

should no longer be allowed to serve as a legal justification for European launch aid.

I urge my colleagues to help me defend one of the largest employers in the United States and the largest exporter in the Nation from what I believe to be Airbus' true agenda—the elimination of commercial aircraft production in the United States. We must not allow this to happen.

#### HONORING THE APPOINTMENT OF JIM MORGO AS SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMISSIONER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

**HON. STEVE ISRAEL**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, September 29, 2004*

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Jim Morgo, who has exceptionally served the people of Long Island, as an affordable housing advocate. I also wish to congratulate him on his appointment as the Commissioner of Economic Development for Suffolk County. Jim has served as the President of the Long Island Housing Partnership for over 17 years. During this time, he has become Long Island's leading voice in support of both the preservation and production of housing for our region's working families.

The Long Island Housing Partnership LIHP is a private, not-for-profit organization created by Long Island's business, religious, educational and professional leaders to address the region's growing housing crisis. This partnership is dedicated to providing housing opportunities for those who could not otherwise afford decent and safe housing. The LIHP realizes its purpose through mortgage counseling, housing development, and promotion of affordable ownership and rental units for low and moderate income Long Islanders. Created in 1988, Jim Morgo was its first President and he played a critical role in placing the LIHP at the forefront of all of the area's debates affecting affordable housing and community development.

It is impossible to measure the number of families Jim Morgo has helped and lives he has touched as he worked to develop affordable homes, and create new and innovative ways to enable working families to achieve the dream of homeownership.

I am sure that in his new role, Commissioner Morgo will continue to find creative means to help low-income families achieve the dream of homeownership, help our young families purchase their first home in the neighborhood where they grew up, and expand community development opportunities for the entire Suffolk County Community. I congratulate him on his appointment, thank him for his service, and look forward to working with him in the years to come.

#### APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 4200, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FIS- CAL YEAR 2005

SPEECH OF

**HON. SILVESTRE REYES**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, September 28, 2004*

Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I submit for the RECORD the text of the Ortiz amendment as agreed to by the House Armed Services Committee on May 12, 2004 and as was to be printed in the House record as agreed to by a colloquy between Representative HUNTER and myself on May 20, 2004. The text of the Ortiz amendment follows:

The committee understands that the Secretary of Defense purchases 'bio-chem protective suits' from the National Center for Employment of the Disabled. It is also the committee's understanding that the NCED is an entity recognized under the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act (41 U.S.C. 46-48c), as an entity that creates jobs and training opportunities for people who are blind or who have other severe disabilities.

#### IN SUPPORT OF THE DRIVER'S LI- CENSE IMPROVEMENT AND SE- CURITY ACT OF 2004

**HON. JAMES P. MORAN**

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, September 29, 2004*

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, today we are pleased to introduce the Driver's License Improvement and Security Act of 2004, or DLISA, which will create a six state pilot project to standardize and modernize state-issued driver's licenses and identification cards. Two years ago I joined my colleague, TOM DAVIS, in sponsoring legislation to create nationwide standards for driver's licenses and identification cards.

Our previous attempt to address fundamental flaws in the driver's license system may have been rather ambitious, but existing vulnerabilities in our identification system present a clear threat to our Nation's security and allow criminals to subvert our laws. A pilot project will allow the Secretary of Transportation and participants in the program to work out interoperability and logistical concerns on a smaller and more manageable scale.

Today's legislation is the product of several years of hard work, input and research by state motor vehicle authorities, policy, technology, and identification security experts. As my colleagues prepare to consider comprehensive legislation to overhaul our national intelligence institutions, I strongly urge them to consider the following question: Why has it taken so long for us to repair a gaping hole in our identification system that leaves us vulnerable to criminals and terrorists? Reform should begin with the obvious—basic vulnerability issues.

I agree with the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that institutional national intelligence reform is necessary, but I am dismayed by the lack of attention being paid to chronic and correctable shortcomings in our driver's license and ID card system. The legislative solution

we are proposing today retains traditional state authority over non-commercial driver's licenses, but recognizes that disparate standards, outmoded technologies and inadequate security features create risks that are national in scope and therefore justify Federal resources and technical assistance.

