

are trying to get at the bottom of why 9/11 occurred and what we could have done to avoid it.

They have had testimony from Mr. Tenet, who is Director of the CIA, from Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and his predecessor, Secretary Cohen. They are going to entertain testimony from President Clinton and President Bush. They certainly had Mr. Clarke before them, and I think that is all well and good. I think all of those leaders in Government who were involved in the decisionmaking should sit and meet with this commission to get to the bottom of how America can be safer, which brings us to the story of the day.

I can't understand why Condoleezza Rice, who has served this administration and this country so well, is resisting an invitation to appear before the 9/11 Commission. If the President can find time, if former President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the head of the CIA can find time, certainly it is not a matter of scheduling.

Second, she has made a number of appearances, as you know, on television on "60 Minutes" last night, and many other shows. So she is prepared to entertain questions from reporters. Why is she resisting this opportunity to testify? To say it has never been done, that it is unprecedented, let me say thank goodness 9/11 had never occurred before and it was unprecedented.

Let us gather together in a bipartisan fashion. Ms. Rice should come before the bipartisan commission and answer as many questions as openly and honestly as she can without ever crossing the line in the area of national security. But as she resists this opportunity to share her feelings about the preparation of the defense of America, she shortchanges the process which is simply trying to make America a safer nation.

Let us keep this bipartisan. Let us entertain not only Mr. Clarke but also Ms. Rice in terms of her views and memories of what happened on that fateful day.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

IRAQ DEBATE

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate that has been swirling around the country with respect to Iraq. The debate comes up again with respect to the commission which is currently meeting.

I cannot respond to all of the specifics that come along. I am tempted to, but I will not because I want to spend the time that is allotted to me by setting the total record before those who might be listening so we can understand that many of the original statements or original positions with respect to Iraq that are being repeated over and over again are, in fact, false.

I remember our colleague across the aisle, the late Senator Moynihan from

New York, one of my dear friends and one of the Senators for whom I have the highest regard, quoted something. He probably didn't think of it himself, but it was more or less his mantra, as he said to me: "Everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not to his own facts."

We keep hearing things said over and over again with respect to the war in Iraq as if they were fact. It is time to set the overall record straight.

We heard one statement that there was absolutely no connection between 9/11 and Iraq. The other one we hear over and over again is the reason we went into Iraq is because we thought Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Some make it a little more stark than that.

There was a group that marched on the Utah State Legislature wearing T-shirts that said, "Bush Lied To Us. There Were No WMDs," as if the President of the United States George W. Bush himself alone was the only authority for the notion that there were weapons of mass destruction; and, once again repeating the false position that the only reason we went into Iraq is because we believed they had weapons of mass destruction.

To quote another individual not nearly as well known as Pat Moynihan but my high school history teacher, she would always say to us, "You cannot cut the seamless web of history." I want to take this opportunity to lay out the whole seamless web of the history of terrorism and do our best to understand it so we can realize the first statement that there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11 and the second statement that the only reason we went in is because Bush lied to us about weapons there, are not true. And I hope we can get the dialog back to the facts.

I am distressed at what has happened to the dialog on this issue. I must comment. On television was the former Vice President of the United States with his hand with a clenched fist raised, the blood vessels standing out on his neck, screaming at the top of his voice, speaking of the President, "He has betrayed this country."

To say the President has betrayed his country is to accuse him of treason, which is one of the crimes specifically listed in the Constitution as an impeachable offense. We have not heard that kind of rhetoric from a politician as highly placed as Al Gore since the 1950s. And the politician who used to speak like that was a member of this Chamber. His name was Joe McCarthy, and the President whom he accused of treason was Harry Truman.

Let us step away from that kind of rhetoric in this debate and review the facts.

I had the opportunity of attending the Kissinger Lecture at the Library of Congress which was given by George Shultz, former Secretary of State. It was one of the most cogent and lucid statements of where we are with re-

spect to the war on terror I have ever heard. An update of that appeared in today's Wall Street Journal. I would like to quote from that those points which address the issues I have talked about, and ask unanimous consent that the entire piece be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1).

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, former Secretary of State George Shultz begins with this comment:

We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me but not many others did. [Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.]

Twenty-five years ago, it was on the radar screen of an American administration—in this case one headed by Ronald Reagan—that terrorism was a problem.

Secretary Shultz goes on to discuss this and then makes this comment:

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

Let me emphasize that last sentence again. Speaking of international terrorism that was involved in all of these things, going back to the assassination of Sadat in 1981, he says:

And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

All right. Do we have an example of such a state that has developed awesome weaponry that may be for sale? Yes.

