

publicly financed California university for the same cost as other state residents. To further this effort nationwide, in 2003, she established the Ellen and Federico Jimenez Scholarship Fund for undocumented students who are ineligible for state or federal financial school assistance. This scholarship makes the critical difference in the lives of students who would otherwise be unable to afford the cost of a higher education.

As a mother of three children, Antonia Hernández also realizes the tremendous influence parents have in lives of their children. That's why, under her leadership, MALDEF graduated thousands of parent leaders from its Parent School Partnership (PSP) program, which instructs parents on how to become involved in their children's education.

In the area of employment, Antonia Hernández has provided opportunities for Latinos by mounting legal battles for fair hiring practices. Her work on the landmark legal case of *Ballasteros v. Lucky* forced the food service industries to allow Latinos to work in every major grocery chain in California. The victory resulted in the hiring of Latinos in several hundred retail stores.

Antonia Hernández has been a tenacious defender of immigration reform. Working with Congress and state governments, she has been a devoted advocate on behalf of fair and just immigration reform. Most notably, in 1985, MALDEF successfully halted the implementation of California's Proposition 187, which would have barred immigrants from receiving public education, medical services, and other public benefits.

Underlying all of MALDEF's efforts is a steadfast commitment to political empowerment in the Latino community. With this in mind, under Antonia Hernández's leadership, MALDEF has vigorously defended the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In 1982, she helped to create a new section of the Act that explicitly outlaws discriminatory election practices. She also championed a bilingual provision to protect limited-English proficient voters. In order to ensure a strong political voice for Latinos throughout the country, MALDEF led nationwide census outreach campaigns in 1990 and 2000. Over the years, MALDEF has won many Latino-majority voting districts, one of which resulted in the first Latino seat in 100 years in Los Angeles County (1990 Garza v. County of L.A.) and another which created the state of Illinois' first Latino Congressional district as a remedy for past discrimination in the Chicago area (1995 King v. Illinois State Board of Elections).

Antonia Hernández has worked to ensure that Latinos receive their fair share of public services, including access to medical insurance, language translation for public services, and fair and equitable treatment in land-use decisions. Just one example is the 2001 case in which MALDEF won a case against the City of Poth, a South Texas town that finally agreed to pave the streets in its Latino neighborhoods.

Mr. Speaker, Ms. Hernández is a visionary. Through her work at MALDEF, her service to the Latino community has truly improved lives and helped to carry out the organization's unwavering mission to remove obstacles that prevent the Latino community from realizing its dreams. We thank her for her many years of public service and we are grateful that she will continue her work in the community as she

moves on to serve as President and CEO of the California Community Foundation. Her courage, compassion, and, above all, her dedication to helping others have made a difference at MALDEF and in the Latino community. We trust that this is indeed not an end to her work in public service, but a new beginning to even greater victories ahead.

USES AND MISUSES OF INTELLIGENCE

HON. RUSH D. HOLT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, in just over 3 years the United States has faced two acute intelligence failures. The first was the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The second can be found in the arguments made to go to war in Iraq. Weapons of mass destruction have not been found. Anti-American sentiment has been strengthened and spread across the Islamic world. In the aftermath the United States has been saddled with a long-term commitment to pay the rising costs of war and endure the continuing loss of life in Iraq. It is in this context America's hard-won lessons from its past covert activities should be turned to, to guide us in our current endeavors.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a copy of the following speech by Professor Raymond H. Close delivered to the Princeton Middle East Society at Princeton University last month on the uses and misuses of intelligence in the conflict with Iraq.

USES AND MISUSES OF INTELLIGENCE

(By Raymond H. Close)

Today I want to describe to you the details of a few specific situations that took place a number of years ago where intelligence estimates and covert actions were employed, and in some cases deliberately distorted, in a manner calculated to support policy objectives of the U.S. Government that might otherwise not have received the support of the American people and the approval of the world community. From an assessment of those experiences in the past, perhaps we can draw some useful lessons to guide our intelligence officials today in fulfilling their professional obligations more honestly and appropriately.

My own experiences in the twenty years that I spent actually engaged in clandestine operations in the Middle East were entirely in the areas of old-fashioned espionage and so-called covert action—which I define as the effort to achieve specific strategic objectives for the United States through secret intervention in the political processes of another country. As you all know, the term "covert action" can also include the employment of lethal violence in some situations to accomplish objectives that could not otherwise be justified by our own legal system or by humanitarian principles, carried out by methods designed to hide our government's role behind a shield of "plausible denial".

Let me start by telling you about some of my experiences in Lebanon during the years 1952-1958, from which some lessons can still be drawn, I think.

