

is equal to what Senator LUGAR controls on his side. If there is any difference in the numbers, he and Senator DODD can adjust it accordingly.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERT BOLTON TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume executive session for the consideration of Calendar No. 103, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the time until 6 p.m. will be equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which 1 hour will be reserved under the control of the Senator from Ohio, Mr. VOINOVICH, and with the exceptions just noted by consent.

The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will yield shortly to distinguished colleagues who have sought an opportunity to speak for the first time on the nomination of John Bolton. I had the privilege of addressing the Senate yesterday for over 50 minutes in which I attempted to outline all of the best reasons for John Bolton's confirmation, which I hope will occur today. I believe he will be an outstanding representative of our country, a very able diplomat to the United Nations.

During the course of my comments—now reflected, because they were delivered yesterday, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD today—we attempted to go through each of the case histories of interviews completed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in response to the questions or allegations made about the nominee. Affirmatively, I have tried to point out the tens of very able Americans who have endorsed John Bolton, including a large number of former Secretaries of State, Defense, National Security Directors, and, most importantly, people who have worked with him at the United Nations, at USAID.

I ask Members to reference the specifics of my speech yesterday, if there are questions with regard to the work done by the able staff on both sides of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee, to make certain that each of the arguments that has been presented has been met and fairly argued.

During the entirety of the debate yesterday, the arguments that were made were not new ones. They may be important ones, and perhaps they will be reargued today. But I ask Members to think constructively now about the President of the United States, his desire for reform of the United Nations, and his desire to have John Bolton there at the United Nations to work in that capacity for reform of an institution that the United States wishes to see much stronger, more able, and certainly a valuable part of American diplomacy and national security policy.

I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California is recognized.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I listen to my distinguished chairman, and I wonder who he is actually talking about when he says there is so much support for John Bolton. There has been an unprecedented outcry of Republicans and Democrats against this nomination.

I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD the votes on U.S. ambassadors at the United Nations since 1945.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VOTES ON U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE UN

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (1945–1946): Voice Vote

Warren R. Austin (1947–1953): Unanimous Consent

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1953–1960): Unanimous Consent

James J. Wadsworth (1960–1961): Unanimous Consent

Adlai E. Stevenson (1961–1965): Unanimous Consent

Arthur J. Goldberg (1965–1968): Unanimous Consent

George W. Ball (1968–1968): Unanimous Consent

James Russell Wiggins (1968–1969): Unanimous Consent

Charles W. Yost (1969–1971): Unanimous Consent

George Bush (1971–1973): Unanimous Consent

John A. Scali (1973–1975): Unanimous Consent

Daniel P. Moynihan (1975–1976): Unanimous Consent

William W. Scranton (1976–1977): Unanimous Consent

Andrew J. Young (1977–1979) 89–3 :

Donald F. McHenry (1979–1981) 83–0 :

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (1981–1985) 81–0 :

Vernon A. Walters (1985–1989): Voice Vote

Thomas R. Pickering (1989–1992) 99–0 :

Edward Joseph Perkins (1992–1993): Unanimous Consent

Madeleine K. Albright (1993–1997): Unanimous Consent

Bill Richardson 100–0 (1997–1998):

Richard Holbrooke (1999–2001) 81–16 :

John D. Negroponte (2001–2004): Voice Vote

John C. Danforth (2004–2005): Voice Vote

Mrs. BOXER. What this will show for the record is that starting in 1945, we have had voice votes and unanimous consent votes on almost all of these nominees. There were few exceptions. Andrew Young got the post 89 to 2;

Donald McHenry, 83 to nothing—they had votes—Jeane Kirkpatrick, 81 to nothing. The largest “no” vote was Richard Holbrooke, who had 16 against him. Bill Richardson was 100 to nothing; John Negroponte, voice vote; Danforth, voice vote.

I am putting this in the RECORD because when you listen to my friends who are supporting John Bolton, you would think that this is just a run-of-the-mill type appointment, that it is usual to have this kind of firestorm. Nothing could be further from the truth. This nomination is a diversion from the consensus candidates that we have had in the past. Since my chairman talked about all the support John Bolton has, I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD in a letter dated May 9, 2005.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Updated May 9, 2005.

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR AND SENATOR BIDEN: We have noted with appreciation the moves of President Bush at the beginning of his second term to improve U.S. relations with the countries of the European Union and of the United Nations. Maintaining these ties and the willingness of those countries to cooperate with the United States is essential to U.S. security.

It is for this reason that we write you to express our concern over the nomination of John R. Bolton to be permanent representative of the United States at the United Nations. We urge you to reject that nomination.

By virtue of service in the State Department, USAID and Justice Departments, John Bolton has the professional background needed for this position. But his past activities and statements indicate conclusively that he is the wrong man for this position at a time when the U.N. is entering a critically important phase of modernization, seeking to promote economic development and democratic reforms and searching for ways to cope better with proliferation crises and a spurt of natural disasters and internal conflicts.

John Bolton has an exceptional record of opposition to efforts to enhance U.S. security through arms control. He led a campaign against ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Today, the administration is pressing for development of new types of nuclear weapons. John Bolton blocked more extensive international agreement to limit sales of small arms, the main killer in internal wars. He led the fight to continue U.S. refusal to participate in the Ottawa Landmine Treaty. Today, the U.S. has joined Russia and China in insisting on the right to continue to deploy antipersonnel landmines. John Bolton crafted the U.S. withdrawal from the joint efforts of 40 countries to formulate a verification system for the Biological Weapons Convention and blocked continuation of these efforts in a period of increasing concern over potential terrorist use of these weapons and of terrorist access to the stocks of countries covertly producing these weapons. John Bolton's unsubstantiated claims that Cuba and Syria

are working on biological weapons further discredited the effect of U.S. warnings and U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction.

John Bolton led the successful campaign for U.S. withdrawal from the treaty limiting missile defenses (ABM Treaty). The effects of this action included elimination of the sole treaty barrier to the weaponization of space. In the face of decades of votes in the U.N. General Assembly calling for negotiation of a treaty to block deployment of weapons in space, he has blocked negotiation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a treaty on this subject. The administration has repeatedly proposed programs calling for weapon deployment in space.

As chief negotiator of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on withdrawing U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from field deployment, John Bolton structured a treaty without its own verification regime, without required progress reports from both sides, without the requirement to destroy warheads withdrawn from deployment, and without provision for negotiating continued reductions. Under his guidance, the State Department repudiated important consensus agreements reached in the year 2000 Review Conference of the Non-proliferation Treaty and has even blocked the formulation of an agenda for the next review conference to be held in May 2005.

Under John Bolton as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, the State Department has continued to fail to resolve the impasse with Russia about the legal liability of U.S. personnel working with Russia on the security of the huge arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of the former Soviet Union and has failed to accelerate measures aimed at the safety and security of this huge arsenal from theft, illegal sale and terrorist access.

John Bolton's insistence that the U.N. is valuable only when it directly serves the United States, and that the most effective Security Council would be one where the U.S. is the only permanent member, will not help him to negotiate with representatives of the remaining 96 percent of humanity at a time when the U.N. is actively considering enlargement of the Security Council and steps to deal more effectively with failed states and to enhance the U.N.'s peace-keeping capability.

John Bolton's work as a paid researcher for Taiwan, his idea that the U.S. should treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, and that it is fantasy to believe that China might respond with armed force to the secession of Taiwan do not attest to the balanced judgment of a possible U.S. permanent representative on the Security Council. China is emerging as a major world power and the Taiwan issue is becoming more acute.

At a time when the U.N. is struggling to get an adequate grip on the genocidal killing in Darfur, Sudan, Mr. Bolton's skepticism about U.N. peacekeeping, about paying the U.N. dues that fund peacekeeping, and his leadership of the opposition to the International Criminal Court, originally proposed by the U.S. itself in order to prosecute human rights offenders, will all make it difficult for the U.S. to play an effective leadership role at a time when the U.N. itself and many member states are moving to improve U.N. capacity to deal with international problems.

Given these past actions and statements, John R. Bolton cannot be an effective promoter of the U.S. national interest at the U.N. We urge you to oppose his nomination.

Sincerely,

The Hon. Terrell E. Arnold, Former Deputy Director, Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Reagan), Former U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo, Brazil (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to Romania, Chile, and India (Nixon, Ford, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert L. Barry, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria and Indonesia (Reagan, Clinton), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Carter), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Carter).

Ambassador Josiah H. Beeman, Former U.S. ambassador to New Zealand and Western Samoa (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Maurice M. Bernbaum, Former U.S. ambassador to Ecuador and Venezuela (Eisenhower, Johnson).

Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Binns, Former U.S. ambassador to Honduras (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard J. Bloomfield, Former U.S. ambassador to Ecuador and Portugal (Ford, Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Peter Bridges, Former U.S. ambassador to Somalia (Reagan).

Ambassador George Bruno, Former U.S. ambassador to Belize (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Edward Brynn, Former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ghana (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs (Clinton).

Ambassador George Bunn, Former member of U.S. delegation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations (Johnson), Former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference (UN) (Johnson).

Ambassador (ret.) A. Peter Burleigh, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia (Reagan), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives (Clinton), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel (Clinton), Former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN and Acting Permanent Representative to the UN (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Patricia M. Byrne, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council (Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Mali and Burma (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) James Cheek, Former U.S. ambassador to Sudan and Argentina (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Paul M. Cleveland, Former U.S. ambassador to New Zealand and Western Samoa and Malaysia (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. representative to the Korean Energy Development Organization (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Carleton S. Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to Nepal (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Jane Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) James F. Creagan, Former U.S. ambassador to Honduras (Clinton), Former U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo, Brazil (G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) T. Frank Crigler, Former U.S. ambassador to Rwanda and Somalia (Ford, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) John H. Crimmins, Former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic and Brazil (Johnson, Nixon, Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard T. Davies (signed before he passed away on March 30, 2005), Former U.S. ambassador to Poland (Nixon, Ford, Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) John Gunther Dean, Former Deputy for CORDS, Military Region 1, Vietnam (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, Denmark, Lebanon, Thailand, India (Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean, Former U.S. representative to the Mutual and Bal-

anced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Willard A. DePree, Former U.S. ambassador to Mozambique and Bangladesh (Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert S. Dillon, Former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon (Reagan), Former Deputy Commissioner General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Donald B. Easum, Former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (Nixon, Ford, Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Nixon, Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) William B. Edmondson, Former U.S. ambassador to South Africa (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Nancy H. Ely-Raphel, Former U.S. ambassador to Slovenia (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) James Bruce Engle, Former U.S. ambassador to Dahomey (Nixon, Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard K. Fox, Former U.S. ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Lincoln Gordon, Former U.S. ambassador to Brazil (Kennedy, Johnson), Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Johnson).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert Grey, Jr., Former U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Holsey Gates Handyside, Former U.S. ambassador to Mauritania (Ford, Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) William C. Harrop, Former ambassador to Israel, Kenya, and Zaire (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), Former Inspector General, U.S. Department of State (Nixon).

Ambassador (ret.) Samuel F. Hart, Former U.S. ambassador to Ecuador (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Arthur A. Hartman, Former U.S. ambassador to France and the Soviet Union (Carter, Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Nixon).

Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to Algeria (Carter).

Ambassador Gerald B. Helman, Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Geneva (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert T. Hennemeyer, Former U.S. ambassador to Gambia (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) H. Kenneth Hill, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria (G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) John L. Hirsch, Former U.S. ambassador to Sierra Leone (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Lewis Hoffacker, Former U.S. ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Nixon).

Ambassador (ret.) H. Allen Holmes, Former U.S. ambassador to Portugal (Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Reagan), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (Clinton).

The Hon. Thomas L. Hughes, Former Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State (Kennedy, Johnson).

Ambassador (ret.) Dennis Jett, Former U.S. ambassador to Mozambique and Peru (Clinton).

Ambassador James A. Joseph, Former U.S. ambassador to South Africa (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Philip M. Kaiser, Former U.S. ambassador to Senegal, Mauritania, Hungary, Austria (Kennedy, Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert V. Keeley, Former U.S. Ambassador to Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece (Ford; Carter, Reagan), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Carter).

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Andrew I. Killgore, Former U.S. ambassador to Qatar (Carter).

