbollah to assert a global reach that has extended into the Western Hemisphere. We witnessed the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center, also in Buenos Aires.

In December 2001, Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counter-terrorism official, detailed the beginning of al-Qaeda's links with Iran.

Levitt noted: "According to U.S. intelligence reports, Osama bin Laden's operatives approached Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, MOIS, agents in 1995 and again in 1996, offering to join forces against America."

He added: "In fact, phone records obtained by U.S. officials investigating the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that 10 percent of the calls from the Compact-M satellite phone used by bin Laden and his key lieutenants were to Iran."

Testimony from defendants in the Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings, indicate that Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, have had strategic meetings throughout the years in Sudan and elsewhere.

This is just the tip of the iceberg.

There is still time to contain the threat posed by Iran and adopt short and long-term policies that will compel Iran to change its unacceptable behavior.

H.R. 282 provides such a response.

Briefly, this bill: Codifies U.S. sanctions on Iran and requires that they remain in place until Iran has verifiably dismantled its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs; amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA, including by enlarging the number of entities that would be subject to sanctions, limiting its application to Iran, and eliminating the expiration date of the law; requires that the names of all individuals, governments and companies that have invested a total of at least \$20 million in Iran's energy sector be published in the Federal Register; denies U.S. assistance to countries that are invested in Iran's energy sector; authorizes the President to provide U.S. assistance to peaceful pro-democracy and human rights groups in Iran and for independent broadcasts into Iran.

We must use all available political and economic means to truly make Iran pay for its behavior, and to leverage for cooperation from our allies and convince them to deny Iran the resources to continue along this track.

We must act before it is too late and our options are severely limited.

I ask my colleagues to render their overwhelming support to this legislation.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Madam Speaker, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Foreign Trade Council, Coalition for Employment Through Exports and USAEngage yesterday distributed to members a very cogent description of some of the reasons to oppose H.R. 282. I recommend that members review it.

Hon. JIM McDERMOTT,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

Re H.R. 282, Iran Sanctions Act.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN McDERMOTT: Our organizations write in opposition to the Iran Sanctions Act, H.R. 282, which has been placed on the House suspension calendar for this week. While we recognize the serious concerns raised by the current regime in Iran, we are concerned that the changes which have been proposed to the U.S. sanctions program would hinder, not help, our efforts to address the situation. Specifically, these changes would remove the vital flexibility of U.S. sanctions policy, drive a wedge between U.S. and our allies in the on-going joint efforts to influence the Iranian regime, increase the involvement of courts in U.S. foreign policy, and discourage foreign investment in the United States. We urge you to oppose passage of H.R. 282 when it comes up under suspension of the rules this week to allow for fuller and more informed consideration over the negative consequences of these changes to U.S. law.

In particular, we note the following concerns with the current bill as it was ordered reported by the House International Relations Committee on March 15:

The bill would remove the extremely useful periodic review of the Iran sanctions regime by removing the sunset provision included in the earlier Iran Libya Sanctions Act. Sunset provisions are vital to creating an effective sanctions regime as they permit Congress to review sanctions to ensure that they are effective and useful over time. Congress engaged in a useful debate over reforms in Iran when sanctions up for renewal in 2001 and it is important that Members allow for such a debate in the future.

H.R. 282 would make the United States more vulnerable to international commercial complaints and damage U.S. global financial leadership by greatly expanding the entities subject to sanctions to include insurers, creditors and foreign subsidiaries. The United States would undoubtedly face complaints and lawsuits from our trading partners questioning their legality. It would also stoke "economic nationalism," which may seriously disrupt vital U.S. business overseas.

The capital market sanctions contained in H.R. 282 would discourage foreign investment in the United States and could potentially damage U.S. business interests abroad. By requiring publication of the names of entities that have investments in violation of the sanctions, ordering a report by an office of the Security and Exchange Commission, and encouraging divestment of stocks, H.R. 282 sends a negative signal to foreign companies interested in investing in the United States. This bill encourages global companies to avoid investments in the United States by leaving them exposed to potential capital market sanctions. Foreign governments may also seek to retaliate against U.S. firms abroad based on their own political motivations.