A driver's license is a dangerous tool in the hands of a criminal. It allows them to easily travel on our roads, open bank accounts, rent vehicles, and take domestic flights. The driver's license has come to represent more than authorization to operate a motor vehicle; it imparts a stamp of legitimacy and is often taken as unquestionable proof of identity. Possession of a driver's license allows criminals to easily travel and blend into the population.

Problems in our identification system were evident before 9/11. A thriving criminal enterprise learned to exploit the lack of standardization, the hodgepodge of loosely enforced rules, and antiquated security features, to serve a growing demand for fake licenses. The black market in fake licenses was, and remains, quite lucrative, commonly yielding \$2,000 for a single fake license.

Many of the 9/11 hijackers used black market "brokers" to illegally obtain driver's licenses. 13 of the 19 hijackers were able to obtain driver's licenses or non-driver ID cards. Like illegal gun dealers, those who profit from this illicit racket ask few questions and care little about the consequences of their actions.

Since we first introduced legislation to remedy this problem, two reputable commissions have called for Federal government action. The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age and the 9/11 Commission recommended that the Federal government should take action to standardize and improve the integrity of our driver's license and ID card system. Since the 9/11 commission's report was released, other legislative proposals have been unveiled, but none of them would fully implement the biometric and smart card technologies recommended by the Markle Task force and 9/11 Commission. Our bill takes full advantage of available technologies and addresses specific logistical, interoperability and policy concerns revealed by countless studies and reports on the subject over a number of years. DLISA draws upon these findings and balances some outstanding concerns about privacy, states' rights and the need for greater uniformity.

The technology embraced in our bill is far from nascent. Private companies and government agencies currently utilize smart card and biometric technologies in their ID cards. Smart cards have been in use for years in the military with the Common Access Card, or CAC. Congress sanctioned the use of smart card biometric technology in the USVISIT visa program.

DLISA will not create a national ID card. Instead, it preserves state authority and takes advantage of the existing state motor vehicle infrastructure and system of linked networks. In fact, DLISA is a step back from earlier congressional legislation. Congress created uniform standards for commercial licenses when it passed the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, paving the way for the Commercial Driver's License Information System, or CDLIS. Congress has also recognized the need to assist state licensing authorities in a non-commercial context when it created the National Driver Register; which, like this bill,

was implemented first as a pilot program. DLISA is entirely voluntary, only states that wish to participate in the pilot project must adhere to the guidelines. In setting the authorization amount, we relied on the states own cost projections. States will not incur any expense under DLISA.

Of course there are many out there who fear change. Civil libertarians, conspiracy theorists and absolutists will attempt to characterize DLISA as a threat to individual privacy. In fact the opposite is true. By reducing identity theft (clearly a privacy concern), controlling access to personal data through encryption and proper regulations, and making it easier to create a digital paper trail on government employees who access your data, smart cards will actually reduce privacy violations.

Nor will my bill adversely harm immigrants. Congress has long been trying to improve the system to verify worker eligibility, and smart driver's licenses will make a quantum leap in

the efficiency of that system, which will in turn make it harder for illegal aliens to get jobs with honest employers. Many people consider this an undesirable side effect of improving the driver's licensing system; after all, the vast majority of immigrants are hard-working people trying to make better lives for their families. The solution, however, is to change the rules governing immigration, not to preserve the fraud in the ID system.

Finally, DLISA does not allow the government to track people's movements. Smart cards do not work with satellites to track your movements. The best government could do in tracking your movements is maintain records of where and when you are asked to show your license, something it already does by writing down your driver's license number. For example, when you enter a government building for a meeting, the security guard may record your information in a log.

It is difficult to completely allay the concerns of civil libertarians and privacy advocates, lest

we do away with all forms of identification. But this legislation will not create invasion of privacy risks that do not already exist today. It will, however, significantly reduce the risk of identity theft, and correct current widespread abuses in the system. As an added benefit, the technology will make it easier for law enforcement officials to do their job by eliminating wasted time filling out tickets and paperwork, but it will not magically transform every law enforcement officer or civil servant into a voyeur or jackbooted thug bent on harassing you at every turn.

Taken as a whole, the potential benefits of smart licenses far outweigh the potential risks. The vast majority of Americans understand that privacy is a tradeoff rather than an absolute, and will accept the risks in exchange for the benefit—added security.

I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this bill, and give this issue the urgent attention required to correct serious flaws in our driver's licensing and ID card system.