

investigation that reportedly may yield a dozen or more indictments for charges of fight fixing.

All too often my office receives a call from a parent whose child was killed in a match asking why proper medical or safety precautions were not taken by the local commission with jurisdiction, or from a boxer who has worked tirelessly to escape poverty, only to find themselves subject to the exploitation of the unscrupulous few who control the sport.

Professional boxing is the only major sport in the United States that does not have a strong, centralized association or league to establish and enforce uniform rules and practices. There is no widely established union of boxers, no collective body of promoters or managers, and no consistent level of regulation among state and tribal commissions. Due to the lack of uniform business practices or ethical standards, the sport of boxing has suffered from the physical and financial exploitation of its athletes.

The General Accounting Office confirmed in a July 2003 report on professional boxing regulation that, because professional boxing is regulated predominantly on a state-by-state basis, there is a varying degree of oversight depending on the resources and priorities of each state or tribal commission. The report also indicates that the lack of consistency in compliance with Federal boxing law among state and tribal commissions "does not provide adequate assurance that professional boxers are receiving the minimum protections established in Federal law."

The consequences of this vacuum of effective public or private oversight has led to decades of scandals, controversies, unethical practices, and far too many unnecessary deaths in professional boxing. Yet another tragic, but precise example, of poor local regulation occurred just last year in Utah where a 35-year-old boxer collapsed and died in a boxing ring. The young man should never have been allowed to participate in the bout given that he had suffered 25 consecutive losses over a three-year period leading up to the fight, including a loss only one month earlier to the same opponent against whom he was fighting when he died. While tragic in its own right, this is merely one in a seemingly endless series of incidents that continue to occur as a direct result of inadequate state regulation.

This measure would improve existing boxing law, and also establish the USBC. The primary functions of the commission would be to protect the health, safety, and general interests of boxers. More specifically, the USBC would, among other things: administer Federal boxing laws and coordinate with other federal agencies to ensure that these laws are enforced; oversee all professional boxing matches in the United States; and work with the boxing industry and local commissions to improve the status and standards of

the sport. The USBC also would maintain a centralized database of medical and statistical information pertaining to boxers in the United States that would be used confidentially by local commissions in making licensing decisions.

There has been quite a bit of confusion among local boxing commissions regarding the effect that this bill would have on them. Let me be clear. The purpose of the USBC would not be intended to micro-manage boxing by interfering with the daily operations of local boxing commissions. Instead, the USBC would work in consultation with local commissions, and only exercise its authority should reasonable grounds exist for intervention.

The problems that plague the sport of professional boxing compromise the safety of boxers and undermine the credibility of the sport in the public's view. This bill is urgently needed to provide a realistic approach to curbing such problems.

Mr. DORGAN. I am pleased to support with my colleague, Senator MCCAIN, the Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2003.

This is an issue that we have now been examining for some time, and I am pleased that the Senate is moving this legislation forward.

The Senate Commerce Committee had the opportunity over the past years to spend time with figures such as Roy Jones Junior, Muhammad Ali, Bert Sugar, Lou Dibella, and Bernard Hopkins, and we heard some things that caused great concern.

I grew up as a boxing fan who wants to see the sport succeed, but I have worried about how the sport is doing, and I believe this legislation will take an important step.

Professional boxing is the only major sport in the United States that does not have a strong, centralized association or league to establish and enforce uniform rules and practices for its participants. There is no union, no organization that polices promoters or managers, and unfortunately no consistent level of state regulation among the state athletic commissions.

Part of the problem is the alphabet soup of 29 sanctioning bodies—all with different titles and rankings—and another part is a lack of faith that anyone, not the state commissions, managers or promoters are on the up and up.

I believe that a system based on state commissions alone just takes us to the lowest common denominator. We are in desperate need of some basic national standards and uniform enforcement.

There continue to be stories about how some people are exploiting the patchwork of federal and state boxing regulations to the detriment of boxers and their fans.

This manipulation is often tolerated, or tacitly permitted by the state boxing commissions, and too often current laws are rarely enforced by the state attorneys general, or the U.S. Attor-

ney's office who are too busy or just not interested.