Ambassador Henry L. Kimmelman, Former U.S. ambassador to Haiti (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Roger Kirk, Former U.S. ambassador to Somalia and Romania (Nixon, Ford, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Dennis H. Kux, Former U.S. ambassador to Ivory Coast (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Ford, Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Samuel W. Lewis, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Ford), Former Director of Policy Planning, State Department (Clinton), Former ambassador to Israel (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Clinton), Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs, U.S. Department of State (G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) David L. Mack, Former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard Cavins Matheron, Former U.S. ambassador to Swaziland (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Charles E. Marthinsen, Former U.S. ambassador to Qatar (Carter, Reagan).

Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Director of the Strategic Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Reagan), Senior ACDA representative on U.S. START delegation (Reagan).

Ambassador Carol Moseley-Braun, Former U.S. ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Ambler H. Moss Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to Panama (Carter, Reagan), Former Member, U.S.-Panama Consultative Committee (Carter, Reagan, Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Leonardo Neher, Former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso (Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) David D. Newsom, Former U.S. ambassador to Libya, Indonesia, the Philippines (Johnson, Nixon, Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Nixon), Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Donald R. Norland, Former U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Chad (Johnson, Ford, Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) David Passage, Former U.S. ambassador to Botswana (G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) Edward L. Peck, Former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Mauritania (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Perry, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Christopher H. Phillips, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Brunei (G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) Sol Polansky, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador Stanley R. Resor, Former Secretary of the Army (Johnson, Nixon), Former U.S. representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna (Nixon, Ford, Carter).

Ambassador Nicholas A. Rey, Former U.S. ambassador to Poland (Clinton).

John B. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (Nixon), Legal adviser to the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Delegation (SALT I) (Nixon).

Ambassador (ret.) Stuart W. Rockwell, Former U.S. ambassador to Morocco (Nixon).

Ambassador James R. Sasser, Former U.S. ambassador to the People's Republic of China (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Cynthia P. Schneider, Former U.S. ambassador to The Netherlands (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Talcott W. Seelye, Former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia and Syria (Nixon, Ford, Carter).

The Hon. John Shattuck, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (Clinton), Former Chairman, Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad (Clinton) Former U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and Poland (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).

Ambassador Richard Sklar, Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for Management and Reform (Clinton).

Ambassador Robert Solwin Smith, Former U.S. ambassador to Ivory Coast (Nixon, Ford) Former Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (Nixon) Former Deputy Permanent Delegate to UNESCO (Truman, Eisenhower).

Ambassador (ret.) Carl Spielvogel, Former U.S. ambassador to the Slovak Republic (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Monteagle Stearns, Former U.S. ambassador to Greece and Ivory Coast (Ford, Carter, Reagan), Former Vice President, National Defense University (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Andrew L. Steigman, Former Ambassador to Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe (Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) Michael Sterner Former, U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) John Todd Stewart Former, U.S. ambassador to Moldova (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard W. Teare, Former U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Harry E. T. Thayer, Former U.S. ambassador to Singapore (Carter, Reagan).

The Hon. Hans N. Tuch, Career Minister, U.S. Foreign Service, USIA.

Ambassador (ret.) Theresa A. Tull, Former, U.S. ambassador to Guyana and Brunei (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).

Ambassador William J. vanden Heuvel, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Carter), Former U.S. representative to the United Nations, Geneva (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Christopher van Hollen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (Nixon, Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) Richard N. Viets, Former U.S. ambassador to Tanzania and Jordan (Carter, Reagan).

Ambassador (ret.) Frederick Vreeland, Former U.S. ambassador to Morocco (G.H.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East (G.H.W. Bush).

Ambassador (ret.) Lannon Walker, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Carter, Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Senegal, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Alexander F. Watson, Former U.S. ambassador to Peru (Reagan) Former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (G.H.W. Bush), Former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Melissa F. Wells, Former U.S. ambassador to Guinea Bissau

and Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zaire, Estonia (Ford, Reagan, Carter, Clinton), Former U.S. representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Thomas G. Weston, Former Special Coordinator for Cyprus (Clinton, G.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Clinton).

Ambassador (ret.) Robert E. White, Former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Carter), Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) James M. Wilson, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific Affairs (Nixon), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State (Ford).

Ambassador (ret.) W. Howard Wriggins, Former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (Carter).

Ambassador (ret.) Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia (Clinton).

Mr. President, this is a letter going to the Honorable RICHARD LUGAR, the Honorable JOSEPH BIDEN, our chair and ranking member. It is an unprecedented letter:

We write to express our concern over the nomination of John R. Bolton to be Permanent Representative of the U.S. at the United Nations, and we urge you to reject that nomination.

This is from 102 very distinguished Americans who have served their country under both Republican and Democratic Presidents. I am going to read off some of the names for the record: The Honorable Terrell Arnold, who worked under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter; Ambassador, retired, Harry Barnes, who worked under Nixon, Ford, and Reagan; Ambassador Robert Barry, who served under Reagan, Clinton, and Carter; Ambassador Josiah Beeman, who served under Clinton; Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum, who served under Eisenhower and Johnson; Ambassador Jack Binns, who served Carter and Reagan; Ambassador Richard Bloomfield, who served under Ford, Carter, and Reagan; Ambassador Peter Bridges, who served under Reagan; Ambassador George Bruno, who served under Bill Clinton; Ambassador Edward Brynn, who served under George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

I could go on and on, but I think placing this in the RECORD for my colleagues to see will undermine the comments that are made about how much support this particular nominee has. That is simply glossing over the record. That is what is happening in this debate—glossing over the record by my friends, who are saying: Oh, what is the problem? So he is a bully, so he tries to fire people, so we have all these letters—and it goes on. Their ultimate point is that he is just what we need at the United Nations.

I come out very differently. This is just what we don't need at the United Nations. We have a credibility problem in the world right now, and we need someone to walk in there, such as John Danforth walked in there, with credibility. I don't think we should be considering the nomination today. I made

that clear when I put a hold on the nomination. I lifted that hold because, clearly, colleagues believed they wanted to begin debate and, with due deference, I lifted the hold.

The fact is, we don't have the information we have requested from the State Department and from the administration. You may think, well, maybe there is so much information out there, what more could there be on John Bolton? Well, I answer it this way. I have colleagues on both sides of the aisle coming up to me and saying: Do you have any more? Do you have a smoking gun on John Bolton? What else is out there? We heard what is out there. Do you have a smoking gun? The answer I give them is we not only have found several smoking guns but several bodies who were there to tell what happened to them. We found the victims. They are out there. They were saved only because there were folks who served higher than John Bolton, who said to him: You are wrong, you are bullying people, you are twisting their words, you are exerting politics in what should be clearly an independent intelligence function. And because of that, John Bolton was saved from himself. But we have the smoking guns and the victims, which we will talk about. But our colleagues want more information.

Well, there are three big pieces of information out that we have not received. One is of deepest concern to our ranking member, JOE BIDEN, who has done an excellent job. Frankly, he and his staff and all of our staffs have done an extraordinary job. One piece of information deals with Mr. Bolton's interest in finding out intelligence matters that were revealed on some intercepts. We think it is very important because we don't know who was the target of Mr. Bolton's interest in the 10 times when he requested to see these intercepts.

It is a very important matter because, from what you can tell from the information we have so far, Mr. Bolton had a very clear agenda in his work at the State Department. What that agenda appears to be, from what we know, is hyping up the threat from various countries. We already know what a hyped-up threat can do. We have lost 1,600-plus of our beautiful soldiers in Iraq because of a hyped-up threat. There are more than 12,000 wounded. So when we are discussing John Bolton and his proclivity to try to exaggerate and twist intelligence information, this is not some theoretical dispute about whether he has an ideology, or whatever. That is not the question. The question is: Could his action have resulted in perhaps another conflict, or certainly more tension? The fact is, it could have—if he wasn't stopped by the higher ups. And now we hear that the higher ups are saying to Senators: Don't worry, we will control him at the U.N.

Mr. President, I don't want someone to have to be controlled at the United

Nations. John Danforth didn't have to be controlled. Mr. Negroponte didn't have to be controlled. Jean Kirkpatrick didn't have to be controlled. Daniel Patrick Moynihan didn't have to be controlled. Bill Richardson didn't have to be controlled. They knew what the policy of the United States of America was. They respected independent intelligence analysts. They never tried to twist information to fit their preconceived notions of what the world should look like. That is why this information is important.

There are two other areas that we are interested in, also, dealing with a speech that Mr. Bolton prepared on Syria. Somehow we cannot get the draft of that speech. We think that is important. There is another area we have asked for, which is that one of Mr. Bolton's assistants who works with him has private clients, and we have asked to see the list of those private clients. We have not been able to get that either. So out of due respect for the United States Senate and for each of us as Senators, we are not an arm of the executive branch. We are a proud independent branch of Government. It gets you back to the whole issue of checks and balances.

We have every right to see this information. If John Bolton can see these intercepts, why can't JOE BIDEN see them, who is our ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and someone whom everybody respects around here as being very cautious and careful? And there is not one scintilla of evidence that JOE BIDEN ever did something to undermine any administration's foreign policy. He bends over backward the other way. So that is a reason we should not be having this vote right now. We need to have more time to work on the administration to get this information—these intercepts, the speech, and the conflict of interest of the gentleman who now works for Mr. Bolton, Matthew Friedman. Mr. Friedman's former clients, as best we can tell, included the Government of Nigeria and also Fernando Marcos. We don't know who else is there. We would like to put an end to the speculation that someone is working in a top position for Mr. Bolton who has outside clients, which could pose conflicts of interest.

There was a report in the Washington Post that got our attention on the front page some weeks ago, which said Condi Rice gave a message to the top staff not to cooperate with the Congress. Immediately I wrote to her. I got a letter back from her assistant. I wrote her a letter and she sent me back a letter from her assistant that said: We are cooperating. That report was false. We are going to turn over every-

I ask Senators on both sides: Don't you have pride in what you do? Don't you feel good about what you do? Don't you believe that being a Senator deserves some respect? Don't you believe you deserve to have information? Well,

if you do, you should not vote to proceed with this nomination at this time, just based on the fact that we have not gotten the information.

I think we are continuing to see the arrogance of power from this administration and a disregard for the checks and balances. We don't need a ruler in the White House; we need a government. We don't need someone who will rule us; we need someone who will govern with us. That is what this is about—a lack of respect for members of the committee.

Beyond that, as I said, we do have a lot of smoking guns on this nominee, and we do have the victims of his actions. I will spend some time talking about that. It will be repetitive because each colleague has seen the information. You heard the very emotional testimony of Senator VOINOVICH, who feels so strongly about this, and he has laid it out in his fashion. Senator BIDEN has laid it out, as have others. I will lay it out in my fashion.

Politicizing intelligence. What does that mean? It means that you have a political agenda, you try to use intelligence by cherry-picking it or twisting it to make your point. It is dangerous. It is exceedingly dangerous. There was a report in a British newspaper that had documentation from someone in the military in Britain who said, in fact, that is what happened in Iraq. We don't know that right now because we have not had that particular investigation. We only know that we made big mistakes on the intelligence front. But we didn't look at it saying: Did people in the office cherry-pick? Did they politicize intelligence? We don't know the answer. That is what the British documents say. We don't know that here. We were supposed to look at it, and I hope we will because history deserves an answer and so do the families of our soldiers who are dead.

Politicizing intelligence is dangerous for our country. And now we think about probably one of the first assignments our U.N. ambassador may well have, which is to convince the U.N. Security Council about the threats posed by other nations, such as Iran and North Korea. I don't see Mr. Bolton having credibility, given his record of politicizing intelligence to be able to convince other countries that there is a problem. Maybe Secretary Rice will have to come over there. Maybe the President will have to speak to the U.N. instead. Would it not be good to have someone at the U.N. who had credibility walking in, such as Senator Danforth had? Would that not be important? Mr. Bolton won't have the credibility because he has a record of trying to remove intelligence analysts who disagreed with him, and he also attempted to exaggerate intelligence to fit his views.

So this issue of using political pressure and the power of your position to twist the arms of independent intelligence analysts is, I believe, the most serious issue concerning John Bolton

because we know this could lead to unjustified war, and we should not promote someone who has a history of exaggerating threats, or at least trying to exaggerate threats that are not supported by intelligence.

When you hear me make this comment, you might say: Well, Senator BOXER, you are a strong Democrat. Who else supports this view that politicizing intelligence is what John Bolton did? How about the former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, who testified that Bolton's berating of analyst Christian Westermann had a "chilling effect"—his words—a chilling effect within that agency and that analysts in INR—that is the intelligence research arm of the State Department—were very negatively affected by the incident. So we have John Bolton trying to get rid of Christian Westermann, by everyone's account a very honorable, bright intelligence officer doing his work, and it negatively affected, according to Carl Ford—by the way, Carl Ford describes himself as a conservative Republican. What did he say? He said his hero is DICK CHENEY. Here we have a self-described conservative Republican, and his hero is DICK CHENEY. He says John Bolton had a chilling effect within the intelligence agency, and John Bolton negatively affected that whole operation there.