H.R. 282 would hinder the flexibility of the President to conduct foreign policy. The bill would require the President to direct the Treasury Department to initiate investigations into the potential for sanctioning firms investing in Iran and would require the President to determine to impose sanctions

on such entities within 360 days. This provision would also apply retroactively, requiring sanctions determinations on pending investigations of prior investments within ninety days of enactment. If the President chose to waive the sanctions, which is possible under an inadequately narrow provision in this bill, he would be required to renew that waiver every six months. This policy of requiring investigations and sanctions determinations on each and every past and future investment in Iran by a person described in the Act would severely restrict the Administration's flexibility to conduct foreign policy in ways that can adapt to complex, changing circumstances.

Finally, we encourage Congress and the House International Relations Committee to rethink the sanctions regime in light of their serious unintended impact on the people of Iran and our own ability to forge vital international alliances. When we hear of reports like those raised in the March 15 hearing of the Committee on International Relations—about the difficulties that humanitarian organizations have had operating to relieve suffering by earthquake victims—it seems appropriate to take a closer look at whether there might be a better way for the United States to address the serious concerns raised by the policies of the Iranian government.

At the very least, we hope that there will be an opportunity to hold a fuller debate over the proposed radical changes to the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, and therefore respectfully request that you vote against H.R. 282.

Respectfully submitted,

USA\*Engage.

Coalition for Employment Through Exports.

National Foreign Trade Council.

U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, several years ago we discovered that Iran was operating a secret program to enrich uranium and carry out other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.

Iran's failure to report these activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency was a blatant violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The more we have learned about Iran's nuclear program in the intervening months, the more obvious it's become that Tehran's true intention is not peaceful power generation, but the development of a nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States, our allies in the Middle East, and any other part of the world within the range of Iran's increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles.

Any seeds of doubt on the purpose of Iran's nuclear activities were dispelled once and for all by their outright rejection of a sensible proposal offered by our European allies and, more recently, Iran's resumption of uranium enrichment in defiance of the international community.

The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made the urgency of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that much greater.

His messianic world view, vocal support for "wiping Israel off the map," and close ties to Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations make the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran truly unimaginable.

Everyone hopes we can find a diplomatic solution to this crisis, and the IAEA's recent decision to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council was a long-overdue step in the right direction.

But tough words must be backed by tough action, and we have got to keep the pressure

on Russia and China to support meaningful measures that will cause the Iranian regime to reevaluate the wisdom of its current course.

And, through this legislation before us today, we must push our own Executive Branch to enforce the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, legislation passed by Congress back in 1996 to deter investment in Iran's oil and gas sector.

By requiring the President to impose sanctions on foreign firms that continue to invest in Iran, we hoped to starve the Iranian regime of hard currency necessary to pursue nuclear weapons and support terrorism.

In the months after ILSA was signed into law, there were strong indications that it was having the intended deterrent effect.

But then, in an effort to avoid offending our allies, the Clinton Administration made a decision not to enforce the law—a shortsighted policy continued by President Bush.

H.R. 282 would close a legal loophole that has allowed the State Department to sit on investigations for years without making a determination, one way or the other, if a foreign firm has in fact made an investment in Iran.

Madam Speaker, this legislation won't make Iran's nuclear program go away, but it is an important step in the right direction, and—with 360 cosponsors—sends a clear signal that Congress is extremely concerned about this critical matter.

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me today in supporting H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act.

I want to thank Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN and Mr. LANTOS for drafting this bill that has gathered great support from our colleagues to address the urgent and problematic situation in Iran.

This bill will extend and strengthen existing sanctions designed to cut off funds Iran could use for its illicit atomic programs.

Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the past three years have turned up evidence that Iran has been pursuing nuclear technology for nearly two decades. Despite recent rulings by the IAEA Board of Governors that found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, and a presidential statement last month by the United Nations Security Council that called upon Iran to reinstitute its voluntary suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, Iran has stated that it will continue development of its nuclear program.

The U.S. and our allies cannot stand by and watch Iran develop nuclear capabilities, and this legislation is just a first step in what must be done to address this problem.

A state that has vowed to continue supporting terrorist activity against the West and the U.S., has openly stated that Israel must be wiped off the map, and has threatened to retaliate to international pressure and sanctions by giving nuclear technology to other states, must be dealt with before it has a robust nuclear program.

Iran's pursuit for weapons of mass destruction—and nuclear technology in particular—along with its outright support for international terrorism require a strong response from our government.

Passing H.R. 282 is a first step in addressing this urgent situation, and I ask my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.

Ms. HARRIS. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support

Act. For more than two decades the Iranian regime has displayed its contempt for the rule of law by willingly and aggressively breaching its international obligations, in pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The incendiary remark made by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, that Israel is a "fake regime [that] can not logically continue to live," underscores the importance of this measure.

