

submitted to the Oval Office within no longer than 100 days.

The No. 1 lesson of September 11 is obvious: Our intelligence on the terrorist threat was unreliable. It was subject to major gaps of necessary information and analysis. Had we applied exactly those same lessons learned as we prepared for the war in Iraq, the President would have had less confidence in the intelligence he was being given on issues such as weapons of mass destruction and the conditions that our military men and women would face during and after the initial assault.

Ponder this: What a difference that would have made as we learn from the Senate Intelligence Committee report on the problems of pre-Iraqi war intelligence. If we do not now take action to remedy those weaknesses, we will not be able to avoid accountability for our failure to detect and deter the next attack.

As has been demonstrated over the past decade, the fundamental opponent of intelligence reform is inertia and the natural tendency to maintain the status quo. Before we can get people to reject the status quo, there has to be, first, an agreement as to what are the problems to which the status quo has contributed.

I have found that the medical model of first diagnosing a problem and then prescribing a remedy to be a useful prescription with social problems. Today, I want to give the diagnosis of our intelligence community that a careful physician might offer. Next week, I will come to the Senate to offer my prescription.

This is what I consider to be five major problems and challenges facing American intelligence. One, the failure to adapt to a changing adversary and a changing global threat environment. Just as it was difficult 40 years earlier for the intelligence community to make the transition from the practices of the OSS against Germany and Japan, today's intelligence community has found it even more difficult to shift from the cold war to the war on terror.

Our new enemy is distinctly different than we are. It is a non-nation state, asymmetrical in the extreme. It is motivated by a religious belief that denies the legitimacy of governments which intrude on the direct relationship which should exist between all law and man. We are almost deaf to the numerous, frequently arcane languages that our new adversaries speak. As a people and as a nation, the United States has limited expertise in their cultures. By the failure to make the transition to this new world we inhabit and the new threats we face, American intelligence is rendering itself less and less capable of bringing the security which our citizens need and deserve.

A second failure is the repeated instances in which the intelligence community did not provide effective, strategic intelligence. In the summer of 2001, intelligence was reporting to

American decisionmakers that, yes, al-Qaida was something of a threat to U.S. interests, but outside the country, not inside the homeland of the United States. So while we spent hundreds of millions of dollars to fortify our embassies abroad, we did virtually nothing to increase the safety of domestic commercial aviation.

As the planning for the war was intensifying in the winter and spring of 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz reached two conclusions which were validated by intelligence, much of which came from the intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense. They claimed that after the war the U.S. troops would be received as liberators and that the Iraqi people would shower our troops with flowers, as the American soldiers had been welcomed in Paris in 1944. They went on to say that the Iraqis would turn on the faucets of that nation's oil riches and pay for the occupation and rebuilding of their nation. Sadly, of course, neither of these projections has come true.

The third failure is the failure to establish within the intelligence community broad priorities and then to deploy the resources of the intelligence community behind those priorities. In December of 1998, former CIA Director George Tenet declared terrorism was the intelligence community's primary target, that America was at war with al-Qaida.

The problem is that within the CIA and the other intelligence agencies few heard the battle cry and even fewer responded.

Rather than set up intelligence systems to validate convenient political notions, we need a system that pursues mutually agreed-upon priorities.

Fourth, the intelligence community has not implemented the policies necessary to recruit, train, reward or sanction, maintain the talents or diversify its human intelligence capabilities.

The U.S. human intelligence at the end of the cold war has been described as very deep in our knowledge of the Soviet target, almost ignorant about everything else.

In the places where we most need human intelligence, such as in the Middle East and Central Asia, we are woefully deficient.

The intelligence community's current recruitment and training regimes, which rely heavily on college campus career days, has been inadequate to overcome this handicap.

We are confronting terrorists with a band of men and women who are enthusiastic to perform the challenging intellectual work of an analyst or the dangerous undertaking of an operative, but often lack the necessary skills to be effective.

In my opinion, we need to rethink our system of intelligence recruitment, training, and performance evaluation.