In 1957, I participated in a covert action operation in Lebanon, explicitly ordered by President Eisenhower, in which it was our objective to keep a government in power that was committed to the open and enthusiastic support of American policy objectives

in the region, but was under assault by internal elements determined that their country should adopt a more independent stance. We were initially successful, but our crude manipulation of the democratic process during Lebanon's 1957 parliamentary elections contributed directly to a civil war that was ended only on the landing of a large U.S. Marine and Army military force one year later. To justify that armed intervention, we deliberately and knowingly provided false intelligence to the United Nations purporting to prove that our forces had responded to indirect aggression against the freely elected government by forces inspired and supported by international communism. This was pure fabrication. By the autumn of 1958, following our military intervention, the government that we had supported by our covert action had been replaced by a regime composed primarily of individuals who had been leaders of the political opposition, but who were not by any objective standard enemies of the United States. The supreme irony, I always thought, was that shortly thereafter Barry Goldwater wrote a book in which he extolled the glorious success of our ill-advised and ultimately counterproductive covert action operation in Lebanon. Goldwater recorded that, in a triumphant demonstration of how to employ U.S. power in the cause of freedom, a communist regime had been overthrown in Lebanon and replaced by a pro-western government. This breathtaking contradiction of historical fact was an example to me of how effective the big lie can be, and has, particularly in recent months, reminded me to keep an open mind when it comes to assertions of fact by senior American policymakers. A case in point: On February 5th, 2003, just one year ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his now-famous report to the United Nations Security Council, said this: "My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." Secretary Powell's use of the pronoun "we" in this statement was clearly intended to include CIA Director George Tenet, whose face appeared right over Powell's shoulder throughout the presentation. Tenet's presence could only have been intended to put the CIA's official stamp of approval on everything Powell was reporting—even information that Tenet must have known was highly questionable.

The Bush Administration apparently felt under pressure to strengthen its case for war in Iraq by persistent enhancement of whatever intelligence happened to be available that seemed to support their policy objectives. The details of how that corruption was implemented are much less important, however, than the violation of principles that allowed a preemptive war to be initiated on the basis of evidence that was known by the senior levels of our government to be inconclusive, and even demonstrably false in some cases. This misuse of intelligence will have long-term costs, first among which is that American and world public opinion will, in future crisis situations, be so dubious about the credibility of American intelligence that approval and support of other U.S. military actions overseas may be withheld by the international community even in situations where intervention is urgently called for. Secondly, the personal image of George W. Bush relying on questionable information to make life and death decisions has drastically compromised his credibility and effectiveness as a national and world leader. Finally, the present crisis has revealed flaws in the way various intelligence agencies in Washington evaluate their product, and how honestly and objectively it is packaged and marketed to their customers in a competitive

political arena in which the possession of allegedly "solid" secret information can provide such a formidable advantage.

Another appropriate example, from which valuable lessons can still be derived today, concerns events in Africa in the late summer of 1998, when the Clinton Administration retaliated against terrorist bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by launching long-range Tomahawk missiles at targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan. The missile attack on Khartoum, in particular, because it was based on embarrassingly inaccurate intelligence, made subsequent American counter-terrorism strategy much more difficult to implement. At that time, in September 1998, I wrote the following in an op-ed piece published in the Sunday Outlook Section of the Washington Post under the headline: "We Can't Defeat Terrorism with Bombs and Bombast". This is an extract from that article, written exactly three years before 9/11:

"To launch missiles into countries with which we are technically at peace—and to kill their citizens—is to declare that the United States is free to make its own rules for dealing with the international problem of terrorism. What standing will we have in the future to complain about any other country that attacks the territory of its neighbor, citing as justification the need to protect itself from terrorism? Did those who authorized these attacks think through the long-term implications of this short-sighted and dangerous precedent?

"Let's get down to practical realities. The new threat we face is often stateless, without sovereign territory or official sponsorship. Friendly governments around the world—especially those with large Muslim populations such as India, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Gulf states and the new republics of Central Asia—share a common need for internal and regional stability. Terrorism is a weapon that threatens all civil authority. This set of circumstances provides an unprecedented incentive, which is to say a God-given opportunity, to establish new systems and procedures for intergovernmental cooperation, even among states that may differ on other basic issues. But the fight against a silent and hidden common enemy requires infinite patience and tact on the part of law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. It demands absolute secrecy, mutual trust and professional respect. If the United States loses its cool without warning, if it is seen by others as a loose cannon that resorts to sudden violent action on a massive scale, the critically needed cooperation will not be there." Later in the same article I added: "President Clinton and others have labeled all Islamic terrorists as members or 'affiliates' of the 'Osama bin Laden Network of Terrorism.' This is, of course, the common mistake of demonizing one individual as the root of all evil. In fact, elevating bin Laden to that status only gives him a mantle of heroism now and, more ominously, will guarantee him martyrdom if he should die. Informed students of the subject have known for years that although the various militant Islamist movements around the world share a common ideology and many of the same grievances, they are not a monolithic international organization. Our recent attacks, unfortunately, may have inflamed their common zeal and hastened their unification and centralization—while probably adding hosts of new volunteers to their ranks. We are rolling up a big snowball."