H.R. 282 denies technical assistance and financial resources to the regime of President Ahmadinejad, and strengthens sanctions against those who would facilitate the development of a covert nuclear program in Iran. This bill sends a clear and unambiguous message to Iran that their behavior is unacceptable.

The overwhelming 37–3 vote by which this measure passed the International Relations Committee exemplifies the bipartisan nature of the issue.

Madam Speaker, with the proliferation of nuclear weaponry at issue, there is neither room for error, nor for mixed signals. The price to be paid for inaction or indecision is beyond consideration. This legislation is a measured, responsible demonstration of our commitment to ensuring the freedom of Iranians and Americans alike.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I am attaching an exchange of letters between Chairman HYDE and Chairmen DAVIS, THOMAS, MCKEON and OXLEY concerning the bill H.R. 282 "The Iran Freedom Support Act" for printing in the RECORD.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,  
Washington, DC, April 13, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding with respect to consideration of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act, which the Committee on International Relations ordered reported on April 13, 2006. In the bill as ordered reported by your Committee, section 206, specifically the provisions providing Senses of Congress urging U.S. government pension plan and thrift savings plan managers to take certain actions (section 206(c) and (d)) and the provision requiring certain disclosures by managers of U.S. government pension plans and thrift savings plans (section 206(e)) are within the jurisdiction of the Government Reform Committee.

I thank you for your agreement to support the removal of section 206(e) from the bill and to modify sections 206(c) and (d) with the addition of language recognizing the fiduciary duties of U. S. government pension plan managers, as you work to move this important legislation forward. Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and your willingness to work with us regarding pension issues, I will not request a sequential referral of this legislation to the Committee on Government Reform. However, I only do so with the understanding that this procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the Committee on Government Reform's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my Committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I would expect Members of the Committee on Government Reform be appointed to the conference committee on these provisions.

Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

TOM DAVIS,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, April 13, 2006.

Hon. TOM DAVIS,  
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur with your assessment that Section 206 of the bill, as ordered reported by the Committee on International Relations, which deals with United States Pension Plans, falls within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Government Reform—specifically Section 206(e), which requires certain disclosures by managers of U.S. government pension plans. In addition, the Senses of Congress contained in Sections 206 (c) and (d), urging U.S. government pension plan managers to take certain actions, are also within the jurisdiction of your Committee.

I thank you for your agreement to support moving this important legislation forward. Based on our discussions, this Committee will remove Section 206(e) from the bill, modify Sections 206 (c) and (d), and add language recognizing the fiduciary duties of pension plan managers. I appreciate your willingness to forego seeking a sequential referral of this legislation. I understand your willingness to do so does not in any way prejudice the Committee on Government Reform's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the future. Should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I will urge the Speaker to appoint members of the Committee on Government Reform to the conference committee.

As you requested, I will include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN HYDE: I am writing regarding H.R. 282, the "Iran Freedom Support Act," which the Committee on International Relations marked up on March 15, 2006.

As per the agreement between our Committees, to be included in a manager's amendment to H.R. 282, the amended bill would modify the language in Section 101(a) so that the import sanctions contained in Executive Order 12959 may remain in effect under the terms of the Executive Order but would not be codified by this bill. In addition, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the reported bill will remain in the amended version. These sections would change current law by striking the statutory option the President currently has to ban imports against both Iran and Libya.

Because all of these provisions have the effect of modifying and altering the applica-

tion of an import ban, they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. However, in order to expedite this legislation for floor consideration, the Committee will forgo action on this bill. This is being done with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 282, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in your Committee report.

Best regards,

BILL THOMAS,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.

Hon. WILLIAM M. THOMAS,  
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing regarding H.R. 282, the "Iran Freedom Support Act," which the Committee on International Relations marked up on March 15, 2006.

As per the agreement between our Committees, I will include in the manager's amendment to H.R. 282 language which would modify the text in Section 101(a) so that the import sanctions contained in Executive Order 12959 may remain in effect under the terms of the Executive Order but would not be codified by this bill. In addition, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the reported bill will remain in the amended version. These sections would change current law by striking the statutory option the President currently has to ban imports against both Iran and Libya.

