

building new infrastructure. Because so many young people want to raise families in the five boroughs, we are forced to foot the bill for building more schools.

Our new burden in New York is to manage the success of Jane Jacobs' vision of a vibrant, dense, growing, exciting city.

And for that, we owe Jane Jacobs a debt of gratitude.

IN HONOR OF THE GRAND OPENING OF LONOKE COUNTY SAFE HAVEN, INC.

**HON. MARION BERRY**

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, April 26, 2006*

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I rise here today to celebrate the grand opening of Lonoke County Safe Haven, Inc., an organization that provides critical resources to victims of domestic violence. This center will give women and their children a place to turn during difficult times and is a valuable addition to our community.

Lonoke County Safe Haven, Inc. was founded in March 2005 after J.M. Park read an article about a domestic violence victim. The article inspired Park and others to create a program where domestic violence victims can access vital recovery services. The organization began to help victims in September 2005, providing services such as a helpline, court advocacy, information on county, state, and federal resources, and recommendations for local shelters.

Today's grand opening is a significant step for Lonoke County Safe Haven, Inc. and a great milestone for our community. The new center, directed by Teresa Sims, will give battered women and their children throughout Lonoke County a place to seek assistance from dangerous living conditions. The center will provide services from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., with hopes of one day expanding into a shelter of its own. The organization is already recognized by the Arkansas Coalition Against Domestic Violence for its work to strengthen the support system for battered women and their children.

On April 17, 2006, our community will gather to celebrate the grand opening of the Lonoke County Safe Haven, Inc. I ask my colleagues to join me in expressing our appreciation for this center and for all of the individuals committed to making Lonoke County a safer place for women and children.

INTRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT AND NATIONAL GUARD EMPOWERMENT ACT OF 2006

**HON. TOM DAVIS**

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, April 26, 2006*

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006.

In support of this proposal, consider the following:

The U.S. continues to face a wide spectrum of threats at home and abroad, including terrorism, natural disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other emerging perils. In meeting these threats, the U.S. relies heavily on the men and women of the National Guard. The National Guard is a force essential to the Nation's security and safety.

At no time in America's history has the National Guard played so critical a role in the security of our homeland and in our Nation's military objectives abroad.

The National Guard is a critical component of Department of Defense's contribution to the security of our Nation and has been key to the Department's accomplishments at home and abroad. Much of the success DOD has had would not have been possible without the participation of National Guard forces.

The National Guard's response to our Nation's emergencies in the post 9/11 world has been unparalleled.

The National Guard is a vital part of this Nation's security, and this country relies on the exemplary service provided this Nation by the members of the Guard, their families, their employers and their communities.

The men and women of the National Guard have earned the right to be represented at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.

To ensure the appropriate representation, manpower, training and equipment are provided to the National Guard for their future missions at home and abroad, the National Defense and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006:

Establishes the National Guard Bureau NGB as a joint activity of the Department of Defense rather than strictly of the Departments of the Army and Air Force as it is now.

Increases the Chief of the National Guard Bureau billet from the grade of Lieutenant General to General.

Tasks the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to serve as an advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and eliminates the current National Guard major general position established for that function.

Provides a seat on Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Elevates responsibility for development of the NGB charter from the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to the Secretary of Defense.

Specifies in law one of the functions of NGB to facilitate the use of National Guard forces for contingencies, military operations other than war, natural disasters and support to civil authorities—all in coordination with the States. This function exists in policy as part of the current NGB charter from the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

Requires NGB to, in coordination with the State Adjutant Generals identify gaps between Federal and State emergency response capabilities which might best be filled through military assistance to civil authorities and to make recommendations for National Guard programs and capabilities to fill those gaps, in coordination with the States.

Charges the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the State Adjutant Generals, to validate state requirements for military assistance to civil authorities, develop doctrine and training requirements, and acquire materiel, etc. for this purpose, in coordination with the States.

Requires a report on requirements for military assistance to civilian authorities that are

validated but not funded—which in essence will become an unfunded requirements list.

Changes the titles of the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard to Vice Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau for Army and Air respectively to reflect the unity of purpose inside the organization.

Prohibits growth in the size of the NGB staff in order to answer concerns about the possibility of the NGB bureaucracy growing as a result of the changes sought herein.

Strengthens the Total Force talent pool by encouraging the Department of Defense to include Reserve Component major generals of the line for promotion to fill Lieutenant General positions.

Requires that the Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be a National Guard officer.

The Committee on Government Reform and the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, have conducted oversight investigations and have held many hearings that have focused on the contributions of the men and women of the National Guard. The following are findings that I submit for the RECORD. These 50 findings represent the States in the Union we seek to defend.

1. Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center, 1,500 New York National Guard troops reported for duty. Within 24 hours of the attacks, over 8,000 New York National Guard Soldiers and Air men and women were on active duty supporting New York State's security needs. These troops provided not just a calming presence on the streets of New York during unsettling times; they provided New York's first responders with critical perimeter security support, refueling for civilian emergency vehicles, emergency lighting, power generation, communications, emergency transportation, engineering assets and other logistical support.

2. At the request of the President, State Governors supplemented the security of the Nation's airports with National Guard personnel. Their missions encompassed over 400 airports in 52 States and territories. National Guard troops along the northern and southern borders were used to support the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol in the heightened post 9/11 security posture.

3. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew, 1992, in which National Guard forces constituted 24 percent of the military response, National Guard forces represented more than 70 percent of the military force for Hurricane Katrina.

4. The response to Hurricane Katrina proved that the National Guard is the Nation's first military responder and that the overwhelming majority of forces that respond to disasters in the United States will be National Guard who will be on the scene before the Department of Defense is requested to respond.

5. More than 9,700 National Guard soldiers and airmen were in New Orleans by August 30. National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the storms passing. In wake of the Hurricane Katrina devastation, the National Guard mobilized over 50,000 personnel in support of hurricane relief in the largest and fastest domestic deployment since World War II, saving over 17,000 lives. The Air National Guard flew nearly 3,500 flights and over 12,000 tons of cargo in support of all Hurricane relief in the last year.

6. The National Guard Bureau will be a part of any large-scale emergency response. As demonstrated during the Hurricane Katrina response, the National Guard Bureau is a significant joint force provider for homeland security missions.

7. The National Guard is continuously on active duty supporting State security missions, Federal security missions under Operation Noble Eagle and overseas military operations as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and more are engaged in regularly scheduled training and operational requirements around the Nation and the world. Under Title 32, counter-drug activities are a daily operational mission of the National Guard, fortifying a longstanding successful relationship with civil authorities.

8. The Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force could not fulfill current title 10 responsibilities without the Army and Air National Guard. In 2005, National Guard units at one time made up 50 percent of the combat forces in Iraq.

9. The National Guard has mobilized over 340,000 soldiers and 46,000 airmen supporting the Global War on Terror since September 11, 2001.

10. Since September 11, 2001, more than 85 percent of the Army National Guard has been mobilized. Since September 11, 2001, the Air National Guard has flown over 226,000 sorties accumulating over 680,000 flying hours. These deployments abroad have created a battle hardened and seasoned force of experienced veterans ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

11. National Guard forces have provided: 55 percent of the Army's combat capability; 55 percent of the Air Force's airlift capability; 50 percent of the Army strategic and tactical manpower; 45 percent of all in-flight refueling missions; 33 percent of all aircraft in Operation Iraqi Freedom; 100 percent of Operation Enduring Freedom A-10 missions; 66 percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom A-10 missions; 45 percent of all F-16 fighter missions; 86 percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom tanker sorties; 94 percent of Strategic Air Defense Alert; and 75 percent of all domestic combat air patrols in the Global War on Terror.

12. The National Guard offers unique efficiencies between State and Federal, and domestic and overseas missions, operating under three different command relationships: Federal funding and Federal control; Federal funding and State control; and State funding and State control.

13. National Guardsmen and women are their State's primary emergency response force, providing support in their communities and to civil authorities and other first responders throughout their States.

14. The National Guard is invaluable to civil support mission, homeland defense and emergency preparedness. The National Guard has an undeniable record of military assistance to civilian authorities since the birth of this Nation, responding heroically and meeting every mission asked of them, particularly in times of crisis—terrorism, natural disasters, plane crashes, blizzards, wildfires, floods.

15. There must be strong agreement between State and Federal leadership as to the operational objectives during emergencies. State concerns about maintaining sovereignty must be respected. Governors, who are most intimately familiar with and better understand

the National Guard's unique capabilities, must retain the ability and authority to deploy their National Guard forces in times of crisis.

16. Governors using State-to-State emergency mutual assistance compacts are an integral part of the use of National Guard resources in responding to emergencies at home.

17. The National Guard and State Adjutants General provide an invaluable nexus of coordination between Federal and State planning, exercising and response to emergencies and disasters. Over 50 percent of State Adjutants General are also in charge of their State's Emergency Management operations, thereby offering unparalleled integration of planning, preparation and response capabilities in emergencies.

18. National Guard forces are also uniquely positioned to engage within the U.S. and its territories by virtue of their geographic dispersal and relationships to State and local governments.

19. The National Guard is familiar with the local area and local culture. The National Guard has close ties with first responders such as local and State law enforcement, fire departments, and other emergency service providers. The local community relies upon the National Guard because they are part of the community. National Guard personnel are more likely to have more experience working with local responders than the active component.