I received many complimentary messages after that article appeared in the Washington Post, including one from Robert Bryant, Deputy Director of the FBI, who invited me to lunch and told me that he had in-

structed all his officers who were working on the terrorism target to read it. He particularly appreciated the emphasis that I had put on dealing with terrorism by patient criminal investigation and cooperation with other international law enforcement agencies rather than by what I had dubbed "bombs and bombast". The intelligence indicating that the pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum was producing a precursor of biological weapons was completely incorrect—another case of bad intelligence having been seized upon to justify a violent military initiative that proved to be unjustified and seriously counter-productive. Thomas Pickering was Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the time. I clearly remember when this distinguished and highly respected statesman, a former U.S. ambassador to Jordan, Israel, India, the Philippines and the United Nations, appeared on national television to explain and defend the Clinton Administration's Tomahawk missile attack on the Sudan, offering confident and positive assurances of the accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports that the Daral-Shifa plant was a critically dangerous installation—putting himself in exactly the same humiliating position that Colin Powell is in today as a result of his similarly inaccurate testimony before the United Nations one year ago.

Finally, I would like to take a look at some important features of the present situation in Iraq, looking again for lessons that should have been drawn from earlier experience, but were ignored. Here I am prepared to go out on a limb with some current intelligence estimates of my own. In other words, I'm ready to make some predictions about the future, based on my own past experiences. I offer these predictions with confidence, but with sincere hopes that they will prove to be wrong.

The United States began its invasion of Iraq operating under a number of seriously flawed expectations that were based on nothing other than bad intelligence, construed by dedicated ideologues to suit their own preconceived misjudgments.

One expectation was that gratitude toward the United States for liberating their country from Saddam's terrible dictatorship would be the determining factor in shaping Iraq's political future, in defiance of overwhelming evidence that their own social and cultural heritage would inevitably take precedence over American dictates. Secondly, the U.S. has maintained a confident expectation that a new government of Iraq would grant the U.S. long-term leases on military bases from which the U.S. could project its power throughout the entire Middle East and Central Asian region for a long time into the future. Another expectation has been that the new Iraqi government will continue in the future to cooperate closely with the United States in the management of its oil and gas resources, even when Iraq's own economic and political needs might be in conflict with American objectives. And fourthly, the Bush Administration leadership (and especially the neo-cons and their allies in Congress) have all confidently expected that Iraq would become a fully cooperative partner in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian problem, even when U.S. policies are in conflict with Iraqi conceptions of justice. It is as if our intelligence experts have suffered total amnesia when it comes to the historic realities of nationalism in the Arab world.

My prediction is this: Any new political group aspiring to leadership of Iraq must recognize that its popularity and its credibility will depend on the degree to which it can demonstrate its independence (read that as "defiance") of American influence. When this finally becomes apparent, the United States Government will decide to interfere

with the political process to whatever extent, and by whatever means, are necessary to ensure that control of the country remains with acceptably cooperative and compliant Iraqis. I think that such an operation would of necessity be anything but covert, and I'm ready to predict that it will be a messy failure. My conviction that the CIA will be directed to ensure the installation of a compliant new regime in Iraq is based on my experiences in Lebanon and elsewhere, which demonstrated that men who occupy the Oval Office seem inevitably to develop an irrational confidence that by pushing a button they can have their dirty tricks department across the Potomac River in Langley perform a covert action operation to fix the problem—justifying the action as necessary to protect the freedom of the American people and the welfare of all humanity.

In my opinion, the hard reality is that when push comes to shove, the Bush Administration, for all its exalted protestations of virtue and Godliness, is not going to allow a government that defies U.S. policy objectives to take power in Baghdad. High principles will, as I have seen so many times in my own experience, be compromised as necessary to produce results that can be presented as justification for a preemptive war costing thousands of human lives and uncounted billions of dollars. The end result will be that the entire Middle East will be destabilized, while the forces supporting and sustaining terrorism will be injected with new vigor.

IN HONOR OF SERGEANT LAVERN
JOHNSON-REYNOLDS

HON. XAVIER BECERRA

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, it is with the utmost pleasure and privilege that I rise today to recognize, pay tribute to, and celebrate the retirement of Sergeant Lavern Johnson-Reynolds. Joining the United States Capitol Police on February 12th, 1979, Sergeant Reynolds served our country honorably for over 25 years. During these 25 years of dedicated service, her duties entailed a variety of assignments, which included the United States Capitol Police's Senate Division, Communications Division, Capitol Division and Criminal Investigations Division. Additionally, Sergeant Lavern Johnson-Reynolds served as an instructor in the Training Academy for 10 years. She earned her promotion to Sergeant in December of 1995.

On a personal note, Laverne married Dr. Gary Reynolds and gave birth to their daughter Destiny Johnson-Reynolds during her tenure on the force.

Mr. Speaker, as family, friends and colleagues gather to celebrate Sergeant Lavern Johnson-Reynolds' many accomplishments, it is with great admiration and pride that I ask my colleagues to join me today in saluting this exceptional officer whose dedicated service will be sorely missed. She served our country proudly with the United States Capitol Police for over 25 years, training future officers, and protecting this institution, Members of Congress, and staff. Mr. Speaker, I ask that the House of Representatives join me in conveying our appreciation for Sergeant Lavern Johnson-Reynolds' dedicated service, and reciprocate the honor she has illustrated through