The fifth failure is the failure to realize that many of the most important

decisions made by the intelligence community that were previously described as tactical have now become strategic.

Unfortunately, the level and perspective of those tasking the gathering of that intelligence has not changed, often with highly adverse consequences.

One of the reasons that congressional oversight of the intelligence community exists is because in 1960, in the days before a planned summit between President Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet Union downed an American U-2 spy plane.

The tension surrounding the plane's mission and its downing aborted the summit, and that enraged Senator Mike Mansfield. This is what Senator Mansfield said:

Not a single member of the Cabinet nor the President exercised any direct control whatsoever over the ill-fated U-2 flight at the critical moment at which it was launched.

He continued that the decision to undertake the flight

"owes its origin more to bureaucratic inertia, lack of coordination and control and insensitivity to its potential cost than it does to any conscious decision of politically responsible leadership."

In other words, a tactical blunder had set back a strategic goal.

Today, even more than in 1960, tactical intelligence gathering operations need to show an appreciation—a greater appreciation than is true today—for their strategic implications.

Mr. President, it has been 3 years since we suffered the horror of September 11. The time to act is long since past.

In future days, I will discuss recommendations to address what I think are the major challenges we face, and to urge the courage and commitment, will and urgency, to protect the American people in the way that we failed to do on September 11, 2001.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S INCOMPETENCE ON IRAQ

Mr. KENNEDY. Yesterday, the Senate Armed Services Committee held two hearings to consider the reports by General Fay and General Jones and the report by former Defense Secretary Schlesinger about the Abu Ghraib prison debacle.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib are just one part of a much larger failure, for which our soldiers have been paying a high price since day one. Because of the Bush administration's arrogant ideological incompetence and its bizarre "mission accomplished" mentality, our troops and our intelligence officers and our diplomats had neither the resources nor the guidance needed to deal with the worsening conditions that steadily began to overwhelm them and continue to do so.

On issue after issue in Iraq, the administration has failed the basic test of competence.

Before the war, the administration mishandled the intelligence, causing great damage to U.S. respect in the world, making the war on terrorism far harder to win. It is preposterous for the administration to pretend that the war in Iraq has made America safer. No President in America's history has done more damage to our country and our security than President Bush.

The American people know where the buck stops.

The administration bungled prewar diplomacy on Iraq, leaving us isolated and unable to obtain real allied support.

The administration failed to consider the possibility that the liberation of Iraq might not be the cakewalk they predicted. They failed to consider the possibility that their preoccupation with Iraq could undo much of our achievement in Afghanistan and give the al-Qaida terrorists time to regroup and plan murderous new assaults.

Far too many of our soldiers were not adequately trained for their mission in Iraq and they did not have adequate equipment for their missions either.

The administration failed to send enough troops to do the job of keeping the peace. They disbanded the Iraqi army, and they are struggling now to recreate it.

The administration's failures have also put a huge strain on the Army and our Reserve Forces and imposed great hardships on the families of our soldiers.

The number of insurgents in Iraq has gone up. The number of brutal attacks has gone up, and so have the casualties.

When President Bush recklessly declared "mission accomplished," the civilian leaders in the Department of Defense took him seriously and left our Armed Forces in Iraq underprepared, understaffed, and underled for the mission that was only just beginning.

President Bush has stated that the war in Iraq was a catastrophic success. He is half right—the war has been a catastrophe.

The war has been a catastrophe for our soldiers, who were foolishly sent to war with no plan—no plan—to win the peace.

The war has been a catastrophe for their loved ones.

The war has been a catastrophe for our Nation's standing in the world and for the war on terror. As I have said, it has distracted us from the real threat of al-Qaida in Afghanistan and elsewhere, made the war against terrorism far harder to win, and made America more hated in the world than at any other time in our history.

Nothing I have said detracts from the extraordinary heroism of our soldiers. They have responded to their mission in Iraq with immense courage and dedication. But their outstanding service

does not and cannot excuse the incompetence of their civilian leaders.