20. WMD Civil Support Teams are a specialized homeland security capability based entirely in the National Guard.

21. As America prepares for an influenza pandemic, the National Guard has more domestic response training and decentralized capabilities than any other military organization and is ready to respond on a moment's notice.

22. The National Guard Bureau has proved its ability to plan for and respond to natural and man-made events with the development of essential concepts including: Joint Force Headquarters-State, Joint Task Force State, CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, CERFP, National Guard Reaction Force, NGRF, and the Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment, JCCSE.

23. The Department of Defense has not adapted to the significant role of the National Guard in this Nation's security.

24. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force have not sufficiently integrated the National Guard into planning, procuring or decision-making processes.

25. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force do not have a long-term strategy to equip the National Guard at a high level of readiness for overseas or domestic missions.

26. The Department of Defense does not adequately resource or equip the National Guard for its current operational missions. Currently the National Guard receives only 4.5 percent of the Department of Defense's budget.

27. The Army National Guard has long been equipped at less than war-time readiness levels and is forced to transfer equipment to deploying units. Army National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have also been directed by the Department of the Army to leave behind hundreds and in many cases, thousands of equipment items for

use by follow on units. Army officials do not track accurately or develop plans to replace this Guard equipment.

28. Army and Air National Guard forces are generally expected to perform homeland defense and civil support missions only with equipment supplied for their warfighting mission or equipment supplied by the States.

29. In the current budget, the Department of the Air Force does not fund the Air Sovereignty Alert, ASA, mission of the Air National Guard at full capacity.

30. During the BRAC process, the Air Force failed to adequately solicit input of National Guard Bureau leadership and systemically failed to confer with State Adjutants General.

31. When developing Future Total Force Strategy, the Air Force has failed to adequately consult Air National Guard leaders and State Adjutants General.

32. The Department of Defense does not have adequate knowledge of the role of the National Guard at home nor has it incorporated the National Guard's significant capabilities into plans for homeland defense or security. Left unchecked, the Department of Defense will continue to ignore the Federal requirements of the National Guard to perform homeland defense and civil support missions.

33. The Department of Defense has not recognized the value of including State Adjutants General in all homeland defense and military support to civilian authority planning.

34. The Department of Defense has not recognized that Governors will rely on National Guard manpower and equipment before relying on Federal forces.

35. Although DOD has a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which recognizes the National Guard's critical role in Federal and State missions, the strategy does not detail what the Army or Air National Guard's role or requirements will be in implementing the strategy.

36. The Department of Defense and Northern Command have not articulated specific requirements or capabilities that National Guard forces need during major homeland disasters. Without formal requirements, equipment deemed necessary for the National Guard to assist civilian authorities in Katrina had not been purchased by the Department of the Army or the Department of the Air Force.

37. The readiness of the National Guard to perform homeland missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because the National Guard's roles in these missions has not been defined; requirements for manpower, equipment and training have not been established; and preparedness standards and measures have not been developed by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense does not provide for the purchase of equipment for the National Guard specifically for military assistance to civilian authorities.

38. WMD Civil Support Teams' face challenges and shortfalls in personnel, equipment acquisition and facilities under current Department of Defense and service budgets.

39. Lack of coordination of National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response to Katrina. Advance planning between active-duty personnel and the Guard is vital during emergencies. The Department of Defense and the National Guard must plan and exercise together to prepare for events in the homeland.

40. National Guard Bureau leadership and State Adjutants General are not adequately involved in Department of Defense planning

guidance developed at Northern Command, including concept of operations plans and functional plans for military support to civilian authorities.

41. There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force Katrina and the National Guard Joint Forces headquarters in supporting states.

42. The Department of Defense has not adequately incorporated or funded the National Guard to participate in joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities, which would have allowed for a more effective response to Hurricane Katrina and other homeland emergencies.

43. Northern Command does not have adequate insight into State response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response.

44. There is an unresolved tension between the Department of Defense and the States regarding the role of the military in emergency response that could be resolved if along with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense adopted and made the National Incident Management System a priority for emergency management.

45. The National Guard lacked communication equipment during Hurricane Katrina, suggesting that the Pentagon does not assign homeland defense and military assistance to civilian authorities a sufficiently high priority.

46. The Department of the Army decided to reduce Army National Guard force structure and end-strength without substantive consultation with National Guard Bureau leaders or State Adjutants General, and the Air Force has decided to reduce Air National Guard force structure and end-strength without substantive consultation with National Guard Bureau leaders or State Adjutants General.