Mr. Ford said further the only reason, at the end of the day, that political pressure did not work on Mr. Westermann was because, thankfully, he said, the analyst was strong enough to say no to Bolton.

I want to say on the floor of the Senate to Mr. Westermann I have never met him, I do not know him, I do not know his politics—I want to say to him: Thank you for the courage that you displayed in the face of a bully in such a high-level position.

By the way, one of the things Senator DODD did, and I thought he did it brilliantly, was to point out that Bolton reached down, way down to Mr. Westermann. That was not someone he worked with, that was a peer. He reached down to this individual who had never, in his whole career, had a negative thing said about him, and tried to twist his arm to get the intelligence he wanted, and when he could not do it, tried to get him fired. That is just the first one. So we have the smoking gun with the testimony of Carl Ford, and then we have the victim, Mr. Westermann.

Mr. Bolton did not stop there. We refer to this gentleman as Mr. Smith because he is in the CIA. He is the national intelligence officer for Latin America. Bolton attempted to have him removed from his position because he disagreed with the views that Bolton expressed about Cuba in a speech saying that the views Mr. Bolton wanted to express in his speech did not reflect the intelligence community's assessment. This incident shows how far Mr. Bolton would go to pressure the intelligence community.

Mr. Bolton worked in the State Department. He reached way down to get Mr. Westermann fired. But then he goes to a completely different agency, over which he does not even have any influence—or should not have—and he tried to ruin the career of an analyst he had never even met.

It is one thing to challenge intelligence analysts to say: You know, my information is thus and so, and you don't seem to reflect it in your thinking. Let's talk about it. That is fine. We do that all the time in debate. I know when I am preparing for a talk such as this on the floor of the Senate, I will have my staff come in and say: I don't see it that way. Why do you see it that way? And you try to figure out what is the right thing to say, the right thing to do, and the thing on which you will not be challenged. But Mr. Bolton threatens retribution when the intelligence does not conform to his views. That is a disaster to promote someone such as that.

Robert Hutchings, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, describes the risk of politicizing intelligence this way:

I think every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But . . . when it goes beyond that to a search for a pretty clearly defined preformed set of judgments, then it turns into politicization. And . . . even when it is successfully resisted . . . it creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging . . .

What does he mean by that? This is a man who is an expert in intelligence. Conformity is dangerous because it means there is no discussion, no debate about what the truth is, where we are going. We need to have diverse voices. But at the end of the day, people have to understand that when they are speaking for the United States of America, they must speak the truth, as we know it at the time, based on the information we know.

First, we have politicizing intelligence, which is a disaster. Then we have a pattern of retribution against lower level employees, which I believe leads to paralysis in the workplace. When you have a circumstance where Colin Powell had to come over to talk to these intelligence analysts and tell them, Don't worry, we are with you, keep doing your job, do not be intimidated, that is an extraordinary circumstance, and that is what happened in the case of Mr. Bolton. He had so harmed the morale of the intelligence agents, as Mr. Ford, a conservative Republican testified, that Colin Powell had to take time out to go over and speak to these analysts.

This is not a question of partisan politics. This nominee has as many Republicans opposed to him as he does Democrats, and maybe even more.

So we have the politicizing of intelligence which is very dangerous for our people, and we have retribution against lower level employees. When Mr. Bolton was asked about this, he brushed it off: Oh, I didn't really,

didn't matter—I am paraphrasing—I shrugged it off, just got it off my chest. Yet he sought to remove Christian Westermann for disagreeing with him over intelligence in Cuba. Not once and shrug it off, not twice and shrug it off, but the record shows three times over a 5-month period he went after Mr. Westermann.

This is confirmed by Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary for the INR—that is the State Department intelligence division—Thomas Fingar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR; and Fred Fleitz, Chief of Staff to John Bolton; Neil Silver, an INR office manager; and Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Colin Powell.

Bolton said to the committee: No, it was nothing, it was no biggie, I got it off my chest, I shrugged it off, I did not do anything. Carl Ford, Thomas Fingar, Fred Fleitz, Neil Silver, and Larry Wilkerson—most of those people from the Bush administration—said: No, he tried to remove Mr. Westermann three times over a 5-month period. And Mr. Bolton sought to remove Mr. Smith over at the CIA, over whom Mr. Bolton had no authority whatsoever. We know that Bolton and his staff discussed the removal of this person over several months, and Bolton personally went out to CIA headquarters to seek Mr. Smith's removal.

Let me say that again. We have retribution against independent intelligence analysts, three times in 5 months against Westermann, and Mr. Bolton went all the way out to the CIA to get rid of Mr. Smith. Who confirms this? John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of the CIA, Stu Cohen, former acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and Alan Foley, Director of the CIA Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation and Arms Control.

We have not only the smoking gun, but the two victims. Now we have another person. Bolton also wrongly accused Rexon Ryu—a highly regarded midlevel State Department officer—of withholding a document from him. Eight months after the incident, Bolton denied Ryu a significant new assignment working on the G8 summit. This is confirmed by John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.

Of all the people you want to promote, it would not be somebody who people in his own party say tried to politicize intelligence, tried to dish out retribution on independent intelligence analysts and because someone did not give him a piece of paper, he denied him a very important new assignment.

Then, in 1994, we have a bizarre report of Bolton allegedly chasing a woman through a hotel lobby in Moscow, pounding on her door, falsely telling her colleagues she was under criminal investigation. How do we know that? There is a contemporaneous account provided by a colleague of this woman who said, yes, she called him during that whole time and told him everything that happened.

In addition to these examples, we have learned that Mr. Bolton tried to have a State Department lawyer removed from a case involving sanctions and tried to have two unnamed State Department officers removed over policy differences.

So there is a clear pattern of politicizing intelligence, which is dangerous for this country, and seeking retribution against lower level employees. You know what I find very significant is that the reason John Bolton failed in every one of his efforts, no matter how hard he tried—and we have the records, he tried—is because another official stepped in to stop John Bolton from his abusive behavior. One time it was Assistant Secretary Ford who prevented the retribution from taking place, again, a conservative Republican. In another instance, the Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin, under this President George Bush, had to step in when an analyst's job was threatened. Even Secretary Armitage, who was the Assistant Secretary to Colin Powell, was forced to intervene to prevent Bolton from removing a State Department lawyer from a particular case.

Who is going to prevent Mr. Bolton from handing out this type of retribution when he is in New York managing 150 Americans? Secretary Rice has told Senator VOINOVICH that Mr. Bolton would be closely supervised as U.N. Ambassador. How embarrassing is that? How embarrassing is that, a U.N. Ambassador who has to be closely supervised by the Secretary of State. She is going to make sure he does not step out of line. She has other things to do.

I want to quote Senator VOINOVICH in the Foreign Relations Committee when he said:

Why in the world would you want to send someone to the U.N. that has to be supervised?

We have a circumstance here, and I want to say to Senator VOINOVICH what courage he has to step out on this and what credibility he has. I have watched Senator VOINOVICH, and I never remember him speaking out against a Presidential appointee ever. This is a momentous and difficult thing to do for Senator VOINOVICH. But this leads me to my third reason to oppose the Bolton nomination—not only politicizing intelligence, not only seeking retribution, but unprecedented opposition from both parties. I put into the RECORD already a list of 102 former ambassadors who oppose this nominee, most of whom worked in the Reagan administration, some in the Ford administration, the Carter administration, the George H.W. Bush administration. But let's hear what some of the Republicans have said about Mr. Bolton. Here are the comments of Carl Ford, self-described conservative Republican, former Assistant Secretary of State for their Intelligence Division within State:

He is a quintessential kiss up, kick down sort of guy. There are a lot of them around

... But the fact is he stands out, that he's got a bigger kick and it gets bigger and stronger the further down the bureaucracy he is kicking.

And here is a quote from Lawrence Wilkerson, the former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, who, as we all know, was the Secretary of State in George Bush's first term. This is really unprecedented, to get these kinds of quotes from people who served under Republican administrations about the Republican nomination.

My objections to ... him being our Ambassador at the U.N. stems from two basic things. One, I think he is a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that have to be led ... Second, I differ from a lot of people in Washington both friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton as to his quote 'brilliance' unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans ... and had no willingness—and, in many cases no capacity—to understand the other things that were happening around those beans. And that's a recipe for problems at the United Nations.

This is Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Foreign Affairs:

I don't know if he's incapable of negotiation but he's unwilling.

And here we want someone at the U.N. to reform the U.N., to straighten out the U.N., to change it for the better, and you are sending someone who is shown, as she says, as being unwilling to negotiate and maybe even incapable of it.

John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, October 2001 to July 2004—so this is very recent—says:

I believe it would be fair to say that some of the officers within my bureau complained that they felt undue pressure to conform to the views of Under Secretary Bolton versus the views they thought they could support.

John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA for a while. He was Acting Director before they put Mr. Goss in place.

It is perfectly all right for a policy maker to express disagreement with an NIO or an analyst, and it's perfectly all right for them to challenge such an individual vigorously, challenge their work vigorously. But I think it's different to then request because of the disagreement that the person be transferred ... Therefore [I] had a strong negative reaction to the suggestion about moving him.

And he was talking about Mr. Smith, the intelligence analyst who Mr. Bolton tried to get removed from his portfolio. I have told you about the letters the committee has received. The committee never asked for these letters. A letter with more than 100 former diplomats who oppose the nomination. In the letter that I put in—I didn't read the letter to you. I will just read it now in part. This letter is signed by people who served the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush administrations.

[John Bolton's] past activities and statements indicate conclusively that he is the wrong man for this position at a time when the U.N. is entering a critically important phase of modernization, seeking to promote economic development and democratic re-

forms and searching for ways to cope better with proliferation crises and spurt of natural disasters and internal conflicts.

I talked about how unprecedented this opposition is to such a post. Since 1945, the Senate has confirmed 24 nominees to serve as U.N. ambassadors. Of these 24, only 2 received any opposition and nothing of the level of opposition we see to John Bolton. The people who received some opposing views were Andrew Young and Richard Holbrooke. That was about pretty much it on the list as I saw it.

Let me see if there is anybody else.

That is it. All the rest, unanimous consent or everybody voted for them.

Unprecedented, polarizing, divisive, and partisan appointment.

Now, there is a fourth reason I oppose this nomination, and I hope my colleagues will consider this. John Bolton holds views on the U.N. and international law that shatter his credibility in the world. You want to send someone over there who doesn't have to be babysat by Condoleezza Rice. You don't want to send someone over there who doesn't tell the truth. You want to send someone over there you do trust and who comes to the job with credibility.

I ask you this, my colleagues: Mr. Bolton in a speech—and I have seen the actual film—said:

There is no United Nations.

“There is no United Nations.” We are going to send someone to the United Nations who says there is no United Nations. He also said:

If the U.N. Secretariate building in New York lost 10 floors, it wouldn't make a bit of difference

Now, what kind of credibility does he have walking onto the floor of the—even if he is babysat by Condi Rice, who says she is going to watch over him—what kind of credibility does this man have? He has this record of politicizing intelligence. He has this record of retribution. He has the most unprecedented opposition of anyone.

I see the Senator from Connecticut has come, and I thank him, Senator DODD, for working so hard on this. It is not easy. Senator DODD rarely steps out like this on a Presidential appointment. It is extraordinary. And when we look at the votes of all the U.N. ambassadors since 1945, only twice did we even have anybody get a few “no” votes. It is unprecedented. It is unprecedented. And there are all these reasons for it.

If you really want to reform the U.N., which we all do, we should not be sending John Bolton. He simply does not have the credibility to do it. He doesn't have the credibility to convince wavering countries to be on our side. He has been inaccurately compared to Jeane Kirkpatrick. If you look at some of the U.N. ambassador's, former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's comments, she talked about the following. She said:

U.N. votes matter because they affect widely held views about perceptions of

power, about effectiveness, and about legitimacy.

What did John Bolton say. He said:

Many Republicans in Congress and perhaps the majority not only don't care about losing a General Assembly vote, but they actually see it as a make my day outcome.

How does this bring John Bolton credibility?

I wish to take a moment to just ask my friend from Connecticut if he is prepared to speak at this time because if so, I would wind down.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from California, I came over to hear my colleague's remarks. I appreciate her courtesy.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator.

