

Staff, projected in April would be needed to make it through September. President Bush and the top brass at the Pentagon have, once again, underestimated the resources needed to sustain our military halfway across the world.

The sad part is that many of us have actually come to expect President Bush to shortchange our troops. Military operations are costing more than the Pentagon estimated, in part because top officials expected that Iraq would be a peaceful democracy by now and we could start bringing our troops home. But it does not take a genius to realize that rebuilding a country from the ground up, an entire country that has been decimated by a brutal dictator, takes years, possibly decades.

The costs of these failures are adding up, Mr. Speaker, both in human and in financial terms. Two days ago the United States reached another disheartening milestone when the 900th American soldier was killed in Iraq. Moreover, due to a shortage of qualified soldiers, the Pentagon has shamefully reenlisted the Ready Reserve, a group of retired soldiers who have moved on to civilian life.

Congress has already appropriated nearly \$200 billion in supplemental funds to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That number could easily reach \$1 trillion before the end of this decade. We cannot possibly fund the war in Iraq at the rate we are going, especially if we want to truly address the threat of terrorism, that threat which, by the way, was never in Iraq, where weapons of mass destruction have yet to be found. Instead of rooting out terrorist networks in Afghanistan, the Bush administration chose to focus on Saddam Hussein, who had no connection to al-Qaeda.

In the process, we have not only failed to adequately address the growing terrorist threat; we have actually added to that threat by incurring the wrath of thousands of Muslims who think we are fighting a war against Islam.

We need to be much smarter about how we address America's national security, Mr. Speaker. That is why I have introduced H. Con. Res. 392, legislation to create a SMART security platform for the 21st century. SMART stands for Sensible Multilateral American Response to Terrorism. In crafting this legislation, my staff and I received the help and support of the Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and Women's Action for New Directions. Without the counsel of these organizations, SMART security would not have happened as it did.

SMART security is more vigilant than President Bush claims to be in fighting terror. Instead of emphasizing military force, SMART focuses on multilateral partnerships and stronger intelligence capabilities to track and detain terrorists, and it does so while respecting human and civil rights.

Terrorism is an international problem, and so it makes sense that the

fight against terrorism should involve the international community. That is why SMART security calls for working closely with the U.N. and with NATO to achieve our goals. Only by actively involving other nations in this fight can we hope to prevent future acts of terrorism.

It is time America got smart about its national security. I urge all of my colleagues to cosponsor this vitally important resolution, H. Con. Res. 392, because SMART security is tough, pragmatic, and patriotic, and it will keep America safe.

ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF CYPRUS BY TURKISH TROOPS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BILIRAKIS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, as I have done every year, I rise again today to reiterate my fierce objection to the illegal occupation of the island of Cyprus by Turkish troops and declare my grave concern for the future of the area. The island's three decades of internal division make the status quo absolutely unacceptable.

In July 1974, Turkish troops captured the northern part of Cyprus, seizing more than a third of the island. The Turkish troops expelled 200,000 Greek-Cypriots from their homes and killed 5,000 citizens of the once-peaceful island. The Turkish invasion was a conscious and deliberate attempt at ethnic cleansing. Turkey proceeded to install 40,000 military personnel on Cyprus. Today, these troops, in conjunction with United Nations (U.N.) peace-keeping forces, make the small island of Cyprus one of the most militarized areas in the world. Over a quarter of a century later, approximately 1,500 Greek-Cypriots remain missing, including four Americans.

The Green Line, a 113-mile barbed wire fence, separates the Greek-Cypriot community from its Turkish-Cypriot counterpart. For thirty years, the Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus (TNRC), recognized by no nation in the world except for Turkey, has prohibited Greek-Cypriots, until recently, from freely crossing the Green Line to visit the towns and communities of their families. With control of about 37 percent of the island, Turkey's military occupation has had severe consequences, most notably the dislocation of the Greek-Cypriot population and the resulting refugees.

Thirty years later, the forced separation of these two communities still exist despite efforts by the U.N. and G-8 leadership to mend this rift between north and south. The U.N., with the explicit support of the United States, has sponsored several rounds of proximity talks between the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, and Mr. Rauf Denktash, the self-proclaimed leader of the occupied northern part of the island.

In March 2003, the United Nations-sponsored Cyprus peace talks at the Hague between the President of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Mr. Denktash came to an abrupt halt. Responsibility for this unfortunate setback in the peace process rested largely with Mr. Denktash, who rejected U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan to end the 29-year division of Cyprus. It was shameful that the Secretary General's personal diplo-

macy was met by this kind of flat-out rejection. A large share of the blame also rested with the Turkish military and hard-line nationalists in Ankara, who have maintained the illegal Turkish military occupation of Cyprus since Turkish forces invaded the island in 1974. If the Government of Turkey was sincere about settling the Cyprus problem, it could have put the necessary pressure on Mr. Denktash to say "yes" to the U.N. Plan at that time.