That incompetence was on vivid display again yesterday, in the Armed Services Committee, where we heard testimony on the report by General Jones and General Fay about Iraq. Their findings were chilling.

Their report states point blank that the Pentagon expected our troops, under General Sanchez, to provide stability and support for the Coalition Provisional Authority "in a relatively nonhostile environment" in Iraq. Those are the exact words of the report—"a relatively nonhostile environment."

That description is no surprise. The administration had been doing its best to convince the American people that the war would be easy.

In February 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld told troops that the war "could last, you know, 6 days, 6 weeks, I doubt 6 months." As Secretary Rumsfeld well knows, it has now been three times as long as that, with no end in sight.

In March 2003, Vice President CHENEY said we would "be greeted as liberators" and dismissed out of hand any suggestion that we would be viewed as conquerors in a long, bloody occupation.

Before the war, the Pentagon flagrantly ignored the postwar planning carried out by the State Department in its "Future of Iraq" project. The civilian leaders at the Defense Department were dismissive of any opposing view. They were convinced that the war would be easy, cheap, and fast.

They ridiculed General Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the Army, and Larry Lindsey, formerly President Bush's top economic advisor, who said that a successful war in Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and hundreds of billions of dollars.

They put their own ideology above practical military planning, and we continue to see the catastrophic results today.

Simply put, the civilians at the Pentagon did not anticipate or prepare for the insurgent fighting that occurred, despite the prewar warnings from military leaders.

Even after the shameful failure at Abu Ghraib came to light, the administration continued to pour out statements that were completely at odds with the facts.

On May 7 this year, Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Armed Services Committees of both Houses of Congress. He told Senators that "a small number of the U.S. military" had perpetuated the abuses. He told the House that "a few members of the U.S. military were responsible." A week later, President Bush tried to minimize the scandal by saying it involved "disgraceful conduct by a few American troops."

But as we now know, it wasn't just a few bad apples at Abu Ghraib.

The Fay Report found 54 military intelligence, military police, medics, and

civilian contractors who had "some degree of responsibility or complicity in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Leaders in key positions failed to properly supervise the interrogation operations at the prison."

The Fay Report identified not just individual failures but systemic failures, including: "inadequate interrogation doctrine and training, an acute shortage of MP and MI soldiers, the lack of clear lines of responsibility between the MP and MI chains of command, the lack of clear interrogation policy for the Iraq Campaign."

The Schlesinger Report found that military leaders in and out of Iraq and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense "failed in their duties and that such failures contributed directly or indirectly to detainee abuse." The report faults the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for failing to "set in motion the development of a more effective alternative course of action." Plainly, senior leaders did not do what was necessary to prevent these abuses.

Secretary Rumsfeld told the Armed Services committee that the abuses were brought to light by Specialist Joseph Darby in January 2004, and the military chain of command "acted promptly on learning of those abuses."

This claim, too, is false. Senior leaders had ample warning that these abuses were occurring long before January 2004.

General Jones' report found that indications and warnings had surfaced at General Sanchez's level "that additional oversight and corrective actions were needed in the handling of detainees," including at Abu Ghraib.

The report pointed to many specific warnings from within the Army about clear problems that were ignored by the Pentagon's civilian leadership. It cited an incident in which a detainee was abused at Camp Cropper after a prison riot. It cited investigations by the Army's Criminal Investigative Division into incidents of abuse and disciplining soldiers. It cited the death of a CIA detainee at Abu Ghraib. It cited the totally inadequate filing system for tracking detainees, which consisted of a hodge-podge of computers and filing boxes.

The civilian leaders at the Pentagon also had ample warnings from outside the Army, which they also ignored. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported on abuses in the prisons as early as May 2003, soon after the fall of Baghdad. During a visit to Abu Ghraib 5 months later, in October 2003, Red Cross inspectors were so upset by what they found that they halted their visit and demanded an immediate explanation from U.S. military authorities. Yet the worst abuses at the prison occurred over the next 3 months, from October to December of that year.