I have how many minutes remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California has 3 minutes remaining.

Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent to have an additional 5 minutes. I will close down in 3 minutes.

So we have reason after reason after reason here. Senator VOINOVICH laid out the record. He read from the record. I am going to close with something I hope every single Member of this Senate will listen to. John Bolton did not tell the truth to the committee. I am going to repeat that. John Bolton did not tell the truth to the Foreign Relations Committee. He said he shrugged off the issue. He shrugged off the issue with these people he tried to fire. He said he just dropped by the CIA on his way home from work. He said he didn't try to dish out retribution or try to fire anybody at all. He said a lot of things that weren't true to our committee. And that is very serious. He wasn't truthful with us. He didn't give us honest accounts. He didn't tell us the truth about how he tried on many occasions to fire these analysts. And if nothing else I have said matters about the retribution, about the twisting of arms to get intelligence to build up a phony case against other countries, if the fact that he said there was no United Nations doesn't move you, or if that 10 stories were gone it wouldn't matter, if you don't care anything about that, I think you ought to care about telling the truth before a committee of the Senate. And we have had chapter and verse. We have it cold here.

For all those reasons, I hope we will not vote for John Bolton. And if we do not get the information Senators BIDEN and DODD are pushing so hard for, we should delay this until we see that information because it is a matter of right and wrong. It is right for us to get that information. It is wrong for the administration to withhold it. We are a separate but equal branch with the White House.

I thank my colleagues. I know this was a long statement, but this is a very important issue. And it is not just one reason against John Bolton; there are about six. I hope I have laid them out.

I thank you very much, Mr. President. I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. BOXER. I ask would ask the time in the quorum be divided equally between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would note that has been requested. It is so ordered.

Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of John Bolton. The question for me is, in a position of exceptional importance to the United States and our Government, that of representative to the world body—the United Nations, is John Bolton the kind of person who can best represent the interests of the United States? Is John Bolton the kind of personality who can negotiate and talk and establish personal relationships with the representatives of the other nations of the world as we try to carry forward the agenda of the United States? To those two questions, the answer is clearly no.

There are examples of former representatives to the United Nations, nominated by Republican Presidents—such as Ambassador Negroponte, such as a former Senator and former Ambassador John Danforth—who embody the type of person you would want representing our country before the United Nations.

This position is particularly critical to our country at this time because two of the greatest threats to the interests of the United States are North Korea and Iran, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Clearly we have an interest in preventing both countries from possessing the bomb, even though it looks as though North Korea already does. We ought to be making sure that at the end of the day North Korea does not have weapons of mass destruction that they can proliferate all over the world, particularly into the hands of terrorists.

The same with Iran. There is no evidence that Iran has a bomb now, but clearly the evidence is there that Iran is trying to achieve that. We need a representative in the United Nations who can help us work with other nations, particularly European nations, with regard to Iran. Also, we must focus on the nations in the region of North Korea, so, at the end of the day these two countries do not have nuclear weapons. This is in the clear interests not only of the United States, but it is in the clear interests of the world. Otherwise, you raise the possibility of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials getting into the hands of terrorists. And once that happens, Katie bar the door, we would have a whole new and extreme threat to the interests of the civilized world.

Is John Bolton the person who we think can establish those personal relationships within the United Nations? The relationships that we will need in order to get Europe to help us with Iran, and in order to get help with North Korea. I think that answer is clearly no.

The stakes are high. That is why I speak with passion. That is why I have spoken with passion as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

But there is more. The "more" is simple. Should John Bolton be promoted based on his performance in his existing job as arms control negotiator? Should he be promoted? I think the answer is clearly no because John Bolton has not done a good job. Look at those two nations I just mentioned, North Korea and Iran. Have we gotten anywhere in our arms control negotiations with regard to those two countries in the last 4 years when he was Under Secretary for Arms Control? The answer to that is no.

Why should we be promoting an individual who has not done his job well into a position of even higher visibility—I will not say of greater importance—of higher visibility as a representative of our country? It is clear to me that we should not.

If we didn't have this deal here about supporting the President's nominations, do you think if Senators on that side of the aisle voted their conscience, they would support this nomination? I think the answer is clearly no. Senator VOINOVICH has had the courage to stand up and call it as he sees it. I do not know Mr. Bolton, but I have observed him and I have observed his demeanor and I have looked at his record. I think his record is one that does not suggest we elevate him to this position of extreme prominence in the representation of the interests of the United States before the United Nations, particularly at this delicate time when we need our best representative at the United Nations. I think at the end of the day it is clear he should not be our representative at the United Nations. Therefore, I am going to vote no on the nomination of John Bolton.

I yield the floor.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time since Senator NELSON of Florida yielded the floor be charged against Republican-controlled time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. The President has made an inspired choice.

Mr. Bolton has the necessary experience, the knowledge of the U.N. system and the confidence of the President to be a successful advocate of U.S. policy at the United Nations.

As Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Mr. Bolton has taken a tough line

against the tyrants and the despots who wish to harm us.

He has stood up to Iran and North Korea, refusing to appease their nuclear ambitions.

Mr. Bolton is candid about his disdain for rogue regimes. He's not going to be dancing with Kim Jong Il—he called him a tyrannical dictator. That is fine with me. He has also been candid about the weaknesses of the United Nations. That is fine with me too.

The United States has sent forceful, blunt-speaking ambassadors to the United Nations before like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the United States has been better for it.

Senator Moynihan called the U.N. “a dangerous place” for American interests.

That is why it is necessary to send Mr. Bolton to the U.N.—to make sure that American interests are advanced.

He is outspoken, but he also is a skilled diplomat, who knows how to work with friends and allies, and has a proven track record of success in building coalitions to support vital objectives.

It was John Bolton who led the effort to create the Proliferation Security Initiative—a multinational coalition of nations, working together in unprecedented ways to stop the transport of dangerous weapons and materials at sea, on land and in the air. Some 60 nations are now supporting this effort.

When he was Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs, with the United Nations as part of his portfolio, he was the one responsible for the repeal of the odious 1975 “Zionism is Racism” resolution that was passed in the United Nations.

At a time when the United Nations continues to be plagued by scandal and mismanagement, the United States needs a strong presence to reform that body.

Just look at the scandals the UN is facing on oil-for-food, sexual abuse, theft, and sexual harassment:

We now know that Saddam Hussein, corrupt U.N. officials, and corrupt well-connected countries were the real benefactors of the Oil-for-Food Program.

They skimmed their illegal gain from illegal oil shipments, financial transactions, kickbacks, and surcharges and allowed Saddam Hussein to build up his armed forces and live in the lap of luxury while his people starved.

There have been allegations of sexual abuse in peacekeeping operations by U.N. personnel going back at least ten years, most recently in the Congo where 150 allegations of rape, pedophilia, and prostitution are being investigated.

The theft of \$3.8 million by an employee of the World Meteorological Organization led to the revelation that Mohammed Hassan apparently cashed an undetermined number of checks for his own enrichment, but his colleagues chose not to speak out.

There was a recent whitewash by the Secretary General of sexual harass-

ment by two senior U.N. officials, the High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nation's top oversight official.

This list of current scandals does not even begin to touch on broader issues such as the proper role of the United Nations and the need for fiscal responsibility and austerity. There has been a 42 percent increase in the U.N. regular budget over the past 10 years. The United Nations is supposed to have a zero nominal growth budget.

Those funds support programs with questionable value. We are all painfully aware that the United Nations has a Commission on Human Rights which includes notorious human rights abusers such as Sudan, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe.

The United Nations is imploding under the weight of its own scandals. And these scandals are helping to unveil the cronyism that is corroding the U.N. system. The U.N. is in desperate need of reform—and in desperate need of a reformer like John Bolton. Perhaps most importantly, John Bolton is a strong believer in sovereignty.

The principle of state sovereignty is what undergirds the entire international system.

Yet today we see respect for state sovereignty eroding all around us. We see it in the International Criminal Court's claim of authority to try the citizens of countries that have not consented to ICC jurisdiction. We see it in the U.N. false claim to have sole authority to permit the use of force.

These trends are dangerous, not only because the erosion of sovereignty is a threat to freedom, but because the erosion of respect for state sovereignty absolves states of their sovereign responsibilities to deal with problems within their borders.

It gives states an excuse to punt problems to supra-national bodies, like the UN and the ICC, instead of taking responsibility for problems that originate within their border from poor national governance. In the war on terror, every state needs to meet its sovereign responsibilities. As sovereignty has eroded, terrorists have taken advantage of these trends. John Bolton has the fortitude to stand up for what is right, fight the good fight, and prevail.

Secretary Rice called John Bolton a tough-minded diplomat. That's exactly what the U.S. needs at the U.N.—and exactly what the U.N. needs from the U.S.

Let me conclude by reinforcing why this body should support John Bolton's nomination. The U.S. does not need a U.N. representative for the world. We need a U.S. representative to the world. We need someone who has the interests of our country first and foremost in his mind as he represents us at the U.N.

There are many anti-U.S. forces at the U.N. Appeasement has never worked in dealing with aggressors. And

it will not work for our country at the U.N.

I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I say to my friend, the junior Senator from Nevada, he is right on target as he always is. The Senator is right: The policy of appeasement is what we have been watching for a long time. I have often said an appeaser is a guy who feeds his friends to the alligators hoping they eat him last.

Hiram Mann said:

No man survives when freedom fails,
The best men rot in filthy jails,
And those who cry appease, appease
Are hanged by those they tried to please.

John Bolton is not that appeaser. I am so much in support of this man. I have been listening to the criticisms, and I cannot figure who they are talking about. My feelings about John Bolton can be summed up by the former Governor of Massachusetts, William Weld. He is not someone I very often quote, very often agree with, but William Weld said:

He's strong medicine, all right, but sometimes strong medicine is needed, such as it is at the United Nations today.

I think he is actually very correct in that. My colleagues know I have many concerns about the United Nations and about Kofi Annan. I have been quite outspoken and a critic of his and the United Nations in general. It seems every day we hear new reasons to express outrage about the performance of the United Nations.

There are clearly abundant problems in the United Nations, particularly related to the Iraqi Oil for Food Program. We are not talking about thousands of dollars; we are talking about millions of dollars. We are talking about dollars with ties to the actual family of Kofi Annan.

Do not get me wrong, the United Nations should be a tremendous force for good in the world by providing a place for countries to cooperate and pursue and achieve the original missions of the U.N. founders: to promote freedom, peace, respect for human rights.

Unfortunately, it has been a disaster. I have grave concerns about the means that have been employed, reportedly, to achieve those ends.

The U.N. peacekeeping missions have been questionable. In addition, these operations rely heavily on the use of U.S. troops and funding in a way that threatens our military readiness and unfairly taxes our resources.

Other serious concerns are questions about the focus of the United Nations on its inefficient structure and massive bureaucracy which wastes American taxpayer dollars. This is significant because the United Nations operates by collection of assessments and dues. Each member of the United Nations is required to pay a certain percentage of the organization's budget based on their size and based on their ability to pay. I never quite understood the formula.

Since January of 2001, the United States was assessed 22 percent of the regular budget of the United Nations even though all nations, regardless of size, get the same vote in the General Assembly. This leads to the situation where the United States is forced to both subsidize the United Nations and go along with many of the decisions that are against our national interests.

As Americans, we should have no problem leading the way on the global stage on issues of peace, human dignity, and liberty, but the U.N.'s action in recent years has made it clear that the organization has lost its moorings. Unless things change for the better, we will want to reevaluate our support.

In addition to financial matters, there are several other areas in which the U.N. has shown itself to be badly in need of reform. I mentioned the oil-for-food scandal. We know about that. That has received a lot of attention—not enough but a lot of attention.

One of the elements of the oil-for-food scandal has not gotten as much attention, and that is what Saddam Hussein's regime was doing with the money they got by skimming from oil contracts negotiated under the program. As we learned from Charles Duelfer's Iraqi Survey Group report:

The ISG has been investigating Iraq's procurement process, sources of finance, the involvement of foreign firms, and the specific types of goods that were sought, Iraq utilized a complex and well developed procurement system hidden by an effective denial and deception strategy. By the late 1990s, Iraq, in contravention of U.N. sanctions, pursued the procurement of military goods and technical expertise for military capabilities . . .

. . . Money also was obtained from kick-back payments made on contracts set up through the U.N.'s Oil for Food Program. Iraq derived several billion dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil smuggling and kick-backs. One senior regime official estimated Iraq earned \$4 billion from illicit oil sales from 1999 to 2002. By levying a surcharge on Oil for Food contracts, Iraq earned billions more during the same period.