47. The Department of the Army currently plans to scale back the Army National Guard to 324,000 soldiers from 350,000. The Department of the Air Force plans to scale back the Air National Guard by 14,000 airmen and women. To cut Guard manpower in this time of increased homeland need, and the fluxation of current Department of Defense transformation policies affecting the Army and Air National Guard, creates an unacceptable risk to the security of this Nation.

48. States and Governors are not adequately represented at the Department of Defense when planning and exercising for homeland events.

49. The role of the National Guard Bureau as the channel of communications between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security and the States needs to be enhanced.

50. USNORTHCOM and its subordinate headquarters lack knowledge of their domestic theater of operations, specifically State emergency plans and resources, and knowledge of National Guard resources. USNORTHCOM and its subordinate headquarters need to be reformed to include substantially increased National Guard general officer command presence and participation by other senior National Guard personnel in all levels of their operations.

Mr. Speaker, the front line in the global war against terrorism is right here at home. Cold War structures and distinctions separating projected active duty forces and stateside reserve components no longer meet the strategic im-

peratives of this century. This proposal updates those structures to reflect the integral role of the National Guard in the modern battle plan and ensures the Guard will have the clout and resources necessary to meet that vital mission.

NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,  
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.

Hon. THOMAS M. DAVIS III,  
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN DAVIS: The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) applauds your introduction of a House version of the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006.

This legislation is a powerful first step in providing the appropriate presence for the leadership of the National Guard in the decision making processes of the Department of Defense. The security of American citizens was forever altered on September 11, 2001. Since that date, the National Guard has grown in stature and importance as a full partner in ensuring their well-being.

It is completely logical that the policies and procedures that heretofore have guided the effective use of the National Guard should be considered for revision in light of the sweeping changes to the missions and employment of our armed forces. NGAUS looks forward to working with you and with members of the United States Senate in passage of similarly innovative legislation.

Thank you for your efforts on behalf of the National Guard.

Sincerely,

STEPHEN M. KOPER,  
Brigadier General (ret), President.

ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.

Hon. THOMAS M. DAVIS III,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: The Adjutants General Association of the United States heralds the introduction of the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. This legislation which you have created along with members of the U.S. Senate bravely seeks to ensure the National Guard will have a strong voice in matters of national security, homeland defense, and homeland security.

Events associated with Hurricane Katrina, BRAC, and QDR highlighted important instances where National Guard leadership was not consulted on key matters of national interest and citizen safety. As the National Guard faces major issues in re-equipping and transformation, a strong voice in defense circles is more vital than ever.

Thank you for your efforts on behalf of appreciative Adjutants General.

Sincerely,

ROGER P. LEMPKE,  
Major General, Adjutant General.

#### INTRODUCTION OF THE CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION ACT

HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY  
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, today I am again re-introducing legislation that is intended to help solve the shortage of available, afford-

able child care facilities. In my congressional district in New York City, more than half of all women with pre-school children are in the workforce and the need for child care is enormous. This is not a local problem but one that is national in nature.

The Children's Development Commission Act or Kiddie Mac, will address this problem by authorizing HUD to issue guarantees to lenders who are willing to lend money to build or rehabilitate child care facilities. It also creates the Children's Development Commission which will certify the loans and create federal child care standards. Kiddie Mac will also give micro-loans to facilities which need to make the necessary changes to come up to licensing standards, as well as provide them with lower cost fire and liability insurance. Through some of the premiums paid by the lenders, a non-profit foundation will be formed which would focus on research on child care and development, as well as create educational materials to guide potential providers through the certification process.

I have introduced this legislation in several past Congresses but the need for it has only grown more acute. I urge my colleagues to consider the proposal and join me in enacting it this year.

#### RECOGNIZING THE CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL AT BEIRUT

HON. DARRELL E. ISSA

OF CALIFORNIA  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the Centennial Anniversary of the American Community School at Beirut.

The American Community School was founded in 1905 as the Faculty School by a group of American missionary families living in Lebanon. The school was supported by the American University of Beirut, the American Presbyterian Mission and Aramco. It was the first American K-12 school in Lebanon and is an independent, non-profit, co-educational school chartered in the state of New York. Today, the school's enrollment exceeds 1,000 and the school is an ambassador of American education to the Middle East.

The American Community School's student population has changed over the years and is now composed of a diverse community made up of students from American, Lebanese and international families. The school offers numerous activities to supplement the education of its students. Alumni of the school have gone on to do great things, with many of them excelling in careers serving the United States government and Lebanese-American relations.

I would like to commend the American Community School's leadership for their innovative vision in implementing and carrying out the school's mission of providing quality American-style education. The school's teachers should be recognized for their consistent dedication and for inspiring their students to pursue a well-rounded, life-long education. Finally, past and present students of the school should be applauded for their success in such an independent, challenging environment.

The school is appreciative of the support of the United States Congress. America's direct