

Transit Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 361; 118 Stat. 885) is amended by inserting “(or, in the case of the period of October 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005, \$2,425,000) after “\$4,850,000”.

(q) **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROJECT.**—Section 3015(c)(2) of the Federal Transit Act of 1998 (49 U.S.C. 322 note; 118 Stat. 885) is amended—

(1) by inserting “, and \$2,500,000 for the period of October 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005,” after “per fiscal year”.

(r) **PROJECTS FOR NEW FIXED GUIDEWAY SYSTEMS AND EXTENSIONS TO EXISTING SYSTEMS.**—Section 3030 of the Federal Transit Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 373; 118 Stat. 885) is amended by inserting “and for the period of October 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005,” after “2004” each place it appears.

(s) **NEW JERSEY URBAN CORE PROJECT.**—Section 3031(a)(3) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (105 Stat. 2122; 118 Stat. 885) is amended by inserting “and for the period of October 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005, after “2004” each place it appears.

(t) **TREATMENT OF FUNDS.**—Section 8(t) of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2003 is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and by section 7 of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part IV” and inserting “by section 7 of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part IV, and by section 8 of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting “for fiscal year 2004” after “section”.

(u) **LOCAL SHARE.**—Section 3011(a) of the Federal Transit Act of 1998 (49 U.S.C. 5307 note; 118 Stat. 886) is amended by inserting “and for the period of October 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005” after “2004”.

#### **SEC. 9. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF TRUST FUNDS FOR OBLIGATIONS UNDER TEA-21.**

(a) **HIGHWAY TRUST FUND.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Paragraph (1) of section 9503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—

(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking “October 1, 2004” and inserting “April 1, 2005”;

(B) by striking “or” at the end of subparagraph (J),

(C) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (K) and inserting “, or”;

(D) by inserting after subparagraph (K) the following new subparagraph:

“(L) authorized to be paid out of the Highway Trust Fund under the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI.”; and

(E) in the matter after subparagraph (L), as added by this paragraph, by striking “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V” and inserting “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI”.

(2) **MASS TRANSIT ACCOUNT.**—Paragraph (3) of section 9503(e) of such Code is amended—

(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking “October 1, 2004” and inserting “April 1, 2005”;

(B) in subparagraph (H), by striking “or” at the end of such subparagraph,

(C) in subparagraph (I), by inserting “or” at the end of such subparagraph,

(D) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following new subparagraph:

“(J) the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI.”; and

(E) in the matter after subparagraph (J), as added by this paragraph, by striking “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V” and inserting “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI”.

(b) **AQUATIC RESOURCES TRUST FUND.**—

(1) **SPORT FISH RESTORATION ACCOUNT.**—Paragraph (2) of section 9504(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by

striking “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V” each place it appears and inserting “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI”.

(2) **BOAT SAFETY ACCOUNT.**—Subsection (c) of section 9504 of such Code is amended—

(A) by striking “October 1, 2004” and inserting “April 1, 2005”; and

(B) by striking “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V” and inserting “Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part VI”.

(3) **EXCEPTION TO LIMITATION ON TRANSFERS.**—Paragraph (2) of section 9504(d) of such Code is amended by striking “October 1, 2004” and inserting “April 1, 2005”.

(c) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) **TEMPORARY RULE REGARDING ADJUSTMENTS.**—During the period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2003 and ending on March 31, 2005, for purposes of making any estimate under section 9503(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of receipts of the Highway Trust Fund, the Secretary of the Treasury shall treat—

(1) each expiring provision of paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 9503(b) of such Code which is related to appropriations or transfers to such Fund to have been extended through the end of the 24-month period referred to in section 9503(d)(1)(B) of such Code, and

(2) with respect to each tax imposed under the sections referred to in section 9503(b)(1) of such Code, the rate of such tax during the 24-month period referred to in section 9503(d)(1)(B) of such Code to be the same as the rate of such tax as in effect on the date of the enactment of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2003.