I concur that these provisions have the effect of modifying and altering the application of an import ban and, therefore, they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. I appreciate your willingness to assist in expediting this legislation by foregoing action on this bill. This is being done with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee on Ways and Means with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of this exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,  
Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill was ordered reported by the Committee on International Relations on March 15, 2006. Section 206, "United States pension plans", and section 207, "Report by Office of Global Security Risks", of the bill as ordered reported by your committee are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services under clause 1(g) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

Ordinarily, the Committee on Financial Services would be entitled to receive a sequential referral of the bill. However, I thank you for your agreement to support in moving this important legislation forward the removal of section 206(e) and section 207 from the bill and to modify section 206(b) by inserting the Secretary of State in lieu of the President. Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and your willingness to work with us regarding these issues, I will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation. However, I do so only with the understanding that this procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on Financial Services be appointed to the conference committee on these provisions.

Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL G. OXLEY,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.

Hon. MICHAEL G. OXLEY,  
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur that the bill, as ordered reported by the Committee on International Relations on March 15, 2006, contains language which falls within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services. Specifically, Section 206, "United States Pension Plans," and Section 207, "Report by Office of Global Security Risks," of the bill are within your Committee's jurisdiction.

Our two committees have reached agreement that, in the interest of moving this important legislation forward, the text of the bill which we will place in the manager's amendment will remove Section 206(e) and Section 207 from the bill and will modify Section 206(b) by inserting the "Secretary of State" in lieu of "the President." Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, I appreciate your willingness to work with us regarding these issues and to forego sequential referral of this legislation. I understand that by doing so, it should not be construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I will request the Speaker to name members of the Committee on Financial Services to the conference committee.

As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of this exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate

to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,  
*Chairman.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE,

Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
*Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN, I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. Section 206, United States Pension Plans, of the bill as ordered reported by your committee is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Workforce—specifically, section 206 (e), which requires certain disclosures by managers of private pension plans. In addition, the Senses of Congress contained in sections 206 (c) and (d) urge private pension plan managers to take certain actions and are also within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

I thank you for your agreement to support the removal of section 206 (e) from the bill and to modify sections 206 (c) and (d) with the addition of language recognizing the fiduciary duties of pension plan managers, as you work to move this important legislation forward. Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and your willingness to work with us regarding pension issues, I will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation. However, I do so only with the understanding that this procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the Committee on Education and the Workforce's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on Education and the Workforce be appointed to the conference committee on these provisions.

Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,  
*Chairman.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.

Hon. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,  
*Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur with your assessment that Section 206 of the bill, as ordered reported by the Committee on International Relations, which deals with United States Pension Plans, falls within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Workforce—specifically Section 206(e), which requires certain disclosures by managers of private pension plans. In addition, the Senses of Congress contained in Sections 206 (c) and (d), urging private pension plan managers to take certain actions, are also within the jurisdiction of your Committee.

I thank you for your agreement to support moving this important legislation forward. Based on our discussions, this Committee

will remove Section 206(e) from the bill, modify Sections 206 (c) and (d), and add language recognizing the fiduciary duties of pension plan managers. I appreciate your willingness to forgo seeking a sequential referral of this legislation. I understand your willingness to do so does not in any way prejudice the Committee on Education and the Workforce's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the future. Should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I will urge the Speaker to appoint members of the Committee on Education and the Workforce to the conference committee.

As you requested, I will include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,  
*Chairman.*

Mr. CARDIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill strengthens U.S. sanctions on Iran, and requires that they remain in place until Iran has dismantled its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs.

Iran is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which poses a threat to the national security of the United States and to the world. Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations to the international community, specifically the 1973 Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2002 the world learned that Iran was illegally continuing to develop a secret nuclear program, which has led to years of negotiations with the international community. Last August, however, the Iranian government resumed its conversion of uranium. In February the IAEA voted 27 to 3 to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for further action. In March the U.N. Security Council directed Iran to its nuclear activities. Iran defied the United Nations, and made an announcement that it had enriched uranium to reactor-grade levels, which is a precursor to the development of a nuclear bomb. This week the U.N. Security Council is meeting to evaluate Iran's behavior, and I urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to pressure Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.

I am pleased that the legislation today establishes mandatory sanctions for contributions to development of weapons, limits the President's flexibility to waive sanctions, authorizes funding to promote democracy activities in Iran, and supports efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Finally, this bill eliminates the sunset of sanctions against Iran, and requires them to remain in place until the President certifies that Iran has dismantled its WMD programs.