Quoting again from Secretary Shultz, he speaks directly of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. He adds to this Kim Jong Il of North Korea, and then says:

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

Yes, we have heard much on this floor about America must not invade another sovereign state. That is precisely what Secretary Shultz is talking about when he says, these states that develop awesome weaponry and cooperate with terrorism for the purpose of

upsetting the international order, then claim the immunities of the international order for themselves—as he says: “such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state.”

He goes on to summarize all that happened in Iraq. And again, those who will read the entire piece as it appears following my statement can get all of those details. But after he recites the details of what Saddam Hussein has done, he turns to David Kay, the man who is quoted again and again as the authority for the statement on the T-shirt that says: “Bush Lied To Us.”

Well, let's see what David Kay really said. I said in my previous statement David Kay told this Congress, testifying before the Armed Services Committee, that Saddam Hussein was, in fact, more dangerous than we thought when we started the war. But these are the portions of David Kay's position Secretary Shultz chooses to highlight, and I think they are the right ones to bring out.

Quoting again:

As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, “We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened.”

Sellers of what? Buyers of what? Who would the sellers be? Who would the buyers be? The sellers, obviously, would be the Iraqis. The buyers would be the terrorists. And what are we talking about?

Back to Secretary Shultz:

When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: “The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons.”

Just think about that for a second: the knowledge to make them.

If I could give a very homely example, last week my wife and I were celebrity chefs at the March of Dimes gala, and we won a prize, and people all said: Is this an old family recipe? We had to admit, no, we called a chef in Salt Lake City at one of the finest restaurants there, who happens to work as a judge at these kinds of celebrity cook-ins, and he gave us a recipe he thought would win. We have been celebrity chefs four times. We have called him all four times. We have won three out of four.

The capacity to tell somebody how to make something will produce that something just as much as having that something yourself. This chef did not participate, but his recipes participated, and his recipes won. All we had to do was be the willing buyers in the case; and he was the willing seller. I

will add, just for the record, no money changed hands with respect to the recipe. But the example is there, and that is what David Kay is talking about.

Going back to Secretary Shultz, he says:

... in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations—including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale—behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

Secretary Shultz concludes his piece with this comment:

If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

Put it in context, put it in the historic pattern, and we realize this is all connected and that the action with respect to Iraq was a very proper, significant, indeed, essential part of the overall war on terrorism. If we had not moved ahead, we would have been irresponsible.

The summary is in the callout that is put in the paper that says:

The U.S. had no choice: We had to oust Saddam Hussein, or face the gravest threat.

Mr. President, may I ask how much time I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 4½ minutes.

Mr. BENNETT. If I might use that 4½ minutes, then, to address the fundamental question of the future nobody talks about. We are spending all of this time rehashing the past. Here is the fundamental question of the future: What happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction? The assumption raised by the statement that “Bush lied to us about the weapons” is that the weapons never existed.

Well, the first person to convince me the weapons existed was Madeleine Albright. The first President to tell me the weapons existed was William Jefferson Clinton.

The first group that insisted weapons were there was working for the United Nations. This was not a partisan thing put together by George W. Bush. The weapons were clearly in Iraq, and the question is not why didn't Bush tell us the truth about them; the question is, what happened to them? That is the question we need to address. That is the question of the future we are ignoring in all of this debate about who said what at what point in the past.

As I see it, there are four possibilities of what happened to the weapons Saddam Hussein had. No. 1, we got them all in the bombing in 1998. We must remember, as we try to truncate the history, the war in Iraq began in 1991. The U.N. resolution that called for the war was never suspended. It was renewed with acts of war in 1998. A heavy 4-day period of solid bombing is an act of war. President Clinton carried that out with the approval of this Congress. So the first possibility is that bombing destroyed all of the weapons of mass destruction.

The second possibility, Saddam Hussein himself dismantled his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in an effort to convince the U.N. inspectors they were not there so the inspectors would leave him alone and he could go back to building them after the inspectors were gone. There is some suggestion that was in fact what happened, that he did not intend to disarm, as U.N. Resolution 1441 required he do. All he intended to do was deceive, and that is where the weapons went.

Possibility No. 3, they were trucked over the border. Some of them got into Syria or other places and into the hands of others who still have them.

And possibility No. 4, they are still in Iraq and we simply have not found them. When people ask me, which of these four possibilities do you think is the most likely, I say: All of the above. I believe we destroyed a good portion of his weapons in the 1998 bombing. I believe he himself dismantled others in a deliberate attempt to deceive the U.N. inspectors. I believe some of them did get out of the country and are in the hands of other bad actors somewhere. And I believe there are probably still some hidden away somewhere in the desert in Iraq.