#### **SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS**

##### **SENATE RESOLUTION 430—DESIGNATING NOVEMBER 2004 AS “NATIONAL RUNAWAY PREVENTION MONTH”**

Mr. HATCH (for himself and Mr. LEAHY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. RES. 430

Whereas the prevalence of runaway and homeless youth in the United States is staggering, with studies suggesting that between 1,600,000 and 2,800,000 young people live on the streets of the United States each year;

Whereas running away from home is widespread, with 1 out of every 7 children in the United States running away before the age of 18;

Whereas youth that end up on the streets are often those who have been thrown out of their homes by their families, who have been physically, sexually, and emotionally abused at home, who have been discharged by State custodial systems without adequate transition plans, who have lost their parents through death or divorce, and who are too poor to secure their own basic needs;

Whereas effective programs supporting runaway youth and assisting young people in remaining at home with their families succeed because of partnerships created among families, community-based human service agencies, law enforcement agencies, schools, faith-based organizations, and businesses;

Whereas preventing young people from running away and supporting youth in high-risk situations is a family, community, and national responsibility;

Whereas the future well-being of the Nation is dependent on the value placed on young people and the opportunities provided for youth to acquire the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to develop into safe, healthy, and productive adults;

Whereas the National Network for Youth and its members advocate on behalf of runaway and homeless youth and provide an array of community-based support services that address the critical needs of such youth;

Whereas the National Runaway Switchboard provides crisis intervention and referrals to reconnect runaway youth to their families and to link young people to local resources that provide positive alternatives to running away; and

Whereas the National Network for Youth and the National Runaway Switchboard are co-sponsoring National Runaway Prevention Month to increase public awareness of the life circumstances of youth in high-risk situations and the need for safe, healthy, and productive alternatives, resources, and supports for youth, families, and communities: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate designates November 2004 as “National Runaway Prevention Month”.

##### **SENATE RESOLUTION 431—EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO RESPOND TO THE GROWING THREATS POSED BY CONDITIONS IN BURMA UNDER THE ILLEGITIMATE RULE OF THE STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL**

Mr. MCCONNELL (for himself, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. DOLE, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LUGAR, and Mr. CORZINE) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Whereas the National League for Democracy, headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is the legitimately elected political leadership in Burma;

Whereas the ruling State Peace and Development Council, headed by General Than Shwe, and its affiliated organizations continue, through a variety of means, to violate the human rights and dignity of the people of Burma through murder, torture, rape, forced relocation, the employment of child soldiers, the use of forced labor, and the exploitation of child laborers;

Whereas the State Peace and Development Council has detained over 1,300 prisoners of conscience, including National League for Democracy leaders and supporters of democracy;

Whereas, under the repressive rule of the State Peace and Development Council, the situation in Burma poses an immediate and growing threat to the Southeast Asia region, including through the unchecked spread of HIV/AIDS, the illicit production of, and trafficking in, narcotics, trafficking in persons, and alleged efforts to purchase weapons from North Korea, China, and Russia;

Whereas, at the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly that expresses grave concern about the ongoing systematic violations of human rights inflicted upon the people of Burma and calls on the

State Peace and Development Council to release all political prisoners, respect the results of the national elections in 1990, and restore democracy to Burma; and

Whereas the National League for Democracy has called upon the United Nations Security Council to intervene on behalf of the people of Burma: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations Security Council should immediately consider and take appropriate actions to respond to the growing threats posed to the Southeast Asia region by conditions in Burma under the illegitimate rule of the State Peace and Development Council, including the threats posed by widespread human rights violations, the unchecked spread of HIV/AIDS, the illicit production of, and trafficking in, narcotics, trafficking in persons, and alleged efforts by the State Peace and Development Council to purchase weapons from North Korea, China, and Russia.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, today I submit, along with some fellow members of the unofficial, bipartisan Senate Burma Caucus, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United Nations Security Council should immediately consider and take appropriate actions to respond to the growing threats posed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in Burma to its immediate neighbors and the entire region.

What are these threats? The unchecked spread of HIV/AIDS that is further aggravated by the SPDC's use of rape as a weapon of war against the people of Burma, particularly ethnic women and girls; the illicit production and trafficking in narcotics, which destroys the lives of Asian youth and families; trafficking in persons and brutal crackdowns on ethnic minorities that create significant populations of internally displaced persons and refugees; alleged efforts to purchase weapons from North Korea, the People's Republic of China and Russia.