I am pleased that the United States has continued to work closely with the international community—including the European Union, Russia, and China—on this urgent matter. I urge the President to keep Congress fully and current informed on this matter, as called for in this resolution. I urge the international community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

We cannot allow a rogue nation such as Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran has actively supported terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has funded suicide bombers in Israel and militant organizations elsewhere.

Many of these terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) so that they can kill or injure thousands or even millions of people. The Iranian President has publicly expressed his hope for a world without America, his desire to wipe Israel off the map, and has denied the existence of the Holocaust.

Ms. LEE. Madam Speaker, although not a perfect bill, I plan to support H.R. 282 based on several important decisions I authored and that were included in the committee-passed bill. First, and most importantly, this bill includes my language explicitly stating that this bill in no way constitutes an authorization to use military force against Iran. Additionally, it includes my provision clarifying that none of the funds authorized for democracy promotion should be used to fund destabilizing activities against Iran. Moreover, in the report accompanying this legislation, I was able to include language aimed at ensuring that none of the funds authorized in this legislation are channeled to democracy promotion organizations that may in turn bankroll covert action against Iran.

My vote today in no way detracts from my vigilance regarding this administration and its reported interest in another preemptive strike—this time against Iran. I have and will continue to strongly oppose the so-called doctrine of preemption and believe we must engage Iran in smart and tough diplomacy regarding its nuclear programs.

Mr. FARR. Madam Speaker, I am very concerned about Iran's nuclear power program. I am extremely opposed to any attempts by the Administration to preemptively strike Iran. We must work multilaterally to bring Iran back to the negotiation table and into compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty.

While the government of Iran continues to defy international pressure to conform to the NPT, unilateral military action against Iran is not the solution. The repercussions and unintended consequences of a U.S. military attack on Iran are terrifying to contemplate. I personally do not believe that a military strike on Iran would advance U.S. or regional security. I am afraid it could create a backlash against the U.S. that would be a more serious threat than a nuclear Iran. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to debate the commitment of troops or military action, and the obligation to the American people to have an up or down vote before the Administration takes any steps towards military engagement.

The solution to the Iranian problem lies in diplomacy. The Administration needs to work with other members of the U.N. Security Council and gain a strong coalition of support for a diplomatic solution. I urge my colleagues to join me in calling on the Administration to find peaceful means of ensuring Iran's compliance with the NPT.

Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of Iran Freedom Support Act, H.R. 282. I am a cosponsor of this important legislation because I remain deeply troubled by the current regime and situation in Iran.

It is long past time for the House to address the security challenge posed to the world community and our allies in the Middle East by the current regime in Iran. The hateful and threatening comments made by the President of Iran against Israel cannot be tolerated. Further, the provocative actions taken by Iran to

further their nuclear weapons program must be stopped. A nuclear Iran would destabilize the region and threaten the United States and our allies. We must use every tool at our disposal today to end Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran must change its way.

This important legislation would codify bilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran and strengthens third-party sanctions through amendments to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. H.R. 282 would make the removal of these sanctions contingent upon a Presidential certification that Iran no longer poses a threat to the national security of the United States, its interests, or allies. It would also require the Administration to report to Congress on countries cooperating (or not) with U.S. efforts to forge a multilateral Iran sanctions regime. The bill would also provide U.S. assistance to pro-democracy groups in Iran and to independent broadcasts into Iran from abroad.

I was troubled when I read the recent reports about the Administration seriously considering a nuclear attack on Iran. While I strongly oppose Iran's efforts to create a nuclear weapons program, it would be unconscionable to use nuclear weapons in an attempt to eliminate their program. The President must reassure the world that America remains a responsible world power. He must state unambiguously that the United States will never use nuclear weapons in a first strike against Iran or any other sovereign nation.

H.R. 282 is in keeping with United States priorities to address the multiple threats posed by the Iranian regime, as well as with our goal to bring peace and stability to the people of the Middle East. I support this important legislation.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I would like to include the following article, which I referenced on the floor, in the RECORD of the debate on H.R. 282, the "Iran Freedom Support Act."

[From the Asia Times, March 30, 2006]

NEO-CON CABAL BLOCKED 2003 NUCLEAR TALKS  
(By Gareth Porter)

WASHINGTON.—The George W. Bush administration failed to enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in May 2003 because neo-conservatives who advocated destabilization and regime change were able to block any serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to former administration officials.

The same neo-conservative veto power also prevented the administration from adopting any official policy statement on Iran, those same officials said.

Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to secretary of state Colin Powell, said the failure to adopt a formal Iran policy in 2002-03 was the result of obstruction by a "secret cabal" of neo-conservatives in the administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney. "The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with Tehran," Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to Inter Press Service (IPS). The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S. concerns about its nuclear program, although it made no specific concession in advance of the talks, according to Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior director for Middle East Affairs.

Iran's offer also raised the possibility of cutting off Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organization, accord-

ing to Leverett. That was an explicit response to Powell's demand in late March that Iran "end its support for terrorism".

In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the U.S. to address security questions, the lifting of economic sanctions and normalization of relations, including support for Iran's integration into the global economic order.

Leverett also recalls that the Iranian offer was drafted with the blessing of all the major political players in the Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini.

Realists, led by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer. Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed on the offer.

Exactly how the decision was made is not known. "As with many of these issues of national security decision-making, there are no fingerprints," Wilkerson told IPS. "But I would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W. Bush."

As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's "grand bargain" initiative was a result of the administration's inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.

A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of inter-agency coordination for more than a year, according to a source who asked to remain unidentified.

But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD, the source recalled, because officials in Cheney's office and in under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and kept trying to amend it.

Opponents of the neo-conservative policy line blame Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, for the failure of the administration to override the extremists in the administration. The statutory policymaker process on Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in an e-mail, was "managed by a national security adviser incapable of standing up to the cabal . . ."

In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-02. They believed Iran could be helpful in stabilizing postconflict Iraq, because the Iraqi Shi'ite militants whom they expected to return from Iran after Saddam Hussein's overthrow owed some degree of allegiance to Iran.

The neo-conservatives tried to block those meetings on tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. "They were saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't want to owe them," he recalled.

Nevertheless, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (now envoy in Iraq) was authorized to begin meeting secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq. The neo-conservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking al-Oaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.

Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002 of refusing to share any information with Iran on al-Oaeda or other terrorist organizations.

On May 3, 2003, as the Iranian "grand bargain" proposal was on its way to Wash-

ington, Tehran's representative in Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue, according to Leverett: if the U.S. gave Iran the names of the cadres of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) who were being held by U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the U.S. the names of the al-Oaeda operatives they had detained.

The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory during the Hussein regime and had been named a terrorist organization by the U.S. But it had capitulated to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neo-conservatives now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to destabilize the Iranian regime.

The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative draft NSPD drawn up by neo-conservatives in the administration.

The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the liking of the Israeli Embassy.

(Franklin eventually pleaded guilty to passing classified information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.)

Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News reported on May 30, 2003, that the Pentagon was calling for the destabilization of the Iranian government by "using all available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services of the Mujahideen-e Khalq . . ."

Nevertheless, Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK should not be repatriated to Iran. "I have it on good authority," Leverett told IPS, "that Bush's initial reaction was, 'But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist.'" Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the Iranian proposal.

By the end of May, the neo-conservatives had succeeded in closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the Franklin indictment, Franklin told an Israeli Embassy officer in October that work on the NSPD had been stopped.

But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic contact between Iran and the U.S., the neo-conservatives had a clear path to raising tensions and building political support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United States.

Ms. SCHWARTZ of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Freedom Support Act.

Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for international terrorist organizations, and abhorrent human rights practices pose one of the greatest threats to global security.

Further, the Iranian government has made clear its intentions toward the United States. Six months ago, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that a world without the United States is a "possible goal and slogan". This is not a veiled threat and we must take him seriously.

Our greatest responsibility is the safety and security of the American people. As such, we must employ every option at our disposal to ensure that Mr. Ahmadinejad's stated goals remain unattainable.

The Iran Freedom Support Act takes a responsible and sensible approach—tightening and codifying economic sanctions against the Iranian regime. It will hinder Iran's ability to acquire nuclear weapons and fund terrorist groups and it will send a clear signal to the



Iranian regime that it will be held accountable for its threatening behavior.

The United States must also continue to push the United Nations Security Council for strong action to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the meantime, it is our job to take meaningful steps to eliminate the threats posed by Iran. And that is why I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Miss. McMORRIS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I applaud this bi-partisan effort by Congress to address the increasing threat posed to our country and world by Iran.

Many defense experts have predicted that we face no greater threat from a single country than from Iran. Iran's leaders, including Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have continuously called for the destruction of Israel, rejected overtures from the world community, including the United Nations, supported international terrorism, and continued to advance their nuclear program with the announcement on April 11 that Iran had successfully enriched fuel-grade uranium.