Nearly a year later, the Turkish government finally expressed interest in renewing negotiations using the Annan plan as a basis. However, the clock was ticking toward Cyprus becoming a full member of the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004. The goal was to have a completed and agreed-to settlement plan by the week before so Cyprus could enter the EU as a united island. Even though both sides knew they were not going to get everything they wanted, each side was guaranteed a fair plan and one that would be immediately functional. Unfortunately, the final version of the Annan plan which was submitted for a referendum vote to both communities was unbalanced and biased against the Greek-Cypriots.

On several occasions, my colleagues and I strongly voiced our serious concerns with the Annan plan through letters, meetings and floor statements. We wanted to make sure that all those involved in the negotiation process were well aware that unless these issues were addressed and resolved, the Greek-Cypriots would not agree to the plan. Greater efforts should have been made to address these legitimate concerns which could have secured a positive vote from the Greek-Cypriots.

On April 24, 2004, the people of Cyprus had the opportunity to speak for themselves and vote on a United Nations settlement plan. The Greek-Cypriots' rejection of the suggested settlement plan should not be interpreted as a vote against reunification, but rather, as an important statement about the fundamental principles that must be addressed in any viable and workable settlement.

The Greek-Cypriot voters have made clear that the suggested settlement plan failed because it did not provide for guarantees to ensure the complete implementation of commitments under the plan. Security was a major concern for the Greek-Cypriots.

The Annan plan did not thoroughly satisfy the condition of the removal of foreign troops from Cyprus and the elimination of the right of the guarantor powers to intervene in Cyprus. Although previous versions of the Annan plan called for the complete withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces once Turkey joined the E.U., the final version of the Annan plan provided for an indefinite presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus. According to the plan, the number of troops would gradually decrease to 650 over a period of 14 years. However, their continuing presence and intervention rights would make a full and genuine independence of Cyprus impossible.

The plan also provided for the continuation of the Treaty of guarantee. This treaty gives the guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece, United Kingdom (UK)) the right to unilaterally intervene in order to preserve the "constitutional order" of the United Cyprus Republic and its constituent states. However, the Annan plan failed to specifically clarify that this treaty does not authorize military intervention. This was a critical point because Turkey insisted that it

would continue to have the right to intervene militarily in Cyprus. This Turkish arrogance increased the Greek-Cypriot fear of a repetition of the 1974 invasion and its tragic consequences.

The Annan plan also did not provide for a property recovery system that would recognize the rights and interests of displaced Greek-Cypriots, and a property compensation system that would not force Greek-Cypriots to pay for their own restitution. The plan allowed for one-third restitution and two-thirds compensation for property owned in the north by Greek-Cypriots who would be losing the use of their properties. The funds for the restitution would be guaranteed by the Federal State. However, nine-tenths of the Federal State's resources would derive from Greek-Cypriots and the remainder from Turkish-Cypriots. Essentially, the Greek-Cypriots, to a large extent, would be paying for their own loss of property.

In addition, compensation for the property would have been required to be paid by the constituent states. This meant that Greek-Cypriot refugees would have to request compensation from the Greek-Cypriot Constituent State. Again, Greek-Cypriot taxpayers, who were the victims of the invasion, would be paying for their own loss of use of property.

Lastly, the Annan plan ignored the right of all Cypriots to buy property and to live wherever they choose without being limited by ethnic quotas and failed to provide a viable, functional government free of built-in deadlocks and voting restrictions based on ethnicity. It set complicated and restrictive provisions regarding the right of Greek-Cypriot refugees to return to their homes in the north. More specifically, a restrictive moratorium of 6 years would be implemented for those Greek-Cypriots who wished to return and permanently live in the Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State (TCCS). For the first 19 years or until Turkey's accession to the EU, the number of Greek-Cypriots who wished to permanently live in the TCCS would not be able to exceed 18 percent of its total population. After that time period, they would not be able to exceed 33.3 percent of the total population of the TCCS. This restriction would have been permanent.

The Annan plan established a system based on permanent ethnic division, while denying fundamental democratic rights to a segment of the population. Under the plan, Greek-Cypriots permanently living in the TCCS and possessing its internal citizenship status would not have the right to participate in the elections for its 24 representatives in the federal Senate.