For the past decade, we have known that the SPDC poses a clear and present danger to the people of Burma, including democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Resolutions, statements and reports by the U.S. State Department, the United Nations, the European Nation (E.U.), and human rights organizations have repeatedly documented and condemned brutal human rights violations committed with impunity by the SPDC.

Today, there is no question that Burma's myriad problems are no longer the internal affair of a handful of psychopathic generals in Rangoon.

Last May, the NLD called upon the U.N. Security Council to intervene.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the United Kingdom, and the Administration, who are scheduled to take over chairmanship of the Council in October and November, respectively should heed their call.

In Burma, time now favors the democrats. With the international community's continued vigilance, appropriate

pressure can be placed on the SPDC before they assume chairmanship of the ASEAN in 2006 to secure a meaningful path toward reconciliation that includes the full and unfettered participation of the NLD. If the Security Council takes up the matter of Burma, significant strides will be made toward democracy and justice in that country.

It is an understatement to say that I am disappointed with the E.U.'s decision to allow "low level" participation by the SPDC in the upcoming ASEM meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam. Such action serves only to prolong the suffering of the Burmese people, including the hundreds currently languishing in prisons for peacefully championing the principles of freedom and justice, and the three NLD youths recently arrested for the "heinous" crime of gathering signatures on a petition calling for Suu Kyi's release from house arrest.

With France, Spain and Portugal reportedly clamoring to derail the toughening of sanctions against Burma, it is only fair to ask: When will they act to support the democrats of Burma?

It is time the world's democracies make 2006 the "Year of Democracy" in Burma.

I want to recognize Senators FEINSTEIN, MCCAIN, MIKULSKI, FEINGOLD, LEAHY, and DOLE for their support of the resolution, and freedom and justice in Burma.

I ask unanimous consent that an article by William Ashton that appeared in the *Irrawaddy* on the SPDC's efforts to procure weapons be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE ARMS KEEP COMING—BUT WHO PAYS?

(By William Ashton)

Burma's ruling State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, has been at pains over recent months to tell the international community that it is devoting a considerable effort to implementing a new "road map" to multi-party democracy and introducing measures for a more open economy. The military government has also claimed major advances in promoting education and public health, and in developing the country's civil infrastructure.

The Rangoon regime can certainly point to an increase in diplomatic activity, and show visitors to Burma many new roads, buildings and dams. However, the SPDC's statements continue to ignore the fact that, for the past 15 years, a large proportion of its central budget—probably between 35 and 45 per cent each year—has been allocated to the armed forces, or Tatmadaw. This does not include significant allocations to the defense sector from off-budget sources and unofficial payments that never appear in the national accounts. Also, while an increasing proportion of Burma's annual defense expenditure is now used to pay for recurring personnel and maintenance costs, a high percentage is still devoted to the acquisition of new arms and equipment from abroad.

#### CONTINUED MILITARY EXPANSION

When the armed forces took back direct political power in 1988, they launched an ambitious defense expansion and modernization program. Since then, the regime has consist-

ently spent a greater proportion of central government outlays on defense than any other country in the Asia-Pacific region. The Burmese armed forces have doubled in size, making them the second largest in Southeast Asia and, by some calculations, the 15th largest in the world. New command and control structures have been put in place, and capabilities in key support areas like intelligence, communications and logistics have been substantially upgraded. The country's military infrastructure has also been improved. In addition, the Burma Army has acquired a wide range of tracked and wheeled armor, towed and self-propelled artillery, air defense weapons, transport, small arms and communications equipment. The air force has taken delivery of more than 150 helicopters, fighters, ground attack, transport and training aircraft. The Burma Navy too has expanded dramatically, with new corvettes, missile patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels and riverine craft.

Given its enormous expansion since 1988, the massive influx of arms and equipment since then, and the difficulties of keeping its current inventory fully operational, it might be expected that the Tatmadaw's acquisition programs would now be slowing down. Yet, over the past 18 months, there has been clear evidence that the Rangoon regime continues to give its highest priority to the development of Burma's military capabilities.

While some of the SPDC's more ambitious projects, such as the planned acquisition of strategic weapon systems, have reportedly been shelved for the time being, other major contracts have gone ahead. China remains Burma's principal source of military technology but, despite an arms embargo imposed by its traditional suppliers, the regime has managed to find a number of new vendors.