All of these actions are unacceptable. We would be remiss to ignore a country that perilously threatens our allies and the security of the world while simultaneously seeking to advance its unsupervised nuclear capabilities. We must not allow Iran to bully the world or our allies or fail to show Iran that we will take their irresponsible and careless behavior seriously.

H.R. 282 will help support democracy while taking a firm stance against the radical and reckless leaders of Iran and those that would support them. At this time, supporting democracy in Iran is an important ingredient to resolving this situation peacefully. One of my top priorities in Congress is to ensure our national security, and I support H.R. 282 as an important step in combating the rising risk of Iran.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Madam Speaker, I rise today in reluctant opposition to H.R. 282, the Iran sanction bill. If this bill was only about imposing targeted sanctions against the Iranian regime, or companies and countries who invest in Iran, I could support it. In fact, I voted in favor of the original Iran sanctions bill when it was approved in 1996, and I voted to extend the bill when it came up for renewal in 2001.

Unfortunately, the bill on the floor today does not just extend or expand sanctions against Iran and those doing business with that country; it also establishes a U.S. policy in favor of regime change in Iran. Therefore, I am extremely concerned that H.R. 282 is the first step in taking our country down the same misguided path that was taken with Iraq. The Iranian exile groups that would likely benefit from the provisions in this bill to support groups seeking regime change in Iran eerily echo Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress. You may recall that Chalabi's INC worked with the Bush administration to mislead Congress and the American people about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction in order to gain support for toppling Saddam Hussein using U.S. forces.

It is my hope that as this bill continues through the legislative process, it will be amended to focus on sanctions and diplomacy rather than U.S. sponsored regime change. I believe that sanctions should be targeted at foreign investment in Iran, which would force Iranian leaders to choose between a growing economy and their desire for nuclear weap-

ons. Sanctions could also be targeted at Iran's leaders by freezing their assets and imposing travel bans. Targeted sanctions can ratchet up the pressure on Iran's leaders without harming or alienating the Iranian people.

Mr. SHAYS. Madam Speaker, when Iran will have a nuclear weapon is not the right question. Rather, we need to focus on when Iran will have the indigenous capability to produce nuclear fissile materials. This is the point of no return and should be our benchmark regarding the urgency of addressing Iran's behavior.

It is an undisputed fact Iran is pursuing nuclear capabilities. It is a fact Iran is the world's most egregious exporter of terrorism. And we all heard for ourselves when Iran's president threatened to "wipe Israel off the map" and when Ayatollah Khamenei, just yesterday, told another one of the world's worst human rights abusers, Sudan, that Iran would gladly transfer nuclear technology. When one considers these points together, it becomes clear how important it is we act today.

Some residents of Connecticut's Fourth Congressional district have already expressed concern to me about the United States' consideration of the use of force against Iran to eliminate its nuclear weapons program and end its state support of terrorism. Such action, while not off the table, must be an absolute last resort. That is why it is so critical our government utilize the tools at our disposal including economic and diplomatic sanctions and the appropriate distribution of foreign aid as suggested in this bill, to deter the threat Iran poses to global security. It is also appropriate for us impose pressure on the other nations of the world who prop up the Iranian government and the extremists at its helm by investing heavily in that nation.

While I understand the concern the Administration has expressed that by passing this bill we are tying its hands to conduct foreign policy, I would be more sympathetic if it were doing more to enforce the laws Congress has already passed.

The International Relations Committee states in the report accompanying this legislation that, "the laws which have been enacted, as enforced, and other steps taken by current and past Administrations, have proven inadequate . . . Specifically with respect to ILSA, the Committee is deeply dismayed that the current Administration, like the prior Administration, has not acted to sanction a single enterprise for investing in Iran, but has delayed its decisions on 'alleged' investments well past the point of failing the 'laugh test.'"

Given the extreme rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, I do not expect this legislation will bring an immediate change to Iran's aggressive and ill-advised march to acquire nuclear capabilities. It does send an important message, however, that the United States will not stand by as Iran pursues its nuclear ambitions and threatens international security.

The bottom line is, in defiance of its assurances to the contrary, Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program. The United States must be unequivocal in its rejection of these ambitions.

I urge support of this legislation and appreciate the leadership of Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS to bring it to the floor today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.

PENCE) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 282, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

□ 1245

#### PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5020, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 774 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 774

*Resolved*, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such amendments are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the