. . . this was revenue outside U.N. control and provided resources the regime could spend without restriction . . .

. . . Iraq imported banned military weapons, technology, and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts. Companies in several countries were involved in these efforts. Direct roles by government officials are also clearly established.

If this is the kind of program the U.N. runs, I don't know how anyone can get away with saying it does not need serious reform.

Another outrageous abuse of U.N. authority took place in the Democrat Republic of Congo. The U.N.'s own watchdog department, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, investigated alleged abuse by the U.N. peacekeeping forces in the northeastern Congolese town of Bunia and found a pattern of sexual exploitation of women and children which it said was continuing at the time of the report. U.N. peacekeepers working in the Democrat Republic of Congo sexually abused girls as young as 13. I have been to both Congos many times, and I have watched these things going on.

The other day I was in the Congo and I saw a fleet of cars, about 400 cars. I asked what they were. They had the U.N. symbol. They were cars that were going to take the peacekeeping people to remote areas of Africa.

I suggest for the reading of anyone who is interested in that part of the country, "King Leopold's Ghost." It tells what has happened in that country. I cannot help but believe that many of these U.N. peacekeepers are continuing to abuse these people, as we have seen in the past.

I have spoken many times on this floor about the redundant and counter-productive bureaucracy that has been built up, layer upon layer, providing cushy jobs with no accountability and little, if any, transparency. And I have also noted in the past the exorbitant cost of the renovation of the U.N. headquarters, for which American taxpayers are again footing the bill, we think. These issues, and others like them, remain unresolved and will continue to undermine the U.N.'s legitimacy around the world.

There are so many things we hear about over and over again, about the abuse of power of these peacekeepers going in, but I would like to share with you a personal experience. About 3 weeks ago, I was in Uganda, and in northern Uganda, on the southern Sudan border, there is a terrorist group there that has been operating for 30 years, with the same individual. They will go in and raid these camps, take these kids out—I am talking about 12-year-old kids—and arm them with guns, teach them to fight, and then send them back home to murder their parents. And if they don't do it, they cut their hands off.

Now, this is going on today. I saw it. I was there. Where is the United Nations? They are not there. They are not doing anything. I often wonder what they are doing. But something has to happen to change all of that.

That is where this nominee comes in. After reviewing John Bolton's credentials, I cannot tell you how strongly I endorse him. He has served as Under Secretary of State, is extremely qualified to hold the position of ambassador to the United Nations, and has an impressive record as an accomplished lawyer, diplomat, and scholar.

My colleagues have extolled Mr. Bolton's successes as a reformer in this Chamber before. He has a reputation of toughness, reliability, honor, and, yes, tenacity. Because of these very reasons, I believe Mr. Bolton will be extremely effective in this position and will best represent President Bush and the United States at the United Nations.

I have often watched the United Nations and have wondered sometimes, who is on our side? I can assure you, with John Bolton there, you are going to have someone on our side.

We have already spent a great deal of time discussing the Democrats' obstructionism this week, so I will only

say a few words about that now. The various political ploys used to hold up Mr. Bolton's nomination were frustrating and ridiculous, and were based on nothing more than personal dislike, attacks on this administration's policy, and a misguided and irresponsible vision for the United Nations.

Now, I have heard criticism that John Bolton should not be confirmed because he has opposed the U.N. activities and he has said negative things about the United Nations. That is all the more reason we should confirm him in this position. I often think how they say: Well, he doesn't like the United Nations. Why should we send him as our representative? That is exactly the kind of person who needs to be there to effect some changes. It is like saying, if you have a prison, that you need to have a convict running the prison. No, you do not. You need to have somebody who is wanting to come up with some reforms. So we need somebody who will reform the mess that is up there.

There are a lot of us who have said for a long period of time that we ought to just get out, just give up, that the United Nations is not looking after our best interests. I think with John Bolton there that will change. He has a proven record of success. He will do a great job. It is broke. He can fix it. We need to confirm his nomination.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I wish to join my colleague from Oklahoma and other colleagues who have risen today to support the nomination of John Bolton to be our U.N. ambassador.

The United Nations is a unique institution, obviously. It is an institution which has gone through its good times and some bad times. Many of us, on our side of the aisle especially, have been critical of the United Nations over the years for different activities, whether they have been policy driven or, in some cases, just the operations aspects of the United Nations. But I think, at least for my part, I agree that it is an extremely important institution, that it represents an attempt by the community of nations across the world to find a forum where they can interact and, hopefully, reach conclusions which are constructive to mankind generally and especially address issues which cannot and should not be addressed by nation states individually, such as issues involving large expansions of disease, issues involving the treatment of children around the world, issues involving the questions of war.

It is important we have a forum where nations can come together and try to work together and, if they disagree, at least have the disagreements be more transparent and, therefore, the ability, hopefully, to reach agreements, and at least have the capacity to temper those disagreements, which is more probable of occurring as a result of transparency.

It is an institution which, by its very nature, is going to have difficulty reaching consensus and moving forward on extremely complex issues and issues which are intensely felt because of the fact that it represents such a diverse collection of the world, almost the entire world, for all intents and purposes, nation states which all have different purposes and interests.

But it is a very important forum, and it is something that we, as a country, clearly were one of the originators of in San Francisco after the war. It actually is the outgrowth of Woodrow Wilson's concepts with the League of Nations. We have helped it evolve and grow, and we have basically underwritten it. The American taxpayers, for better or worse, pay approximately 25 percent of all the costs the U.N. incurs, whether they are operational costs or peacekeeping costs. That number varies between those two accounts, but the number is very significant.

I used to chair the appropriating committee which had jurisdiction over those funds, and it was frustrating at times to send the money because I felt their actions in a number of areas, to be kind, maybe involved a bit of mismanagement, to be kind, and in other areas were just misguided but were part of the whole.

As a participating member state, we have an obligation to support the institution and to try to correct it from within. How do you correct it from within? I think this administration has made a very aggressive effort to try to make the U.N. more accountable, first in the area of operations, in the area of just the basic management of the institution, reducing the amount of patronage, reducing the amount of misallocation of funds. This administration has focused aggressively on that. And secondly, this administration has made a very aggressive effort in the area of initiating policy, policy which may impact how we deal with AIDS in Africa, how we deal with the health care problems across the world, and the pandemics that are coming at us, regrettably, and how we deal, obviously, with peacekeeping initiatives in a variety of different pressure points around the world, especially in the Middle East and in Africa and, of course, in the Balkans to some degree.

So we have, as a Government—and this Government specifically, the Government under President George Bush—aggressively pursued policies to try to focus the U.N. on trying to be a better managed place and being an institution which better, more effectively reflects policies of democracy and liberty. That has been our basic theme in trying to work within the U.N. structure.

John Bolton brings to the table the expertise necessary to continue that initiative. He may be rough around the edges on occasion. There is no question about that. But there is also nothing wrong with that. If being rough around the edges on occasion is a detriment, a

personality trait which people should not have, then I guess there are a lot of us here who should not be in the Senate.

The fact is, you have to be aggressive and you have to be willing to assert your view and the views that you are projecting as a representative of this country if you are going to be effective in making a case for this Nation. John Bolton will accomplish that in the U.N., in my opinion. In fact, it is his type of personality in the sense of his willingness to aggressively advocate a position which is consistent with our promotion, as a nation, of liberty, democracy, and honesty within the management of the U.N. "Honesty" may be too strong a word, but at least more efficiency within the management of the U.N. That will be the greatest strength that he brings to the table there. People will understand clearly where America is coming from, and it is important they understand that. And the American taxpayer will know that we, within the hallways of the U.N., will have someone who is going to advocate for efficient and effective use of those tax dollars we are sending there. That is our right, I believe, as taxpayers, to ask for that type of leadership within the U.N.

So John Bolton, in my opinion, with his broad expertise in foreign policy and with his commitment to promoting this administration's commitment to the promotion of liberty and the promotion of democracy across the globe, and to fighting terrorism, is the right person for this job. I regret he has been held up. And it appears Members of the other side intend to try to filibuster his appointment.

A President should have, just as a matter of policy, a person in the position at the U.N. who is of his choosing. This is the right of a President, to send a person to the U.N. who the President feels most effectively will advocate the policies of the administration because it is, after all, the President who has the primary responsibility of promoting foreign policy within our Government structure. It is not the responsibility of the Congress, although there are a lot of folks in this body who appear to think they are Secretary of State. The fact is, the Constitution does not provide that portfolio to the Congress, it provides it to the President and the President's appointees to Cabinet-level positions, which the U.N. ambassador position represents.

So it seems highly inappropriate that we should be holding up his nomination unless someone can show definitively that he does not have the personal integrity or the personal honesty to serve in the position. If individuals disagree with his ability or his capacity to carry out the job, that is not really our call, unless that disagreement is a function of honesty, integrity relative to the individual's qualifications, because in this instance it is the President's right to pick the individual he thinks can carry out the job most ef-

fectively, and the President has picked John Bolton.

I have not heard anything from anybody that calls into question John Bolton's integrity or honesty. I heard a lot of people who expressed frustration about maybe how he manages individuals, but that clearly is not the criteria for rejecting a nominee to a Cabinet-level position. If it were, there would have been a lot of nominees rejected under every President who has ever nominated individuals because all of us have warts, and many of those people who have been nominated to Cabinet positions clearly had a number of warts.

So I do think it is inappropriate to pursue a filibuster in this instance. To have a policy disagreement with the President as to the way he approaches the U.N., that may be appropriate. That policy disagreement can be debated, but it should not ensue or lead logically to a filibuster of an individual who has a nomination to the position because it is, after all, the President's right to choose individuals to serve at his Cabinet-level positions. Those individuals should be confirmed in a timely manner so that the President has the capacity to pursue foreign policy initiatives and the leadership of this Nation on the issues of foreign policy with a full complement, a full team of individuals to support his initiatives.

I do hope we will move forward to a final vote on Mr. Bolton this afternoon. People who feel he is the wrong choice—and they may have policy differences with the President on how we are pursuing liberty and democracy across the globe—can vote against him on that basis, but at least give him a vote, and give him a vote promptly.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENSIGN). The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of John Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

Let me begin, briefly, by stating what this nomination and debate is not about. It is not about reform at the United Nations. There is not a single Member of this body who I know of who does not agree with the notion that we ought to be doing everything we can to make the United Nations a stronger institution, a more meaningful one, in today's world, where more direct actions can be taken where problems exist around the world to make it more efficient, to function better. All of us agree with that, and all of us agree that whoever assumes this position as ambassador from the United States to the U.N. ought to play a critical role in that effort. That is not in question here. That is not a matter of debate.

What is also not a matter of debate is the style of the particular nominee in question. I think all of us in this city certainly respect the fact that some people's style is a little more brusque than others, can be a little more blunt

than others. I do not know of anyone, certainly on this side of the aisle—or that side, for that matter—who disagrees with a nominee because they do not particularly like their style, although they may have been particularly rough on some employees. We may not applaud it. We may not like it. We may think it is unwise and bad management style. But almost nobody in this Chamber on either side has objections to this nominee solely because of the question of reform at the United Nations or whether Mr. Bolton's style is objectionable or not.

My objection to this nomination focuses on one single issue. Members will have to decide for themselves whether they think this issue is of such importance that it would disqualify Mr. Bolton from the position he has now been nominated to or allow him to go forward.

The facts are no longer in debate. It is often said in this Chamber, you are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts. The facts are overwhelming in terms of the allegation that Mr. Bolton, whatever his motivations may have been—and I suspect I know what they were—decided that because he disagreed with some intelligence analysts, he wanted them removed from their jobs.

I have never objected, nor would I—in fact, I agree with my colleague from Michigan who spoke so eloquently, that, in fact, there ought to be more debate between policy centers and intelligence analysts. What was missing during the debate on Iraq, as to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, was the absence of debate between policymakers and intelligence analysts. None of us, that I know of, disagree with the notion that there ought to be more debate. Where policy setters disagree with intelligence analysis, they ought to express that objection and tell people they think it is wrong. But if you go beyond just disagreeing, if you go beyond forceful debate, if you reach down and decide you are going to remove or try to remove an intelligence analyst from their position because you don't like what they are saying to you, that then crosses a line.

I don't care whether it is a Democratic administration or a Republican one. If this body, by a vote of confirmation says to a person who seeks the position of ambassador to the United Nations, that even though you have tried to fire intelligence analysts because you disagreed with their analysis, then I think we send a dreadful signal at the very time in the world that our credibility on intelligence is in question.