#### ARMS DELIVERIES

A survey of arms deals with Burma over the past 18 months has revealed the following:

##### CHINA

Rangoon is locked into a continuing close logistical relationship with Beijing, due to the need to maintain all the arms and military equipment purchased from China, at an estimated cost of billions of dollars, since 1988. However, the SPDC is interested in acquiring even more arms, and new weapons and consignments of materiel continue to be delivered. There have been reports of 200 heavy-duty trucks crossing the China-Burma border, and of shipments of unspecified "air force weapons", multiple rocket launchers and possibly artillery. There were also reports in March 2004 that the Burma Army was negotiating yet another arms deal with China, this time to buy obsolescent weapons being phased out by the People's Liberation Army. In addition, there have long been rumors that Burma has been negotiating with China for the purchase of combat helicopters, minesweepers, anti-ship missiles and sea mines.

##### NORTH KOREA

Rangoon's developing relationship with Pyongyang has gone well beyond the small arms ammunition purchased in 1990, and the sixteen 130mm artillery pieces acquired by the SPDC in 1998. For example, in 2003 a team of North Korean technicians was sent to Rangoon to install surface-to-surface missiles on some new Burma Navy vessels. In addition, discussions have taken place between Rangoon and Pyongyang over the purchase of a small submarine, and possibly even a number of SCUD short-range ballistic missiles. Late last year there were even suggestions that North Korea was assisting Burma with the construction of a nuclear reactor, raising the specter of the Rangoon regime one day acquiring a nuclear weapon.

## INDIA

As part of a renewed effort to get closer to Burma, India has provided the Tatmadaw with a range of weapons, ammunition and equipment. In May 2003 the Indian Defense Ministry confirmed that it had sold the Tatmadaw eighty 75mm howitzers (or "mountain guns"). Also, India has reportedly sold mortar and artillery ammunition to Rangoon, and advanced communications equipment. A Burmese military delegation visiting India in early 2004 said that the Tatmadaw welcomed further arms deals. The Indian Defense Minister has stated that New Delhi is keen to sell Burma naval vessels. A demonstration by Indian combat aircraft in Burma this year prompted speculation about future sales to the Burma Air Force.

## UKRAINE

The Russian language press stated in late 2002 that the Ukraine had contracted to provide Burma with some 36D6 radar systems. In mid-2003 it was reported that the Ukraine had sold the Tatmadaw 50 T-72 main battle tanks. In February 2004, a Ukrainian-flagged ship made a secret delivery to Rangoon, probably of air defense weapons. Also, in May 2003, one of the Ukraine's leading arms exporters signed a contract with Burma worth US \$500 million, to provide the Rangoon regime with components for 1,000 BTR-3U light armored personnel carriers. Over the next ten years these vehicles will be supplied in parts, and assembled in a new, purpose-built factory in Burma. More arms deals between Rangoon and Kiev are likely.

## SERBIA

In December 2003, Serbian language sources claimed that Rangoon had contracted with Belgrade to buy a number of "Nora" self-propelled howitzers. The cost of these weapons, which are marketed by Jugimport-SDPR, is unknown. In addition, in March 2004 about 30 Serbian engineers arrived in Burma to repair and upgrade the Burma Air Force's 12 Soko G-4 jets, which were purchased from the Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These aircraft have been grounded for several years, due largely to a lack of spare parts.

## RUSSIA

In late 2002 the SPDC purchased eight MiG-29B-12 air superiority combat aircraft and two dual-seat MiG-29UB trainers from Russia, at a reported cost of about US \$130 million. All these aircraft were delivered to Burma by the end of 2003. In addition, in July 2002 Rangoon signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Burma. While the project has encountered major problems, probably due to its cost, it may still go ahead. It is likely that the shipments of Russian military equipment detected in southern Burma in April 2003, which were thought to be components for the reactor, were in fact deliveries of a new communications system.

## SLOVAKIA

According to a news report dated October 2003, the Unipex Company of Slovakia is currently being investigated for taking part in the illegal export to Burma of machines for the manufacture of "artillery grenades" (possibly rocket propelled grenades).