Clearly, Secretary Rumsfeld misled the Congress and the American people when he said that the leadership had

acted swiftly to address the abuses, when in fact, they allowed abuses to continue and allowed the situation to fester. They acted only when the public disclosure of the abuses in the press made it impossible for their cover-up to continue.

The administration then attempted to minimize the abuses at Abu Ghraib as part of its overall strategy to bury any bad news from Iraq and hide its incompetence, or worse, from the American people. But as these reports show, the catastrophe is far too great to be wished away with political spin.

The Jones-Fay report states very clearly that "the military police and military intelligence units at Abu Ghraib were severely underresourced."

The report says that a failure to distinguish between Iraq and other theaters of operation led to "confusion" about which particular interrogation techniques were authorized in Iraq.

It says, "The intelligence structure was under-manned, under-equipped, and inappropriately organized for counter-insurgency operations."

What the report is saying, put in plain language, is that the operation was botched—totally botched.

We know from General Taguba's report that few, if any, of the military police assigned to Abu Ghraib were trained on how to run a prison, or even on the basic requirements of the Geneva Conventions.

Yesterday, the generals told us that additional missions had overwhelmed General Sanchez's headquarters, leaving them unable to manage the growing crises at Abu Ghraib and unable to respond to the many warning signs from the Red Cross.

We heard over and over again about the impossible strains imposed on General Sanchez and his headquarters, because he was suddenly forced to take on two huge missions in Iraq—supporting the Coalition Provisional Authority and beginning the reconstruction—in addition to fighting a growing insurgency.

The Jones-Fay report says that General Sanchez was missing two-thirds of the personnel needed for his own command in Iraq. It says "of the 1,400 personnel required, the [Fifth] Corps staff transitioned to only 495, or roughly a third, of the manning requirements." This was barely enough to fight the war, and far too few to rebuild a country or supervise the detention system.

The obvious basic questions are who put our military forces in this untenable position? Who decided that the war would be short, cheap, and easy? Who decided that the war was over and that we needed to start rebuilding Iraq? Who decided to play "Mission Accomplished?"

The problems at Abu Ghraib are just symptoms of these larger failures. We sent our troops into battle without enough life-saving body armor and armor for their humvees on patrol. Those shortages were allowed to last for over a year, while our casualties continued to mount.

We had far too few troops in place to prevent the looting of Baghdad and many other parts of the country.

Huge ammunition depots went unguarded, and insurgents kept getting materials and bombs to use against our troops.

We disbanded the Iraqi military, at one time the fourth largest military in the world, only to begin training a new one from scratch when the blunder was finally admitted.

In his report, General Jones gave us a definition of a leadership failure: where "leaders did not take charge, failed to provide appropriate guidance", "failed to accept responsibility or apply good judgment". By this standard, and on this record, President Bush and his administration are clearly guilty of leadership failure.

Despite these colossal failures of leadership and this gross incompetence, no one has been held accountable.

The military holds its soldiers accountable for leadership failures. A few weeks ago, the Navy fired the captain of the USS *John F. Kennedy* aircraft carrier for running over a small boat in the Persian Gulf. The Navy didn't hide incompetence and gloss it over. It responded decisively and plainly stated that it had "lost confidence" in the captain's ability to operate the carrier safely. He was the eleventh commanding officer of the Navy to be fired this year alone. The Navy fired 14 commanding officers in 2003.

In February 2004, the Commanding Officer of the frigate USS *Samuel B. Roberts* was fired for a "loss of confidence," after he spent a night off the ship during a port visit to Ecuador.

In October 2003, the Commanding Officer of an EA-6B Prowler Aircraft Squadron lost his job after one of his jets skidded off a runway. The Navy cited a "loss of confidence" when they made the decision to dismiss him.

In December 2003 and January 2004, Commanding Officers of the submarine, *Jimmy Carter* and the frigate USS *Gary* were fired, both for "loss of confidence."

For military officers in the Navy, the message is clear—if you fail, you're fired. The message to the civilian leadership in this administration is equally clear—if you fail there will be no consequences and no accountability, even if 1,000 American lives are lost.