This bill will create a United States Boxing Commission to oversee the sport. The federal Commission would have the responsibility to license promoters, managers, and sanctioning organizations. The Commission would be able to keep things in line by revoking or suspending licenses as situations warrant.

It is imperative that we establish this federal mechanism in order to protect not only the boxers, but also the overall integrity of the sport.

QUESTIONS ABOUT IRAQ AID REQUEST

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I want to discuss an issue concerning U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. Before I begin, however, I want to again recognize the bravery and sacrifices that are being made every day by Americans and Iraqis, and especially those who have been killed or wounded. There have been, almost daily, horrific, cowardly acts of terrorism, increasingly aimed at citizens. The appalling attacks this week, where the bodies of Americans were dragged through the streets, disgust and deeply sadden us all. My deepest condolences go out to the families and friends of those who have died.

Yesterday, the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA-IG, issued his first report on the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. I want to remind people that it was Senator FEINGOLD, and later in the process, Senator STEVENS, not the Bush administration, who worked hard to establish the CPA-IG office during the debate on the Iraq supplemental. I had the privilege of working with Senator FEINGOLD to help draft some of the provisions of his amendment, and he, along with Senators STEVENS, are to be commended for their leadership on this issue.

Page 33 of the CPA-IG's report contains a table, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, so ordered.

(See exhibit 1).

Mr. LEAHY. The information it contains concerns me, as it should every Senator. It shows that, as of February 29, 2004, nearly 4 months after President Bush signed the Iraq supplemental into law, only \$900 million of the \$18.4 billion appropriated for reconstruction programs has been obligated, less than 5 percent.

At a time when security is the most critical issue in Iraq, sadly demonstrated by this week's tragic attacks in which nine Americans were killed, the administration has obligated only \$292 million of the \$3.24 billion for "security and law enforcement," less than 10 percent of the total appropriated. This is money that is supposed to go for training a new Iraqi army and police force to reduce the risks to American soldiers and civilians working in

Iraq. On top of this, only \$25 million for "justice, public safety, and civil society" has been obligated. This is less than 3 percent of the \$1 billion appropriated.

Not one dime of the \$1.85 billion appropriated in the supplemental has been obligated for "health care," "private sector development," "roads, bridges and construction," and "transportation and telecommunications."

It would be one thing if the administration had warned us they were going to have trouble spending the \$18 billion, but they said the opposite. They told us these funds were urgent. It was "an emergency." The money had to be appropriated immediately, and not one dime less than the amount requested. There was no time for Congress to carefully consider this legislation. It had to be rammed through as fast as possible.

The administration resisted accountability for how it would spend these billions and billions of dollars, and that fact was, and is, a major concern that many in the Senate have had about that supplemental appropriations bill.

In a letter to Congress on September 17, 2003, the President stated: "This request reflects urgent and essential requirements. I ask the Congress to appropriate the funds as requested, and promptly return the bill to me for signature."

Ambassador Bremer testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 24, 2003: "No one part of this \$87 billion supplemental is dispensable, and no part is more important than the others . . . This is a carefully considered, integrated request. This request is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent. Unless this supplemental passes quickly, Iraqis face an indefinite period with blackouts eight hours a day. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect but no less real."

I would point out to Ambassador Bremer, who I respect a great deal, that less than 8 percent of the funds for "electricity" have been obligated. That is \$428 million out of \$5.6 billion.

I could go on, but by now the point is clear: If every dime of the \$18 billion was so necessary, as a lump sum, to pay for the reconstruction of Iraq this year, why then has so little been obligated nearly 4 months after the President signed the bill?

I did not vote for the \$18 billion and at the time I discussed my reasons in detail. But one of the reasons was that it was obvious that the White House was asking for far more than they could effectively use this year because they did not want to revisit this issue in an election year. They did not want to have to defend this controversial program again in the court of public opinion. They did not want the accountability that should accompany the spending of such large sums.

This is one Senator who does not believe we should spend billions of dollars

of the taxpayers' money without proper accountability. We all knew we would have to spend billions to help rebuild Iraq. But the issue was how many billions, over what period of time, and how to pay for it in a time of rising deficits. Back when we were asked to vote on the supplemental, I urged, as did others, that because the situation in Iraq was, and is, so unpredictable, that we appropriate only as much as could be effectively used. I said that we should then revisit the issue this year, see how the funds were being used, make any necessary adjustments to the reconstruction program, count what other nations were contributing, and then decide how much additional U.S. funding this year would be needed to fill gaps in resources.