It is likely that other contracts have been signed but not yet been made public. The frequent visits to Rangoon of North Korean and Ukrainian cargo vessels over the past 18 months, and the measures taken to hide the nature of their cargoes, strongly suggests that other deliveries of arms and equipment have occurred. Several eastern European countries are keen to sell arms to Burma. Also, countries like Singapore, Pakistan and

Israel maintain close links with Rangoon. All have weapon systems that are on the Tatmadaw's wish list. In the past, these factors have often led to substantial sales of weapons, military equipment and dual use goods to Burma, and related training contracts.

## PAYING THE BILL

In considering the financial implications of these sales, several factors need to be borne in mind. Not only does the regime need to cover the initial purchase price of these arms, but it faces the continuing costs of keeping them serviceable, providing facilities to house them, buying spare parts to maintain them and training people to repair and use them. The latter often includes sending selected military personnel overseas for specialized training, and in a few cases supporting foreign experts resident in country. Some of these costs can be paid in local currency, but they still constitute a heavy drain on Burma's precious foreign exchange reserves. The regime is still able to earn hard currency through the export of gas, gems, timber, agricultural produce and other natural resources, but its economy is facing major problems. These have not been helped by the new sanctions imposed by the U.S. in June 2003, after a government mob violently attacked democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

In the past, some of these costs have been met through trade deals, under which Burma has paid for part of its contracts with primary goods like rice and teak. North Korea and Russia, for example, have accepted such commodities in part payment for arms and military equipment. Even the Russian nuclear reactor could be paid for in part through barter arrangements. Also, for strategic and other reasons, some arms suppliers have been very generous in their terms. For example, China has repeatedly offered the Rangoon regime special "friendship prices" for arms, and overlooked deadlines for the repayment of loans. The Ukrainian firm selling Burma APCs has probably provided vendor financing of some kind.

Even so, given the regime's current debts, its continuing need for foreign logistical support, and its latest acquisitions, the investment required now and in the future will be huge for a country like Burma. These costs must inevitably be carried at the expense of other sectors of the government that are desperate for scarce resources.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for a resolution submitted yesterday by Senator MCCONNELL and myself that urges the United Nations Security Council to respond to the growing threats posed to the Southeast Asia region by conditions in Burma under the rule of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

I have been proud to work with Senator MCCONNELL to raise awareness about the situation in Burma and to put pressure on the SPDC to respect the wishes of the Burmese people, restore democracy, and release from house arrest the leader of the National League for Democracy and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi. Congress has acted decisively in support of these efforts by passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 to impose a complete ban on Burmese imports for one year and renewing that ban this past July.

There is still much work to be done. The threat posed by the military junta

goes beyond Burma's borders and extends to the entire Southeast Asia region. The SPDC has committed numerous human rights abuses and detained over 1,300 political prisoners. It has allowed the spread of HIV/AIDS to go unchecked. It has engaged in the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics. It has engaged in the trafficking of human beings. It has attempted to purchase weapons from North Korea, China, and Russia.

The international community simply cannot afford to ignore these threats any longer. Inaction will only strengthen the regime in Rangoon and foster greater instability in the Southeast Asia region. This resolution simply encourages the United Nations Security Council to consider the situation in Burma carefully and take appropriate action.

While I am proud that the United States has acted in support of freedom and democracy in Burma, we need the help of our friends and allies to put pressure on the SPDC to change its behavior and respect the wishes of the Burmese people and the international community. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.

## AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 3664. Mr. CAMPBELL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2666, making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for other purposes.

SA 3665. Mr. CAMPBELL proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2666, supra.

SA 3666. Mr. CAMPBELL (for Mr. STEVENS (for himself and Mr. DURBIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2666, supra.

SA 3667. Mr. CAMPBELL (for Mr. DURBIN) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2666, supra.

SA 3668. Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. BIDEN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2781, to express the sense of Congress regarding the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, to provide assistance for the crisis in Darfur and for comprehensive peace in Sudan, and for other purposes; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SA 3669. Mr. MCCONNELL (for Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself and Mr. MCCAIN)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2279, to amend title 46, United States Code, with respect to maritime transportation security, and for other purposes.

## TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 3664. Mr. CAMPBELL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2666, making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for other purposes; as follows:

On page 21, strike lines 13 and 14 and insert "approval of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives."

SA 3665. Mr. CAMPBELL proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2666, making