It is time for the Department of Defense run a tighter ship at all levels of command, including the civilian leadership. The civilian leaders at the Pentagon should be held at least to the same standard of accountability that military officers in the Navy are held to.

Obviously, it is different to place overall blame on our military leaders when their only fault may well be that they couldn't talk their arrogant civilian leaders out of a flawed plan for Iraq.

But someone must be held accountable for the massive failures in Iraq. The buck has to stop somewhere!

Civilian control of the military is one of the great cornerstones of our democracy. But what if the civilian leaders don't know what they're doing, and mindlessly order our troops into battle unprepared?

Alfred Lord Tennyson said it well in those lines in his famous poem, "Charge of the Light Brigade":

Not tho' the soldiers knew
Someone had blundered.
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.

This is what the administration has done to our troops in Iraq, and if Tennyson were writing today, he might well call his poem, "The Charge of the Bush Brigade."

Clearly, there must be accountability for this breathtaking incompetence, which has resulted in the death of over a thousand American soldiers so far, put more in daily danger, and weakened America's national security.

Yesterday, at the Armed Services Committee, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown described the key to accountability:

At each level, the question is loss of confidence. And in the Navy, the loss of confidence goes with grounding your ship. At a higher level the loss of confidence has to be determined on a basis that's somewhat broader, the full performance. And I think that applies at the highest military levels. And it applies at the level of the Secretary of Defense and his staff. . . . And the electorate has to decide on the basis of its confidence at election time.

This administration has had its chance—and it failed the basic test of competence. If failed to deploy adequate forces in Iraq to win the peace. It failed at Abu Ghraib. It failed in granting sweetheart deals to Halliburton. It has failed the loss of confidence test, the basic test of Presidential leadership.

The President seeks re-election based on his ability to fight the war on terror.

The administration has lost confidence of the so-called "coalition of the willing." Country after country is withdrawing troops, leaving America responsible for 90 percent of all the troops on the ground and 90 percent of all casualties.

On November 2d, the American people will decide, whether a majority of the country have lost confidence in the President's leadership because of his failures in Iraq and his failures on a wide range of immense important domestic issues as well. There can only be one answer—America needs new leadership. As I have said before, the only thing America has to fear is 4 more years of George Bush.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period of morning business for debate only, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TERRORIST ATTACKS

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to offer my thoughts on the eve of the third anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Rather than show divisiveness and criticism, or talk about politics, I think it is important to reflect on how much that tragedy has changed our lives and challenged all of us—not just Republicans, not just Democrats, but all Americans—to do all that we can to protect all that is good and wholesome about America.

Tomorrow, Saturday, American families will be doing what they have done for generations in the early fall. In Charlottesville, the University of Virginia will be hosting the Tar Heels from North Carolina; in Columbia, SC, the University of Georgia football team will be playing the Gamecocks of South Carolina; in Richmond, Saturday night, there will be more than 100,000 fans there for the big NASCAR race; at the wonderful and traditional Wrigley Field in Chicago, the Cubs will be playing the Florida Marlins; and families, in the afternoon, will be having cookouts in their backyards; others will be gathered as a family at their dinner tables.

During all of these wonderful, truly American events, we will all pause to remember a day when such innocence was shattered by the vile, hate-filled attacks on our homeland that manifested themselves so viciously in New York City, at the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, and in Somerset County, PA. We will remember the loss of 3,000 Americans that day, and we will pray for their souls and certainly pray for their families. We will remember friends and we will remember neighbors lost on that day.

At all of those sporting events, when the National Anthem is sung, I venture to guess that song will be sung with greater vigor, more loudly, and with greater patriotism than one would normally hear. When they conclude those final lines talking about how we are the "land of the free," and because we are the "home of the brave," we will be thinking of our troops who are serving and protecting us in precarious positions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and prosecuting the war on terrorism.

In some ways, September 11, 2001, seems a long time ago. Yet we have done so much in only a few years, and we will continue to do so in the future, to prevent such attacks on America.