We all know that to be the case, regrettably. We have been through a dreadful period where intelligence was very wrong in assuming there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So the issue for this Senator is, did Mr. Bolton do this or not? And if he did, why are we even considering this nomination? Because anyone, regardless of the administration, their political per-

suasion or ideology, who tries to fire people, not debate, not disagree with them, not reprimand some higher official because he disagrees with what they are saying, but to reach down and fire an analyst at the CIA or the Department of State because you don't like what they were telling you, in my view, crosses a line.

This body has an obligation to the American public to stand up and say: We will not tolerate that.

This is far more important than Mr. Bolton. It is far more important even than this President or this Congress.

The issue goes far beyond any individuals. It goes to the heart of whether we are going to have credible intelligence which we, as Members of Congress, can believe, and our allies around the world, and from those we seek to find support on various foreign policies who will understand the purposes for which we are seeking their support. That is what I worry about more than anything else.

Yesterday I spoke on the floor about the availability of information. The reason I had requested, and that we have an expedited version of a cloture motion, doesn't have to do with whether or not Mr. Bolton should have an up or down vote. I want to have an up or down vote on Mr. Bolton. But I also believe this body has a right to information.

When the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee are deprived the opportunity to read the names on the intelligence intercepts, the names Mr. Bolton could see, that his staff could see, but that the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee are deprived the opportunity to see, then we are not getting the information we ought to have in order to make an intelligent decision.

The only vehicle I have available to me is to say, I am going to insist upon a 60-vote criteria unless you give us the information. It is 11:20. I am still waiting. There is no reason for us to have to have a cloture vote this afternoon. Instead, we can have a simple up-or-down vote on Mr. Bolton at 6 o'clock tonight, if in the next hour or two the administration would release those names to the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the information Senator BIDEN is seeking regarding the matter of the supposed weapons of mass destruction in Syria. There are not a lot of documents. It wouldn't take much time. But if we can't get those documents, if we are not being allowed to see the very things the nominee had a right to see, then I don't think we are being treated as a coequal branch of Government that has a right, through the appropriate means, with the appropriate members. I am not suggesting every

member of the committees should see these names, but that the appropriate people we have designated historically have access to that kind of information for a nomination such as the one before us.

I am still hopeful that will happen. I am not so naive as to be unaware of what we have just been through in the debate about filibusters on Federal judges. I would not have brought up this nomination right now in the wake of that. I thought we were going to deal with Federal judges, not the nominee to the United Nations. But the majority, as is its right, sets the agenda. They have asked this Congress, this Senate to debate the issue of Mr. Bolton.

I am put in the position of saying: I guess after all of this you can do what you want and deny us that information. I would hope some of my Republican friends, despite the fact they are going to vote for Mr. Bolton, would vote with us on the cloture motion. I took some interest in the fact that even on the House Republican side, the difficulty that major committees of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, are having in getting information from this administration is growing. If we don't at some point stand up for our rights as a constitutionally designated coequal branch of Government, then this administration will receive the message that we don't care about this and that we can deny this Congress anything we want and they will do nothing about it.

So aside from how you feel about Mr. Bolton, yes or no, it is important for this institution to stand up for its rights and to demand this information as we have a right to.

I am hopeful we can still get the information and not have to go through a cloture vote at 6 o'clock this evening.

Let me get back to the subject matter of Mr. Bolton himself. The reasons for my concern are primarily focused on one issue. That is, of course, whether Mr. Bolton tried to fire people within the CIA and the State Department because he did not like the analysis they were giving him.

What is extraordinary about this nomination, first and foremost, is the number of people on whom we have relied, considering their status, who oppose this nomination. I would like to read the names. I am not suggesting all of these people are opposed to Mr. Bolton, but the basis upon which we have determined that Mr. Bolton tried to fire two intelligence analysts relied primarily on the names on this particular chart. I want to read the names and the positions they hold. It was these individuals, more than anything else, who made a significant difference in our conclusions that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to fire these individuals.

John McLaughlin was the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

These individuals are either presently members of the Bush administration, this President, or were formerly members of the Bush administration.

Larry Wilkerson was chief of staff to Secretary Colin Powell; Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. The dates of their service are here. They are all dates that run roughly 2002, 2003, up to the present time, or just a month or so ago.

Stuart Cohen, Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; Alan Foley, head of the CIA's Office of Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control; Jamie Miscik, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA; Thomas Hubbard, United States Ambassador to South Korea, a Bush appointee; John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Christian Westermann, analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Neil Silver, Office Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; INR supervisor, we don't use his name here, the immediate supervisor of Mr. Westermann; Fred Fleitz, acting chief of staff of John Bolton; Wil Taft, Department of State legal advisor; and a Department of State attorney whose name we are not using as well in the office of legal advisor.

These are 15 individuals either presently serving in the Bush administration or having previously served. It is on them that we relied. It is their damning statements that confirm without any question that Mr. Bolton essentially tried to have these intelligence analysts fired. They also provided other damaging information.

I have been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 24 years. Those who have served with me know it is rare, indeed, for this member to get up and object to a Presidential nomination, particularly one that is not a lifetime appointment. In fact, as my colleagues who have served with me for some time know, I have been one of only a handful who have supported nominees of Republican administrations. I was one of two Democrats who supported John Tower when he was nominated to be Secretary of Defense under President Bush's father. I supported John Ashcroft in the first administration of the current President Bush, one of only a handful of Democrats who did that.

I tried to recall an instance when I have taken such a strong objection to another nominee in 24 years. I can't recall one that has gone this far. I have had my objections to others, but they usually didn't reach this particular point. So it is uncomfortable for me to come to the floor to engage, over almost the last 2 months, in this nomination. But when you add the names of 102 former ambassadors, 15 present or former members of the Bush administration, these are not Democrats, these

are not some left-wing organizations that are out there objecting to John Bolton. These are serious people who do a serious job, many of them career officials who have served our country with great distinction over the years. These individuals are the ones on whom we relied to draw their conclusion.

I am going to share with my colleagues their statements, not mine, not the names of some Democrats who might have some political motivation but, rather, people who care about our country, care about the United Nations, believe it needs reform, believe we need a strong person there to engage in that kind of reform, but believe John Bolton is not the person who ought to be receiving the nomination.

The committee did an extensive review of all the allegations related to this nominee. Committee staff, on a bipartisan basis, conducted more than 30 interviews of individuals with knowledge of the nominee. There was excellent cooperation on the part of most of those staff we sought to interview. I believe the work of this Senate has been assisted by these individuals who courageously came forward to answer questions and provide information that in many cases they would rather not have done. These individuals did not want to speak ill of another Republican or a former colleague. But they acted as dutiful citizens, patriots, and cooperated with the committee's efforts to fully explore matters related to the nomination of John Bolton. Regardless of how this Senate disposes of this nomination, these individuals have done a service to our country. We should honor them for doing so, for having the courage to come forward and to be honest when asked questions about this nominee.

Mr. Bolton's behavior clearly troubled a number of people who have worked directly with him over the last number of years.

Former Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford, a self-proclaimed conservative Republican, described Mr. Bolton as "the quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy." He also labeled Mr. Bolton a "serial abuser."

We did not hear from any people disabusing the committee of that view. That he has an abusive management style is problematic, but as I said at the outset, that would not be justification for voting against Mr. Bolton to be the ambassador to the United Nations. This is not about style. It is not about reform of the U.N. It is about whether this individual tried to fire intelligence analysts in his position as Under Secretary of State.

However, when Mr. Bolton harnesses that management style of his, as he has over the last 4 years, to affect intelligence judgments or to stifle the consideration of alternative policy opinions, then I think he has crossed the line over what is acceptable behavior. Why? Because those actions go directly to the heart of the integrity of

U.S. intelligence and the firewall that must exist between policy and intelligence to ensure the integrity of that intelligence. Again, I emphasize, this is not about a disagreement. It is not about a policymaker disagreeing with an intelligence analyst.

Intelligence analysts do not speak ex cathedra. They are not sitting there coming to conclusions that we ought not to question. That is legitimate. In fact, we need more questioning. The issue is whether one ought to go beyond questioning and decide to remove someone because you disagree with their conclusions.

When this committee convened last month to consider the matter, we had irrefutable evidence—this is not conjecture—and this body has to decide whether you are going to send this man forward in the face of irrefutable evidence that on 5 different occasions over the past 48 months, Mr. Bolton tried to have 2 intelligence analysts removed from their jobs—one at the State Department and one at the CIA—because these individuals would not clear the language Mr. Bolton wanted to use, which was not supported by available intelligence.

I emphasize another point that needs to be made. When Mr. Bolton speaks as John Bolton, he can say whatever he wants. But when he gets up and says, "I am speaking on behalf of the United States," then there is a different standard. When you speak on behalf of our country, you cannot just say anything you want. You have to rely on the best intelligence we have. You may disagree with that and you can fight over it, but in the final analysis you cannot offer your own opinions when you are expressing them as the U.S. views. You can say John Bolton believes this. If Mr. Bolton wants to speak to the Heritage Foundation and say, "I believe the following," I may think he is profoundly wrong, but I would fight with my life for John Bolton to be able to say it. That is first amendment rights.

It is when Mr. Bolton gets up and says, "I am speaking on behalf of the United States of America and I want to say the following," and then he absolutely contradicts what is being concluded by the intelligence analysts here, at that point, it seems to me he has a higher responsibility than he has shown.

Carl Ford's testimony was a watershed for me. Never in my 24 years as a Senator have I ever witnessed one high-ranking, former administration official testify as vociferously and as strongly as Mr. Ford did against a colleague. That is exactly what he did last month. Carl Ford made it clear why he did so. He believed Mr. Bolton's actions caused a chill among his intelligence analysts—so much so that the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had to buck up the employees to assure them that they should not succumb to political pressure.

Because we have talked a lot about this, I used this chart in the Foreign

Relations Committee. I realize from a distance it looks like a lot of spaghetti. What it amounts to is the chart of the positions of the State Department, beginning with the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Chief of State, Executive Secretary, and the various Under Secretary positions here. The third one is Mr. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. That is his responsibility, this group right here. He was in charge of the people who worked in this particular column.

Where did that intelligence analyst work? He worked down here. You have to go way down to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, who was head of the INR. This intelligence analyst was down here; that is where Mr. Westermann worked. He was not directly in Mr. Bolton's line of command, but in a separate division. He is a GS-14 at this level.

You need to understand what happened here. This was a case where Mr. Bolton doesn't get ahold of Mr. Ford and say: I have a problem with your intelligence analyst because I disagree with what he said. I think he is wrong and I want to argue about it.

Mr. Bolton reaches down out of his line and drags this guy up to his office and begins to berate him for the job he has done. That is objectionable to me, and outrageous. If it ended there, that is dreadful behavior and nobody ought to do that without clearing what you want to say with the people who are responsible for that individual's work. If it ended there, maybe I would just vote against the nominee and I would not make the case on that basis alone. It is what happens afterward. It is not just berating. There is no doubt that there would be chill in the Department if an Under Secretary of State dragged an intelligence analyst to his office and word goes out. As we all know, in institutions the word flies around immediately. One of our fellow workers has been dragged up to the Under Secretary's office and screamed at because he didn't like his conclusions. That is why Colin Powell, the guy at the top, had to go down to these offices—down here on the chart—and explain to them that they did the right thing. You, Mr. Westermann, did the right thing. You are not supposed to succumb to political pressure. You tell people what they think they need to hear, and if they don't like it and disagree with you, that is one thing. But you did the right thing. It was wrong by implication, because why would the Secretary of State go down here and bring these analysts together and remind them that they had done their job if he felt Mr. Westermann being dragged up to Mr. Bolton's office was not wrong? That is why the Secretary of State did that. He went down there to tell those people not to worry about this, do your jobs. I think the Secretary was worried that the word would go out to these analysts that if you don't want to get in

trouble, start to agree with Mr. Bolton when he disagrees with you; that is the easy thing to do. If he tells the analyst you ought to say the following, you better say that. If you do, you won't be brought up to his office and bellowed at. That is dangerous and that is one of the reasons we have such concern about this nomination.

As I said, this was the conclusion of Secretary Powell, according to Mr. Wilkerson, his chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson, who was the chief of staff of Secretary Powell, testified before the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee the following: Secretary Powell "went down into the bowels of the building and talked to people about not being inhibited by, or in any way fearful of, people on the seventh floor, or leadership in general, questioning their analyses or their statements or whatever."