Since the vote on the referendum, Greek-Cypriots have been criticized for allegedly rejecting peace and the "only chance" for reunification. Many people—including the Greek-Cypriots themselves—regret that the plan presented to them did not allow both communities to respond positively. Criticism and anger, however, will only further divide the island precisely when the Cypriot people need the support of the international community to continue on the path toward lasting peace.

Greek-Cypriots should not be blamed for voting against a plan that they believed did not meet the interests of their country and their futures. It is one thing for others to comment on the terms and conditions for settlement, but it is the Cypriots who must live with whatever plan is adopted.

The Government of Cyprus continues to emphasize that it remains committed to perse-

vering in its efforts to reunify Cyprus as a bizonal, bicomunal federation with democratic and human rights for all Cypriots. Earlier this year, the Cypriot Government announced a series of measures aimed at assisting those Turkish-Cypriots residing under the control of the Turkish occupation army. This package includes a wide range of political, social, humanitarian, educational and economic measures that will enhance the ability of the Turkish-Cypriots to enjoy many of the benefits that the Republic of Cyprus offers to its citizens—as well as to share in the benefits of European Union membership. Far beyond a merely symbolic gesture, the package is a substantive program to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the larger Cypriot society.

At the same time, the Turkish occupation regime partially lifted restrictions on freedom across the artificial line of division created by Turkey's military occupation. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have crossed the line to visit homes and areas of their own country that were inaccessible to them for nearly 30 years. It isn't clear whether opening the border was just a tactic to ease the frustrations, or a sign of a fundamental change of heart. But it has produced rare displays of human kinship, exchanges of flowers and pastries, and emotional visits to homes abandoned in the mid-1970s.

However, neither the Government's measures for the Turkish-Cypriots nor the partial lifting of restrictions by the occupation regime should be seen as a substitute for a comprehensive resolution to end the division of Cyprus.

I urge this Administration, the United Nations and the European Union to respect the democratic decision of the Cypriot people, to remain engaged in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, and to work toward a fair and lasting reunification of Cyprus.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take my special order at this time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection. Without objection.

9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. KINGSTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, today we received the long awaited report from the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 report I think had some constructive ideas that we in Washington are going to listen to. It was a bipartisan group and they had a lot of good thoughts and some good discussion, and it was a unanimous report.

Three of the things that they said were our problems going into 9/11 was one, we did ignore a lot of red flags. Number two, the capacity that we had to fight terrorism, we were somewhat in the Cold War model and not using all of the technology or on-the-ground

intelligence that we really need for this century. Number three, the management of information, the FBI not talking to the CIA, other agencies not sharing information led to lots of things going on and the right arm not knowing what the left arm was doing.

Finally, just our imagination, unable to really conceive of people who hated us so much that we did not know what they were plotting against us, that they were willing to kill themselves, they were instructed to kill Americans in order to get revenge on a country that had done them no harm.

Yet, indeed, if we look at some of the terrorist attacks leading into 9/11, as outlined by our colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MURPHY), and I will submit this for the RECORD, it is unbelievable. November 1979, terror in Iran, American embassy attacked, hostages taken. April 1983, Beirut, 63 people killed from a truck filled with explosives driven into the United States embassy. October 1983, Beirut, 241 U.S. servicemen killed from a truck filled with explosives, driven through the main gate of a U.S. Marine Corps headquarters. September 1984, Beirut, a truck filled with explosives crashed through the gate of the U.S. embassy compound. October 1995, the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacked, one American killed. November 1985, hijackers on an Egyptian plane kill U.S. passengers. December 1985, Rome and Vienna, 20 killed from suicide bombers at U.S. and Israeli international airports. April 1988, 259 killed in bombing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. December 1992, Yemen, 2 killed from a bomb at Gold Mohur Hotel immediately after 100 U.S. servicemen departed. February 1993, World Trade Center, New York City, 6 deaths and more than 1,000 injuries. October 1993, 18 U.S. servicemen killed, Osama bin Laden claims he supplied weapons and fighters to the Somalis. 1994, New York City, investigators thwart the attempt to blow up Holland and Lincoln Tunnels and other New York City landmarks. 1995 Manila, Philippines investigators discover plots to assassinate the Pope and President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines.

This list, Mr. Speaker, goes on and on, and I am going to submit this for the RECORD. But again, one of the things the 9/11 Commission said is we could not imagine the whole concept of the war on terror. I think that what really happened on 9/11, we changed our views that terrorism is not a crime, but an act of war, and that these events, some isolated, are yet still linked together.

I think with some of the recommendations that they have come up with we will be able to avoid this in the future. In the meantime, we need to complete our job and our duty in Iraq. Iraq has harbored terrorists, and that was also in the 9/11 Commission Report. And we have a report that has come in; one year after being in Iraq,