But the White House would have none of that. The President insisted on getting every dime up front, paid for by increasing the deficit rather than reducing the President's tax cut for the wealthiest Americans, even though, as the CPA-IG and OMB reports clearly show, they cannot possibly spend it all this year. They probably will not be able to spend half of it. All that talk about how this had to be done in the blink of an eye and without adequate checks and balances was baloney.

Congress received some of the first indications that the administration was going to have trouble handling all of this money when the Office of Management and Budget published a plan, on January 5, 2004, that projected CPA spending at a modest \$1.4 billion by the end of the first quarter. The CPA-IG report confirms that the administration is having difficulty handling all of this money, as many of us predicted.

We all want this money spent wisely, and no one wants any administration to spend money for the sake of spending money. Also, this is not to take anything away from the brave men and women who are working so hard, under extremely difficult conditions, to rebuild Iraq.

But the issue exposed by this report is not the administration's spending rate in Iraq. The issue it exposes is the administration's credibility. It seems self-evident that a large portion of the money was not as urgently needed as administration officials insisted at the time, or the CPA, as press reports have suggested, is tied up in bureaucratic knots and is not able to move fast enough to rebuild Iraq. I submit that the answer is both of the above, but I will let the numbers speak for themselves.

Perhaps we will see a large ramping up of spending in the second quarter, as the administration suggests it will do according to OMB's spending plan. Perhaps the administration can provide a good explanation for why these projects have proceeded so slowly. But regardless, it is clear that Congress could, and I believe should, have appropriated only a portion of the money last year. There is plenty of opportunity to act on another supplemental

this year, instead of frittering away the Senate's time on hot-button political issues designed to score points in an election year.

I believe the Congress can encourage the administration to do better in Iraq, shaping a more effective strategy in the process. This Vermonter believes that more debate, more transparency, and even a dose of frugality, especially when it comes to spending \$18 billion of the taxpayers' money would be a good thing.

I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

The CPA has allocated \$7.9 billion of the \$18.4 billion. Additionally, the CPA has established a \$4 billion reserve. Table 8 below contains more detail on program status.

TABLE 8.—PROGRAM STATUS¹ (IN MILLIONS) AS OF FEBRUARY 29, 2004

Sector 2207	Report ² spending plan	Appor- tioned	Committed	Obligated
Security and law enforcement	\$3,243.0	\$2,232.7	\$850.4	\$292.0
Electricity	5,560.0	1,683.1	1,301.4	428.2
Oil infrastructure	1,701.0	1600.0	772.2	4.0
Justice, public safety, and civil society	1,018.0	560.9	130.3	25.0
Democracy	458.0	458.0	106.0	106.0
Education, refugees, human rights, governance	280.0	138.5	32.6	27.1
Roads, bridges and construction	370.0	119.3	0.0	0.0
Health care	793.0	330.0	0.0	0.0
Transportation and telecommunications	500.0	164.0	61.9	0.0
Water resources and sanitation	4,332.0	496.2	18.0	18.0
Private sector development	184.0	64.5	2.0	0.0
Total by sector	18,439.0	7,947.2	3,273.0	900.3
Construction	12,611.0	3,950.0	1,783.2	595.8
Nonconstruction	5,370.0	3,539.2	1,383.8	198.5
Democracy	458.0	458.0	106.0	106.0
Total by program	18,439.0	7,947.2	3,273.0	900.3

¹ Have not been formally reviewed or audited by the CPA-IG.

² Public Law 108-106 Section 2207 is the CPA quarterly progress report. As of the date of this report, CPA was revising the IRRF allocations.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the Senate for ratifying the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—Safeguards Agreement by unanimous consent last night.

The Additional Protocol will augment the IAEA's safeguards monitoring system and provide early warning about illicit nuclear weapons-related activities under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

By acting swiftly to ratify the treaty, the United States Senate has sent a clear signal to the international community that the United States is committed to not only maintaining a leadership role in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to work closely with other nations in that endeavor.

We know that we cannot go it alone and we will need the help of our friends and allies.