Mr. Bolton had a very selective recollection about his interactions and intentions with respect to intelligence analysts at the State Department and the CIA during his appearance before the committee.

Mr. Bolton told the committee:

I didn't seek to have these people fired. I didn't seek to have discipline imposed on them. I said, "I've lost trust in them." And are there other portfolios they could follow. It wasn't anything to me that I followed at great length. I made my point and moved on.

Committee staff interviews and review of State and CIA documents paint a very different picture indeed. What is that picture?

First, with respect to Mr. Westermann. Six months after this event I have described on the chart with—this run-in occurred, Mr. Bolton was still seeking to have Mr. Westermann removed from his job as the biological weapons expert analyst at the Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department.

Mr. Bolton's recollection about what he did with respect to the CIA analyst was likewise clouded on April 11. As to the so-called "Mr. Smith," as we called him to protect identity, Mr. Bolton said:

I had one part of one conversation with one person one time on "Mr. Smith," and that was it. I let it go.

We now know that much more than that occurred. Let me lay it out for you.

In addition to a meeting with the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, we now know from e-mails that Mr. Bolton considered raising the matter directly with the Director of the CIA, George Tenet. We know as well that he continued to conspire with former Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich and his office for a period of 4 months after he first "lost confidence" in "Mr. Smith" to have him removed from his job.

Also under consideration by Mr. Reich and Bolton were other punitive measures—we know this now—such as denial of country clearance for Mr. Smith's official travel throughout

Latin America, banning him from all meetings held in their bureaus. And the ultimate act of pettiness—consider revoking his State Department building pass.

I am not making this stuff up. He said he had "one part of one conversation with one person one time, and I let it go."

Hardly. The facts are overwhelming here regarding what he tried to do both at the State Department and the CIA.

We have also learned that other intelligence analysts were having difficulties with Mr. Bolton's office.

Jami Miscik, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 2002 to 2005, in the Bush administration, told the committee staff that Mr. Bolton had a reputation for being difficult to deal with. She noted that "interaction between policymakers and the intelligence community usually goes more smoothly than it often did . . . in the cases with Mr. Bolton . . . It is rare that . . . a single policymaker is known for having . . . pretty regularly contentious kinds of issues in this regard."

We know as well that expert intelligence officials disapproved of and resisted Mr. Bolton's efforts to "cherry-pick" intelligence for ideological purposes.

Dean Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 2003 to 2005, described the "cherry-picking" problem in the context of what Mr. Bolton wanted the Intelligence Committee to bless with respect to Syria's weapons of mass destruction capabilities:

Mr. Bolton took isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry picking of little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest possible case.

We also know that Deputy Secretary Armitage didn't trust Mr. Bolton's judgments when it came to making public speeches. We have heard this from others, such as GEORGE VOINOVICH, as well as CARL LEVIN, as well as BARBARA BOXER and others, who have spoken on this matter.

Mr. Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff, told the committee:

There were problems on a number of occasions with Under Secretary Bolton's proposed remarks. . . . The Deputy, Mr. Armitage, made a decision and communicated that decision to me, that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor would he give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by Rich Armitage.

With all of the other duties Deputy Secretary Armitage had in managing the Department in Secretary Powell's absence, he also felt he had to babysit Mr. Bolton because the normal clearance procedures established by the Department didn't work with Mr. Bolton. Yet, this body is now being asked to vote to send Mr. Bolton to New York, where he will be unsupervised on a daily basis. Lord only knows the kind of problems that can ensue with Mr. Bolton, given his past performance.

Individuals under Bolton's direct line of authority also took issue with the

rigidity of his views. John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation and a career diplomat, told committee staff that Mr. Bolton “tended to hold onto his own views strongly and . . . he tended not to be enthusiastic about alternative views. And he did not encourage us to provide our views to the Secretary.”

Again, I am not arguing about someone's style here. But when you have 125 employees at the U.N. and the only things you want to hear are the things you agree with, that is a management style that is dangerous for a person who is going to work with all of the nations we have to build relationships with in the U.N. We all do this as Senators. We know when a staff member gets up and wants to tell us an alternative view, it is uncomfortable. We would like them to agree with us. We also know how vitally important it is as Senators that people in our offices who have the willingness to stand up and know when they do, they are not going to be threatened with their jobs, or considered for removal because they are telling us something we don't want to hear. We understand the value of that. Mr. Bolton doesn't. That is dangerous.

Mr. Wolf said:

Some of the officers within the non-proliferation bureau complained that they felt undue pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary, versus the views that they thought they could support.

That is a dangerous statement, that we have somebody who is about to take on a position who would make others feel they were unfit or are being pressured to conform their views.

All of these matters I have just mentioned cause me grave concern about this nomination. But what troubled me the most were the devastating comments made by Secretary Powell's chief of staff, Mr. Wilkerson, an individual who on a day-to-day basis was in a position to know what was going on in the Department and what foreign policy challenges the Secretary of State was attempting to manage.

This is what he has to say about Mr. Bolton's single-minded preoccupation with sanctioning every Chinese entity he could find which might have violated nonproliferation standards:

Are we actually stopping China's proliferation through sanctions that was dangerous to our interests? Or are we doing it, and ignoring problems that cry out for cures, diplomatic? The one time I had a conversation with John about this, I asked him, “How do you go beyond sanctions, John? War?” Mr. Bolton replied, “It is not my business.”

Mr. Wilkerson also explained to our committee staff why he believes Mr. Bolton is ill suited for the U.N. position. I am quoting Mr. Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff. This is not some liberal left-leaning Senator or Congressman or columnist talking about Mr. Bolton. This is the former chief of staff of a Republican Secretary of State under George Bush—this President's administration:

One, I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there at the United

Nations that have to be led; they have to be led well, and they have to be led properly. And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up there—

Speaking about Mr. Bolton—
you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year.

Second, I differ with a lot of people in Washington, as to his brilliance. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans . . . had no willingness—and in many cases no capacity to understand other things that were happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations.

These are very serious conclusions from an individual who was a loyal and trusted member of Secretary Powell's team, and they go to the heart of whether Mr. Bolton has the capacity to carry out his duties at the United Nations. This is not about whether we like the nominee's views on the United Nations, arms control, or Cuba. He is entitled to his personal views about any of those matters, and he should not be disqualified from any office because he has them. But for the interests of the United States to be served at the United Nations, there has to be a balance between ideology and pragmatism.

The individual on the spot in New York will be called upon, from time to time, to strike that balance. He also must have the credibility to make the best case for the United States before that international body. These things are at the heart of effective diplomacy.

Ambassador Negroponte was able to strike that balance between ideology and pragmatism and have the credibility to make the case of the United States before the U. N. Security Council. Senator John Danforth, a former colleague, was able to do so as well.

Based on what we have learned about Mr. Bolton in recent days, I seriously doubt he is willing or able to strike that balance, and I now know, given his penchant for stretching intelligence and pressuring analysts, that his credibility will be challenged by other U.N. members.

Our colleagues brush aside this problem by saying Mr. Bolton will be getting his instructions from Secretary Rice. Mr. President, that is just not realistic at all. Much of the guidance that is developed for our U.N. ambassadors is developed cooperatively between Washington and New York. What gets said at the United Nations by a representative is, in large measure, shaped by our reporting from our mission in New York. I feel Mr. Bolton will be incapable of making the kind of judgments that move the diplomatic process forward.

We all know these are difficult times. Our responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan are significant and costly. Other challenges to international peace and stability loom large on the horizon—Iran, North Korea, the Middle East. The humanitarian crises in Africa and Asia cry out for attention. The United States cannot solve these problems all by ourselves. We know that. We need tremendous international as-

sistance and cooperation to address them, and the logical focal point for addressing that international support is the United Nations. It makes sense.

But international support will not be automatically forthcoming and will require, as we all know, U.S. leadership at the U.N. to build the case for such cooperation. That U.S. leadership must necessarily be embodied in the individual who serves as our ambassador to the United Nations is obvious.

Based on what I know today about Mr. Bolton, I believe he is incapable of demonstrating that kind of leadership. The ambassador to the United Nations is a very important position. The individual who assumes that position is necessarily the face of our country before the world.

For all the reasons I have cited—Mr. Bolton's management style, his attack on the intelligence community, his tunnel vision, his lack of diplomatic temperament—I do not believe he is our man to be the face at the United Nations.

But of all those reasons, I come back to the one I made at the outset. It is not about style, it is not about reform at the United Nations, it is not about Mr. Bolton's views on a variety of subject matters. Our colleagues have to make a decision. We now know, categorically, without any question whatsoever, that this nominee tried to fire intelligence analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. That evidence comes from his own colleagues, from people with whom he has served, not from outside groups or members of this body.

The decision for our colleagues today is whether or not we promote someone who has done that and what message it sends to the analyst community, what message it sends to our allies, and what message it sends to our adversaries, for that matter, around the globe. That this individual who engaged in such reprehensible behavior, in my view, should be given the position of U.N. ambassador to represent the United States at this critical hour, I think is a massive mistake.

Again, I am still hopeful that in the remaining hours of this debate, the administration will see fit to provide the additional information for which we have asked for almost 2 months. I regret deeply having to ask my colleagues to vote on a cloture motion. I have said, if cloture is invoked, we will vote immediately on Mr. Bolton. If it is not invoked, it will layover, and we will continue to try to get the information.

I have no desire to filibuster this nomination. I do have a desire to see the Senate stand up for its rights when it seeks information—information the nominee had access to but the chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and Foreign Relations Committee were denied. That is a precedent we need not make with this decision.

My hope is our colleagues will support the opposition on the cloture motion and, if we get a vote on Mr. Bolton today, we reject this nominee. There are many qualified, blunt, forceful people who can assume this job who embrace the President's view on foreign policy and who will do a very good job at the United Nations. John Bolton is not that individual.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DODD. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I commend the very able Senator from Connecticut both for his statement and for the letter that he and the ranking member of the committee, Senator BIDEN, sent to a number of us about the necessity of trying to get these materials which we have sought.

Clearly the Congress needs this information in order to do its job. The position of the Senator from Connecticut on the cloture motion, as I understand it, is that we ought not to invoke cloture and move to a vote on Bolton until the material is provided. If the material is made available and we are in a position to make judgments, then I take it we can move forward in the normal course of the debate toward a final vote on Bolton's nomination; is that correct?

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in response to my friend and colleague from Maryland, that is exactly the point.

Mr. SARBANES. That strikes me as an eminently reasonable position. It needs to be made clear that there is material the executive branch is refusing to make available to the Senate, and which we need in order to be adequately informed in carrying out our responsibilities of advising and consenting on this nomination.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague from Maryland, I was going to recite to him—because I think some of my colleagues may think this Senator from Connecticut has raised this issue in the last 24 hours as a delaying tactic—I want to point out to my colleagues the chronology which begins actually on April 11—approaching 2 months ago. Then there were subsequent requests on April 14, April 22, April 29, May 4, May 18, as well as even as late, as of course, we all know, yesterday.

I want to make it clear that from very early on, we tried to get this information. I emphasize, again, these are names Mr. Bolton has seen, his staff has seen, and we are not asking every Member see, only the ranking members and the chairmen of the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, to let them know whether or not the names coincide with the names of people we have run across in our examination of Mr. Bolton to be a nominee to the U.N.

The chairman of the Intelligence Committee will tell you they had an interview with General Hayden and he showed them some documents. But in

his letter to our colleagues last evening, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee very honestly pointed out that the names of the 19 individuals in the 10 intercepts he sought are redacted. The only pertinent information is those names and the motivation Mr. Bolton had in seeking that information.

The heart of the request—even the Intelligence Committee chairman cannot see it. Yet Mr. Bolton could see it, his staff could see it. But the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee is not allowed to see it. Every Senator ought to be outraged about that. If we let them get away with it here, they will get away with it every single day hereafter. Either we stand up for our rights as a Senate, as a coequal branch of Government, or we do not.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. Yes, I yield.

Mr. SARBANES. It is not every single day hereafter for this administration; it becomes a precedent for every administration. And I suggest to all Members of the Senate that they may find themselves, down the road at some point, seeking information they think is relevant and having it denied to them by the executive branch, citing the refusal to provide the information in the Bolton case as a precedent for the action they are taking.

Mr. DODD. Again, the Senator from Maryland is absolutely correct. These issues come back and come around and the word spreads: You can get away with this. It is not just this administration. The Senator is correct. Future administrations will use this as an example of why they do not have to comply with the request because previous Congresses allowed this information to be kept secret when Senate committees were seeking it.

Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAMHAM). The Senator has 19 minutes.

Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent that the remaining time I have be divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. REED, also asked for time. I had 60 minutes, and want to give up some time.

Mr. MARTINEZ. If I can make an inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.

Mr. MARTINEZ. My understanding is the Senator from Arizona was going to be recognized during this timeframe for his remarks.

Mr. DODD. I have a little less than 20 minutes remaining. What I want to do is give the 20 minutes I have left to my colleagues to use. Mr. President, I make that request, that the time remaining be divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The remain-

ing time is divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. DODD. And Senator REED from Rhode Island also seeks some of that time. Just Senator REED and Senator KENNEDY. The Senator Maryland has time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, first, I commend the very able Senator from Connecticut not only for his statement on the floor, but the very reasoned and judicious way he has proceeded in considering this nomination.

I join with those who think the refusal to provide the information constitutes a sufficient basis not to invoke cloture while we continue to press the administration to provide the information the Senate needs in order to do its job.

I spoke yesterday with the distinguished Ranking Member of the committee, Senator BIDEN, on the floor about this issue, and I have done so again here today with my friend, the Senator from Connecticut. I strongly urge my colleagues to take that position because it is a very important question of the role the Senate should play, and whether we really are an independent branch of the Government that will act to carry out our responsibilities.

Let me now address the substance of the Bolton nomination. In the 60 years since the founding of the United Nations, a number of extraordinarily distinguished men and women have been chosen to represent us in that body as the U.S. ambassador: Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., James Wadsworth, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George W. Ball, James Russell Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William Scranton, Andrew Young, Donald McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters, Thomas Pickering, Edward Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright, Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, and John Danforth.

The fact that at least 17 of them, spanning 8 administrations—Republican and Democratic—have been elevated to serve on the President's Cabinet demonstrates the critical importance in which this position historically has been held.

The fact that we proudly remember so many of these names, after the passage of a number of years, underscores both the visibility of the U.N. ambassador and the statesmanship that the position requires. On a daily basis, our ambassador to the U.N. speaks to the entire world on behalf of the United States.

The comments our ambassador makes and the relationships he or she cultivates make the difference between a United States that is respected as a leader in the world, setting an example of American values and principles, and a United States that is ignored and misunderstood.

In today's world, this difference affects the lives of millions at home and abroad. The United Nations is not a tool to be used "when it suits our interest and when we can get others to go along," as Mr. Bolton has suggested but is, rather, an essential and ongoing forum for the advancement of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of U.S. national security interests.

The U.N. makes decisions that affect war and peace. It helps to determine whether the United States will have international support and allies or will be forced to undertake difficult missions on its own in the face of broad opposition across the globe. Skillful work at the U.N. enables us to have burden sharing, both in terms of the commitment of human resources and the commitment of financial sources.

The United Nations offers us an opportunity to make our case to the world, to demonstrate international leadership, and to build multilateral cooperation. As Secretary General Annan commented in a recent speech, the U.N. "is not just a building in Manhattan, or a piece of international machinery. It embodies a conviction on the part of people everywhere that we live on a small planet, and that our safety, our prosperity, our rights—indeed, our freedoms—are indivisible." For this reason, our representatives at the United Nations must be men and women of exceptional wisdom and credibility, who can listen and persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations will seek and rely upon.

Despite the need for a U.N. ambassador who recognizes and can make the most of the U.N.'s potential and promise, we have before us now a nominee to be our ambassador to the U.N., who over a number of years has demonstrated outright hostility toward the United Nations as an institution and toward the fundamental legitimacy of international law. Mr. Bolton has argued repeatedly that the United States has no legal obligation to pay its dues to the United Nations and that treaties are nothing more than "political commitments".

He called the Law of the Sea Treaty, which has been endorsed by our military and submitted by President Bush as an urgent priority for Senate advice and consent, "an illegitimate method of forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside the customary political process." He is quoted as saying:

It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short term interest to do so—because, over the long-term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States.

To send someone as our ambassador to the United Nations who does not demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and its legal foundations is a disservice to our national interests. This has nothing to do with whether reforms are needed at the U.N. or

whether we should more closely monitor its activities. Many of us are committed to doing both of those things. It is a very basic question of one's mindset about the United States, about the United Nations and about international law. If other nations believe that the U.S. is not out to reform the United Nations but to undercut it, then they are likely not to be receptive to any of our criticisms or recommendations.

Secondly, it is clear that Mr. Bolton does not have the diplomatic skills or, indeed, the demeanor to represent our country effectively at the U.N. There are certainly moments when the situation may call for bluntness, when abandoning diplomatic niceties can convey the urgency of a particular issue or position. However, Mr. Bolton has shown a propensity for making extreme and provocative statements that have caused unnecessary conflict and confrontation. It is not an occasional outburst that might, on occasion, be justified by the situation but, regrettably, a routine way of doing business.

Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which the U.N. is to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security Council should have one permanent member, the United States, "because that is the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world"?

Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton's assertion that "if the U.N. Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference" will help us in persuading other countries to support U.N. reform efforts?

These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the tongue but, rather, his customary and consistent approach to dealing with others who disagree with him. Even given the opportunity to demonstrate a less confrontational approach, he has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. Bolton, time and again, has shown himself singularly lacking in the willingness to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of view.

Contrast that attitude with these comments made by Ambassador Moynihan and Ambassador Kirkpatrick when they were nominated for this position. Ambassador Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the committee, said:

A certain principled statement of views on both sides can be useful: it requires that we respect what others think and try to understand what they think and ask that they do the same in return. . . . Things where we disagree are marginal compared with where we do agree. And yet it is so easy to grow estranged at the first problem, the first question is how to get away from a confrontation system back to the quest for understanding and agreement in a situation where this is wholly possible and entirely necessary.

Similarly, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing before the committee, said:

I do not think that one should ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention and hope of doing is to operate in a low key, quiet, persuasive and consensus-building way.

This nomination came out of the committee without recommendation. There was a 9-to-9 divided vote. By contrast, all of the previous nominees to be U.N. ambassador were brought to the floor by very strong committee votes and approved on the floor by very strong votes—most of them unanimous, none of them really close.

In addition to Mr. Bolton's extreme policy views and his confrontational demeanor, there is the issue of his professional conduct. There is ample evidence that he has attempted to politicize intelligence in a way that I believe has harmed our Nation's diplomacy.

Mr. Bolton sought the transfer of two intelligence analysts with whom he disagreed on substantive matters. He repeatedly attempted to stretch the facts to back his own ideological predisposition. He created such a climate of intimidation in the State Department that the Secretary of State found it necessary to set up a special meeting with the Intelligence and Research Bureau in order to directly reassure the analysts.

To make matters worse, Mr. Bolton told the committee that he had not tried to have analysts punished or disciplined, and he denied that he sought retribution against them. He said, "I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on," when his attempts to have them reassigned were rebuffed.

And yet we have learned from extensive interviews with numerous administration officials that he did try to have the analysts removed from their positions, that he did seek to punish people for disagreeing with him, and he did persist in his efforts for many months after, as he says, he shrugged his shoulders and moved on.

That he was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts does not speak for Mr. Bolton. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination of those professionals who withstood his demands, who refused to bend to the inordinate pressure he was applying.

Given this conduct, when he goes before the United Nations to make a statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a terrorist plot or whatever it may be, what credibility will he have, knowing that he sought repeatedly to punish intelligence analysts who delivered contradictory information; knowing that he is sort of a man who, as Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, put it, "took isolated facts and made much of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry picking of little factoids and little isolated bits were drawn out to present the starkest possible case"?

We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and Mr. Bolton's conduct casts serious doubt on his ability to be one.

Moreover, Mr. Bolton's poor administrative and management skills, in my view, raise serious questions as to whether he can exercise a senior leadership role. The testimony of Carl

Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, was especially powerful on this point. Mr. Ford told the committee:

In my experience, throughout my time in the executive branch, I've really never seen someone so abusive to such a subordinate person.

He said he could think of no one else who comes even close to John Bolton in terms of the way that he abuses his power and authority with "little" people.

Secretary Powell's Chief of Staff, Larry Wilkerson, described to the committee staff the kinds of problems he had on a daily basis in dealing with Bolton.

Assistant secretaries, principal deputy assistant secretaries, acting assistant secretaries coming into my office and telling me, "Can I sit down?"

"Sure, sit down. What's the problem?"

"I've got to leave."

"What's the problem?"

"Bolton."

When asked if he got similar complaints about other Under Secretaries, he replied:

On one occasion, on one particular individual. The rest were all about Undersecretary Bolton.

In summarizing this experience Wilkerson stated, "I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there"—meaning at the U.S. mission to the U.N.—"that have to be led. They have to be led well, and they have to be led properly."

Being ambassador to the United Nations is not just a representational job; it is also a management job. There are 125 full-time, permanent State Department employees working there at our mission alongside numerous detailees from other agencies and departments. The ambassador has supervisory responsibility over all these people. Most are career civil servants, and they are there to represent the policies of the President and to serve the interests of the Nation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. SARBANES. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 minutes to conclude the statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. SARBANES. What are they going to do up there in New York if John Bolton repeats the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the State Department, under incredible pressure, to seek the support and counsel of their assistant secretaries? There will be no one in New York to shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John Bolton.

Mr. President, unfortunately, it seems to have become, for some, a favorite pastime to assault the United Nations. They blame it for failing to resolve many of the problems that have occurred in the world. But I think we have to acknowledge that the U.N. has a role to play in preventing conflict and promoting cooperation. Skillful

U.S. leadership at the United Nations can enhance our national interest in a very significant way, and part of that skilled leadership is to send an ambassador who has credibility and the wisdom necessary to carry out his responsibilities.

This nominee falls far short of that standard. Mr. President, 102 retired diplomats have taken the extraordinary step of sending a letter urging the Senate to reject the nomination.

Finally, let me say just this word about the witnesses who came forward to the committee to testify about Mr. Bolton's past conduct. These people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give what they thought would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton's behavior. It took a lot of courage for people like Mr. Ford, Mr. Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, Ambassador Hubbard, and others to come forward. I am very concerned they may pay a price for this brave action, and I very deeply regret if this should turn out to be the case. I think their motive in coming forward was to promote the national interests of our country. In that sense, I think they are true patriots. They have nothing to gain by opposing the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. SARBANES. In fact, they have much to lose.

Mr. President, this nomination ought to be defeated. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing it. We can do better, and, for the sake of our country, we must do better.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to ask if we could get a unanimous consent request here. The Senator from Arizona, my colleague from Arizona, I believe is next. How long does he wish?

Mr. KYL. I would like to speak for 10 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. KENNEDY. Nine minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arizona be recognized for 10 minutes, the Senator from Massachusetts for 10 minutes, and me for 10 minutes following that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. KENNEDY. Reserving the right to object, may I ask that Senator OBAMA be recognized subsequent to that?

Mr. McCAIN. Fine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I would like to be recognized as well in the ensuing sequence. My understanding is it has been going back and forth between the sides. The Senator from Connecticut spoke, and then the Senator from Maryland spoke. That caused us to have a little bit of a scheduling issue, so I would like to continue on that schedule and then allow myself to be recognized.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask that the Senator from Florida be recognized following Senator OBAMA.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request before the Chair is Senator KYL for 10 minutes, Senator KENNEDY for 10 minutes, Senator McCAIN for 10 minutes, Senator OBAMA for 15 minutes, and the Senator from Florida for 15 minutes.

Is there any objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EXTENSION ACT OF 2005

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 2566, which was received from the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2566) to provide an extension of highway, highway safety, motor carrier safety, transit, and other programs funded out of the Highway Trust Fund pending enactment of a law reauthorizing the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century.

Mr. MARTINEZ. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, and any statements be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (H.R. 2566) was read the third time and passed.

NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERT BOLTON TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in very strong support of John Bolton to be our next ambassador to the United Nations. I have known Mr. Bolton for a long time. He is a great individual, a great representative of the United States, and, most importantly, the person the President wants to represent the United States at the United Nations. It is the responsibility of the Senate to act on his nomination because the President has requested us to do so.

Mr. Bolton has successfully championed a number of multilateral initiatives during the time he has been working for the Bush administration. He is committed to the success of the United Nations and sees it as an important component of our diplomacy and is a strong voice for U.N. reform.

I am concerned that a lot of debate has shifted to matters that have nothing to do with his qualifications and some of which attempt to assassinate his character. There is no question he