Unless the first answer is the only one that is correct and they were all destroyed in the bombing, they are still around somewhere. The capacity to build them was still around, as David Kay pointed out, before we went in and removed that.

If there are some of them still around, why aren't we looking for them? Why aren't we paying attention to where they might be? I believe the American military is still on the alert for them. I believe the American intelligence community is still looking to where they might be. But in the debate we have here on the Senate floor, this question is never raised. It is never given any attention. Instead we spend all of our time looking backward and trying to assign blame instead of looking forward and trying to solve problems.

I commend Secretary Shultz's presentation to all. It is a clear historic perspective over a quarter century from one of our senior statesmen that makes it clear the rhetoric surrounding this issue has been inappropriate and focused on the wrong thing.

I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Asian Wall Street Journal, Mar. 29, 2004]

AN ESSENTIAL WAR
(By George P. Shultz)

We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception).

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased out intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terror threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other—bilaterally or multilaterally—to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our

common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and political development; and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful preemption. Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the option of forceful preemption, you diminish the effectiveness of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack as hideous as they are—witness what just happened in Madrid—the U.S. must be ready to preempt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable harm.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic. They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.

About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth country in the region.

That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.

That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation—Desert Storm—to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed out.

When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."

Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and produced and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all necessary force" against Iraq—an authorization that at the end of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled—would be reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.

In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the inspection effort.

By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N. resolutions.

In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to 1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December 1998.

But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days—apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.

So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors reported

that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.

From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.

President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions—a long line of them—to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.

That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on—and on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining the U.S.—a position that seemed to emerge from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was impossible militarily, politically, and financially.

Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:

There as never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interest in ways that defy and endanger the international state system.

The international legal case against Saddam—17 resolutions—was unprecedented.

The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N. inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international peace and security.

Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse, otherwise deal with his arsenal.

He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N. resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his compliance.

President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678

and 687, the original basis for military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization with the international system. In the end, it was the U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.

The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material, and of how we discovered these developments before they got completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As David Kay put it in a February 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened."

When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small accounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons."

Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations—including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale—behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

September 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network.

If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

OIL SUPPLY

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last Thursday a press release from the De-

partment of Interior came across my desk that at first glance appeared to be the announcement of an April fool's joke. The press release stated beginning April 1, the Interior Department will deliver about 115,000 barrels of oil per day to the Department of Energy for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I thought this was an April fool's prank because this is about the worst possible time for the administration to be taking oil off the market for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Crude oil and gasoline prices are historic highs and inventory levels are near historic lows. Consumers are paying record prices at the gas pumps. Manufacturers and farmers and a whole lot of other folks are paying high prices for diesel fuel. Our airlines face soaring fuel costs and so does the trucking industry. Our economy, which has major problems, will be weakened further by high energy prices.

To make the timing even worse, the Department of Interior plans to begin its oil deliveries to the DOE on April 1, the same date the OPEC cartel is scheduled to start cutting its oil production. The purpose and effect of OPEC's cuts are to raise oil prices further. The effect of the administration's stated plans to keep filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve regardless of the price of oil, if implemented, will be the same, principally because tight supplies and private inventories will become even tighter due to the administration's additional demands for oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Regrettably, the Interior Department's announcement is no April fool's joke. To the contrary, it is another misstep in the administration's illogical and counterproductive practice of putting oil into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, regardless of the price of crude oil.

Over the past 2 years, this practice has pushed up oil prices with minimal improvement to our overall energy or national security and with great detriment to our economic security.

Let's just review what has happened with energy prices. Crude oil prices have been steadily increasing over the past 2½ years. Last week crude oil reached a 13-year high of over \$38 per barrel. So far this year, crude oil is averaging about \$35 per barrel. In 2003, a barrel of crude oil cost on average over \$31. That was a record at that point. Climbing crude oil prices have led to higher prices for refined products, including gasoline, home heating oil, jet fuel, and diesel fuel.

Today, as well as four times in the last 10 days or so, the price of gasoline reached a record high. Nationally the average price of a gallon of gasoline is now \$1.75. In Michigan, the average price of a gallon of unleaded is up to \$1.78. There are fears prices could go over \$2 if there is even a small interruption in supply.

The DOE's Energy Information Administration, the EIA, projects prices will rise on average to \$1.83 per gallon