Our focus in Government and our private lives has obviously profoundly

changed. We see it with our fortified airports, greater protection in our public buildings, our shipping ports, and even cyberspace.

We have strengthened and updated law enforcement capabilities and intelligence, and our work on the Senate floor in the next few weeks will further enhance those efforts with meaningful improvements and the use of innovations of technology to better gather and analyze counterterrorism information.

We have been more vigilant in watching enemies and threats at home and abroad. We have intercepted financial assistance to terrorists.

Yes, through it all, the fabric of our Nation has become stronger and more appreciated as we face these unprecedented challenges. Our resolve and our focus is more clear. Our determination to protect freedoms here and around the world is greater than ever before.

We are so appreciative of the men and women in uniform who are protecting us, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq or on ships around the world. For our security, they are taking the offensive to the terrorists overseas. We are grateful for those who are active or maybe in the Guard or in the Reserves, or their employers here at home. Of course, we are so grateful to their families who have sent their sons and daughters, their loved ones and their friends overseas to protect us.

Our economic ingenuity, our competitiveness, our strength is being rekindled and reignited by free people and free enterprise. In many ways, those who brought us harm on September 11 surely miscalculated the character of the American people. We are a Nation of bravery and heroism.

I will never forget the stories about the first responders in New York City going into the Trade Centers, breathing their last breaths of life trying to save a few more innocent victims. The same with the Pentagon. The responders came in not only from Arlington but all over northern Virginia, from Maryland, and even some from the District of Columbia, rushing into acrid, toxic air, trying to save those who had been hit, whether on the plane, but mostly those who were the surviving or people working at the Pentagon. These people ignored their personal safety. They rushed into harm's way to help their fellow Americans on that day.

Yesterday, I was at the Pentagon. In fact, I went in through the side of the Pentagon where American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into it. It is all rebuilt. It is strong, in fact stronger than ever. The reason I was at the Pentagon is the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary England, decided to name two new marine landing ships. They are named the USS *Arlington*, because that is where the Pentagon is and was hit, and Somerset after Somerset County, PA, to honor the victims of 9/11 who died in Pennsylvania and Virginia. These two ships will be a tangible demonstration of our shared resolve in this country.

For our friends, neighbors, and loved ones who lost their lives, they will be fitting reminders of their sacrifice.

One of those who lost their lives was a captain of American Airlines Flight 77, Captain Chic Burlingame. He had with him a wonderful poem. It is a poem his brother and sister gave to me. We were making sure he was properly buried at Arlington Cemetery, and I have kept it in my pocket until the Phoenix Project had the rebuilding of the Pentagon. Where I get my neckties and get dressed every morning, I have this picture they gave me. The picture is important, but also what is important is what is on the back of it, and that is a poem Captain Burlingame had on him when they crashed into the Pentagon. It is entitled "I Did Not Die."

I will share the poem with my colleagues.

Do not stand at my grave and weep.
I am not there, I do not sleep.
I am a thousand winds that blow,
I am the diamond glints on snow.
I am the sunlight on ripened grain.
I am the autumn's gentle rain.
When you waken in the morning's hush,
I am the swift uplifting rush
Of quiet birds in circled flight.
I am the soft stars that shine at night.
Do not stand at my grave and cry.
I am not there, I did not die.

Tomorrow, we will be coming together, as is our tradition, to be cheering teams, grilling hamburgers and hot dogs, gathering around tables with those we love and those whom we cherish even more and, yes, indeed, we will pause. We will remember. We will never forget.

Three years after that terrible day that changed our lives, America has come back strong. Everything that makes us good is more appreciated than ever. We are resolved more than ever to stand strong for freedom. I am confident that with the wholesome character of our American people, justice will prevail and liberty will endure.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HEALTH CARE

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, while Congress was in recess, the news media have reported several important studies in the field of wellness and disease prevention. Collectively, these studies are another loud wake-up call. It is time for fundamental change in our approach to health care in the United States.

I have been saying for years that currently we have a sick care system, not a health care system. We have a system that, if you get sick, you get care.